ESSAY

Gender Unbound?

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ABSTRACT

This Essay engages current research on gender norms and biases and the way they interact in the political sphere with female candidates. Since Hillary Clinton’s campaign for U.S. President in 2008, many scholarly retrospectives have presented various reasons that her candidacy faltered. As a starting point, this piece addresses one particular account that is rooted in implicit bias theory. After outlining the application of this claim, which suggests that implicit bias is responsible for her loss, I show that the more conventional and structural explanations for Clinton’s political defeat in the presidential primary contests are likely more responsible. Indeed, most female candidates face these issues in competing for office. These explanations, however, still leave open the real and present concern that gendered expectations do tend to shape the way female candidates craft their campaign strategies. For any future female candidate for president, confronting these expectations will remain a challenge.

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INTRODUCTION

The election of Barack Obama as President led to an important political debate about whether the campaign of 2008 signals the emergence of a postracial America.1 The outcome of this campaign also raises a provocative question regarding the candidacy of his primary opponent, Hillary Clinton—what does her loss during the Democratic primary season tell us about gender bias in American politics? Clinton’s campaign not only clearly made progress toward breaking the “highest, hardest glass ceiling” in American politics,2 but it also revealed some telling evidence about the remaining barriers that many female candidates face in the political system.3 Taking account of the individual cases of expressed gender animus and the more structural elements of bias in the campaign, two scholars—Gregory S. Parks and Quinetta M. Roberson—have provided insights in recent articles about the obstacles confronting female candidates at every level of politics.4

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1 See, e.g., News Release, Pew Research Ctr., The Economy, Health Care Reform and Gates Grease the Skids: Obama’s Ratings Slide Across the Board (July 30, 2009), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/532.pdf. The postracial America argument seems especially doubtful given the later controversy with the President’s comments on the arrest of Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates and Cambridge Police Sergeant James Crowley. Polling by Pew Research Center shortly after President Obama’s press conference showed a split in opinion, largely along racial lines. Id. at 6. Overall, the President’s job approval rating among whites in the wake of these events dropped seven percentage points. Id. at 3.


3 See infra Parts II, IV.

Among the multitude of retrospectives about the implications of the history-making 2008 campaign for the presidency, Parks and Roberson rather distinctively examine the issue of gender bias from a different perspective. Parks and Roberson draw on lessons from employment law to analyze the ways that gender bias influenced the outcome of the Democratic primaries and the general election. Building on their training in psychology to address the theory of implicit bias, the authors explore some interesting comparisons between the way gender bias operates in the typical employment setting and in the context of politics.

This Essay reviews Parks and Roberson’s major contentions, identifying some of the strengths and shortcomings in the authors’ treatment of the 2008 election and gender in politics generally. On the whole, their argument that implicit gender bias was an important, though not wholly dispositive, factor in the 2008 election, as well as politics generally, is well supported by evidence from the campaign. The authors provide a good review of instances in which gender stereotypes and bias likely affected both Senator Clinton’s effort to become the Democratic presidential nominee and the power and public view of First Lady Michelle Obama. They persuasively show that many of these episodes help illustrate the kind of unfair treatment that confronts most female candidates who vie for public office.

The unfair treatment of a candidate in political contests, however, is not quite the same as illegal treatment under the law. Although the insights from psychological studies provide a fresh perspective on its operation, the world of politics is too nebulous to apply the kind of analysis that the authors wish to import into employment law. Despite their insights, the authors’ arguments are somewhat less persuasively supported by the examples they provide.

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6 Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 322–23.

7 See, e.g., id. at 325–32 (comparing explicit sexism in Hillary Clinton’s campaign to explicit sexism in the workplace and considering whether Clinton could file a successful Title VII claim).

8 See id. at 335–39 (describing implicit bias and providing specific examples from the Clinton campaign).

9 See id. at 337–39.

10 See Parks & Roberson, Through the Lens of Title VII, supra note 4, at 4–7.

11 Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 337–39.

12 See infra Part III.
sive in linking the Clinton campaign’s experience to Title VII’s model of prohibited activity. Even accepting that gender bias was a factor in directing the ultimate course of the primaries and general election, the traditional factors that commonly shape political outcomes played a more commanding role in 2008.13

Part I of this Essay assesses Parks and Roberson’s argument that courts should consider theories of implicit bias in evaluating employment discrimination claims. Part II recounts Parks and Roberson’s observations about how gender discrimination operates in the political realm. Part III discusses the problems with the core assumption that the employment law model is easily applicable to politics. For several reasons, the rough-and-tumble world of political competition does not easily fit the criteria-based reasoning encouraged in the employment context. Turning to the details of the 2008 election, Part IV employs alternative theoretical frames to suggest that a more complete account of the campaign may show that gender bias worked along with other unmentioned factors in determining the ultimate outcome.

I. Gender Bias & Employment Law

The analytical core of the Parks and Roberson argument is its prescriptive treatment of gender discrimination cases. In “Eighteen Million Cracks,”: Gender’s Role in the 2008 Presidential Campaign (“Eighteen Million Cracks”), Parks and Roberson’s analysis of Hillary Clinton’s 2008 campaign, their critique focuses on the current doctrine that applies to claims that allege employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.14 As with other areas of antidiscrimination law, a major challenge confronting plaintiffs in these cases is the legal requirement to provide sufficient evidence of an illegal purpose or intent on the part of the employer defendant.15 Today, of course, there are few civil lawsuits in which the plaintiff is able to produce “smoking gun” record evidence—a formal policy or personal statement indicating the defendant employer’s explicit discriminatory intent.16

13 See infra Part IV.
16 See, e.g., Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985).
Consequently, many plaintiffs rely upon more circumstantial cases to satisfy the intent requirement. Two common strategies of this variety include presenting data on the employer’s decisions over an extended period of time or analyzing those decisions across a broader field of similarly situated individuals. Under this approach, the plaintiff seeks to demonstrate that the defendant’s employment decision is part of a pattern of unequal or biased treatment of a disfavored class to which the plaintiff belongs. Multivariate statistical analysis is often crucial to establish such patterns in the employer’s hiring decisions, although it also can force judges and jurors to wade through the conflicting (and sometimes very confusing) interpretations presented by dueling expert witness reports.

Using either the direct or indirect approach, the seminal element in the plaintiff’s evidentiary case is information about the employer’s underlying motivations. Following Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the main Supreme Court decision expounding upon gender-based claims, courts apply a burden-shifting regime that offers the employer the chance to present a nondiscriminatory explanation for the challenged decision. This step can further complicate the plaintiff’s burden of showing discriminatory intent because the plaintiff-employee must answer any such rebuttal by challenging the credibility of the asserted nondiscriminatory rationale. Only if the evidence in its entirety shows that the asserted explanation is a pretext for unlawful discrimination will the court allow the lawsuit to proceed. In practical terms, the plaintiff ultimately must pierce the assumption of rational decisionmaking on the part of the employer to move the claim forward.

