Chevron’s Inevitability

Nicholas R. Bednar*
Kristin E. Hickman**

ABSTRACT

For over thirty years, Chevron deference has been the target of criticism. Now, some judges and legislators are calling for an end to Chevron, and legal scholars are heralding the doctrine’s retreat. Chevron may be evolving, as common law often does. But claims that Chevron is in decline are overblown, and efforts to overturn Chevron in any meaningful sense are misdirected. Chevron-style deference is inevitable in the modern administrative state. The real “problem”—to the extent one sees it as such—is not Chevron but rather unhappiness with the natural consequences of congressional reliance on agencies to resolve major policy issues.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1393
I. CHEVRON’S COMPETING NARRATIVES .................. 1399
   A. Chevron Emerges ................................... 1401
   B. Chevron’s Apparent Dominance .................... 1404
   C. Chevron’s Arguable Decline ......................... 1408
   D. Calls to Overtturn Chevron ......................... 1416
II. CHEVRON’S MANY VERSIONS ........................... 1418
   A. The Original Exposition Raises Questions .......... 1419
   B. Which Tools of Statutory Interpretation, and When? 1423
   C. Deliberative Democracy and a Syncopated Chevron 1428
   D. Step Two and Traditional Hard Look Review ...... 1431
   E. One-Step Chevron ................................... 1433
   F. Flipping Chevron’s Two Steps ....................... 1436
   G. Justice Breyer’s Blended Deference Doctrine .... 1437

* J.D., University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., University of Minnesota.
** Distinguished McKnight University Professor and Harlan Albert Rogers Professor in Law, University of Minnesota Law School. For helpful conversations and feedback, we would like to thank Dick Pierce, Jeff Pojanowski, Mark Thomson, Chris Walker, and participants in workshops at Notre Dame Law School and the University of Minnesota Law School, as well as Jon Siegel and attendees at a panel presentation hosted by The George Washington Law Review at the American Bar Association Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Section fall conference.
H. Chief Justice Roberts and a More Limited Chevron? ........................................... 1439

III. Defending Chevron .......................................... 1442
   A. Chevron Is Just a Standard of Review ................. 1444
   B. Statutory Ambiguity Is Unavoidable ................. 1446
   C. Delegation, Not Deference, Is the “Problem” ........ 1453
   D. Amending the APA Will Not Eliminate Chevron ... 1456

Conclusion ................................................... 1461

“Faithless is he that says farewell when the road darkens,” . . .

“Maybe, . . . but let him not vow to walk in the dark, who has not seen the nightfall.”

—J.R.R. Tolkien

INTRODUCTION

Is the mighty Chevron deference on the wane? Maybe. Several legal scholars seem to think so.2 But what does that mean, what would that look like, and what really would that accomplish?

The Chevron standard of judicial review—with its two-part test mandating judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, derived from the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3—has dominated discussions of American administrative law for a generation and continues to do so.4 Chevron has been dissected, debated,
and applied more than any other canonical administrative law case: more than State Farm or Vermont Yankee; more than Goldberg v. Kelly or Mathews v. Eldridge; more even than all of Overton Park, Abbott Labs, Chenery I, and Chenery II taken together. Only Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife even comes close.

---

5 According to Westlaw, *Chevron* had been cited more than 81,000 times, including roughly 15,100 cases and 11,000 law review articles, as of June 2017.


7 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that courts may not impose procedural requirements beyond those required by statute, by agency rule, or by the Constitution). According to Westlaw, *Vermont Yankee* had been cited more than 12,000 times, including roughly 1,700 cases and 1,600 law review articles, as of June 2017.

8 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits are a protected interest under the Due Process Clause and laying the foundation for modern due process analysis). According to Westlaw, *Goldberg v. Kelly* had been cited approximately 19,700 times, including roughly 4,800 cases and 3,300 law review articles, as of June 2017.

9 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (establishing the modern three-part standard for evaluating whether the Due Process Clause requires agencies to follow additional procedures before depriving parties of protected interests). According to Westlaw, *Mathews v. Eldridge* had been cited roughly 45,500 times, including approximately 13,000 cases and 4,800 law review articles, as of June 2017.

10 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding that an agency must provide an administrative record in support of its actions to facilitate judicial review).

11 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (recognizing that the Administrative Procedure Act creates a presumption favoring reviewability of agency action and creating the contemporary two-part standard for evaluating whether agency action is ripe for judicial review).

12 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (holding that reviewing courts must evaluate agency actions based on contemporaneously established justifications rather than post hoc rationalizations).

13 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (holding that where Congress authorizes an agency to act through both rulemaking and adjudication, the choice between those formats is a matter of agency discretion).

14 According to Westlaw, these four canonical administrative law cases collectively had been cited approximately 52,600 times, including roughly 16,100 cases and 4,200 law review articles, as of June 2017.


16 According to Westlaw, although *Defenders of Wildlife* had been cited roughly 65,200 times overall, including in 3,700 law review articles, as of June 2017, which was substantially less than *Chevron*, it had been cited in roughly 17,600 cases as of that time, which was slightly more often than *Chevron*. *Chevron* predates *Defenders of Wildlife* by several years.
But, although scholarly analysis of *Chevron* continues apace\(^1\) and judicial reliance on *Chevron* remains more or less constant,\(^2\) *Chevron* is under attack and thus, arguably, on the decline. In *Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n*,\(^3\) Justice Scalia—long one of *Chevron's* greatest proponents—acknowledged that *Chevron* “did not comport with” the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)\(^4\) and that the Court was “heedless of the original design of the APA” in developing its deference jurisprudence.\(^5\) Shortly thereafter, in *Michigan v. EPA*,\(^6\) Justice Thomas contended that “*Chevron* deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions” and urged the Court to “stop to consider [the Constitution] before blithely giving the force of law to any other agency ‘interpretations’ of federal statutes.”\(^7\) Justice Neil Gorsuch, as a circuit court judge, advocated abandoning *Chevron*, characterizing it as “permit[ting] all too easy intrusions on the liberty of the people,”\(^8\) though he grudgingly conceded that *Chevron* alone is not quite “the very definition of tyranny.”\(^9\) The House of Representatives has passed two separate versions of the Separation of Powers Restoration Act (“SOPRA”),\(^10\) which purports to overturn *Chevron* by amending

\(^{17}\) For just a few of the scholarly articles written about *Chevron* in the past year, see, for example, John M. Golden, *Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover*, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1660 (2016), discussing *Chevron* deference for U.S. Patent and Trademark Office interpretations; Philip Hamburger, *Chevron Bias*, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1188–89 (2016), contending that “the key constitutional questions” raised by *Chevron* “have been neglected” and proceeding to discuss same; Matthew A. Melone, *King v. Burwell and the Chevron Doctrine: Did the Court Invite Judicial Activism?*, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 663, 664–65 (2016), arguing that the Court’s approach to *Chevron* review in *King v. Burwell* “appears to provide the judicial branch with the opportunity to impose its own policy preferences with respect to issues best left to Congress”; and Christopher J. Walker, *Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism*, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149, 150 (2016), asking “whether courts should apply *Chevron* deference to interpretations of substantive patent law advanced by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”

\(^{18}\) For example, according to Westlaw, in 2015, *Chevron* was cited in 591 federal court opinions, including 8 issued by the Supreme Court. These statistics exceed those from most prior years. Although judicial citations of *Chevron* declined in 2016—with only 514 federal court opinions, including 4 issued by the Supreme Court citing *Chevron*—the decline is roughly in line with year-to-year fluctuations over the past decade.

\(^{19}\) 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).


\(^{21}\) *Mortg. Bankers*, 135 S. Ct. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

\(^{22}\) 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).

\(^{23}\) *Id.* at 2712, 2714 (Thomas, J., concurring).

\(^{24}\) Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

\(^{25}\) *Id.* at 1155 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison)).

the APA to require de novo review of agency interpretations of law.\textsuperscript{27} Several prominent Senators have expressed support for SOPRA as well,\textsuperscript{28} although regulatory reform legislation under consideration in the Senate does not include either version of SOPRA or otherwise repudiate or even curtail \textit{Chevron}.

Digging a little deeper, one can identify several ways in which the Supreme Court has arguably weakened \textit{Chevron} deference already in both scope and substance. Certainly, with its 2001 decision in \textit{United States v. Mead Corp.},\textsuperscript{30} the Court restricted \textit{Chevron}'s application to agency actions carrying the “force of law” pursuant to congressionally delegated authority, relegating other agency actions like opinion letters, enforcement guidelines, and most informal adjudications to the less deferential \textit{Skidmore} review.\textsuperscript{31} Much more recently, in \textit{King v. Burwell},\textsuperscript{32} the Court demonstrated its inclination to avoid using \textit{Chevron} in resolving so-called “major questions.”\textsuperscript{33} The Court arguably has exhibited a willingness to apply \textit{Chevron}'s two steps more aggressively as well; for example, the Court gave \textit{Chevron}'s second step greater

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{29} See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017).
  \item \textsuperscript{30} 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
  \item \textsuperscript{31} See id. at 229–34, 238 (announcing standard and denying \textit{Chevron} review to Customs Service tariff ruling letter); see also Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–88 (2000) (counseling \textit{Skidmore} rather than \textit{Chevron} review for agency “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines”).
  \item \textsuperscript{32} 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
  \item \textsuperscript{33} See id. at 2488–89; see also Kristin E. Hickman, \textit{The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell}, 2015 \textit{PUPP. L. REV.} 56, 62–64 (describing \textit{King} as an effort to limit \textit{Chevron}'s scope); \textit{cf.} FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000) (suggesting \textit{Chevron} review should be unavailable in “extraordinary cases”).
\end{itemize}
heft by incorporating State Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking requirement.34

Still, Chevron has always been controversial, even before its purported decline. Critics have offered all kinds of reasons why Chevron is flawed or misguided.35 And, perhaps joining or at least influenced by Chevron’s critics, commentators have long predicted that Chevron deference would not last. Chevron coincided approximately with the rise of textualism, and at Chevron’s ten-year mark, Thomas Merrill linked the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on textualist reasoning to a “waning” of Chevron.36 Shortly after Chevron’s twentieth birthday, Linda Jellum similarly described Chevron’s “relevance” as “waning,” this time due largely to the Court’s limiting of Chevron’s scope in Mead.37 And now, again, having passed its thirtieth year, Chevron is supposedly on the wane again.

We take a different view. Leave aside, for the sake of argument, stare decisis and whether Chevron even meets traditional criteria the Supreme Court has applied when overturning precedents.38 Although the Court’s rhetoric regarding Chevron’s scope and operation continues to evolve, we believe that reports of the doctrine’s pending demise


35 For just a few of the many articles criticizing Chevron, see Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782–84 (2010), listing ten “overlapping sets of reasons” for why “Chevron should be overruled”; Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKES L.J. 561, 587–88, describing Chevron as “the Supreme Court’s conceptually flawed effort to control the inclinations of some lower court judges to impose their politically unaccountable, unreconstructed New Deal prejudices to push the bureaucracy toward an aggressive regulatory stance”; and Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 678–80 (2007), suggesting that Chevron is predicated on a misunderstanding of agencies’ “operational, policy-implementing role.”


37 See Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 772–81 (2007) [hereinafter Jellum, Chevron’s Demise]; see also Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 188 (2012) (“With two important changes to Chevron’s application—restricting the types of agency interpretations entitled to deference and curbing the implied-delegation rationale—the Court has begun to reclaim the interpretive power it ceded and the lawmaking power it shifted with the rise and fall of Chevron.”).

are overblown. Moreover, we suggest, those who actively seek to eliminate *Chevron* deference are aiming at the wrong target.

For one thing, the common narrative of *Chevron’s* revolutionary rise and dominance of judicial review of administrative action is exaggerated. The sheer volume of cases in which courts must consider agency interpretations of statutes means courts inevitably apply *Chevron* a lot. But for all of the hype and attention, *Chevron* is, first and foremost, just a standard of review—one among several that courts apply in evaluating agency action.39 Rhetoric notwithstanding, *Chevron* alone does not truly drive the outcome in most of the cases in which courts apply it.40

Admittedly, because the Justices have never been able to agree on precisely how *Chevron* review works, the Supreme Court has done a poor job of applying *Chevron* consistently. Consequently, *Chevron* is susceptible to competing theories regarding how it does and should operate, all employed here and there by one court or another, often seemingly interchangeably, without the courts acknowledging or perhaps even recognizing the distinctions.41 This jurisprudential inconsistency has produced a ridiculous degree of doctrinal complexity that provides endless fodder for discussion (and discontent) about *Chevron*. Yet standards of judicial review are never precise instruments, and many other legal doctrines are highly malleable in their application without occasioning the vitriol presently being hurled at *Chevron*.

Finally, predictions of (or hopes for) *Chevron’s* pending demise fail to take into account that *Chevron* deference, or something much like it, is a necessary consequence of and corollary to Congress’s longstanding habit of relying on agencies to exercise substantial policymaking discretion to resolve statutory details.42 As administrative law’s best-known doctrine, *Chevron* has become a convenient scapegoat or bogeyman for those who are unhappy with the administrative state or judicial review of agency action. But unless Congress chooses to assume substantially more responsibility for making policy choices itself or the courts decide to seriously reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine—neither of which seems remotely likely—at least some variant of *Chevron* deference will be essential to guide and assist courts from intruding too deeply into a policy sphere for which they are ill-suited.

39 See infra Section III.A.
40 See infra Section III.A.
41 See infra Part II.
42 See infra Section III.C.
In support of our argument, this Article proceeds in three parts. Drawing from thirty years of *Chevron* jurisprudence and commentary, Part I recognizes and examines two competing narratives of *Chevron*’s trajectory—one a quite dramatic tale of a singular legal doctrine, and the other a more nuanced (and more boring), but more realistic, story of an important and routinely applied but not omnipresent standard of review. Part II offers a taxonomy of sorts, documenting several operating variations of *Chevron* that together help explain why the doctrine has been simultaneously confusing and durable. Lastly, Part III defends *Chevron*’s basic premise as well as the doctrine’s inevitability given Congress’s habit of delegating the power to make significant policy decisions to agencies in the first place.

I. *Chevron*’s Competing Narratives

The great irony in *Chevron*’s tale is that Justice Stevens, who authored the Supreme Court’s opinion in that case, did not intend and never really thought of *Chevron* as a departure from precedent. Even before *Chevron*, if the meaning of the statute was clear or plain, then the administering agency could not successfully claim deference for a contrary interpretation. And for decades prior, the Court had counseled the sort of strong, mandatory deference described by *Chevron* for at least some agency interpretations of statutes. Peter Schuck

---


45 See, e.g., *Schweiker v. Gray Panthers*, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (“Although we do not abdicate review in these circumstances, our task is the limited one of ensuring that the Secretary did not ‘exceed[ his statutory authority]’ and that the regulation is not arbitrary or capricious.” (alteration in original) (quoting *Batterson v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977))); *Batterson*, 432 U.S. at 425 (“In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term. . . . A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a different manner.”); *Atchison, Topoka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Scarlitt*, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937) (“The regulation having been made by the commission in pursuance of constitutional statutory
and E. Donald Elliott have noted that *Chevron* “failed to instruct the circuits with the unmistakable clarity and moral authority that seem minimally necessary . . . for the Court to succeed in altering the shape of court-agency relationships.”

Without subsequent cases parsing and elevating the significance of its language, *Chevron* might have been a rather unremarkable case.

Nevertheless, *Chevron* is often described as sparking a revolution. Certainly, with its famous two-step test, *Chevron* altered the rhetoric of judicial deference. In case after case, judges now ask first whether the meaning of the statute at issue is clear and then, if it is not, whether the administering agency’s interpretation of that statute is “permissible.”

