Maria Ponomarenko
94 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1153
For much of the twentieth century, Congress repeatedly delegated to presidents the authority to “reorganize” the executive branch. Presidents from both parties used this authority to create agencies, consolidate functions, shift responsibilities across the bureaucracy, and otherwise reshape the administrative state. Although Congress reserved the right to “veto” proposals with which it disagreed, the streamlined process established under the various Reorganization Acts nevertheless smoothed the way for bureaucratic change. All of this came to an end in 1984 when Congress allowed the last of the Reorganization Acts to expire.
This Article revisits the fifty-year history of executive reorganization. It explains why it lasted as long as it did, why it ultimately came to an end, and why now might be the time to consider restoring the authority anew. It demonstrates that the Reorganization Acts offered a way for presidents to work with legislators to build new administrative capacity and improve agency governance in ways that were especially likely to stall in the ordinary legislative process. And it shows that the case for executive reorganization may, if anything, be even stronger today. In particular, it argues that executive reorganization has the potential to address, at least to some extent, a growing asymmetry in public law—namely, the degree to which the status quo makes it easier for presidents to destroy existing administrative capacity than to build it anew.