In discussing Price Waterhouse, Parks and Roberson focus on the fact that gender-based stereotypes in the workplace did not figure more prominently in the Supreme Court’s analysis of discriminatory

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17 See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc. (Joe’s Stone Crab II), 220 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing how general data about disparate impact on a particular group can prove a Title VII violation for a facially neutral policy).
18 See id.
22 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507–08.
23 See id.; see also 45C Am. Jur. 2d, supra note 21, § 2416.
intent. They claim that these stereotypes inform a great deal of biased decisionmaking in the workplace, even though the normal judicial search for intent-focused evidence is ill-suited to uncover this implicit bias. *Price Waterhouse* recognizes a relatively loose association between expressed sex-based stereotypes and workplace discrimination. The majority of the Justices concluded that a judge may find that such evidence is relevant to the plaintiff's case. The opinion, however, does not embrace the more controversial assertion that these gender stereotypes, standing alone, can themselves demonstrate the kind of discriminatory intent that the statute forbids. Although the Court directed trial judges to consider this type of evidence in support of a plaintiff's case, it warned that this information must accompany additional evidence that more directly links the asserted stereotype to the employer's decisionmaking.

Justifying a closer relationship between social stereotypes and discriminatory intent is the main goal of Parks and Roberson's works regarding gender in politics. In Parks and Roberson's view, the existing legal doctrine ignores how prominently gender beliefs can inform the employer's thinking long before the challenged employment decision occurs. Indeed, the defendant may not even be cognizant of how these hidden biases can influence a hiring or promotion decision. For both of these reasons, the causal linkages in evidence that the *Price Waterhouse* framework demands may not be readily apparent to the typical plaintiff. Indeed, they may even be impossible to obtain through the normal course of discovery. Reviewing several

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26 See *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, 490 U.S. 228, 251–52 (1989); see also id. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

27 See id. at 251–52 (majority opinion).

28 See, e.g., id. at 270–76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

29 Id. at 241–42, 251–52 (majority opinion).


31 See id. at 322–23, 335–38.

32 See id. at 336; see also Parks & Roberson, *Through the Lens of Title VII*, supra note 4, at 30.


34 Because the scope of federal discovery is limited to the specific claim asserted by a given plaintiff, see *Fed. R. Civ. P.* 26(b), it may be difficult to obtain the kind of comprehensive data on hiring and promotion behavior of a given defendant over time, particularly as it relates to a broad category of given plaintiffs.
district court cases, Parks and Roberson conclude that courts should give greater weight to evidence that unconscious bias shapes choices that might otherwise be regarded as rational. To encourage courts to rethink this limitation, the authors appeal to psychological studies that explore models linking the concept of implicit bias with intentionality.

Turning to psychological research by Linda Hamilton Krieger, an early proponent of implicit bias theory, Parks and Roberson identify problems associated with the current legal doctrine’s approach. They assert that an employment determination is a more complex process than the current legal doctrine recognizes. Disparate treatment inquiries normally evaluate intent at the point of decision rather than at earlier stages of institutional development. The major insight Parks and Roberson distill from Krieger’s literature is that prior, subjective viewpoints about a group can affect later evaluations of employees who are part of those groups. Additionally, the existing legal doctrine requires evidence of explicit, conscious connections between a certain stereotype and a specific employment action. The very nature of the bias that the psychological literature identifies, however, is not known to the employer.

II. GENDER & POLITICS

In contrast to the literature discussing the interaction between race and politics—in which themes of disparity and extra-legal exclusion are more explicit—the scholarship on gender and politics struggles with an elusive and more subtle conceptual challenge. The central issue for gender and politics scholars is this: The basic measures of gender equality in American politics—having equal numbers

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35 Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 322–23, 331–32, 335–38; see also Parks & Roberson, Through the Lens of Title VII, supra note 4, at 27–28.
36 See Parks & Roberson, Through the Lens of Title VII, supra note 4, at 40–41.
38 See Parks & Roberson, Through the Lens of Title VII, supra note 4, at 40–41.
39 See id. at 30.
40 Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 335–36.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See generally, e.g., MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS (1994); KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS?: WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES & RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA (1997); KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS: THE NEW BLACK VOTERS IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (1993).
of female and male voters and the growing ranks of successful female candidates—deceptively indicate that women operate on an equal playing field in politics. As a society, however, we know that a significant gender gap in elected offices exists at virtually every level. How, if at all, does the effect of gender bias figure into the scholarly account for this underrepresentation?

Women continue to make up a much smaller share of elected officials at the federal and state levels than one would expect based on their numbers in the American populace. Immediately after the historic advancements for female candidates in the 1992 elections (dubbed the “Year of the Woman”), women still accounted for just ten percent of the entire membership in the U.S. Congress, less than twenty-five percent of all state executive officers, and barely twenty percent of the offices in the fifty state legislatures.

Almost two decades since that notable rise in female representation, those measures of progress have not dramatically improved. Despite a continued upward trajectory in the number of officeholders, the female percentages in legislative halls and executive chambers across this country remain woefully behind the proportion of women in the electorate. Currently, less than a third of all elected officials within each of the aforementioned categories of political offices in this country are women.

These indicators, which reveal a plodding but steady movement toward gender parity, are especially disappointing in light of the prolonged energy behind the women’s suffrage movement. Long after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment and social movements to broaden access to political and economic power for women, the gender gap in holding public office remains. This nation’s record re-

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45 Lawless & Fox, It Takes a Candidate, supra note 44, at 18–21.
46 Id.
48 See Lawless & Fox, It Takes a Candidate, supra note 44, at 18–20.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 18, 20. See generally Jo Freeman, A Room at a Time: How Women Entered
mains surprisingly weak compared with the performance of democratic societies. While the gender gap in political participation has largely disappeared with respect to voter turnout, political representation by women in America trails similar statistics in other industrialized nations. The United States ranks just thirty-fourth among all democratic states (and fifty-seventh overall worldwide) in the percentage of female elected officers.

Roberson and Parks note several explanations that have been presented by others for why this disparity has persisted. Although they do not adopt a particular taxonomy for the factors they highlight, one can organize the major causal explanations in this area into three broad groupings: competition, mass stereotypes, and individual perceptions. Each of these factors helps to show that women commonly face a more complicated and daunting set of challenges than men do in their effort to get ahead in the political arena.