Scholars also have argued that *Chevron* meaningfully shifted interpretive power from the judicial branch to administrative agencies by calling for strong, mandatory deference to implicit as well as explicit delegations of authority to fill statutory gaps. And one can easily fashion a dramatic narrative arc for *Chevron* from the thirty years of jurisprudence and commentary that followed it. First, *Chevron* gains the Court’s allegiance, comes to dominate judicial review of agency actions, and shifts interpretive power significantly from courts to agencies. Then, the Court gradually begins to reclaim its au-

---


47 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, *Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent*, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 976 (1992) (“Justice Stevens’ opinion contained several features that can only be described as ‘revolutionary,’ even if no revolution was intended at the time.”) (footnote omitted); Cass R. Sunstein, *Beyond *Marbury*: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is*, 115 Yale L.J. 2580, 2595–96 (2006) (observing that “the Court itself may have had limited ambitions for its decision in *Chevron*, but the decision was soon viewed as a kind of revolution”).


The Court curtails 

Chevron

’s scope and applies its two steps more critically. Individual Justices begin to question 

Chevron

’s validity. Now, Congress considers legislation to abolish deferential review of agency legal interpretations.

Of course, the actual story of 

Chevron

is more nuanced. While 

Chevron

has been and remains unquestionably prominent, the Court’s actual fidelity to 

Chevron

deference has never been consistent—reflecting more ebb and flow than rise and fall.

A. 

Chevron Emerges

The D.C. Circuit was the first to pull the two-step 

Chevron

framework from Justice Stevens’s opinion. Other circuits cited 

Chevron

in its first year, but did not explicitly apply its two steps. A few years after his elevation from the D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia praised 

Chevron

’s two-step analytical approach as “unquestionably better than what preceded it.”

To its supporters, 

Chevron

cemented deference as the appropriate judicial attitude for agency interpretations of statutes. In particular, 

Chevron

counseled that courts should only overturn an agency’s resolution of statutory ambiguity when “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” In other words, judicial deference was not merely advisable but 

mandatory

when the meaning of a statute was unclear and the agency’s interpretation was permissible. Justice Scalia maintained that 

Chevron

’s “across-the-board presumption” in

51 See infra Sections I.A, I.B.
52 See infra Section I.C.
53 See infra Section I.D.
54 See Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 140–41 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“As we understand the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements in 

Chevron

55 See, e.g., Phila. Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing 

Chevron

and applying 

Skidmore

’s factors); South Dakota v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 740 F.2d 619, 621–23 (8th Cir. 1984) (analyzing whether the agency had a “substantial basis” for the policy decisions embodied by its interpretation); New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Me., 742 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1984) (rejecting a Federal Communications Commission interpretation because the interpretation does not reflect its position “after debate among staff or commissioners” and an agency interpretation “cannot bind a court as to the meaning of a jurisdictional statute”), But see Lynch v. Rank, 747 F.2d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting an agency interpretation as contrary to the statutory text).
56 Antonin Scalia, 

57 

Chevron

favor of agency discretion often better approximated congressional intent than the “wild-goose chase” of traditional, court-conducted statutory interpretation.\textsuperscript{58} The D.C. Circuit was also a leader in quickly and wholeheartedly embracing this strong interpretation of \textit{Chevron}.\textsuperscript{59}

Many judges and scholars lauded \textit{Chevron} as a blueprint for balancing the roles of agencies and the courts in the modern administrative state.\textsuperscript{60} Yet, as with any new doctrine, even proponents of \textit{Chevron} recognized that the standard presented some difficulties. Judge Kenneth Starr observed that \textit{Chevron} “raise[d] some rather difficult questions” regarding which doctrines previously relied upon by judges in interpreting statutes were appropriate at step one.\textsuperscript{61} Indeed, Justice Scalia prophesized that “the future battles over acceptance of agency interpretations of law will be fought” over step one’s requisite clarity.\textsuperscript{62}

Also, the strong version of \textit{Chevron} deference faced resistance. Cynthia Farina worried that \textit{Chevron} would aggrandize the executive branch to such an extent that it would neuter the constitutional checks on lawmaking endorsed by bicameralism and presentment.\textsuperscript{63} Cass Sunstein complained that \textit{Chevron} undermined the principle of \textit{Marbury v. Madison}\textsuperscript{64} that “[c]ourts . . . are supposed to say what the law is,” and violated the APA’s vision of the judiciary as a check against

\textsuperscript{58} Scalia, supra note 56, at 516–17.

\textsuperscript{59} See Merrill, supra note 43, at 422 (attributing “Chevron’s rise from obscurity” generally to the D.C. Circuit and particularly to Justice Scalia, who was serving on that court when \textit{Chevron} was decided and first applied).


\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era}, supra note 60, at 365 (statement of Kenneth W. Starr).

\textsuperscript{62} Scalia, supra note 56, at 520–21.


\textsuperscript{64} 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
administrative agencies.\textsuperscript{65} Justice Stephen Breyer, then a judge on the First Circuit, acknowledged that courts should consider the agency’s comparative expertise as well as statutory clarity and congressional intent to delegate decisionmaking authority when evaluating an agency’s interpretation of a statute.\textsuperscript{66} But like Sunstein, Justice Breyer clearly viewed courts rather than agencies as the rightful and primary arbiters of statutory meaning.\textsuperscript{67} He described the D.C. Circuit’s strict, two-step interpretation of \textit{Chevron} as simplistic and contrary to “‘proper’ judicial attitudes,” and a “blanket rule” of deference as “seriously overbroad, counterproductive and sometimes senseless” in an area of law replete with different statutes, policy considerations, and problems.\textsuperscript{68} Rather, he contended that \textit{Chevron} was more appropriately “limited to its factual and statutory context” on account of “the difficulties associated with environmental regulation.”\textsuperscript{69}

Moreover, although lower courts deferred to agency interpretations more often after \textit{Chevron},\textsuperscript{70} the Supreme Court’s early post-\textit{Chevron} jurisprudence reflects its collective ambivalence regarding the decision’s significance.\textsuperscript{71} Justice Scalia enthusiastically promoted the strong version of \textit{Chevron},\textsuperscript{72} writing separately to apply \textit{Chevron}’s two-step framework when other Justices would not.\textsuperscript{73} Often, however, the Court failed to cite \textit{Chevron} at all in cases where the standard

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era}, supra note 60, at 367–68 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
\item\textsuperscript{67} See id. at 373.
\item\textsuperscript{68} Id. at 381–82.
\item\textsuperscript{69} Id. at 381–82.
\item\textsuperscript{70} Schuck & Elliott, supra note 46, at 1020–51 (analyzing the shift in lower court rulings post-\textit{Chevron}).
\item\textsuperscript{73} See, e.g., Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 259–60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that \textit{Chevron} reversed the contextual factor tests); Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 380–81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing against legislative history at step one).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
seemed obviously appropriate.\textsuperscript{74} As Thomas Merrill has documented, in evaluating agency statutory interpretations from 1984 to 1990, the Court relied on contextual factors derived from \textit{Skidmore v. Swift & Co.}\textsuperscript{75} and other pre-\textit{Chevron} precedents as often as it applied \textit{Chevron}, and the Court affirmed fewer agency interpretations after \textit{Chevron} than before.\textsuperscript{76} Meanwhile, notwithstanding his authorship of the Court’s \textit{Chevron} opinion, Justice Stevens resisted \textit{Chevron}’s intrusion on traditional judicial authority, insisting that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction.”\textsuperscript{77}

\section*{B. \textit{Chevron}’s Apparent Dominance}

Over time, Justice Scalia’s persistence subdued much of his colleagues’ ambivalence about using \textit{Chevron}’s two-step framework. The Court came to accept that statutory interpretation “is often more a question of policy than of law,” and that \textit{Chevron} “reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches.”\textsuperscript{78} By 1990, all of the Justices had joined at least one opinion invoking a two-step \textit{Chevron}.\textsuperscript{79} By 2000, \textit{Chevron} had become one of the most cited and applied Supreme Court decisions in history.\textsuperscript{80} The Court showed no sign of abandoning the strong interpretation of \textit{Chevron} as Justices Breyer and Stevens had hoped. Rather, \textit{Chevron} had, at least in that sense, entered its prime.

In many ways, \textit{Chevron} seemed both dominant and highly deferential. Government lawyers often pressured courts to apply \textit{Chevron}’s mandatory deference in new contexts.\textsuperscript{81} As a result, the Supreme

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{74} See, e.g., Hirshman, \textit{supra} note 71, at 690 (questioning the Court’s failure to apply or even cite \textit{Chevron} in \textit{Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC}, 476 U.S. 355 (1986), even though the agency’s “claim to deference could hardly have been stronger”).
  \item \textsuperscript{75} \textit{323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)} (calling for judges to give “weight” to an agency’s interpretation of a statute based upon contextual factors such as thoroughness, validity, and consistency).
  \item \textsuperscript{76} Merrill, \textit{supra} note 47, at 980–84.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Merrill & Hickman, \textit{supra} note 50, at 838.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} Richard Pierce at one point suggested that \textit{Chevron} “has been cited and applied in more cases than any other Supreme Court decision in history.” 1 \textit{RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREASURIE} 140 (4th ed. 2002). Other scholars contested Pierce’s assertion as an “overstatement” and claimed that mantle for other cases. \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Herz, \textit{supra} note 2, at 1870 n.19} (comparing federal case citations to \textit{Chevron} with those of other cases). At a minimum, \textit{Chevron} can claim to be the most cited decision in contemporary administrative law. \textit{Id.}; \textit{see also \textit{supra} notes 5–16} and accompanying text (documenting citation counts for canonical administrative law cases).
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Merrill & Hickman, \textit{supra} note 50, at 835.
\end{itemize}
Court and the federal circuit courts of appeals applied *Chevron* to an increasingly broad array of agency legal interpretations. *Chevron* itself was concerned with regulations interpreting the Clean Air Act\(^82\) promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) using notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.\(^83\) Subsequently, however, courts extended *Chevron* to agency adjudications,\(^84\) to proposed or temporary regulations lacking notice and comment,\(^85\) and to a variety of informal agency actions exempt from formalized procedures, for just a few examples.\(^86\) Beyond interpretive format, *Chevron* quickly crept from environmental law into other regulatory areas,\(^87\) assuming precisely the seminal status that Justice Stevens initially sought to eschew.

Courts applying *Chevron* often found statutes ambiguous and deferred to agency interpretations with little apparent effort to discern statutory meaning through examination of text, history, or purpose.\(^88\) In *Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc.*,\(^89\) for example, the Supreme Court found deference appropriate merely because the Black Lung Benefits Act\(^90\) provisions at stake “produced a complex and highly technical regulatory program” that “require[d] significant expertise” to administer.\(^91\) In *National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine*
Corp., the Court declared the agency’s interpretation “permissible” simply because it was “not in conflict with the plain language of the statute.” And in Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan, the Court deferred to the agency’s regulations based on the cursory observation that the relevant statutory subprovision was facially “silent” and “did not foreclose” the agency’s approach. Additionally, for fifteen years after deciding Chevron, the Court did not reject a single agency interpretation at Chevron step two.

The federal circuit courts of appeals in particular applied Chevron very deferentially. In a study of cases from 1995 and 1996, Orin Kerr found that circuit courts accepted agency interpretations in 73% of cases applying the Chevron standard. The circuit courts reached step two in 62% of Chevron cases and upheld the agency’s interpretation in 89% of those cases. To textualists’ dismay, courts did not always “recognize[] the existence of a large area in which Congress has ‘directly addressed precise questions.’”

On the other hand, the Justices continued to disagree over the terms of Chevron’s operation. For example, the Supreme Court did not always eschew extensive analysis at Chevron step one. In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, for example, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court analyzed dictionary definitions and explored the statutory scheme’s structure and purpose in deciding that the claimed power of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to make tariff filing optional for certain long-distance carriers was “beyond the meaning that the statute [could] bear.” Justice Stevens in dissent accused the Court of “a rigid literalism that deprives the FCC of the flexibility Congress meant it to have.” In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion surveyed

93 Id. at 417–18.
95 Id. at 45–46.
96 The first such decision was AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
98 Id. at 30–31.
100 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 50, at 838–53.
102 Id. at 229.
103 Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
decades of tobacco legislation in concluding that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) “clearly” lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Justice Breyer in dissent accused the Court of ignoring the “literal language and general purpose” of the statute. Orin Kerr’s study of *Chevron* in the mid-1990s showed that, although the federal circuit courts of appeals found ambiguity and proceeded to step two significantly more often than not, they rejected the agency’s interpretation in 58% of cases resolved at step one.

Some members of the Supreme Court continued to rely on the contextual factors outlined in the Court’s pre-*Chevron* jurisprudence, even as they applied *Chevron*’s two-step framework. For example, in *Brown & Williamson Tobacco*, Justice O’Connor cited the FDA’s inconsistency with respect to its interpretation as “important context” in reaching that conclusion, against Justice Breyer’s objection that “the FDA’s change of positions does not make a significant legal difference” under *Chevron*. In *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, Justice Stevens cited the agency’s inconsistency in the course of denying *Chevron* deference. Likewise, in applying *Chevron* to resolve *Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala*, Justice White maintained that “the consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due.” By contrast, in *Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.*, Justice Scalia refused to deny *Chevron* deference to agency regulations simply because the agency’s new interpretation might conflict with previous agency interpretations, saying that “change is not invalidating, since the whole point of *Chevron* is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.” As Thomas Merrill observed, cases such as these collec-

---

106 *Brown & Williamson Tobacco*, 529 U.S. at 162 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107 Kerr, supra note 97, at 31–32, 47.
109 *Id.* at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111 *Id.* at 446 n.30.
113 *Id.* at 417.
115 *Id.* at 742.
tively reveal tensions regarding the continued viability of contextual factors within the *Chevron* framework.\textsuperscript{116}

Collectively as well, the courts’ applications of *Chevron* reflected tremendous disagreement over the scope of *Chevron’s* applicability. The Supreme Court often repeated the maxim that *Chevron* applies when an agency is “charged with administering” a statute, but the Court offered little or no further explanation as to what that meant or why it turned to *Chevron* when it did.\textsuperscript{117} In many cases concerning agency legal interpretations, the Court continued not to apply the *Chevron* standard at all.\textsuperscript{118} In a comprehensive study of post-*Chevron* Supreme Court cases, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer documented that only 8.3% of the 1014 cases involving agency interpretations of statutes applied the *Chevron* standard, while 53.6% saw the Court relying purely on its own analysis.\textsuperscript{119} Confronted with such inconsistency from the Supreme Court and a substantially more varied array of agency actions, the lower courts splintered into a bevy of circuit splits and lesser disagreements over the circumstances in which *Chevron* should or should not apply.\textsuperscript{120}

\section*{C. Chevron’s Arguable Decline}

Since 2000, several Supreme Court opinions have seemed to weaken *Chevron* in both substance and scope. The most obvious trend has been in narrowing the scope of *Chevron’s* applicability. Several cases, however, have also signaled the Court’s sanction of more robust and intrusive inquiries at both of *Chevron’s* two steps.

