Benjamin J. Heidloff
94 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1228
The Supreme Court bifurcated its Appointments Clause jurisprudence in Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC by setting aside Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny as inapplicable to “local officers.” A seven-Justice majority in Aurelius approved the Oversight Board’s structure—its leadership appointed by the President alone yet possessing vast powers over financial and budgetary matters—finding that the Board’s members were “local officers” outside the Appointments Clause.
This Essay argues that interstate compact entities’ officials are “local officers,” analogous to the Oversight Board’s members, and that interstate compact agencies should be analyzed under Aurelius. Administrative agencies created by compacts are often led by officials appointed through dispersed methods, reflecting their multistate stakeholders. And under the “law of the Union” doctrine, the Supreme Court treats certain interstate compacts as “transformed” into federal law, which provides an undesirable but plausible mechanism for sweeping the Appointments Clause into regional entities. This Essay’s approach unites historical analysis with modern case law and remedies the incomplete and inconsistent approaches of the existing frameworks.