A. Heightened Competition

Research shows that women seeking office tend to win about as often as their male counterparts do. Evidence also shows that female candidates tend to raise as much money and attract as many votes as men do, on average. These studies also reveal, however, that there are distinctions in the types of campaigns in which women tend to succeed. A comprehensive analysis of congressional campaigns over a fifty-year period found that the gender stratification of the races that women run was a key factor preventing women from expanding their presence in elected offices. One key finding was that female congressional candidates were less likely than male candidates to participate in open seat contests. This point is significant

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Party Politics (2000) (detailing the rise of female participation in the political process from the 1700s to the present).

51 See Lawless & Fox, It Takes a Candidate, supra note 44, at 18–19.
52 See id. at 18–21.
53 Id. at 18.
54 See, e.g., Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 326–28 (discussing gender stereotypes and parties' "gate-keeping activities").
55 Id. at 327.
57 Jennifer L. Lawless & Kathryn Pearson, Competing in Congressional Primaries, in Legislative Women, supra note 56, at 21, 30–36, 49–50.
58 Id. at 26–27, 30–37.
59 Id. at 31–34; Burrell, supra note 56, at 44–47.
because the probability of a nonincumbent winning is substantially higher in an open seat race. But these winning candidates typically are recruited early by congressional campaign committees, and women are not as likely to make the short lists of the political operatives who target such prospects.

In those races that involve an incumbent, female candidates seeking reelection still confront a relatively steeper climb to victory than men. On average, women in this context face a larger, more competitive field of challengers than male candidates. Importantly, the heightened level of competition is evident throughout every stage of the race when a woman is running. For instance, the enhanced competition is as pronounced in the primary contests involving women as in the general election match-ups. Even the opposing party’s primary contests tend to attract a more competitive field of challengers, all else being equal, when a woman enters the political arena. Taken together, these findings indicate that women may be viewed as weaker, more vulnerable candidates, which tends to attract other competitors to the race.

Other research has uncovered a key difference in the types of elected offices in which women have made the greatest advancements. Compared with state and national offices, where men hold the wide majority of available seats, local campaigns appear to be where women tend to enjoy the greatest success. Women are relatively well represented on local boards of education, city and county legislatures,

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60 See Lawless & Pearson, supra note 57, at 30–32. Because incumbency plays a significant role in shaping a candidate’s name recognition, fundraising ability, and organizational networks, on average, challengers rarely succeed in unseating an incumbent seeking reelection. See generally Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections 25–37 (1983) (discussing the “incumbency factor” in electoral politics). By comparison, an open seat contest (without an incumbent) offers a chance for an aspirant to compete on a level playing field with other candidates.

61 See Lawless & Pearson, supra note 57, at 31.

62 See id. at 31–34.

63 Id.

64 See id. at 33–34.

65 See id. at 32.

and (to a lesser degree) local executive positions.67 Although men use these positions as pathways to higher-profile offices, women frequently begin and complete their public service careers at the local level.68 Some research attributes this gender imbalance to personal choices about family and well-being.69 In contrast to this view, other work posits that even though these positions involve direct constituency work and grassroots organizing, they are also limited in their field of discretion.70 At least some of this stratification therefore links to gender bias.

B. Mass Stereotypes

In their accounts on gender bias in politics, Parks and Roberson also have much to say about the biases in the public’s view of issues and candidates.71 To the extent that public opinion about the qualities and issues deemed relevant to politics are associated with gender, stereotypes can cast a great shadow on campaigns and voting.72 Parks and Roberson’s argument about gender bias in the employment setting is most relevant to the social science literature on gender and politics. In one article, the authors cite political communication research suggesting that basic beliefs about gender roles in society very heavily influence mass perceptions about politics.73

Studies of gender stereotypes in politics have well-established theories explaining how the public opinions of politics and candidates are partly rooted in traditional notions of gender socialization.74 Women, who have traditionally played the primary role in maintaining the home and family, continue to maintain domestic identities despite the marked social progress toward egalitarianism.75 Even with greater access to educational and professional opportunities in the current era, women who participate and achieve in the most competitive sec-

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67 Lublin & Brewer, supra note 66, at 382–85, 391.
68 Id. at 382–85, 394.
69 See Lawless & Fox, Men Rule, supra note 66, at 11.
70 Id.; see also Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr. & Patricia K. Freeman, Gender Differences in Constituency Service Among State Legislators, 48 Pol. Res. Q. 169, 169 (1995).
71 See, e.g., Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 339–45 (discussing the effects of Clinton’s failed bid in the 2008 election and how it brought issues regarding gender bias to the forefront).
72 See id. at 338–40 (providing examples from Hillary Clinton’s election).
74 See, e.g., Corrine M. McConnaughey, Seeing Gender over the Short and Long Haul, 3 Pol. & Gender 378, 378 (2007).
75 See generally Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989).
tors of society must harmonize the sometimes competing demands of excelling in the "working world" and successfully maintaining a vibrant home and family life. This "double bind" sometimes imposes harsh life choices on women that rarely confront men, whose historically assigned social role lies in the workplace.

Importantly, the historical experience of women occupying home-based roles has established a norm in society that has failed to evolve as times have changed. Assigning gender-specific roles in the public and private sphere confirms a social expectation that a woman's place lies within the home. Politics, as with other extra-family (and traditionally male) enterprises, involves matters well beyond what is customarily deemed to be the woman's domain. "Up through the mid-twentieth century, the notion of women serving in positions of high political power was anathema, in large part because of the expectation that women should prioritize housework and child care."

These notions of a woman's work have not shifted despite the increasing percentages of women who inhabit spheres outside of the home.

Contemporary studies offer ample evidence that these persistent gender stereotypes also inform the public's viewpoints and expectations about women in politics. Fully a third of respondents in one national opinion survey reported that women have personality qualities that make them less suitable for public service than men. This effect is also pronounced in public views about how well women perform or would perform in executive offices, including governor and President of the United States. In another study, a majority of surveyed voters agreed with the proposition that a man would do a better job than a woman leading the nation through a crisis. These respondents, while eschewing the most blatant gender stereotypes, never-

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77 See id.
78 Lawless & Fox, It Takes a Candidate, supra note 44, at 52.
79 See id. at 8-9.
80 See id.
81 Id. at 8.
82 Id. at 8-9.
83 Shanto Iyengar et al., Running as a Woman: Gender Stereotyping in Women's Campaigns, in Women, Media, and Politics 77, 84-98 (Pippa Norris ed., 1997).
84 Dianne Bystrom, Confronting Stereotypes and Double Standards in Campaign Communication, in Legislative Women, supra note 56, at 59, 60.
85 For example, men and women rated equally well in intelligence and the ability to reach compromise. Id. at 60-61.
theless linked some assessments of qualifications to gender-based views about ability. For example, although the poll found that women exceeded men in perceived ability with respect to trustworthiness and honesty, voters generally rate these traits as less important attributes for a person in the office of the President of the United States.