The Supreme Court’s decision in *Mead*, which provided a threshold question for determining *Chevron’s* applicability and thereby narrowed *Chevron’s* scope, is the most obvious contributor to *Chevron’s* purported decline.\textsuperscript{121} According to the *Mead* Court, *Chevron* deference is available only for agency interpretations issued in the exercise

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} See Merrill, \textit{supra} note 47, at 977–78.
\item \textsuperscript{118} See, e.g., *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 493–94 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (analyzing *Chevron* when the majority had not); *EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.*, 499 U.S. 244, 259–60 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (identifying *Chevron* as the applicable standard).
\item \textsuperscript{119} William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, \textit{The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan}, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1098–100 (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{120} Merrill & Hickman, \textit{supra} note 50, at 848–52.
\item \textsuperscript{121} United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
\end{itemize}
of congressionally delegated authority to act with legal force.\footnote{122 Id. at 226–27.} Under \textit{Mead}, a court should ascertain whether “it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law.”\footnote{123 Id.} If a court determines that Congress has delegated such authority, the court then asks whether the agency “promulgated [its interpretation] in the exercise of that authority.”\footnote{124 Id. at 227.} The \textit{Mead} Court specified that, although \textit{Chevron} typically applies to interpretations adopted in notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudications, “the want of that procedure here does not decide the case.”\footnote{125 Id. at 231.} Drawing from a \textit{Mead} precursor, \textit{Christensen v. Harris County},\footnote{126 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (holding that an agency opinion letter should be reviewed under \textit{Skidmore}).} however, the Court also specified that “policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines” are “beyond the \textit{Chevron} pale.”\footnote{127 \textit{Mead}, 533 U.S. at 234 (quoting \textit{Christensen}, 529 U.S. at 587).} If an agency interpretation does not satisfy \textit{Mead}’s inquiry, then the agency’s interpretation remains “entitled to respect” to the extent it has the “power to persuade” under the arguably less deferential \textit{Skidmore} standard.\footnote{128 \textit{Christensen}, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting \textit{Skidmore v. Swift & Co.}, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).} Unlike \textit{Chevron}, the \textit{Skidmore} standard regards the courts as the primary interpreters of statutory meaning, even as it counsels courts to respect an agency’s interpretation based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”\footnote{129 \textit{Skidmore}, 323 U.S. at 140.}

The direct consequence of \textit{Mead} has been the carving away of a subcategory of agency statutory interpretations that courts decline to review under \textit{Chevron}. Since deciding \textit{Mead}, the Supreme Court has not extended \textit{Chevron} deference to an agency statutory interpretation expressed in a format other than a notice-and-comment regulation or formal (or formal-ish) adjudication.\footnote{130 \textit{See generally} Kristin E. Hickman, \textit{The Three Phases of Mead}, 83 \textit{Fordham L. Rev.} 527 (2014) (surveying Supreme Court applications of \textit{Mead}).} But \textit{Mead} has created its own sort of doctrinal confusion, and \textit{Mead}’s counterrevolution has been
blunted by the Justices’ competing attitudes about and doctrinal approaches to *Chevron* as well as *Mead* and *Skidmore*.131

The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in *King v. Burwell* reflects another effort to curtail *Chevron*’s reach.132 In that case, the Court declined to apply the *Chevron* standard in reviewing an Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) regulation implementing an important aspect of the Affordable Care Act.133 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the interpretation at issue “involv[ed] billions of dollars in spending each year and affect[ed] the price of health insurance for millions of people,” was of “deep ‘economic and political significance,’” and was “central to [the] statutory scheme.”134 He also observed that the IRS “has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy.”135 In relying on such grounds to deny *Chevron* review to the IRS’s regulation, Chief Justice Roberts drew from the Court’s earlier decision in *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*,136 rejecting the FDA’s newfound claim of statutory authority to regulate the marketing of tobacco products.137 A brief passage at the end of Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in *Brown & Williamson Tobacco* suggested that *Chevron* might be inapplicable altogether in so-called “extraordinary cases” of political and economic significance when “there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”138 Some commentators have suggested that *King v. Burwell* may herald a new categorical limitation on *Chevron*’s scope,139 and the federal circuit courts of appeals could heed that call and invalidate agency action when the agency lacks expressly delegated authority over a particular provision.140

---

131 See id. at 548–49; see also infra Part II.
134 *King*, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
135 Id.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 104–06.
138 Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 159–61.
140 See, e.g., ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should not examine the case under *Chevron* because the agency’s interpretation presented a politically and economically significant issue); see also infra Section II.H.
Beyond questions of *Chevron*’s scope, other jurisprudence from the Supreme Court has signaled more subtly the Court’s readiness to employ *Chevron*’s two steps to reject agency interpretations on the basis of either statutory clarity or agency unreasonableness. In *Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio*, for example, six Justices across three opinions disagreed sharply with Justice Kagan’s assertion in her plurality opinion that the statute at issue was ambiguous merely because the text of a single subsection seemed internally contradictory on its face. Chief Justice Roberts in concurrence rejected as “wrong” the suggestion “that deference is warranted because of a direct conflict between [two] clauses,” and called instead for considering the statutory scheme as a whole. Justice Sotomayor in dissent likewise turned to traditional tools of statutory construction to resolve the conflict, criticizing the plurality for “neglect[ing] a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation: We do not lightly presume that Congress has legislated in self-contradicting terms.”

The Supreme Court has shown substantially greater willingness to invalidate agency interpretations at *Chevron* step two. Again, for fifteen years after deciding *Chevron*, the Court did not invalidate a single agency interpretation after applying *Chevron* and declaring the relevant statute ambiguous. The first such instance was *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board*, involving clear congressional intent for the FCC to give content to the obviously ambiguous statutory use of the words “necessary” and “impair” in giving competitors access to existing telephone networks. Justice Scalia acknowledged the agency’s discretion to elaborate on the statutory requirements but nevertheless declared its interpretation to be outside the boundaries of permissibility. Since then, the Supreme Court has invalidated agency interpretations of statutes at *Chevron* step two at least three more times—in 2006, in 2014, and in 2015.

---

142 See id. at 2203 (calling the statutory provision “Janus-faced[,] [i]ts first half looks in one direction, . . . [b]ut . . . the section’s second half looks another way”).
143 Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Chief Justice Roberts’s criticism of Justice Kagan’s depiction of *Chevron* step one).
144 Id. at 2220 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
145 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (making this observation).
147 Id. at 375–80.
148 Id. at 386–92.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has gradually embraced incorporating into *Chevron* step two the arbitrary and capricious analysis of *Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.*,\(^\text{152}\) which requires agencies to offer contemporaneous justifications of their policy choices that demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking.\(^\text{153}\) The first case to do so, in 2011, was *Judulang v. Holder*,\(^\text{154}\) in which the Court evaluated a Board of Immigration Appeals interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act\(^\text{155}\) concerning the criteria for granting discretionary relief to deportable and excludable aliens.\(^\text{156}\) The Court claimed that it was applying *State Farm* rather than *Chevron* as the standard in rejecting the agency’s interpretation of the statute on the ground that the agency relied on analysis that was not “tied, even if loosely,” to statutory purposes or operation.\(^\text{157}\) But responding in a footnote to the government’s argument that *Chevron* step two ought to apply rather than *State Farm*, the Court equated the two: “[O]ur analysis would be the same, because under *Chevron* step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”\(^\text{158}\)

Justice Kagan, the author of the Court’s *Judulang* opinion, subsequently disavowed any intent to make a significant statement regarding administrative law doctrine.\(^\text{159}\) Nevertheless, subsequent opinions of the Court again seem to embrace a relationship between *Chevron* and *State Farm*. In *Michigan v. EPA*, the Court applied the *Chevron* standard in considering a challenge to new EPA regulations concern-

---

153 *Id.* at 43 (“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ . . . Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
156 *Judulang*, 565 U.S. at 45.
157 *Id.* at 55.
158 *Id.* at 52 n.7 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)).
ming mercury and other emissions from coal- and oil-fired power plants.\textsuperscript{160} As framed by the Court, the issue was whether the EPA can reasonably refuse to consider cost in deciding that regulating emissions of hazardous air pollutants from power plants is “appropriate and necessary” under the Clean Air Act.\textsuperscript{161} The EPA had concluded that “costs should not be considered” when making that threshold determination.\textsuperscript{162} In a seemingly straightforward application of \textit{Chevron}’s two steps, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the statutory terms at issue could support more than one reasonable interpretation but concluded that the EPA’s construction simply was not among the available alternatives.\textsuperscript{163} Yet, Justice Scalia’s \textit{Chevron} step two analysis cited \textit{State Farm} and included among his reasons for rejecting the EPA’s interpretation the \textit{State Farm}–like observation that “[n]o regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good.”\textsuperscript{164}

Most recently, in \textit{Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro},\textsuperscript{165} the Supreme Court blended references to procedural failings and \textit{State Farm} in applying \textit{Chevron} to reject a Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulation interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act.\textsuperscript{166} The regulation reversed a longstanding policy of the DOL that treated service advisors as exempt from overtime under the statute.\textsuperscript{167} Justice Kennedy for the Court introduced his analysis with a clear statement that he was applying \textit{Chevron}’s two-step standard because Congress gave the DOL the power to act with the force of law and the DOL did so by using notice-and-comment rulemaking to adopt its interpretation.\textsuperscript{168} He immediately followed, however, by stating that “\textit{Chevron} deference is not warranted where the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’—that is, where the agency errs by failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation.”\textsuperscript{169} He then proceeded to explain that the DOL

\textsuperscript{162} Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2705–06.
\textsuperscript{163} See id. at 2707 (“There are undoubtedly settings in which the phrase ‘appropriate and necessary’ does not encompass cost. But this is not one of them.”).
\textsuperscript{164} Id.
\textsuperscript{165} 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016).
\textsuperscript{167} See Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2123.
\textsuperscript{168} Id. at 2124–25.
\textsuperscript{169} Id. at 2125 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)).
in this case failed procedurally under *State Farm* when it “offered barely any explanation” for its policy change.\footnote{170 Id. at 2126. Justice Ginsburg concurred with Justice Kennedy’s opinion but “stress[ed] that nothing in today’s opinion disturbs well-established law. In particular, where an agency has departed from a prior position, there is no ‘heightened standard’ of arbitrary-and-capricious review.” *Id.* at 2128 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).}

On the other hand, even as some of the Supreme Court’s cases have constrained or weakened *Chevron* deference, others have seemed to expand *Chevron’s* reach. Two examples are particularly notable. First, the Court has allowed *Chevron* deference to trump stare decisis in some cases. In *National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services*\footnote{171 545 U.S. 967 (2005).} in 2005, the Court held that a court’s prior interpretation of a statute does not override the agency’s newer interpretation unless the court held that the statute “unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill.”\footnote{172 *Id.* at 982–83.} Justice Scalia scolded the Court for the “breathtaking novelty” of rendering “judicial decisions subject to reversal by executive officers.”\footnote{173 *Id.* at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting).} According to Justice Scalia, the majority’s “bizarre” holding permits agencies to take “action that the Supreme Court found unlawful.”\footnote{174 *Id.* at 1017. Justice Scalia’s dissent also questioned what this meant for step one: “Is the standard for ‘unambiguous’ under the Court’s new agency-reversal rule the same as the standard for ‘unambiguous’ under step one of *Chevron*? (If so, of course, every case that reaches step two of *Chevron* will be agency-reversible.)” *Id.* at 1018–19.} Subsequently, in *United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC*,\footnote{175 566 U.S. 478 (2012).} the Court considered an IRS regulation that conflicted with a Supreme Court decision that predated both *Chevron* and *Brand X*.\footnote{176 See *id.* at 481.} A plurality of the Court concluded that its earlier decision found the meaning of the statute clear, thus denying the agency the opportunity to adopt an alternative interpretation.\footnote{177 See *id.* at 487.} *Home Concrete* led some commentators to suggest that the Court is unlikely to apply *Brand X*’s holding to its own precedents,\footnote{178 See, e.g., David J. Shakow, *A Concrete Shoe for Brand X?*, 135 TAX NOTES 651, 651 (2012); Walker, supra note 17, at 161 n.63 (suggesting the Patent and Trademark Office should “exercise caution” in relying on *Brand X*).} but that still leaves plenty of circuit court precedents to be overturned by agency action.
Separately, in City of Arlington v. FCC, the Court settled a longstanding disagreement among the federal circuit courts of appeals by holding that an agency’s interpretation of its jurisdiction is entitled to deference. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia explained that there is no difference “between an agency’s exceeding the scope of its authority (its ‘jurisdiction’) and its exceeding authorized application of authority that it unquestionably has.” Justice Scalia disposed of the jurisdiction-nonjurisdictional line as a false dichotomy created to depose Chevron in favor of judicial policymaking. In the alternative, Justice Scalia proposed that the problem of excessive deference is solved by defending statutory limits at step one. Writing separately to express his own distinct views regarding how precisely Chevron operates, Justice Breyer nevertheless reached the same conclusion as the majority.

Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court’s mixed messages regarding Chevron’s functionality and scope are echoed in the jurisprudence of the federal circuit courts of appeals. According to a comprehensive study by Kent Barnett and Christopher Walker of 1558 cases evaluating agency statutory interpretations from 2003 through 2013, circuit courts applying Chevron have continued to defer to agencies at a high rate of 77.4% overall and a whopping 93.8% when the analysis has reached Chevron step two. But agencies actually lost 61% of the cases resolved by the circuit courts at Chevron step one, which in turn represented 22.4% of all cases. The agency win rate was also lower when the circuit courts specified no standard of review or opted for Skidmore or de novo review, which combined represented another 25.2% of cases evaluated. The First Circuit deferred to agencies substantially more often (82.8% of cases) than the Ninth Circuit (65.8%)

179 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
180 See id. at 1866.
181 Id. at 1870.
182 See id. at 1872–73 (“Like the Hound of the Baskervilles, it is conjured by those with greater quarry in sight: Make no mistake—the ultimate target here is Chevron itself. Savvy challengers of agency action would play the ‘jurisdictional’ card in every case. Some judges would be deceived by the specious, but scary-sounding, ‘jurisdictional’-‘nonjurisdictional’ line; others tempted by the prospect of making public policy by prescribing the meaning of ambiguous statutory commands.” (citation omitted)).
183 See id. at 1874.
184 See id. at 1875–77 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
186 Id.
187 Id.
of cases).\textsuperscript{188} The D.C. Circuit applied the \textit{Chevron} standard substantially more often (88.6\% of cases) than the Sixth Circuit (60.7\% of cases).\textsuperscript{189} Deference rates in circuit court cases also varied tremendously depending on the agency and subject matter at issue.\textsuperscript{190}

In sum, at least in the courts, \textit{Chevron}'s story remains a nuanced one. The \textit{Chevron} doctrine may be evolving. Applications of \textit{Chevron} may be highly variable depending upon which Justice or circuit court is writing the opinion. But reports that \textit{Chevron}'s influence is waning—rather than merely evolving—overstate the case.