Related studies confirm that although the public is more accepting of female politicians, the same antiquated stereotypes shade opinions about substantive matters as well. For instance, gender seems to inform expectations about the issues in which women should have greater expertise. Male candidates are regarded as better suited to address policy issues related to national security and the economy. On the other hand, women get more positive marks as superior managers of policy issues related to education, health care, poverty, and homelessness. The ability to handle domestic policy matters is commonly associated with the home and family roles that gender stereotypes tend to assign to women. This social expectation, however, also carries a downside for candidates. This norm discounts the ability of women to master traditionally male-dominated issues involving international relations and defense. Although there is also a partisan dynamic in these findings—respondents who are Democrats show relatively more willingness to elect a female leader than their Republican counterparts—these gender effects remain robust.

Even more to the point, opinion research that explicitly associates personality traits with men and women very closely tracks the aforementioned gender stereotypes. According to these opinion surveys, a majority of voters expressed a belief that women are more kind, compassionate, sensitive, understanding, honest, and trustwor-

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86 Id.
87 Id.
89 See Bystrom, supra note 84, at 62.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 61–62.
92 Id.
93 See id. at 60–61.
94 Id.
thy than men.96 In contrast, the common descriptors that voters more often employ in describing men include “strong,” “tough,” “experienced,” and “knowledgeable.”97 Unsurprisingly, this latter set of male-associated characteristics is commonly embraced by political candidates for office—including those for the presidency.98

The prevalence of gender stereotypes in public opinion leads to two implications for female candidates and officeholders, each of which makes the road to winning elected office a more arduous one for women than for men. First, the media tends to reflect and confirm many of the public’s stereotypes in its presentation of political issues.99 Scholarly analyses of media presentations of political races have found that the very same biased viewpoints and expectations about women and female politicians influence editorial decisions about the subject and quality of news coverage.100 In many cases, the coverage that female candidates receive is more often focused on issues such as their viability, their marital status, and their family life.101 Additionally, the media coverage of women more often emphasizes the candidate’s mode of dress and style than does media coverage of men.102

The second key effect is a reactive one, focusing on the strategic decisions that female candidates and their advisors often make in developing their campaigns.103 Women entering politics must decide whether to embrace a public image that dispels established gender stereotypes or one that capitalizes on them.104 Put another way, the candidate must decide whether she is a “female politician” or a “politician who is a woman.”

Female candidates employ a variety of tools to frame the public understanding of their personal identity as a woman, including ap-

96 Kahn, supra note 95, at 505–07.
97 Id. at 506, 515.
100 Bystrom, supra note 84, at 60.
101 Id. at 62–63.
102 Id.
pearrances with (or without) family, fashion choices, and photo appearances that develop their preferred persona. On the more substantive side, evidence suggests that female officeholders also tend to emphasize issues and committee work that comports with the public's gendered beliefs. Some female candidates have circumvented the gender pitfalls associated with the media by relying on the internet to reach voters. This forum allows candidates to customize messages to multiple constituencies using information that appeals to the particular desires of a specific group.

C. Individual Perceptions

Aside from competition and stereotype, both of which Parks and Roberson address, another issue they might have considered closely, but failed to address in their articles, is how a candidate's own perceptions can play a role in maintaining the political gender gap. This factor suggests that an individual's interactions with institutions can produce this particular set of expectations about the potential to advance. Put differently, this factor involves perceived structural limits on a woman's ability to give effect to her political ambition. Both the stratification in campaigns and the public's gender stereotypes create a "pipeline issue" that affects most potential female candidates. A common but rarely explored issue of female

105 In the case of Hillary Clinton's candidacy, for instance, her much vaunted array of pantsuits was partly an effort to present an image to counter the conventionally female mode of dress. See, e.g., Robin Givhan, Wearing the Pants, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2007, at A24. One can easily contrast the candidate's style to that of Michelle Obama, who commonly utilizes dresses and skirts. See, e.g., Kate Betts, Michelle Obama and the New Power Dressing, HARPER'S BAZAAR, Mar. 2011, at 252. Clinton's fashion choice is reflected in the attire of several women in leadership positions, largely because it closely mirrors the suits of her male counterparts. Similar issues commonly arise in the legal field, including the fashion choices for then-U.S. Solicitor General Elena Kagan—the first female in her role. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Tripping on Obama's Coattails, DAILY BEAST (June 9, 2009 1:11 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-01-09/tripping-on-obamas-coattails/pl.


107 Bystrom, supra note 84, at 67.

108 See id.

109 See, e.g., Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 326-29, 331; Parks & Roberson, Through the Lens of Title VII, supra note 4, at 4, 10-14.


111 See LAWLESS & FOX, IT TAKES A CANDIDATE, supra note 44, at 26-28. Importantly, this point is not intended to suggest that individual perceptions alone account for the gender gap in political achievement. It is the interaction of structural forces with actual experience that tends to shade an individual's assessment of what advancement is possible for women who engage in the political context.
officeholders is confronting negative perceptions about campaigning, or what some frame as a gender gap in "political ambition." Some recent compelling research has suggested that factors that bear on the initial decision to run can dissuade even the strongest female candidates from entering the fray.

In their ambitious study *It Takes a Candidate*, Jennifer Lawless and Robert Fox observed that the gender balance in the pool of highly qualified citizens who are well-suited for political campaigning disappears at the point when those individuals consider a run for office. Their extensive survey of potential political candidates finds compelling evidence of gender differences in the winnowing process that commonly transforms a possible candidate for office into an actual one. Men and women perform equally well in other forms of political participation, but men are far more likely than women to take the preliminary steps necessary to pursue political office. Additionally, the differential effects are further pronounced when considering a run for the more high profile statewide or federal offices. This effect appears largely attributable to the complex ways that gender shapes the institutional structure of campaigning and individual perceptions about what is possible for women seeking political office.

On average, women whose profiles make them eligible for the political arena have higher levels of education than similarly eligible men. And, professionally speaking, the résumés of female candidates include top-shelf indicators of their achievement in high-status fields that commonly produce the most viable political candidates. Among the so-called "political pipeline" professions, women are at least as well placed as men. The process in which a well-situated citizen emerges as a candidate, however, appears to winnow out a substantial number of women. Put plainly, this evidence of public perception and candidate strategy indicates that women must be better than men to fare equally well.

112 Id. at 28–32.
113 Id. at 22, 38.
114 See id. at 26, 46.
115 See id. at 38–41.
116 Id. at 49.
117 Id. at 41.
118 See id. at 34.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 60–62.
The calculus for women deciding whether to run is largely shaped by their perceptions of the political process. Data from Lawless and Fox's study indicates that women are more hesitant to run for office due to both structural and individual factors.\textsuperscript{123} For example, the traditional family orientation of labor does not typically regard girls as politicians; women are less likely than men to report having the early formative experiences that groom them for a professional life in politics.\textsuperscript{124} Additionally, a largely male-based ethos in politics commonly leads officials who recruit new candidates to favor men.\textsuperscript{125} Well-credentialed male respondents more often report having contact with operatives who commonly seek new political candidates; the well-qualified females in the survey reported recruitment contact only half as often.\textsuperscript{126} These factors tend to produce an effect on individual perception; women more often tend to discount their chances of success as a candidate due to an uneven playing field in political campaigns.\textsuperscript{127} In all, demurring from a foray into the political arena is a less surprising decision for women than one might initially believe.

III. What Makes Politics Different

Whether Parks and Roberson have identified a legal problem with their inquiries into the gender issues in the 2008 election, however, is a different matter altogether. This Essay views Parks and Roberson's ultimate goal—testing the viability of gender-based Title VII claims in the political context—as more metaphorical than the provocative title of one of their articles, "Eighteen Million Cracks," might suggest. Parks and Roberson state that their aim is to draw parallels between the political and legal contexts in which gender bias plays a role.\textsuperscript{128} At times, however, it is unclear whether their purpose is truly to illustrate how our understandings of politics might shift if we incorporate some insights from employment law. In the end, this Essay posits that the greatest impact of Parks and Roberson's works is showing that a more complete and sophisticated theory of gender discrimination would give greater attention to the ways that implicit bias negatively influences women in the public realm.

\textsuperscript{123} Id. at 67, 77–78.

\textsuperscript{124} Id. at 63–65, 69–70.

\textsuperscript{125} Id. at 83–89.

\textsuperscript{126} Id. at 87.

\textsuperscript{127} Id. at 89.

\textsuperscript{128} See, e.g., Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 322–23.
Putting aside the sometimes flowery rhetoric that presidential campaigns and their candidates regularly employ, the formal legal problem described by Parks and Roberson in both "Eighteen Million Cracks" and Michelle Obama: A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination Through the Lens of Title VII is not an especially difficult matter to resolve. Even with the greater sensitivity to the type of implicit bias that the authors discuss in the employment law setting, candidate Hillary Clinton would have no ability to seek legal recourse for her failed presidential run. Insofar as the law is concerned, this lack of legal recourse is a positive thing, as the employment law regime is not easily applicable to campaigns and elections for a few reasons.

First, the formal relationship between voters and candidates in the political system is not congruous with that of a normal employer and employee. Politicians are servants of the public; their accountability to the voters stems from the sacred trust embodied in their election. Indeed, there are legal settings in which the sacred trust between an official and the public animates legal action. The formal process in which voters choose their leaders, however, is not an "employment decision" in the sense that Title VII employs the term. No single decisionmaker renders a final judgment in the competition over which candidate actually gets the job; rather, the "hiring" that is done in the electoral context is entirely within the control of what resembles a committee of the whole.

A common example taken from the political world helps to show the limitations of political rhetoric in application to the world of employment law. The winning candidate's trite election night declaration


130 Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4; Parks & Roberson, Through the Lens of Title VII, supra note 4.

131 See Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 332–39 (discussing the study of implicit bias in employment law and examples of implicit bias in the Clinton campaign).

132 One such example of this view from the federal law sphere has to do with the concept of public corruption, which recognizes the relationship of trust between the elected official and the voters. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(4) (2012); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976). Furthermore, the definition of "public servant" is "a government official or employee." MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 952 (9th ed. 1985).

that "the people have spoken" is, in fact, terribly overinclusive—a majoritarian election system such as that used in the United States allows for as much as forty-nine percent of the people to speak and vote for a losing candidate. That same claim that "the people have spoken" is simultaneously underinclusive, as a politician actually represents a much larger constituency than just the selection of the people who traveled to the polls to vote (including those persons who are unregistered and those who legally cannot vote, including felons and children).135

A somewhat more important contrast between politics and a typical employment setting is that each voter's "hiring decision" is not entirely a deliberative one. Election ballots are cast in the secrecy of the polling booth, and voters selections reflect infinite combinations of the factors that they deem most important. Moreover, a voter's point of decision about her preferred candidate is not simultaneous. Countless political communication studies confirm that the electorate does not collect information about candidates and the issues uniformly.136 A surprising share of voters do not focus their attention on the campaign (including the most basic question of whose names are on the ballot) until the closing weeks of the race.137 Indeed, a significant share of voters confirm their perceptions of the candidates in the final days (or perhaps even hours) of the campaign.138

In the 2008 New Hampshire primary, for instance, evidence shows that the late deciders who observed the candidate debates defied the early predictions of a Hillary Clinton loss.139 Their choices

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136 See, e.g., Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 575, 578, 583 (2012) (discussing how voters in different media markets and party insiders, for example, may have more or less information than other voters).


138 See id.

effectively sustained her campaign at a critical time.\footnote{See News Release, Pew Research Ctr., In GOP Primaries: Three Victors, Three Constituencies: Romney Gains Among Non-Evangelical Conservatives (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/385.pdf.} Only a week after the Iowa caucuses, most polling indicated a surge by the Obama campaign.\footnote{See Jones, supra note 139.} Had more people actually viewed the ten preliminary debates leading up to the Democratic primaries, they might have been swayed by the images of a commanding Hillary Clinton sharing the stage with a rather wooden and unsure Barack Obama.\footnote{See id.} Clinton and Obama’s sometimes telling exchanges on policy revealed important personal insights about the candidates.\footnote{See Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Personality Revealed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012, 5:15 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/23/do-good-debaters-make-good-presidents/in-presidential-debates-personality-is-revealed.} The fact remains that relatively few people paid enough attention in the early going to develop a decided viewpoint.\footnote{See Michael Duffy & Karen Tumulty, Gore’s Secret Guru, TIME, Nov 8, 1999, at 34 (describing the story of Al Gore’s campaign consultant Naomi Wolf, who later denied these allegations, emphasizing that her role in the campaign was a minor one).}

The final distinction between elections and a traditional employment hiring process is the lack of clear, uniform criteria. Aside from the formal qualifications for the job of President, multiple (indeed, limitless) factors can inform a voter’s choice of one candidate over another. A few of them may even appear rather frivolous. For instance, one of the most embarrassing (perhaps also telling) moments in the 2000 election was the unearthing of a strategy memo to Al Gore advising him to make specific fashion decisions that women found appealing.\footnote{See News Release, Pew Research Ctr., Growing Doubts About McCain’s Judgment, Age and Campaign Conduct: Obama’s Lead Widens: 52%-38% (Jan. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Growing Doubts], available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/462.pdf.} Voters are unaccountable for their reasoning, other than to their own consciences. Voters can decide based on how a candidate makes them feel, even if those emotions have little at all to do with the candidate’s actual performance in office.\footnote{See Duffy & Tumulty, supra note 145.} Candidates therefore hire consulting teams to minimize the public view of their personal negatives and, especially if that candidate lags in the polls, to emphasize the negatives of their opponents.\footnote{See Duffy & Tumulty, supra note 145.}