\textbf{D. Calls to Overturn \textit{Chevron}}

At least partly as a result of their own internal disagreements regarding \textit{Chevron}'s details, individual Justices have, in recent Terms, expressed disillusionment with the \textit{Chevron} standard. Perhaps the first case to include an expression of discontent, \textit{Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n} did not involve a question of statutory interpretation and, therefore, did not implicate \textit{Chevron}.\textsuperscript{191} The issue in that case was whether a court could require an agency to use notice-and-comment rulemaking if the agency sought to amend an otherwise exempt interpretative rule.\textsuperscript{192} Writing in concurrence, Justice Scalia wandered into a discussion of deference doctrine and acknowledged that \textit{Chevron} “did not comport with the APA” and that the Court was “[h]eendless of the original design of the APA” in developing its deference jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{193} This observation echoed a similar statement made by Justice Scalia in his dissent in \textit{Mead}.\textsuperscript{194}

Justice Scalia’s opinion in \textit{Mortgage Bankers} stopped short of suggesting reconsidering \textit{Chevron}’s validity. Concurring in \textit{Michigan v. EPA}, by contrast, Justice Thomas argued that \textit{Chevron} raises concerns under Articles I and III of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{195} Article III “vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III courts, not administrative

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{188} Id. at 44.
\textsuperscript{189} Id. at 45–46.
\textsuperscript{190} Id. at 50–54.
\textsuperscript{192} Id. at 1203.
\textsuperscript{193} Id. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
\textsuperscript{194} See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court’s \textit{Chevron} jurisprudence has largely ignored the APA’s instruction that courts “decide all relevant questions of law”).
\textsuperscript{195} Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1215–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (raising similar constitutional concerns regarding \textit{Auer} deference).
\end{flushright}
agencies.”196 By contrast, according to Justice Thomas, Chevron deference “wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is’”197 because it “precludes judges from exercising [independent] judgment, forcing them to abandon what they believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor of an agency’s construction.”198 Justice Thomas argued further that agencies claiming Chevron deference often have not engaged in “interpretation” but rather have used statutory ambiguity “to formulate legally binding rules to fill in gaps based on policy judgments made by the agency rather than Congress.”199 Thus, he suggests, Chevron unconstitutionally “permit[s] a body other than Congress to perform a function that requires an exercise of the legislative power” by allowing agencies “the power to decide—without any particular fidelity to the text—which policy goals [they] wish[] to pursue.”200

Some scholars have argued that, if Chevron is to be abolished, Congress rather than the Supreme Court ought to strike the final blow.201 Toward that end, in 2016, several members of Congress introduced, and the House of Representatives passed, SOPRA—the Separation of Powers Restoration Act—which would have amended the APA with the intent of overturning Chevron.202 A somewhat different variation of the same proposal was incorporated into the Regulatory Accountability Act (“RAA”), which the House passed in January 2017.203

Statements by SOPRA’s sponsors indicate that their primary goal is to eliminate the deferential Chevron standard of review for agency interpretations of statutes.204 For example, in a March 17, 2016 speech

---

196 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring).
197 Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
198 Id. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)).
199 Id. at 2712–13.
200 Id. at 2713.
204 See Amar, supra note 27; Hatch & Ratcliffe, supra note 28 (“[I]n practice, courts read these terms so broadly as to give federal bureaucrats essentially unbridled power to say what the law is—oftentimes even if the agency’s interpretation contradicts the plain language of the statute.”); Lee, supra note 28 (“[J]udicial deference to the agencies undercut[s] the courts’ ability to hold the government accountable to the law. Our bill restores accountability to the regulatory process by ensuring that the courts say what the law is, not what the agencies wish the law would be.”).
in support of SOPRA, Senator Mike Lee stated that *Chevron* “has helped to midwife this shadowy fourth branch, by requiring Courts, under certain circumstances, to surrender their Article III constitutional power of judicial review to executive agencies.”205 Regulated industries have announced support of SOPRA to prevent agencies from “expand[ing] the scope of their own regulatory authority.”206 By contrast, the version of the RAA under consideration in the Senate does not repudiate or even curtail *Chevron*.207 Whether SOPRA, in one version or another, will be enacted into law remains to be seen.

II. *Chevron’s Many Versions*

The above survey of *Chevron’s* history demonstrates less that the doctrine has risen and fallen, but more that it ebbs and flows from case to case, sometimes but not always to great effect. *Chevron* has not dominated administrative law jurisprudence quite as much as lore would have it. But it definitely has endured and has featured prominently in numerous cases, including relatively recent ones.

A key reason *Chevron* seems to ebb and flow as it does is that the jurisprudence and academic literature do not advance a single, unified understanding of what *Chevron* deference entails. Rather, they reflect several competing versions of *Chevron*, none of which are demonstrably incorrect, and all of which are theoretically defensible. In other words, *Chevron* has become a generic label for several variations on a theme.208 All share the general premise of strong, mandatory judicial deference to some subset of agency statutory interpretations and some number of analytical steps—generally two, but not always—for getting to that point. But disagreements over the details abound. And, depending on which *Chevron* application one chooses to embrace and

---


208 C.j. Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 581–82 (2013) (arguing that the *Erie* doctrine’s imprecision and ambiguity have rendered *Erie* an improper label for choice of law).
follow, *Chevron* becomes more or less formalistic, more or less textualist, and more or less deferential.

Part of the difficulty stems from the *Chevron* opinion itself, which describes the relevant standard of review in highly variable terms, and thus supports a multiplicity of interpretations. Identifying all of *Chevron*’s many variations is probably impossible. Regardless, appreciating at least some of the many options is essential to understanding both the Supreme Court’s *Chevron* jurisprudence and also efforts to reshape, restrain, and invalidate *Chevron* deference.

A. The Original Exposition Raises Questions

The origin of *Chevron*’s two steps derives easily from the Supreme Court’s assertion in *Chevron* that “[w]hen a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.” From there, the Court’s rhetoric becomes murky.

“First,” according to the Court, “is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” A few sentences later, the Court says that, “[i]f . . . the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute.” Based on these two sentences alone, the step one inquiry would seem both highly textualist and narrowly tailored toward facial specificity. Few questions of statutory interpretation that rise to the Supreme Court or even to the federal circuit courts of appeals, however, are likely to find direct and explicit resolution in the statutory text without additional inquiry. Consequently, with this framing of the step one inquiry, one would expect the vast majority of cases to proceed readily to *Chevron*’s second step.

In between these two sentences, however, the Court says that, “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” A requirement that a court be able to identify clear congressional intent arguably contemplates a more robust, and potentially more purposivist, step one inquiry than a requirement that a statute resolve the interpretive difficulty directly and

---

210 *Id.* at 842.
211 *Id.* (emphasis added).
212 *Id.* at 843 (emphasis added).
213 *Id.* at 842–43 (emphasis added).
precisely. Courts rely on a variety of canons and resources, including legislative history and statutory purpose, to glean congressional intent from facially ambiguous statutory text. Moreover, in a footnote to this sentence, the Court specifies the judiciary as “the final authority on issues of statutory construction” and declares, “[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”214 This footnote, too, obviously contemplates a more robust inquiry than a mere facial check of statutory text. But the footnote fails to specify which traditional tools of statutory construction a court ought to consider in attempting to ascertain clear congressional intent: all of them or merely certain subsets? After all, in theory as well as practice, the statutory interpretation toolbox includes not only a host of textual canons, legislative history, and statutory purpose, but also substantive canons, like the constitutional avoidance canon or the rule of lenity, that themselves serve as ambiguity tiebreakers.215

Finally, at the end of that same paragraph in the *Chevron* opinion, the Court rephrases step one as whether “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”216 This language seems to equate statutory silence regarding a particular question with statutory ambiguity. Certainly, in some cases textual silence is indicative of ambiguity.217 Such was the case in *Chevron* itself, as the Court found ambiguity in the fact that neither the Clean Air Act’s text nor its history offered even the merest hint of congressional intent regarding the “bubble concept” addressed by the regulations at issue in that case.218 But although legislatures will sometimes incorporate exceptions from statutory requirements explicitly in statutory text, legislatures do not commonly construct statutes by expressly excluding everything under the sun that is not included. Hence, the post-*Chevron* jurisprudence has seen the emergence of the “elephants in mouseholes” canon: “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might

214 *Id.* at 843 n.9 (emphasis added).
215 *See infra* Section II.B.
216 *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843 (emphasis added).
218 *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 851.
say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” 219 Yet, precisely when statutory silence shifts from ambiguity to clarity, or vice versa, remains ill-defined at best. 220

The Court’s Chevron opinion was hardly clearer in describing step two. First, the Court said that, at that step, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 221 In a footnote to that sentence, the Court elaborated that a reviewing court “need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the [agency’s] construction.” 222 In the next paragraph, however, the Court used different rhetoric to describe the deference owed to “express delegation[s] of authority” and “implicit” ones. 223 The former were to be “given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” while the latter warranted deference if “reasonable.” 224 Commentators at times have disagreed over whether the permissibility, controlling weight, and reasonableness formulations are interchangeable 225 or establish different deference standards for different types of interpretations. 226 And because the Court’s use of the phrase “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” strongly resembles that of APA section 706(2)(A), commentators also have disagreed over whether judicial


220 See, e.g., Loshin & Nielson, supra note 219; Sales & Adler, supra note 217.

221 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (emphasis added).

222 Id. at 843 n.11.

223 Id. at 843–44.

224 Id.


review under *Chevron* step two is limited to statutory interpretation or extends to considering the agency’s reasons for choosing one interpretation over another.

Finally, the *Chevron* opinion alludes to the continued viability of the contextual factors without affirmatively deciding as much. Citing *Skidmore*, the Court noted that the EPA’s interpretation represented “a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference” because “the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.” The *Chevron* Court contended further that “[j]udges are not experts in the field,” and when the interpretation of a statute “really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy,” deference is appropriate. These statements harken back to the expertise-based multifactor *Skidmore* approach, comporting with Justice Stevens’s belief that *Chevron* itself did not change the Court’s deference jurisprudence. But if *Chevron* incorporated *Skidmore*’s contextual factors, it left open where in the two-step analysis they fall. And *Chevron*’s evasions of the issue—intentional or not—has prompted disagreements among the Justices about whether these factors remain relevant to the *Chevron* analysis.

In summary, *Chevron*’s own rhetoric supports different expositions of its two steps depending on which snippets of language one chooses to emphasize. Whenever the Supreme Court announces (or is perceived as announcing) a new standard or test, some initial confusion is probably inevitable as courts apply that new standard or test in

---


229 *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted) (citing *Skidmore* v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).

230 Id. at 865–66.

231 Compare Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“*Skidmore* deference to authoritative agency views is an anachronism . . . . That era came to an end with our watershed decision in *Chevron* . . . .”), with id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“*Chevron* made no relevant change [to the Court’s deference jurisprudence].”).
subsequent cases. But many of Chevron’s nuances remain almost as unclear today as they did thirty years ago, as the Court, for the most part, has done little to resolve the specifics of Chevron’s two steps directly. As a result, courts and commentators have embraced and advocated different variations on Chevron’s theme.

B. Which Tools of Statutory Interpretation, and When?

No matter the variation, Chevron entails at least some independent evaluation of statutory meaning. Depending on which language from Chevron one wants to highlight, however, that assessment may range anywhere from exceedingly shallow to incredibly robust.

At times, both textualists and purposivists have argued in favor of aggressively seeking statutory clarity under Chevron using the methods and tools that courts have always used when evaluating statutory meaning. Consistent with his more general adherence to textualism, Justice Scalia repeatedly called for a rigorous judicial defense of statutory limits through textualist reasoning. Likewise, consistent with his own, more purposivist leanings, Justice Breyer has proposed a more thorough appraisal of statutory text, purpose, and legislative history, along with contextual factors like consistency, in discerning under Chevron whether Congress intended to give agencies discretionary space. No matter the methodology, a robust Chevron step one analysis that utilizes a wider array of interpretive tools affords judges more room to find statutory clarity. If courts readily find statutory meaning to be clear, then they turn less often to deference.

Nevertheless, courts and scholars have clashed over which interpretive tools ought to be applied at Chevron step one versus step two. For example, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its use of legislative history in Chevron analysis. The Court in the Chevron opinion itself discussed legislative history at some length, despite finding it inconclusive. In several subsequent cases, the Court relied heavily

232 See, e.g., supra notes 43–77 and accompanying text.

233 See supra notes 78–184 and accompanying text.

234 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013); Scalia, supra note 56, at 521 (observing that a “strict constructionist” like himself, “who finds more often . . . that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists”).

235 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1876 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).


237 Id. at 851–53, 862.
on legislative history to find statutory clarity at *Chevron* step one.238 In other instances, however, the Court has framed *Chevron*’s first step rhetorically in purely textualist terms and ignored legislative history in its analysis.239 For example, in *Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States*240 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for all participating Justices, completely ignored the parties’ observations regarding legislative history in concluding that the statute’s meaning was ambiguous,241 leading some courts and commentators to wonder whether the Court regarded legislative history as relevant to *Chevron* step one analysis.242

The Court’s inconsistent use of legislative history in *Chevron* analysis may derive from the Justices’ varying attitudes toward legislative history in general.243 Regardless, the circuits are now divided over when in the *Chevron* framework to consider legislative history. Most circuits will readily consider legislative history at *Chevron* step one.244 But the Third Circuit does not examine legislative history at step

---

238 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133–59 (2000); see also Eskridge & Baer, *supra* note 119, at 1136 (demonstrating that the Court applies legislative history in 62.3% of cases).

239 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665 (2007) (describing *Chevron* deference as “appropriate only where ‘Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue’ through the statutory text” (quoting *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843)).


241 Compare id. (resolving the case without mentioning legislative history), with *Brief for Petitioners at 38–39, Mayo Found.*, 562 U.S. 44 (No. 09-837) (discussing legislative history in support of position), and *Brief for the United States at 24–25, Mayo Found.*, 562 U.S. 44 (No. 09-837) (same). Justice Kagan abstained from the *Mayo Foundation* case.


244 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 781 F.3d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 2015); BNSF Ry. Co. v. United States, 775 F.3d 743, 755 n.87 (5th Cir. 2015); Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 931 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Sumpter v. Sec’y of Labor, 763 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2014); Ron Peterson Firearms, LLC v. Jones, 760 F.3d 1147, 1157 n.10 (10th Cir. 2014); Santana v. Holder, 731 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2013); WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 57 (4th Cir. 2011); Catawba Cty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2009); North Dakota *ex rel.* Olson v. Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 403 F.3d 537, 539 (8th Cir. 2005).
one. Rather, the Third Circuit restricts its analysis at that stage to textual tools such as semantic canons, statutory structure, and dictionaries. The Seventh Circuit similarly defers consideration of legislative history to Chevron step two. The difference in approach may not matter much to an ardent textualist who eschews legislative history in any event. But for a judge who relies more often on legislative history as an interpretive tool, and who also takes seriously the comparatively deferential posture of Chevron’s second step, waiting to consider legislative history might change the outcome in a hard case.

The courts have also expressed uncertainty regarding the relationship between substantive canons and Chevron’s two-step framework. Supreme Court precedent is quite clear that the constitutional avoidance canon trumps Chevron deference. In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the agency’s interpretation in favor of one that avoided “serious constitutional questions,” notwithstanding that the agency’s interpretation “would normally be entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly contrary to the intent of Congress” under Chevron. Likewise, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Court refused to defer to the agency’s regulation specifically because it raised “significant constitutional questions.”

---

245 See United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one.”). The Third Circuit, however, does permit judges to consider legislative history at step two to determine “whether the agency made ‘a reasonable policy choice’ in its interpretation.” See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 307 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 997 (2005)).

246 Geiser, 527 F.3d at 294–98. The Third Circuit claimed that the Supreme Court had “returned to its original mode of analysis, which does not include a consideration of legislative history at Chevron step one.” Id. at 293 (citing Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1543 (2007)).

247 See, e.g., Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder, 758 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that “some of our sister circuits consider legislative history at [Chevron step one], but we prefer to save that inquiry for Chevron’s second step”); Emergency Servs. Billing Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In this Circuit, we seem to lean toward reserving consideration of legislative history and other appropriate factors until the second Chevron step.”’ (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 983 (7th Cir. 1998))).


250 Id. at 574, 588.
252 Id. at 174.
comparison, in *Rancheria v. Jewell*, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Indian canon in lieu of *Chevron* because “the Blackfeet presumption is merely a ‘guideline,’ whereas ‘Chevron is a substantive rule of law.’”

Meanwhile, conflicting Supreme Court precedents have left an ongoing debate over whether “*Chevron* still leaves some place for the rule of lenity,” particularly, although not exclusively, when a regulatory statute provides for both civil and criminal enforcement. In 1995, in *Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon*, the Court suggested that *Chevron* deference trumps the rule of lenity, at least when considering notice-and-comment regulations. “We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard for reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal enforcement,” said the Court. Some courts have expressed concern that lenity and *Chevron* are simply incompatible—that allowing for lenity in reviewing a particular statute would obviate *Chevron* for that context.

But the Supreme Court has occasionally applied the rule of lenity in noncriminal contexts where the statute had both criminal and noncriminal applications, albeit with no mention of *Chevron*. Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit has articulated at some length the case for applying the rule of lenity rather than *Chevron* when an agency interpretation might later support criminal prosecution. In 2014, in a statement accompanying the Court’s denial of certiorari in *Whitman v.*
United States. Justice Scalia called for the Court to consider whether courts “owe deference to an executive agency’s interpretation of a law that contemplates both criminal and administrative enforcement,” and suggested further that “[u]ndoubtedly Congress may make it a crime to violate a regulation, but it is quite a different matter for Congress to give agencies—let alone for us to presume that Congress gave agencies—power to resolve ambiguities in criminal legislation.”