These are not the only differences between employment law and politics, of course. In politics, a thin line exists between information that is off-limits and the knowledge that is accessible to public consid-
eration.\textsuperscript{148} Unlike the traditional employment setting, politics often involves a no-holds-barred review of a politician’s personal life.\textsuperscript{149} Such an examination in a normal employment interview would run afoul of any number of privacy protections in federal law.\textsuperscript{150} Candidates, however, present their personal histories (or some crafted facsimile of them) to give voters helpful insights about who they are.\textsuperscript{151} Sometimes this tactic works to their benefit, sometimes it does not.\textsuperscript{152} But trying to distinguish the personal from the professional seems terribly impractical in the political realm. If attention to these personal attributes were out of bounds as a legal matter, for instance, John McCain might well have pursued an age discrimination claim for the negative attention he received regarding his ability to complete a full term in office.\textsuperscript{153} Similarly, Mitt Romney might have an even stronger religious discrimination case for the attention drawn to his church affiliation when he ultimately withdrew from the Republican primary.\textsuperscript{154}

IV. Alternative Explanations for Election 2008

It is difficult to quarrel with the selected flashpoint moments from the 2008 campaign that Parks and Roberson attribute to driving the final outcome of the primary campaign.\textsuperscript{155} Several of the post-mortem analyses of the Clinton presidential campaign have also highlighted these crucial episodes as reasons that led to her defeat.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{148} See, e.g., Lydia Saad, Percentage Unwilling to Vote for a Mormon Holds Steady, GALLUP (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/103150/Percentage-Unwilling-Vote-Mormon-Holds-Steady.aspx; see also Growing Doubts, supra note 146.

\textsuperscript{149} See Saad, supra note 148.

\textsuperscript{150} See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against any individual on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).

\textsuperscript{151} See generally Growing Doubts, supra note 146 (examining various candidate traits that voters find germane to their election).

\textsuperscript{152} See, e.g., id.; Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 339–45 (discussing how Clinton and Palin chose to portray themselves to the public).

\textsuperscript{153} See Growing Doubts, supra note 146 (providing a statistical analysis of voter surveys and finding that a growing number of voters were becoming troubled by Senator McCain’s age); Caleb Hellerman, McCain Faces Questions on Age, Health, CNN (Oct. 8, 2008), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/10/08/ftl.mccain.health/index.html (describing how Senator McCain’s age had become a “hot” campaign topic).

\textsuperscript{154} See Saad, supra note 148 (reporting that eighteen percent of Republicans would not support a Mormon presidential nominee); see also, e.g., Michael Luo, In Iowa, Mormon Issue Is Benefiting Huckabee, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at A26 (describing how Mitt Romney’s religious faith was made an issue in the primaries by Mike Huckabee’s supporters).

\textsuperscript{155} See, e.g., Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 337–38 (describing instances of implicit bias in the Clinton campaign).

Even if one concedes the claim that the doctrines and norms from employment law have some application to the political sphere, however, these moments may not necessarily provide the most complete explanation of the results.

In the employment law sphere, an alternative nondiscriminatory explanation for a particular outcome can defeat a prima facie case of unlawful gender-biased decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{157} Here, one can point to more traditional factors in the Democratic nomination and general election process that account for the end of the Clinton campaign. Having laid out some of the conceptual problems with trying to harmonize the worlds of politics and employment law, this Part suggests some alternative and more conventional frameworks from political science that helped determine the outcome of this election.

A. Money

Political operatives and scholars who prefer structural explanations for political outcomes would begin any discussion about the Democratic nomination with the huge resource gap that the Clinton campaign faced throughout most of the primaries.\textsuperscript{158} Money is aptly described as "the mother's milk of politics" because it is so central to virtually every element of the candidate's campaign strategy.\textsuperscript{159} Decisions about campaign travel, event staging, and support staff are all basic matters that every national candidate needs to make.\textsuperscript{160} A campaign cannot address any of these matters competently without a substantial infusion of cash. Although money is no guarantee for electoral success, a robust fundraising apparatus markedly improves a candidate's chances of performing well.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{157} See 45C Am. Jur. 2d, supra note 21, § 2416.


\textsuperscript{161} See Michael J. Goff, The Money Primary: The New Politics of the Early Presidential Nomination Process 3–5 (2004) (describing the importance of financing in the precandidacy and early candidacy phases of a presidential nomination); Richard Briffault, A Changing Supreme Court Considers Major Campaign Finance Questions: Randall v. Sorrell and Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, 5 Election L.J. 74, 79 (2006) (suggesting that fundraising often is an "arms race in which each candidate must constantly try to catch or outdo the other").
In contemporary presidential and congressional campaigns, a large campaign bankroll is a key indicator in the “invisible primary,” an early competition for dominance over the polls and the pool of available donors.162 Put simply, early money tends to attract additional money. A well-designed and prodigious fundraising structure thus provides a public signal that a candidate is prepared to compete and win against a general election opponent.163

None of this is intended to say that money is entirely unrelated to gender. According to some scholarship, the necessity to show fundraising prowess is a structural barrier that can exclude women who wish to enter the political fray as first-time candidates.164 Because viable female candidates are often newcomers to politics, many do not have access to the networks for raising the money to support their campaigns.165 The formation of the Political Action Committee EMILY’s List (Early Money Is Like Yeast),166 which directs its fundraising efforts to assist female candidates, is one of the institutional responses to this concern.167

Gender did not have its normal negative effect on fundraising in the 2008 presidential race. Hillary Clinton, the very antithesis of a political novice, launched her campaign with a very sizable account and one of the most experienced teams of high-profile fundraisers in the business.168 She enjoyed striking advantages in early high-profile supporters, a seasoned campaign staff from two successful Senate runs, and the notoriety of a popular former U.S. President aiding her cause.169 Further, the operation was effective at securing commitments from high-level donors through her group of “Hillraisers,” an


163 See Goff, supra note 161, at 3.

164 See Burrell, supra note 56, at 55–56.

165 See id.


elite network of fundraising bundlers. At the start of 2008, the Clinton campaign’s financial situation outpaced what every other candidate had amassed.

After the Iowa caucuses, however, a funny thing changed about these fundraising numbers. Having placed third in that state, the Clinton campaign found itself contending with an Obama money juggernaut that quickly assumed the lead in cash on hand. Like the Clinton money team, the Obama fundraisers had recruited bundlers to solicit donations from major contributors. But the step that proved to be a crucial advantage to the Obama campaign was creating a robust online presence for soliciting and collecting smaller donations. Even though Obama had organized his campaign later than Clinton, the online system provided the means to move quickly and decisively match and even surpass Clinton’s fundraising efforts. All told, Obama’s campaign collected more than $750 million—breaking every record in American politics. To remain competitive, Clinton had to take out a personal loan and eventually amass a debt in the millions of dollars before finally withdrawing from the race.

A theory of gender, on its own, cannot easily account for the two major benefits that Obama gained from this fundraising system. First, the online infrastructure raised the level of innovation in political campaigns by integrating the communications and fundraising strategy in a very sophisticated way. Not only did the Obama campaign develop lists of contacts from the people who attended rallies and related events, but it also utilized existing online platforms to identify and attract supporters. The campaign harnessed web-based pro-

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175 See id.
178 See Mosk, supra note 174.
179 See id.
grams, like Facebook, to target specific groups and collect data on likely supporters, which greatly enhanced its mass appeals for financial assistance. With great precision, the campaign could send regular updates to communities online about the candidate’s daily activities, speeches, and ideas. The specific information also allowed the campaign to tailor its messages based on the interests expressed by supporters. Overall, the strategy greatly enhanced the campaign’s ability to secure new donations.

Second, the Obama campaign utilized its internet system to issue multiple solicitations to smaller contributors. Unlike the Clinton campaign, which relied heavily on exclusive in-person events to solicit its major donors, the Obama team expanded its reach considerably by identifying financial backers at varying income levels. More than a few sent donations of less than one hundred dollars. The campaign could quickly and cheaply summon an infusion of cash by targeting these same supporters later in the campaign because they had not exceeded the legal limit for campaign donations. Even when Clinton had scored important state victories that kept her solidly in the race, the Obama fundraisers would include these developments in their messages to donors as reasons they needed additional donations. The results of these online solicitations were rapid and steady, which allowed the campaign to turn attention to other matters in the very competitive race. Meanwhile, Clinton’s team required additional time and resources so that their candidate could make fun-

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181 See Mosk, supra note 174.

182 See Chang, supra note 180, at 18–20.

183 See id.

184 Id.

185 See Jay Bryant, Paid Media Advertising: Political Communication from the Stone Age to the Present, in CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 96–100 (James A. Thurber & Candice J. Nelson eds., 3d ed. 2010) (emphasizing the Clinton campaign strategy aimed at attending organized fundraising events compared to Obama’s reliance on social media and online tools to raise smaller dollar amounts).


187 See Mosk, supra note 174.

188 See id.

189 Luo, supra note 186.

190 Tumulty, supra note 172.
draising appearances and phone requests for supplemental cash donations.\textsuperscript{191}

Ultimately, the candidates’ early strategic choices regarding fundraising made the difference. Clinton’s team viewed the primaries as a chance to compete with and ultimately outpace her opponents.\textsuperscript{192} Her early dominance in the polls perhaps convinced her strategists that the competition in the race would dissipate after Super Tuesday, when the combination of her popularity and institutional support in large states would propel her to a huge delegate lead.\textsuperscript{193} Accordingly, the Clinton fundraising model relied heavily on a core of high-level donors whose money could support an active campaign schedule through Super Tuesday.\textsuperscript{194} The flaw in the strategy was the absence of a fallback position. Clinton did not anticipate that she would need to spend money in a months-long battle through the convention, which was precisely the scenario that the Obama campaign’s model was designed to support.\textsuperscript{195} By the time Clinton’s people rushed to build and publicize their own online fundraising system, it was already too late\textsuperscript{196}.

\textbf{B. Class Warfare}

Another possible explanation for the result of the Democratic primary has to do with aggregate patterns of candidate preferences expressed by the electorate. Scholars in political science literature have long regarded class as a foundational element of social identity.\textsuperscript{197} And because one’s social standing often correlates with one’s access to political power, class is also a primary ingredient in political

\textsuperscript{191} See id.; Sheehy, supra note 168, at 76–84.


\textsuperscript{193} See id.; see also Sheehy, supra note 168, at 76–84.

\textsuperscript{194} See Jennifer Parker, Democratic Rivals Play ’08 Money Game, ABC News (Sep. 25, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=3644382&page=1; see also Luo, supra note 189; Sheehy, supra note 168, at 76–84.

\textsuperscript{195} See Parker, supra note 194; see also Luo, supra note 189; Sheehy, supra note 168, at 76–84.

\textsuperscript{196} See Luo, supra note 189.

behavior.  Countless studies confirm that class affects several aspects of a voter's political participation—from his candidate preferences to his overall sense of satisfaction with government. On an aggregate scale, the relationship between class and politics is a potent one. Resource inequalities in most industrialized democracies produce social strata with a mix of individual perspectives about what government should do. Some of the most divisive substantive debates in politics—including taxation, equal opportunity, and social policy—are thus all heavily informed by class position. In other words, class shapes both engagement with the political system and expectations about what must be done to assure that government and society function properly.

Class-based struggles and debates are numerous in the evolution of American politics. One of the earliest moments was the elimination of the property requirement for voting, which expanded the American electorate and largely accounted for the election of Andrew Jackson to the presidency. These movements are not uniformly successful. For example, during Reconstruction, an effort to organize poor white tenant farmers in the South failed as white landed interests regained control by convincing white farmers to value their whiteness at the expense of the common economic concerns that they shared with freedmen. In the twentieth century, class-based social movements resulted in national reform legislation in the progressive era and the war on poverty. Although it has often been obscured by race, class-based thinking has remained an important feature of American political development.

Class also has particular implications for electoral politics that are relevant to presidential campaigns. The parties competing for voter
support are quite sensitive to how differing viewpoints are distributed in the electorate, and they structure themselves to take full advantage of these differences.\textsuperscript{208} Both the material aspects (such as socioecon-
omic status or education) and the geographic dimensions (for exam-
ple, state constituencies differ greatly in their class distributions) of
class drive the strategic planning for campaigns. Especially in presi-
dential campaigns, political parties choose nominees and frame their
platforms to appeal to the broadest possible coalition of voters that
crosses class lines.\textsuperscript{209} The recent deepening of the divide between the
class groups and the decline of the middle and working class has made
this effort more challenging because the parties have more often di-
verged to appeal to specific class strata.\textsuperscript{210} Nonetheless, the issue of
class is a dominant feature of contemporary politics.