Supposing substantive canons are part of Chevron analysis, do they apply at step one or step two? Substantive canons often operate as ambiguity tie breakers. Thus, if a reviewing court applies a substantive canon at Chevron step one, then presumably the court will be more likely to find the meaning of the statute to be clear as it assumes Congress intended the statute to be interpreted in accordance with the policy concern of the canon. If applied at step one, therefore, substantive canons may, indeed, render Chevron de facto inapplicable in certain regulatory contexts, such as immigration or Indian affairs.

If substantive canons apply at step two, however, Chevron presumably would trump the canon because the court could feel compelled to defer to an agency interpretation deemed reasonable but for its clash with the canon’s policy presumption. In Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the avoidance canon and instead analyzed deference and consi-
tutional implications separately. Dissenting, Judge Sidney Thomas argued that the avoidance canon applies at *Chevron* step one. According to Judge Thomas, the avoidance canon is “unquestionably a ‘traditional tool of statutory interpretation’ that may and should be used to determine whether Congress intended to preclude the agency’s chosen interpretation.” In summary, the placement of substantive canons within *Chevron* analysis may in some cases serve as a barometer for how rigorously a court will assess statutory meaning for itself or how readily a court will defer.

C. Deliberative Democracy and a Syncopated *Chevron*

The courts’ case-by-case engagement with *Chevron* typically makes their doctrinal analysis more than a little fragmented. Given the multiplicity of *Chevron* cases, it is unsurprising that legal scholars have attempted to bring coherence to that jurisprudence, both by finding commonalities among existing cases but also in advocating for particular views of how *Chevron* ought to function.

In 1994, Mark Seidenfeld articulated an argument for what he dubbed “a syncopated *Chevron,*” based on the proposition that *Chevron* should view “agencies as a means of fostering public deliberation about government policy choices.” Drawing from the *Chevron* opinion’s emphasis on agencies as policymakers, Seidenfeld premised his claim on a theory of “deliberative democracy,” which “views politics as a process by which members of society seek both to define the public interest and to determine the best way to further that interest.” According to Seidenfeld, to promote legitimacy, government must represent the perspectives and values of all members of society and seek to persuade dissenters to adopt the view most beneficial to the whole of society. Agencies provide this discourse by allowing “public participation, political influence, and reasoned decisionmaking.”

---

269 *Id.* at 492–98 (“When Congress has explicitly or implicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, and the agency has filled it, we have no authority to re-construe the statute, even to avoid potential constitutional problems; we can only decide whether the agency’s interpretation reflects a plausible reading of the statutory text. . . . [C]onstitutional avoidance . . . plays no role in the second *Chevron* inquiry.”).

270 *Id.* at 503–05 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

271 *Id.* at 504.


273 *Id.* at 125.

274 *Id.* at 126.

275 *Id.*
Seidenfeld argued that *Chevron* could best effectuate the goals of deliberative democracy by emphasizing step two over step one.\(^{276}\) Consequently, he favored a minimalist, textualist, and highly deferential *Chevron* step one.\(^{277}\) As judges should not make policy choices, he argued, they should find statutory silence or ambiguity under step one “unless the statute clearly manifests congressional intent to constrain agency discretion, as opposed to merely providing guidance on the substantive regulatory issues the statute addresses.”\(^{278}\) At *Chevron* step two, Seidenfeld suggested that courts apply a variation of hard look review. Under traditional hard look review, derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in *State Farm*, courts must reject agency action as “arbitrary and capricious” when the agency in question “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”\(^{279}\) By comparison, Seidenfeld’s *Chevron* step two would “require the agency to identify the concerns that the statute addresses and explain how the agency’s interpretation took those concerns into account.”\(^{280}\) Thus, *Chevron* would require an agency to explain how its interpretation effectuates statutory goals. Courts would then rely on traditional tools, including legislative history and canons of construction, not to discern statutory meaning, but to evaluate the agency’s assessment of statutory purposes and, with that focus, the reasonableness of its interpretive choice.\(^{281}\)

Seidenfeld’s syncopated *Chevron* thus would leave more interpretive questions to agencies, even if “the agency has only an indirect role in administering the statute, so long as the agency procedures encourage discourse about the implications of potential interpretations.”\(^{282}\) Correspondingly, the syncopated model essentially discards the traditional understanding of courts as the primary interpreters of statutory meaning.\(^{283}\) Rather, as judges have often said regarding their own efforts at statutory interpretation, if Congress disagrees with an

\(^{276}\) *Id.* at 127.

\(^{277}\) *See id.* at 127–28.

\(^{278}\) *Id.* at 128.


\(^{280}\) Seidenfeld, *supra* note 272, at 129.

\(^{281}\) *Id.* at 129–30.

\(^{282}\) *Id.* at 133–34.

\(^{283}\) *Id.* at 137.
agency’s interpretation of a statute, then Congress can either pass overriding legislation to reverse agency decisionmaking or threaten to constrain the agency’s budget.\footnote{Id. at 136.}

Many cases arguably apply \textit{Chevron} in a manner consistent with Seidenfeld’s syncopated model. For example, almost any opinion that makes short work of finding ambiguity at \textit{Chevron} step one, but then finds the agency’s interpretation unreasonable at \textit{Chevron} step two, arguably reflects Seidenfeld’s approach—although he might contend that the court asked the wrong questions at step two if its analysis was textual rather than policy oriented.\footnote{Id. at 132 (suggesting as much of the court’s reasoning in \textit{Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC}, 827 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc)).}

By limiting \textit{Chevron}’s first step to a purely textual inquiry and deferring consideration of legislative history to \textit{Chevron} step two, the Third and Seventh Circuits arguably dance more in step with Seidenfeld’s syncopated rhythm. Describing \textit{Chevron} analysis in one recent case, for example, the Third Circuit framed step one as “whether the statute unambiguously forbids the Agency’s interpretation,” and step two as “whether [the agency] made ‘a reasonable policy choice’ in reaching its interpretation.”\footnote{Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 294–95 (3d Cir. 2015) (first quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002); then quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005)).} It then said it would consider legislative history at step one solely for the purpose of “clarifying the policies framing the statute.”\footnote{Id. at 307.} Although the court’s step one analysis was extensive, reviewing arguments concerning the statute’s text and purpose along with substantive canons, its way of thinking about the task at hand resembles Seidenfeld’s vision.\footnote{See id. at 295–306.} Similarly, a key Seventh Circuit discussion of the \textit{Chevron} framework clearly anticipated more extensive step two than step one analysis:

\begin{quote}
While this circuit has examined legislative history during the first step of \textit{Chevron}, we now seem to lean toward reserving consideration of legislative history and other appropriate factors until the second \textit{Chevron} step. In the second step, the court determines whether the regulation harmonizes with the language, origins, and purpose of the statute. While not dispositive, a court may find various considerations informative—these considerations might include the consistency of the agency’s interpretation, the contemporar-}

\footnote{Id. at 307.}
In *Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. NLRB*, the D.C. Circuit cited Seidenfeld’s work and seemed to adhere rather closely to his theory of *Chevron*. The case concerned a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act as prohibiting an employer from permanently replacing workers engaged in a work stoppage based on a good-faith belief that their working conditions are abnormally dangerous. Although the court rejected the agency’s interpretation of the statute under *Chevron*, its analysis avoided any discussion of the statute’s text or legislative history. Rather, expressing “no doubt that Congress delegated authority” to the NLRB to interpret the statute, the court declared, “The only question here is whether the [NLRB] has articulated a defensible policy.” To facilitate its *Chevron* step two analysis, the court required the agency to articulate “the rationale underlying an agency’s construction of the statute.” The problem for the court, and the reason it rejected the agency’s interpretation, was that the NLRB’s members had not been able to agree on a single rationale for its interpretation.

### D. Step Two and Traditional Hard Look Review

Several years after *Chevron*, Ronald Levin professed at a panel discussion that he preferred a robust step one in which the court extracts “all the guidance that it can possibly get out of the statute,” fearing that *Chevron* would dismember the judicial role in agency interpretation. A decade later, Levin rejoiced as courts continued to

---

289 Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 983 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Emergency Servs. Billing Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 459, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he only questions we must answer in the first step of *Chevron* are whether the statutory language to be interpreted, on its face, is ambiguous, and whether Congress was silent regarding that ambiguity.”).

290 46 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

291 *Id.* at 89 (citing Seidenfeld, *supra* note 272).


293 *Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers*, 46 F.3d at 84.

294 *Id.* at 88–89.

295 *Id.* at 90.

296 *Id.*

297 *Id.* at 91.

apply “critical judicial scrutiny” to agency interpretations. Rather than displacing traditional statutory interpretation and deference, he said, *Chevron* provided a “manageable framework.”

Levin recognized, however, that a court’s inquiry at *Chevron* step two would be influenced by how the court chose to approach step one. If one contemplates a robust *Chevron* step one analysis utilizing the full array of traditional tools of statutory construction, one could argue that the only analysis remaining to be performed at step two is whether the agency’s interpretation is absurd—and even then, some courts will apply the absurdity canon at step one to discount patently absurd interpretations.

As a proponent of a robust *Chevron* step one seeking content for *Chevron* step two beyond a mere absurdity inquiry, Levin advocated merging *Chevron* step two with traditional hard look review. According to Levin, employing hard look review at *Chevron* step two would ensure that agencies rationalize their decisions from a policymaking perspective. Moreover, he contended, attempts to differentiate *Chevron* step two and hard look review create “excess baggage,” resulting in judicial inefficiency.

Numerous circuit court opinions, most notably though not exclusively from the D.C. Circuit, correspond with Levin’s model. One of the first D.C. Circuit cases to apply *Chevron’s* two steps, *Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.*, is consistent with Levin’s approach. Writing for the court, Judge Patricia Wald conducted an extensive step one analysis that considered statutory text, legislative conference re-

---

300 Id.
301 See id. at 1290–91.
302 See, e.g., Eagle Broad. Grp., Ltd. v. FCC, 563 F.3d 543, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The rule that statutes are to be read to avoid absurd results allows an agency to establish that seemingly clear statutory language does not reflect the ‘unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,’ and thus to overcome the first step of the *Chevron* analysis.” (citation omitted)); Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 207–08 (6th Cir. 1996).
303 See Levin, *Anatomy of Chevron*, supra note 228, at 1266–79; see also supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text (describing traditional hard look review as distinguished from Mark Seidenfeld’s syncopated *Chevron* version).
305 Id. at 1296.
306 See, e.g., Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 889 n.10 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We recognize that there is support for the proposition that in review of rulemaking the second step of *Chevron* indeed amounts to the same inquiry as arbitrary or capricious review under the APA.”).
307 744 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
ports, subsequent statutory amendments, and Supreme Court precedent, concluding that the court was “unable to characterize” the evidence before it “as entirely clear and unambiguous” evidence of congressional intent. Judge Wald then contemplated the potential overlap between *State Farm* and *Chevron* analysis, noting that step two might either ask whether the agency properly interpreted the statute or whether the agency’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court ultimately declined to extend *Chevron* deference because the agency failed to “provide some basis in the record for [the court] to conclude that the agency ‘considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion,’ and made a reasonable decision.” Numerous subsequent D.C. Circuit opinions equate *State Farm* and *Chevron* step two, although others expressly reject merging the two standards. Even more notably, as described earlier, the Supreme Court seems to be gravitating toward blending *Chevron* step two with *State Farm*’s traditional hard look review in some cases, though without quite acknowledging as much.

E. One-Step *Chevron*

Drawing partly from Levin’s study of *Chevron* step two, Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule have proposed that *Chevron* redundantly and “artificially divides one inquiry into two steps.” If *Chevron* step two asks whether or not the agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute, then step one is redundant with step two. Indeed, courts could decide many *Chevron* issues at either step and reach the same result. If, however, step two evalu-

---

308 Id. at 142–50.
309 Id. at 150–51, 151 n.46 (“We must admit to some doubts about such a distinction.”).
311 See, e.g., *Shays v. FEC*, 414 F.3d 76, 96–97 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing several circuit precedents as conflating *Chevron* step two with arbitrary and capricious review under *State Farm*).
312 See, e.g., *Stilwell v. Office of Thrift Supervision*, 569 F.3d 514, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]his is a *State Farm* case, not a *Chevron* case.”); *Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC*, 76 F.3d 400, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (conceding that the two standards “overlap[] somewhat” but contending that “a permissible statutory construction under *Chevron* is not always reasonable under *State Farm*”); *Arent v. Shalala*, 70 F.3d 610, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining the analytical distinction between *Chevron* and *State Farm*).
313 See supra Section I.C.
315 See, e.g., *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 448–49 (1987) (recognizing statutory term as containing “some ambiguity” but holding that the agency’s interpretation was “incorrect” with reasoning that could be characterized readily as either *Chevron* step one or step two);
states the process of the agency’s interpretive decisionmaking, then step two is redundant with State Farm. Stephenson and Vermeule label these clashes “the doctrinal equivalent of musical chairs.”

Thus, Stephenson and Vermeule argue that Chevron has only one step: “[W]hether the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation.” Under the one-step approach, the reviewing court employs traditional tools of interpretation to identify the “zone of ambiguity” in which all permissible interpretations of a statute may fall. If the agency’s interpretation falls within this zone, the court must defer to the interpretation under Chevron. Otherwise, if the agency’s interpretation falls outside the range of permissible interpretations, the court must strike down the interpretation. In the latter case, Stephenson and Vermeule claim the denial of deference can be framed as either a step one outcome—that the statute “unambiguously prohibits the agency’s interpretation”—or as a step two outcome—that the interpretation is unreasonable.

Some judges seem amenable to this condensed framework. Many cases do not delineate two steps in their application of Chevron to agency interpretations. For that matter, cases that frame the Chevron inquiry as whether an agency’s interpretation is foreclosed by the statute, and conclude without inquiring into policy alternatives that an interpretation not foreclosed by the statute is reasonable, arguably embrace the one-step model by failing to conceptualize two separate, meaningful inquiries.

In a footnote in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, citing Stephenson and Vermeule’s article, Justice Scalia contended:

“Step 1” has never been an essential part of Chevron analysis. Whether a particular statute is ambiguous makes no difference if the interpretation adopted by the agency is clearly reasonable—and it would be a waste of time to conduct that inquiry. The same would be true if the agency interpretation is clearly beyond the scope of any conceivable ambiguity. It

See also id. at 453–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority’s muddling of Chevron’s two steps).

316 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 314, at 604.
317 Id. at 599.
318 Id. at 598–602.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
323 See, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002); see also supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (discussing Yellow Transportation).
does not matter whether the word “yellow” is ambiguous when the agency has interpreted it to mean “purple.”

Subsequently, in *United States v. Garcia-Santana*, Judge Marsha Berzon of the Ninth Circuit cited Justice Scalia’s footnote for the proposition that “the Supreme Court has authorized courts to omit evaluation of statutory ambiguity on the ground that, ‘if Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be unreasonable.’” Similarly, in *Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District*, Judge Ed Carnes of the Eleventh Circuit cited Stephenson and Vermeule to support that *Chevron’s* two steps are “obviously intertwined,” although he still bifurcated his opinion between steps one and two. Overall, empirical analysis of decisions from the federal circuit courts of appeals suggests that those courts may apply a one-step *Chevron* in roughly one quarter of cases.

The one-step view of *Chevron* has its critics. Kenneth Bamberger and Peter Strauss argue, for example, that courts thinking of *Chevron* as having only one step will not distinguish between mandatory and permissible interpretations of the statute. Yet, this distinction is often meaningful. For example, under the Supreme Court’s holding in *Brand X*, the agency has the authority to change its interpretation if a reviewing court has not previously found the meaning of a statute clear at *Chevron* step one. “[A] judicial precedent holding that a particular interpretation is either required or precluded fixes statutory meaning to that extent, foreclosing future agency constructions to the

---


325 774 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2014).

326 *Id.* at 542 (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009)); see also *Home Concrete & Supply*, 566 U.S. at 493 n.1 ( Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

327 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).

328 *Id.* at 1218–28 (citing Stephenson & Vermeule, *supra* note 314) (“Having concluded that the statutory language is ambiguous, our final issue is whether the EPA’s regulation . . . is a permissible construction of that language.”).

329 See Kerr, *supra* note 97, at 30 (observing that 28% of federal circuit court decisions applying *Chevron* in 1995 and 1996 followed a one-step model); Richard M. Re, *Should Chevron Have Two Steps?*, 89Ind. L.J. 605, 638 (2014) (finding that federal circuit courts used a one-step *Chevron* in 22% of cases decided in 2011).


contrary.”\footnote{Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 330, at 616.} Yet \textit{Chevron} stands for the proposition that the agency decides how to interpret the statute and the court only intervenes to the extent that (1) a particular interpretation is mandatory or (2) the agency has adopted an unreasonable interpretation.\footnote{See id. at 617 (“Thus, under \textit{Brand X}, when a court holds that an agency construction is impermissible because it exceeds the scope of interpretive authority assigned to the agency by reason of statutory ambiguity, the court should not go on to offer its views of the best way to resolve statutory meaning. Its role as ‘decider’ has been exhausted.”).} Thus, Bamberger and Strauss maintain, the one-step model of \textit{Chevron} would seem to undercut the reasoning of \textit{Brand X} by curtailing the instances in which an agency would perceive itself as having the power to adopt an alternative interpretation.

F. Flipping Chevron’s Two Steps

As a response to Stephenson and Vermeule’s one-step approach and its critics, Richard Re has developed yet another theory of \textit{Chevron}’s two steps that, in essence, reverses the order of step one and step two.\footnote{Re, supra note 329, at 619. Re is not the only scholar to have proposed flipping \textit{Chevron}’s two steps. See Richard Murphy, \textit{The Last Should Be First—Flip the Order of the Chevron Two-Step}, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 431 (2013).} Under this approach, the court first asks whether or not the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.\footnote{Re, supra note 329, at 619.} If the court finds that the interpretation is reasonable, the court then has discretion to address whether or not the statute mandates that interpretation.\footnote{Id.} Re defends the optional two-step approach because it removes the redundancy of some formalist approaches to \textit{Chevron} but avoids the arguable conflict with \textit{Brand X} generated by the one-step approach described by Stephenson and Vermeule.\footnote{See id. at 625.}

Qualitatively, Re draws examples from cases in which the Supreme Court has deferred to the agency’s interpretation without deciding whether the statute mandates the agency’s interpretation.\footnote{Id. at 634–35; see also Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012) (“We think the BIA’s view on imputation meets [the \textit{Chevron}] standard, and so need not decide if the statute permits any other construction.”); Astrue v. Capato \textit{ex rel.} B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 545 (2012).} In \textit{Astrue v. Capato \textit{ex rel.} B.N.C.},\footnote{566 U.S. 541 (2012).} the Court deferred to the agency’s interpretation under \textit{Chevron} as a permissible interpretation of the statute but refused to address whether the statute mandated the
agency’s interpretation.\(^{340}\) Moreover, Re reinforces his prescriptive formulation with empirical data demonstrating that appellate courts already switch between a one- and two-step approach to *Chevron*, suggesting that one of the steps is optional.\(^{341}\) While Re finds support for the optional two-step approach in the current practices of the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts of appeals, he acknowledges that no court has identified the approach as such.\(^{342}\) The optional two-step approach is, perhaps, more of a normative ideal than an identifiable approach. In cases where the court does not exercise the optional second step, the optional two-step approach would be indistinguishable from the one-step approach. Similarly, cases applying the optional step may appear as a traditional *Chevron* analysis. Nevertheless, Re offers at minimum a prescriptive approach that some judges may already embrace, even if he lacks qualitative comparisons between the cases of individual judges to identify its preexisting usage.

G. Justice Breyer’s Blended Deference Doctrine

Overall, *Chevron’s* scholarly variations maintain the formalistic structure of *Chevron’s* two steps. Justice Breyer, however, breaks the two-step mold. Instead, Justice Breyer is a strong advocate for a rather idiosyncratic approach to *Chevron* review. According to Justice Breyer, “*Chevron* made no relevant change” to the multifactor, contextual analysis of *Skidmore*.\(^{343}\) Rather, *Chevron* merely added an additional consideration to *Skidmore*—namely, whether Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency.\(^{344}\) Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in *Brand X* similarly emphasizes not the “force of law” language from *Mead*, but focuses on the “variety of indicators that Congress would expect *Chevron* deference.”\(^{345}\) He goes on to

\(^{340}\) Id. at 545 (“[E]ven if the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction that garners the Court’s respect under *Chevron* . . .”).

\(^{341}\) Re, supra note 329, at 634–35. We are not entirely convinced by the presentation of Re’s data as a descriptive tool. It appears to rely on the notion that there is a uniform application of *Chevron*. If an individual judge utilizes both one-step and two-step *Chevron* depending on the context, it would certainly support Re’s contentions of an optional-step *Chevron*. Re, however, does not identify any such judges. Alternatively, his data may reveal the panoply of *Chevron*’s variations, with some judges preferring a one-step approach and others a two-step approach. Nevertheless, Re’s optional two-step approach remains prescriptively viable.

\(^{342}\) Id. at 642.


\(^{344}\) Id. at 596.

lambast the Court’s reliance on agency procedure, noting that even in a case involving notice-and-comment rulemaking, “Congress may have intended not to leave the matter of a particular interpretation up to the agency.” Justice Breyer’s Brand X concurrence is consistent with his majority opinion in Barnhart v. Walton, where he examined “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time” to conclude that Chevron applied.

Essentially, Justice Breyer’s blended approach to deference seeks to ascertain congressional intent through an examination of the totality of the circumstances. Thus, he asks simply “whether Congress would want a reviewing court to defer to the agency interpretation at issue.” Particularly as compared to the more formalistic step-by-step model of Mead and Chevron advocated by some courts and scholars, Justice Breyer’s approach is more functionalistic. One of us has described this approach as generating a “word cloud,” with one or more doctrinal factors and tools of statutory interpretation popping out in ad hoc fashion to point toward or away from a congressional desire for deference.

Justice Breyer’s concurrence in City of Arlington best illustrates the blended approach. Justice Breyer refused to reduce congressional intent to just “a deference-warranting gap” in the statute, and instead called upon the Court to also consider additional factors. In addition to the factors he considered in Barnhart, Justice Breyer added that the “distance from the agency’s ordinary statutory duties” and the subject matter, as well as traditional tools of statutory interpretation, can be used to ascertain whether “ambiguity comes accompanied with agency authority to fill a gap with an interpretation that carries the force of law.” If Congress has not spoken unambiguously, the court should ask “whether Congress would have intended the agency to re-

---

346 Id. at 1004.
348 Id. at 222.
349 Hickman, supra note 130, at 541.
350 Id. at 541–42.
351 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
352 Id. at 1875–76.
solve the resulting ambiguity” and award or deny deference accordingly.353

Some circuit court judges have used Justice Breyer’s blended
Chevron—especially his analysis in Barnhart—in deciding which
agency materials outside of notice-and-comment rules and adjudica-
tions warrant Chevron deference. In Atrium Medical Center v. United
States Department of Health & Human Services,354 the Sixth Circuit
considered whether the interpretation by the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) of the Medicare Act,355 articulated in the
Provider Reimbursement Manual (“PRM”), warranted Chevron or
Skidmore deference.356 Prior to Atrium Medical Center, a number of
circuits reviewed the PRM under Skidmore,357 citing Mead for the pro-
position that agency manuals are “beyond the Chevron pale.”358 In
holding that the PRM deserved consideration under Chevron, the
Sixth Circuit found that the portion of the PRM at issue differed from
other parts in that CMS solicited comments, plus CMS has substantial
expertise and developed the PRM over a “long, long time.”359 The
Sixth Circuit then concluded that “[b]ecause Barnhart directs us to
apply Chevron, our analysis of the Secretary’s statutory interpretation
is relatively simple: CMS’s treatment of non-insurance short-term dis-
ability programs is simply not ‘manifestly contrary’ to [the statute].”360
The Sixth Circuit’s analysis lacks the structure of a formalistic ap-
proach to Chevron, and instead blends Mead’s threshold question with
the substantive analysis of Chevron into a single totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances question.

H. Chief Justice Roberts and a More Limited Chevron?

A growing body of opinions from Chief Justice Roberts seems to
reject wholesale application of Chevron to every ambiguous statutory
 provision, suggesting that a “grant of authority over some portion of a
statute does not necessarily mean that Congress granted the agency

353 Id. at 1876.
354 766 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2014).
Medicare).
357 See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass’n Gregoria Auffant, Inc. v. Thompson, 447 F.3d 68, 73 (1st
Cir. 2006); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey Peninsula v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 782, 791 (9th Cir.
2003).
360 Id. at 573.
interpretive authority over all its provisions.”361 Dissenting in City of Arlington, Chief Justice Roberts argued that courts should ask “whether Congress had ‘delegat[ed] authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute’” before applying Chevron.362 He contended that the Constitution requires a limited Chevron to preserve the separation of powers and ensure that Congress truly wished to delegate interpretive authority to the agency to decide the issue.363 Of course, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a minority of the Court in City of Arlington. But he tried again, and accomplished much the same result, writing for the Court in King v. Burwell.364 In that case, Chief Justice Roberts revived a fledgling major questions doctrine to require courts to predicate the availability of Chevron review on the centrality of the issue to the statutory scheme, its economic and political significance, and the extent of the agency’s expertise.365

Christopher Walker has both identified and defended this trend based upon his survey of agency officials regarding the technical drafting assistance they provide to Congress.366 Agency officials overwhelmingly expressed the view that congressional staffers do not understand preexisting regulatory regimes and draft poor-quality statutes.367 In light of these findings, Walker argues that Chevron deference encourages agencies to engage in self-delegation by drafting legislation deliberately, with an eye toward Chevron, to give themselves room to maneuver where they know greater statutory specificity might preclude their preferred policy outcomes.368 Walker argues that Congress cannot effectively police agency self-delegation through

361 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1883 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Hickman, supra note 33.


363 Id. at 1886.

364 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); see supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (describing King v. Burwell); see also Hickman, supra note 33, at 62–64 (linking Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to King v. Burwell with his earlier dissenting opinion in City of Arlington).

365 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89; see also Hickman, supra note 33, at 63–64 (describing the test for Chevron’s applicability one can draw from King v. Burwell, and connecting that test with the Court’s earlier decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.).


367 Id. at 1406–07.

368 Id. at 1407. Critics of Auer deference have raised similar arguments that deference regimes encourage self-delegation when the agency is substantially involved in drafting the later interpreted law. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 654 (1996); Nicholas R. Bednar, Essay, Defying Auer Deference: Skidmore as a Solution to Conservative Concerns in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, U.
the bicameral debate process due to institutional incompetency. Referencing Chief Justice Roberts’s approach, Walker contends a heightened “Chevron Step Zero”—asking “whether the collective Congress intended to delegate [the] particular substantive question to the agency”—would prevent collusion between individual members of Congress and encourage clearer delegation.369

Chief Justice Roberts’s approach has resonated with some circuit court judges. For example, in a concurring opinion in ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission,370 Judge O’Malley of the Federal Circuit cited King v. Burwell in finding that “there are times when courts should not search for an ambiguity in the statute because it is clear Congress could not have intended to grant the agency authority to act in the substantive space at issue.”371 Judge O’Malley argued that the court should not reach Chevron because the agency’s interpretation would allow the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) to regulate the internet despite the ITC having no relevant expertise.372 In conclusion, Judge O’Malley summarized, “[b]ecause Congress did not intend to delegate such authority to the Commission, . . . we never get past what some refer to as Chevron step zero.”373

One can cast Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to Chevron as either an expansion of or an addition to the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Mead, which limited the scope of Chevron’s applicability to agency actions carrying the force of law and reinstated the multifactor Skidmore standard as an alternative for those that do not.374 Alternatively, one can read Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis as yet another reframing of Chevron step one, reminiscent of some of Justice Breyer’s rhetoric. Either way, the result is less deference to agency interpretations of statutes.


370 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
371 Id. at 1302 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
372 Id. at 1303.
373 Id.
III. DEFENDING CHEVRON

When contemplating the many claims of Chevron’s impending demise, one has to consider exactly which aspect or variation of Chevron the anti-Chevron crowd has in mind. Many critics of Chevron do not reject deference per se but rather advocate for certain variations thereof.

Justice Scalia was the strongest advocate of a formalistic two-step Chevron, although he later seemed sympathetic to the notion of Chevron having only one step. Yet, Justice Scalia derided Mead and the more flexible, blended approach to Chevron pursued by Justice Breyer. Justice Scalia questioned Chevron’s validity only after the Court repeatedly strayed too far from his original vision. Similarly, Justice Breyer purportedly dislikes Chevron and has steadfastly refused to accept Justice Scalia’s formalistic Chevron in favor of his more flexible, blended approach. Yet, Justice Breyer tends to be at least as deferential, if not more so, to agency legal interpretations than Justice Scalia was.

Regardless of their many disagreements regarding Chevron’s validity, operation, and scope, however, both Justices have repeatedly acknowledged the importance of judicial deference and its role in administrative law. Like Justices Scalia and Breyer, academic critics of Chevron frequently seem merely to want to replace one version of Chevron with another, or with Skidmore—not do away altogether with judicial deference to agency action. As Part II establishes, for

---

375 See Scalia, supra note 56 (demonstrating Justice Scalia’s advocacy of a two-step Chevron).


379 See Breyer, supra note 66, 373–82; see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875–76 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disregarding Justice Scalia’s Chevron analysis in favor of his own).

380 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 119, at 1153–54 (documenting deference rates among individual Justices, including that Justice Breyer deferred more often than Justice Scalia, although Justice Scalia was more likely than Justice Breyer to defer to ideologically conservative interpretations).
better or worse, the *Chevron* umbrella has proved large enough to accommodate just about any vision of deferential review.

By contrast, other *Chevron* critics seem to want to do away with deferential review of agency statutory interpretations altogether. Certainly, the sponsors of SOPRA fall into this category, with their calls for de novo review. Their efforts focus on the wrong target.

For all of the debate and disagreement over *Chevron*’s substance, scope, and trajectory, two things seem clear, and both concern delegation.\footnote{See supra Parts I, II.} First, *Chevron* is a byproduct of congressional delegation (or conferral of discretionary authority). Indeed, the one aspect of *Chevron* upon which most of the Justices agree is the presence or absence of a congressional delegation of decisionmaking power as the touchstone for deciding whether to defer to agency interpretations of statutes. Only Justice Scalia has objected (rather vociferously) to *Mead*’s emphasis on “delegation” as relevant to deference.\footnote{See *Mead*, 533 U.S. at 239, 241–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1005, 1014–20 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).} Nevertheless, in describing his understanding of *Chevron*, Justice Scalia acknowledged that some statutory ambiguities reflect congressional intent to “leave [their] resolution to the agency,” and such ambiguities represent “the conferral of discretion upon the agency”\footnote{Scalia, supra note 56, at 516.}—i.e., delegation in all but name.\footnote{Justice Scalia’s resistance to characterizing the conferral of policymaking discretion as delegation is consistent with his pronouncements regarding executive power and the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., *Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns*, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001); *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The whole theory of lawful congressional ‘delegation’ is not that Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore assign its responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmakers, inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine—up to a point—how small or how large that degree shall be.”).} Without Congress’s expansive reliance on agencies to make significant policy decisions, *Chevron* would be unnecessary.

Second, Congress shows little inclination to curtail its habit of giving agencies expansive statutory authority to exercise policymaking discretion, and the courts appear equally disinclined to declare such power grants unconstitutional. So long as agencies are allowed such authority, *Chevron* deference—or something much like it—is likely inevitable. The courts and Congress should not fool themselves into believing otherwise.
A. Chevron Is Just a Standard of Review

With all of the debates and complaints about Chevron deference, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Chevron is, primarily, just a standard of review rather than a rule of decision. Chevron serves important doctrinal functions in facilitating the organization of legal arguments and helping judges to think about their role vis-à-vis agencies. In such ways, Chevron may influence judicial decisionmaking. At the end of the day, however, standards of review generally do not determine case outcomes. In the vast majority of cases, judicial evaluation of statutory text, history, and purpose—not Chevron—determines whether courts uphold an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Indeed, much of Chevron’s variability can be attributed to the fact that Chevron is a standard of review.

Standards of review always speak in terms of how skeptical or deferential a reviewing court should be in assessing the “correctness or propriety” of a lower-level adjudicator or interpreter, whether jury, court, or agency. Yet, standards of review are not bright-line rules, nor do they even represent fixed points on an attitudinal continuum. Rather, they are malleable. Justice Frankfurter described standards of review as reflecting moods: “[T]hat mood must be respected, even though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of application.” How does one pinpoint with precision what a mood represents?

Standards of review can be distilled into two key elements: the boilerplate and the application. The boilerplate recites talismanic language—describing the mood—across courts and cases to maintain the appearance of uniformity. For any standard of review, however, the boilerplate only scratches the surface of actual, case-by-case application. Particular to the administrative law context, even before Chevron took hold, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis observed:

Probably more than 500 pages a year are devoted to detailed statements about scope of review of administrative action; most of that verbiage is harmless, for neither the judges nor the readers of opinions take it seriously. Whether the verbiage

385 See Liu, supra note 225, at 291 (arguing that Chevron really only matters in “hard cases . . . when the court has already done all it can to ‘say what the law is’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
388 See Kunsch, supra note 386, at 15; Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381–82 (1985) (describing this as “trigger[s]” and “response[s]”).
The relative uniformity of a standard’s boilerplate tricks commentators into searching for uniformity in the standard’s application.

These observations about a standard of review’s boilerplate hold especially true for the *Chevron* standard. With its two-step framework, *Chevron*’s boilerplate often seems more rule-like than most standards of review—certainly more so than the alternative, multifactor *Skidmore* standard. But that more rule-like framework is deceptive—not least because, as described in Part II, *Chevron*’s two-step boilerplate routinely takes different rhetorical forms that, in turn, support different analytical approaches that may be more or less formalistic, more or less textualist, and more or less deferential.

With regard to application, scholars have long criticized judges for applying standards of review inconsistently. Martha Davis and Steven Childress observed that “standards of review become confused because reviewing judges, like the rest of us, respond differently to new situations.” Certainly, *Chevron*’s history mirrors this critique. The Supreme Court unknowingly sprung upon the lower courts what appeared to be a new two-part standard without articulating with any degree of detail its scope or substance. As litigants invoked *Chevron* in new contexts, courts had to make decisions about whether and how *Chevron* applied to the cases before them. Multiple versions of *Chevron* emerged because even the Justices disagree about the standard’s nuances. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements have been vague and inconsistent, and lower court judges with crowded dockets have been left to do the best they can with the cases before them. Multiply that lack of clarity across thousands of circuit court cases featuring different agencies, statutes, and subject matters, and *Chevron*’s variability is both understandable and predictable.

392 Davis & Childress, *supra* note 391, at 561.
393  *See supra* Section I.A.
394  *See supra* Section I.B.
Furthermore, because *Chevron* arguably calls for separate inquiries into statutory clarity and agency reasonableness, *Chevron* developed not along a single deference continuum but on a multidimensional grid comprised of $X$ (how clear), $Y$ (how reasonable), and $Z$ (how formalistic). Justice Scalia pursued a formalistic *Chevron* with a strong step one and a deferential but robust step two. Mark Seidenfeld’s syncopated *Chevron* assumes a still formalistic, but more deferential, standard with a narrow, textual step one inquiry and a broader but still highly deferential step two. The incorporation of *State Farm*’s hard look analysis by Ron Levin and some courts is also formalistic but, in addition to featuring a robust step one analysis, expands *Chevron* step two beyond a mere statutory inquiry. Justice Breyer’s approach and that of Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule blend *Chevron*’s two steps, and so are less formalistic, albeit in different ways that may or may not be more deferential than the others. And all of these variants of *Chevron* find support in the *Chevron* opinion and subsequent jurisprudence.

In summary, the use of a uniform label for a standard of review—or, indeed, any legal doctrine—does not create a uniformly applied legal doctrine. Allan Erbsen has observed a similar state of affairs with the choice-of-law doctrine announced by *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*. Courts and scholars have debated the contours of the *Erie* doctrine for over three-quarters of a century, and are just now accepting the viability of coexisting variations, leading Erbsen to suggest that there is no one, single *Erie* doctrine. *Chevron*’s status as a standard of review supports accepting its operation as similarly malleable. Perhaps it is time that courts and commentators recognize that *Chevron* can have multiple variations, all of which are reasonable interpretations of the doctrine’s primary source.

B. Statutory Ambiguity Is Unavoidable

No matter what standard of review, or even which version of *Chevron*, the courts choose to employ in evaluating agency interpretations of statutes, courts will disagree over statutory meaning. Even when judges employ pure de novo review using traditional tools of

395 See supra Part II (comparing a number of variations of *Chevron*).
396 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
397 See Erbsen, supra note 208, at 581–82 (“*Erie*’s imprecision and importance have combined to transform the opinion into a mirror that reflects the varying interests of its readers.”).
statutory construction with no layer of deference intruding, they often disagree over what statutes mean.398

Moreover, even if one pursues a robust, de novo–like analysis of statutory text, history, and purpose, some statutory questions simply do not have answers that can be derived through traditional common law reasoning. As Justice Scalia once observed:

An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires: (1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency. . . . When the latter is the case, what we have is the conferral of discretion upon the agency, and the only question of law presented to the courts is whether the agency has acted within the scope of its discretion—i.e., whether its resolution of the ambiguity is reasonable.399

Hence, Chevron itself recognizes that many statutes are silent on particular issues, and that the resolution of these silences “really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress.”400

Some examples are obvious. Many statutes contain specific statutory delegations of authority to make rules or adjudicate cases to accomplish a particular, congressionally identified goal, and resolving such matters obviously is not a matter of interpretation but of pure, naked policymaking.401 Long before it decided Chevron, the Supreme Court recognized the limitations of its role in reviewing agency exercises of specific authority grants. AT&T Co. v. United States,402 decided in 1936, offers a key illustration. In that case, the Court considered regulations implementing a provision of the Communications Act of 1934403 giving the FCC specific authority to establish uniform standards of accounting for utilities required to report their

---


399 Scalia, supra note 56, at 516.


receipts and expenditures to the agency for ratemaking purposes.\(^{404}\) Beyond the contextual need to support the ratemaking function itself, nothing in the statute’s text, history, or purpose offered more detailed guidance regarding the content of those uniform standards of accounting.\(^{405}\) Hence, no mere application of traditional tools of statutory construction could aid the Court in evaluating the FCC’s regulations. Beyond “gauging rationality,”\(^{406}\) what else was the Court to do? In the end, the only option for the Court was to evaluate the FCC’s regulations for reasonableness—whether they were “so entirely at odds with fundamental principles of correct accounting’ as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of judgment.”\(^{407}\) In deferring to the agency, the Court said that it was “not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers.”\(^{408}\)

When drafting a regulatory statute, Congress often cannot (or does not want to) articulate clear legislative rules for things like “what constitute[s] a ‘safe’ drug, a ‘reasonable hazard,’ . . . [or] a ‘crash-worthy automobile.’”\(^{409}\) Congress assigns responsibility for giving content to these terms to agency experts, whether through rulemaking, through adjudication, or both.\(^{410}\) Broad statutory terms may cabin agency discretion, and a court might be able to invoke traditional interpretive tools to arrive at a workable understanding of such words and phrases. In \textit{AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board}, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that the word “necessary” as used in the Telecommunications Act of 1996\(^{411}\) with respect to network elements conferred broad discretion on the FCC, but also served a limiting function, and that the FCC’s interpretation of the statute exceeded the limitations imposed by even that broad term.\(^{412}\) But resolving terms as

\(^{404}\) \textit{AT&T Co.}, 299 U.S. at 235.
\(^{405}\) See id. at 235–36.
\(^{406}\) Id. at 237.
\(^{407}\) Id. at 236–37 (citation omitted) (quoting Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423, 444 (1913)).
\(^{408}\) Id. at 236.
\(^{410}\) See id. at 246–47; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp. (\textit{Chenery II}), 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947) (concluding that, where Congress gives an agency the power to exercise delegated power through both rulemaking and adjudication, the choice between those two formats lies with the agency).
\(^{412}\) See, e.g., \textit{AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilis. Bd.}, 525 U.S. 366, 388–90 (1999) (recognizing statutory terms “necessary” and “impair” as giving the agency broad but not unlimited discretion).
vague as “necessary”—or “safe,” “reasonable,” or “crashworthy”—inherently involves making policy judgments as to what activities are desired or acceptable, promoted or prohibited.\footnote{Wilson, supra note 409, at 241.}

Additionally, as the Chevron Court recognized, particularly given the complexity of modern statutes, sometimes congressional reliance on agency policymaking is not so explicit, meaning that Congress did not see the problem to be resolved but nevertheless clearly signaled somehow in the statute its intent that agencies have discretion in filling the gap.\footnote{See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see also Scalia, supra note 56, at 516–18.} To such ends, Congress routinely by statute authorizes agencies to adopt rules and regulations as needed to effectuate statutory goals.\footnote{See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 483–87 (2002) (noting general rulemaking grants in various statutes). For examples of grants of general authority, see, for example, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2012), granting authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission over the Securities Act of 1933; 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012), granting authority to the Secretary of the Treasury Department over the Internal Revenue Code; and 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012), granting authority to the National Labor Relations Board over the National Labor Relations Act.}

And the Supreme Court has long recognized instances in which Congress has delegated general rulemaking authority and, in turn, statutory interpretation of ambiguous provisions involves policymaking.\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961) (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”).} Such was the case in Chevron itself, where the EPA exercised general rulemaking authority to elaborate how an underdefined statutory term applied to a common set of facts and circumstances, and the Court did not feel that traditional tools of statutory construction offered a clear answer.

Even if Chevron is not part of the analysis, reasonable judges will prefer different tools of statutory construction and reach different conclusions regarding statutory meaning, whether or not they are influenced at least partly by policy implications.\footnote{See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2120 (2016) (reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)).} In \textit{Yates v. United States},\footnote{135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).} for example, the Supreme Court considered whether a commercial fisherman who tossed harvested undersized fish into the sea could be charged under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act\footnote{Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).} for knowingly con-
cealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation” of a United States agency. Writing for the plurality, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, utilized the statutory text, textual canons, dictionaries, other provisions within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, other statutes, legislative history, and the rule of lenity to conclude that “tangible object” applied only to objects intended to “record or preserve information.” Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined, using nearly all of the same tools to reach the opposite conclusion.

Chevron’s threshold inquiry—whether the statute at issue is ambiguous—merely adds another layer of complexity while reflecting the same disagreements regarding statutory meaning. In other words, just as judges will inevitably disagree sometimes in attempting to discern statutory meaning using traditional tools, they will likewise inevitably disagree in applying those same tools to assess whether a statute is clear or ambiguous. As Justice Scalia observed early in Chevron’s life, how one answers “how clear is clear [] may have much to do with where one stands on the earlier points of what Chevron means and whether Chevron is desirable.” He then ruminated regarding differences in interpretive methodology:

One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a “plain meaning” rule, and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of “reasonable” interpretation that the agency may adopt and to which the courts must pay deference.

Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, but did not join the majority opinion. See id. at 1089–90 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1074–89 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1090–101 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Scalia, supra note 56, at 521.
Id.
In short, that question—how clear is clear—focuses only partly on *Chevron* itself. The interpretive methodology of the judge applying it as the standard of review necessarily comes into play as well.

A recent exchange of ideas between Chief Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit and Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit highlights the difficulty of reaching consensus in statutory interpretation cases, with or without the *Chevron* standard. Writing generally about statutory interpretation, Chief Judge Katzmann advocated using legislative history to understand what the law means and ensure faithful execution of congressional intent.426 Although he warned against using legislative history to inject ambiguity into otherwise clear statutes,427 he maintained that failing to consider legislative history could actually expand a judge’s discretion by leaving her “only with words that could be interpreted in a variety of ways without contextual guidance as to what legislators may have thought.”428 By comparison, Judge Kavanaugh expressed concern that judicial reliance on legislative history to resolve interpretive questions would merely allow judges to find whatever evidence supports their favored interpretation.429 He instead advocated a two-step process for resolving statutory meaning: courts should first use textualist tools to find the “best reading” of the statute; courts then could apply substantive canons to depart from the text.430 In response to Judge Kavanaugh, Chief Judge Katzmann raised the possibility that there will always “be legitimate differences about what is the ‘best reading’ under the proposed framework whenever there is ambiguity” in statutory meaning.431

Perhaps not surprisingly, the exchange between Chief Judge Katzmann and Judge Kavanaugh reflected disagreement over *Chevron*’s approach to statutory ambiguity as well. Consistent with *Chevron*’s general premise, Chief Judge Katzmann described statutory ambiguity as “often the product of the simple fact that the issues are difficult and Congress, having identified the general problem, leaves it to an agency or court to determine how best to address the problem in its specifics.”432 By comparison, Judge Kavanaugh was more prepared

---

428 *Katzmann, supra* note 426, at 48.
429 *See Kavanaugh, supra* note 417, at 2149–50.
430 *Id.* at 2144.
431 *See Katzmann, supra* note 427, at 398.
432 *Katzmann, supra* note 426, at 47.
to find statutory clarity. In cases where an agency interprets “broad and open-ended terms,” such as “reasonable” or “feasible,”

a judge can engage in appropriately rigorous scrutiny of an agency’s statutory interpretation and simultaneously be very deferential to an agency’s policy choices within the discretion granted to it by the statute.

But in cases where an agency is instead interpreting a specific statutory term or phrase, courts should determine whether the agency’s interpretation is the best reading of the statutory text.433

Nevertheless, Judge Kavanaugh also worried that “judges often cannot make that initial clarity versus ambiguity decision in a settled, principled, or evenhanded way.”434 Judge Kavanaugh’s concern is not redundancy, but fear that nontextualists will too quickly end the step one inquiry. Indeed, he worried that Chevron encourages the executive branch to abuse the doctrine by aggressively pursuing ambiguity in litigation.435 According to Judge Kavanaugh, “In certain major Chevron cases, different judges will reach different results even though they may actually agree on what is the best reading of the statutory text.”436 Consequently, Judge Kavanaugh concluded that step one is so fraught with disagreement that “we need to consider eliminating that inquiry as the threshold trigger.”437 In this sense, Judge

433 Kavanaugh, supra note 417, at 2153–54 (footnote omitted).
434 Id. at 2118.
435 See id. at 2151. Judge Kavanaugh claims “some academics fail to fully grasp the reality of how this works.” Id. Kavanaugh is undoubtedly correct at least anecdotally, but the extent to which Chevron has such an effect systemically is difficult to discern with any reliable degree of certainty. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 703 (2014) (offering the first empirical analysis of Chevron’s influence on agency rulemaking, with nuanced results). James Q. Wilson, after acknowledging that agencies actively pursue autonomy, stated, “The supposedly imperialistic character of government agencies is a vast oversimplification.” Wilson, supra note 409, at 195. Although he was an academic, Wilson served in three Republican administrations (as well as the Johnson administration) and was a leading expert on bureaucracy. See Tevi Troy, The Mind in the Oval Office, Am. Enterprise Inst. (Mar. 2, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.aei.org/publication/the-mind-in-the-oval-office/print; see also James Q. Wilson, Ph.D. (In Memoriam), Pepp. Sch. Pub. Pol’y, http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/academics/faculty/?faculty=james_wilson [https://perma.cc/MD4W-REN3] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017). Wilson published his seminal commentary on bureaucracy in 1989, and it is fair to theorize that the post-Chevron years have altered agency behavior. Regardless, as this Article describes, at least some understandings of Chevron analysis leave room within that doctrine to police agency aggressiveness.
436 Kavanaugh, supra note 417, at 2153.
437 Id. at 2154.
Kavanaugh’s approach to *Chevron* appears similar to Stephenson and Vermeule’s one-step *Chevron*.438

In short, ambiguity is inevitable so long as jurists continue to disagree about what tools and interpretive theories ought to apply when interpreting statutes. Those disagreements inevitably spill over and infuse the disagreements over *Chevron* and its two steps. But eliminating *Chevron* will not magically resolve the problem of statutory ambiguity.

C. Delegation, Not Deference, Is the “Problem”

In the end, when courts apply *Chevron*, agencies will win some cases and lose others. Whenever judges reject controversial agency statutory interpretations, critics will contend the judges were inadequately deferential. Whenever judges uphold controversial agency statutory interpretations, critics will contend the judges were overly deferential. Sometimes, judges strain our credulity by employing traditional tools of statutory construction in arguably tortured ways to find statutory clarity. Some judges will find ambiguity in a stop sign.439 Blaming *Chevron* for case outcomes that one dislikes is misdirected. The real “fault” (to the extent it exists) is a system of government that routinely relies on unelected agency officials to resolve hard policy questions.

Yet, Congress seems unlikely to stop delegating policymaking authority to agencies. In *Mistretta v. United States*,440 the Supreme Court contended that, “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”441 In the same case, even as he dissented from allowing the Sentencing Commission to adopt uniform sentencing guidelines, Justice Scalia conceded that courts cannot readily preclude Congress from relying on agencies to make policy because “no statute can be entirely precise” and “some judgments involving policy considerations[] must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it.”442

---

438 See supra Section II.E.

439 Credit for this particular observation goes to a judge who said it to one of the authors and whose identity we will not disclose, though he attributed authorship to another as well.


441 Id. at 372.

442 Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Regardless of whether Congress could stop delegating policymaking discretion, it seems unlikely to do so. Arguments abound justifying congressional delegations of discretionary power to agencies. Congress routinely delegates authority to agencies because it wants to utilize their policy and scientific expertise to resolve programmatic details and fill statutory gaps. Additionally, Christopher Walker’s study of agency involvement in statutory drafting reflects interaction between agency officials and congressional staffers that may, in turn, lead Congress to delegate even more discretionary authority to the former. Notwithstanding their own subject matter expertise, congressional staffers routinely seek assistance—much of it technical, but some of it substantive—from agencies when drafting legislation. Congressional staffers may be insufficiently familiar with agencies’ governing statutes and implementing regulations, leading congressional staffers to seek drafting assistance from agency experts to avoid duplicative or conflicting language in legislative proposals. In other words, Congress utilizes agency expertise in the legislative drafting process to improve statutory quality and avoid creating enforcement headaches for the agency once the legislation passes. And because agencies play a substantial role in the legislative process, they may be perceived as possessing comparative expertise over courts in understanding Congress’s original intent, which in turn may prompt Congress to delegate more power to agency officials.

Broad delegations may at times indicate that Congress cannot decide what it wants or does not know what a particular regulatory scheme needs to function most effectively. Particularly in the face of changing social, economic, or technological conditions, good governance in some instances may dictate that Congress should delegate general rulemaking power coupled with open-ended statutory language to give agencies flexibility in utilizing their expertise to accomplish congressional goals. If Congress, despite its investigative powers, cannot ascertain the best means of achieving complex regulatory goals, courts

---

443 See, e.g., McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 184 (1999) (suggesting more positively that delegation allows Congress “to write simpler statutes, allows the details of policy to adjust to new knowledge and changed circumstances, and creates an expert body that can provide useful information about the needs for changes in either legislation or appropriations”).

444 See Walker, supra note 366, at 1388–89.

445 See id. at 1391–94.


447 Wilson, supra note 409, at 246–47.
are unlikely to produce satisfactory solutions to such quandaries when they arise in cases of narrow scope.

More cynically, Congress may at least sometimes draft regulatory statutes ambiguously to serve the interests of the legislators themselves. Scholars have theorized, for example, that Congress uses ambiguous language to reduce legislative delays caused by continued debate over statutory terms and shift the political costs of undesirable decisions from legislators, whose jobs depend on public opinion, to bureaucrats.\(^{448}\) If the details of regulatory schemes are controversial, these scholars suggest, Congress may seek to claim credit for the politically favorable aspects of legislation on one hand, but shift blame for politically undesirable decisions on the other.\(^{449}\)

Regardless of Congress’s reasons for delegating policymaking discretion in the first instance, most jurists prefer not to be in the policymaking business, at least not on the same scale as agencies. As Justice Blackmun put it, “A judge is first and foremost one who resolves disputes, and not one charged with the duty to fashion broad policies establishing the rights and duties of citizens. That task is reserved primarily for legislators.”\(^{450}\) Of course, in any common law system, judicial resolution of individual cases often carries policy implications. Nevertheless, the traditional sort of judicial policymaking is different at least in degree, if not in kind, from the major policymaking role that agencies play in the modern regulatory state.

Particularly as compared to agencies, generalist judges lack the expertise to engage in that latter kind of policymaking. Indeed, the Supreme Court in *Chevron* justified deferring to agency interpretations by recognizing that agencies are better policymakers than courts.\(^{451}\) And, as Justice Scalia further recognized in *Mistretta*, Congress better understands the “necessities” of government and the Court “almost never fe[els] qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”\(^{452}\) Even if courts possessed more institutional capacity to engage in expansive policymaking, most judges likely do not want that sort of responsibility—hence most


judges’ insistence that their function is to interpret rather than make the law.

In sum, Congress has relied and likely will continue to rely on agencies to exercise policymaking discretion in filling statutory gaps. As *Chevron* counsels, when Congress clearly envisions an agency role in resolving such questions, the only role that remains for the courts is to police such agency interpretations for reasonableness. Hence, the Court has grounded *Chevron* in the assumption that, where Congress statutorily grants agencies the power to act with the force of law, Congress thus wants courts to defer to agency interpretations of those statutes.453 Some have described this assumption as fictional, contending that Congress gives little consideration to judicial deference doctrine or standards of review when it drafts legislation. A study by Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman suggests otherwise, demonstrating at least that, nearly thirty years after the Court’s *Chevron* decision, the practices and intentions of congressional staffers charged with drafting legislation strongly support the intuitions driving *Chevron*—that Congress often but does not always intend to delegate primary interpretive responsibility to administering agencies rather than courts.454 Exemplifying the latter, Kent Barnett has documented Congress’s deliberate and express rejection of *Chevron* in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.455

D. Amending the APA Will Not Eliminate *Chevron*

Could Congress amend the APA to contradict the Supreme Court’s assumption that Congress generally wants it to defer as *Chevron* contemplates? Perhaps. SOPRA—the Separation of Powers Restoration Act—passed by the House of Representatives, is an example of legislators attempting to do just that.456 Whether SOPRA would effectively accomplish its goal of eliminating *Chevron* deference is uncertain.

453 See *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
Section 706 of the APA presently calls upon reviewing courts to “decide all relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.” That same provision goes on to instruct reviewing courts to “set aside agency action” they find to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Although the Court’s opinion in *Chevron* used language echoing APA section 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary and capricious standard, and more recent opinions have linked *Chevron* step two to *State Farm*’s interpretation of the same text, Justice Scalia is correct in saying that the Court has never tied the *Chevron* standard of review very tightly to the APA’s text.

SOPRA proposes to amend APA section 706 to require courts to “decide *de novo* all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules.” Although SOPRA’s text does not mention *Chevron* explicitly, statements by the Act’s sponsors and supporters indicate that their primary goal with SOPRA is to eliminate the deferential *Chevron* standard of review for agency interpretations of statutes.

Given the general understanding that SOPRA’s proponents aim to overturn *Chevron*, presumably many or even most judges would honor that intent and stop applying *Chevron*, at least by name. At a minimum, SOPRA’s reference to de novo review may encourage more robust consideration of statutory text, history, and purpose from judges otherwise inclined toward the least intrusive, and thus most deferential, variants of *Chevron* analysis.

On the other hand, SOPRA’s text is not explicit in repudiating *Chevron* altogether, leaving the amendment open to interpretation. As should be apparent from Part II, at least in theory, the *Chevron* standard itself contemplates a de novo–like step one analysis employing traditional tools of statutory construction to evaluate congres-

---

458 Id. § 706(2)(A).
460 See supra notes 152–70 and accompanying text.
462 H.R. 4768 § 2(3) (emphasis added).
sional intent and provides for deference under step two only when those tools fail to yield a clear answer. Also, as noted above, many statutes contemplate that agencies will exercise discretion to fill statutory gaps—sometimes explicitly, for example by expressly calling upon agencies to develop regulations to resolve a particular issue; other times implicitly, for example by using vague or undefined terms and separately authorizing agencies to adopt regulations as needed. Consequently, a reviewing court might reasonably interpret a specific statutory grant of discretionary authority—for example to adopt regulations or pursue formal adjudication to elaborate and implement undefined or underdefined statutory terms—as taking precedence over a general call for de novo review contained in the APA. Thus, a reviewing court might reasonably conclude that SOPRA’s reference to de novo review does not preclude judicial deference in all cases, but rather merely limits the scope of when the court ought to honor the agency’s choices. If such is the case, then it is difficult to see what exactly SOPRA’s call for de novo review accomplishes that cannot be reconciled with *Chevron* and *Mead*.

Perhaps recognizing these limitations, a lengthier SOPRA incorporated into the House version of the RAA goes even further by specifying:

> If the reviewing court determines that a statutory or regulatory provision relevant to its decision contains a gap or ambiguity, the court shall not interpret that gap or ambiguity as an implicit delegation to the agency of legislative rulemaking authority and shall not rely on such gap or ambiguity as a justification either for interpreting agency authority expansively or for deferring to the agency’s interpretation on the question of law.

Presumably, this language is intended to undermine *Chevron’s* instruction that courts should defer when faced with ambiguous statutes. By instructing courts not to read statutory ambiguities as delegations of legislative rulemaking power, this language also raises the specter of some very old notions regarding different types of statutory grants of rulemaking power. In doing so, the revised SOPRA may generate more questions and create more uncertainty than it resolves.

---

465 See *supra* notes 401–16 and accompanying text.
466 *Cf.* Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general . . . .”)
In the middle of the twentieth century, the consensus among courts, agencies, and legal scholars held that agencies could only promulgate legally binding regulations when Congress specified statutorily what the content of those regulations should be.\textsuperscript{468} By contrast, more general statutory grants of authority to adopt rules and regulations as needed were thought not to support legally binding regulations at all.\textsuperscript{469} In light of this distinction, prior to \textit{Chevron}, courts evaluated agency regulations adopted pursuant to specific grants of rulemaking power merely for reasonableness but less authoritative, general authority regulations using \textit{Skidmore}'s arguably less deferential, multifactor analysis.\textsuperscript{470} One of \textit{Chevron}'s innovations was to eliminate the old specific versus general authority distinction in the judicial deference context.\textsuperscript{471} By implicitly distinguishing between specific and general authority delegations of rulemaking power, does the revised SOPRA contemplate a return to different standards of review for specific versus general authority regulations? If so, which ones—\textit{Chevron}, \textit{Skidmore}, neither, or both?

Moreover, the added language addresses only the standard of review that courts should apply when evaluating agency legal interpretations. Meanwhile, other provisions of the RAA preserve a distinction between legislative rules subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements and interpretative rules and policy statements exempt from those procedures, without defining those categories.\textsuperscript{472} Since at least the 1960s, courts have routinely treated regulations adopted pursuant to general grants of rulemaking authority as legislative rules carrying the force of law and, thus, as subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.\textsuperscript{473} By implicitly distinguishing between specific and general delegations of rulemaking power, does the revised SOPRA repeal the legal effect of fifty years of general authority regulations treated as legislative rules by agencies, courts, and regulated parties alike? Do all of those regulations suddenly become interpretative rules, subject to change without further notice and opportunity

\textsuperscript{468} See Hickman, supra note 50, at 1564–67 (documenting pre-\textit{Chevron} historical understandings regarding different types of statutory rulemaking authority).

\textsuperscript{469} Id.

\textsuperscript{470} See id. at 1568–73 (relating deference doctrine to scholarly and judicial understandings of specific versus general delegations of rulemaking power in the decades prior to the \textit{Chevron} decision).


\textsuperscript{472} H.R. 5 § 103(b) (amending APA section 553 rulemaking procedures but retaining the exceptions from most procedural requirements for interpretative rules and policy statements).

\textsuperscript{473} Hickman, supra note 50, at 1574–75.
for comment? And if so, then what happens if Congress downgrades thousands of regulations governing primary behavior and extending government benefits from binding law to mere nonbinding agency advice?

In short, although intended to overturn *Chevron*, neither version of SOPRA is altogether clear as to its meaning or its scope. Additionally, the revised SOPRA contained in the House version of the RAA is arguably inconsistent with other provisions of that legislation and, if adopted, could be enormously destabilizing for those who depend upon consistency in the laws that govern their legal rights, obligations, and interests. Perhaps for these reasons, the version of the RAA presently making its way through the Senate contains none of SOPRA’s language and does not seek otherwise to repudiate *Chevron* or limit its scope.\(^\text{474}\)

Regardless, whatever amendment to the APA Congress might fashion and adopt, merely telling courts to decide cases for themselves and not read too much into statutory gaps is unlikely to eliminate judicial deference to agency interpretations of law. When faced with two competing, seemingly reasonable interpretations of a statute, and when traditional tools of statutory construction fail to provide a clear answer, many judges will be inclined simply to side with the agency charged by Congress with administering the statute. With *Chevron* deference as an option, courts finding themselves in such a scenario are free to say so as the basis for their decision. Without that alternative, courts in such circumstances may very well still side with the agency but with less transparency, justifying their decisions using whatever interpretive tools the agency suggested in its brief—even if that reasoning did not persuade the court that the agency’s interpretation really was superior. Such disingenuousness in judicial decision-making hardly seems like an improvement over the status quo.

In the end, the only way for Congress to really “repeal” *Chevron* sensibly and effectively is statute by statute, and perhaps even provision by provision, disclaiming the use of *Chevron* where Congress intends the agency to have no major policymaking role, and clarifying statutory language where Congress disagrees with the administering agency’s interpretation thereof. That outcome seems almost as unlikely on a grand scale as Congress ceasing its reliance on delegating policymaking discretion in the first instance.

---

Conclusions

Reports of Chevron’s demise are greatly exaggerated, and efforts to overturn Chevron aim at the wrong target. Certainly, Chevron is a highly imperfect doctrine. The opinion itself is confusing. Courts are inconsistent when they apply it, adding to the confusion. Legitimate questions abound regarding Chevron’s proper scope and operation. Undoubtedly, there remains room for improvement and clarification.

Yet, casting Chevron as administrative law’s bogeyman has always been a bit overwrought. Chevron undoubtedly is not what the Framers had in mind, but then again, neither is the modern regulatory state. So long as agency officials possess the authority to make major policy decisions, Chevron—or something much like it—will survive. Congress will continue delegating, so courts will continue deferring in some number of cases. To the extent that courts and commentators want to curtail the administrative state, they should focus their efforts on rolling back congressional delegations of policymaking discretion to agency officials rather than overturning Chevron.

In short, Chevron’s basic premises represent a reasonable judicial response to the government that we actually have and the world in which we actually live. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, Chevron is the worst standard of review, except for all the others.475

475 CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF: THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF QUOTATIONS 573 (Richard M. Langworth ed., 2008) (quoting speech to the House of Commons on November 11, 1947: “[D]emocracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time . . . .” (alteration in original)).