Even if gender was at play in affecting voter choices in the 2008
Democratic primary race, class consciousness has been even more in-
fluential as a factor shaping the political process. Demographic evi-
dence from the voter polls shows that the year 2008 proved no
exception to the general effect of class identity shaping political view-
points.\textsuperscript{211} Compared even to gender and race, class dynamics proved
to be an even more reliable predictor for how each candidate fared
across the country.\textsuperscript{212} In Kentucky, where more than sixty percent of
the electorate does not hold a college degree and about forty percent
of voters earn less than $50,000, Clinton earned one of her most over-
whelming victories.\textsuperscript{213} Exit polling showed that her strongest support

\textsuperscript{208} See id.

\textsuperscript{209} Judith Large & Timothy D. Sisk, Democracy, Conflict and Human Security:
Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century 94 (2006); Katherine Cramer Walsh, The Effect of So-
cial Class Identity on Presidential Vote Choice: The Role of Identity Stability and Political and
Economic Context (Apr. 20–23, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The George Wash-
ington Law Review).

\textsuperscript{210} See id. at 22–26.

\textsuperscript{211} See Exit Polls, CNNPolitics, www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USP00p1
(last visited Sep. 12, 2013); see also Key Indicators, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/tag/
Key%2bIndicators.aspx (last visited Sep. 12, 2013) (summarizing statistical breakdown of presi-
dential candidate support by different key indicators); Lydia Saad, Blacks, Postgrads, Young
Adults Help Obama Prevail, Gallup (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/111781/Blacks-
Postgrads-Young-Adults-Help-Obama-Prevail.aspx#1 (providing the final pre-election Gallup
Poll Daily tracking survey).

\textsuperscript{212} Compare Exit Polls, supra note 211, and Key Indicators, supra note 211, with Saad,
supra note 211.

.com/election-guide/2008/results/votes/index.html (last visited Sep. 12, 2013); State Fact Sheets:
.htm.
in that state came from voters who are high school graduates and have salaries that are in the lowest income bracket.214

Although Kentucky voted near the end of the primary campaign, the result was quite consistent with the trends in several other states.215 Even in those contests that she lost, Clinton performed better than Obama in gaining support from working class voters.216 In the bellwether state of Missouri, which Clinton narrowly lost to Obama, Clinton won fifty percent of all voters without a college degree.217 She won, however, only thirty-one percent of college graduates compared to Obama’s overwhelming sixty-five percent of that group.218 This pattern is not especially surprising given how prominently class typically figures into American political competition.219

Class dynamics also influenced the mode of campaigning from state to state. Obama enjoyed an advantage by organizing early in the caucus states, but states with traditional primary elections moved in one direction or another based largely upon the key demographic of class.220 Generally, Clinton was more likely to succeed in places where the average primary voter was rural, held a wage job, and completed education in high school.221 She roundly defeated Obama in contests held in the largely rural states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia—states with a profile resembling her adopted home state of Arkansas.222 This pattern of performance held true even after Obama had advanced with a sizable delegate lead over Clinton.223 On the other hand, Obama won far more often in the states featuring a di-

214 Exit Polls, supra note 211.


218 See id.

219 See supra notes 201–10 and accompanying text.


222 Cohen & Agiesta, supra note 220; see also Results: Hillary Clinton, supra note 216.

223 See Results: Hillary Clinton, supra note 216.
verse class profile—including more voters with graduate degrees, with salaried employment, and with a city address.  

On several issues, the candidates showed their sensitivity to the class dynamics inherent in the election. The contrast was on full display in the campaign to win one of the most crucial state primaries, Pennsylvania. With balanced support throughout the state, including the suburban counties around Philadelphia, Clinton won this state by almost ten percentage points. Clinton achieved her highest margins over Obama in the northeastern and middle counties of the state, partly by calling attention to her connections to the working class city of Scranton. At several public events and in commercials, she emphasized her experiences learning to shoot during summer vacations with her grandparents in the Pennsylvania woods. Clinton also appeared at photo opportunities in the more rural counties of the state interacting with working class groups.

Obama sharply ridiculed Clinton’s tactics by jokingly comparing her to Annie Oakley. His attack, however, was partly a reaction to his own publicized gaffes involving class-based appeals. In taped comments at a northern California fundraiser only weeks before the primary, Obama had suggested to an audience that people in small towns facing economic hardship were “bitter” and therefore “cling[ed]” to political issues related to guns and religion out of frustration. Further, Obama engaged in his own affirmative efforts to

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224 Carter & Cox, supra note 221.
227 In the counties of the northeast region of Pennsylvania, Clinton achieved her highest margin of victory over Obama according to exit polling. See, e.g., id.
228 See Peter Hamby, Clinton Touts Her Experience with Guns, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 12, 2008, 7:00 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/04/12/clinton-touts-her-experience-with-guns/.
231 See id.
appeal to this same demographic of working-class voters.²³³ Who can forget the most awkward televised moment of his campaign: the candidate clutching a bowling ball in a fruitless effort to demonstrate his ease with the working-class lifestyle?²³⁴

To be sure, class has an important tie to gender. The U.S. Census reports that the poverty rate of households headed by women is nearly double the poverty rate of households headed by men.²³⁵ As significant as this factor was in shaping this campaign, class seems to make only a minor appearance in Parks and Roberson’s accounts of the 2008 primary race.²³⁶ It may be that the presence of gender biases is class specific, which poses an intriguing set of questions for assessing how different voters perceive the candidates and issues in politics. Even if Parks and Roberson are correct about the independent role of gender bias, their claim would be stronger if they also provided some explanation about how it operated in light of the well-known and widespread effects of class in this particular election.

C. Intersectionality

A final factor that Parks and Roberson failed to emphasize is intersectionality—another key factor affecting how the voters and candidates approached this campaign. Parks and Roberson do note that race and gender each shaped this election, but they do not include in that consideration how the combined influence of these factors made a distinct impact.²³⁷ This is an especially important matter in the Democratic primary because women of color are such a significant share of the electorate in several important states.²³⁸

The absence of any consideration of intersectionality in Parks and Roberson’s articles is even more surprising considering how employ-

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²³⁴ See id.
²³⁶ See, e.g., Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 339 (mentioning briefly how poorer individuals tended to vote for Senator Clinton); Parks & Roberson, Through the Lens of Title VII, supra note 4, at 34, 42 (quickly addressing the breakdown of voters according to class and providing a table without any analysis).
²³⁷ See Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 340.
ment law scholars have already stressed the importance of this factor. Commentators like Kimberle Crenshaw have masterfully argued for greater critical attention in antidiscrimination doctrines to the effects of multiple levels of discrimination and bias in society. These studies conclude that the interactive effects of discrimination and bias are as relevant for analyzing an employer's behavior in discrimination lawsuits as understanding the injuries of a plaintiff who must bear the consequences of those actions.

This key observation has an important application in the political sphere, where several scholars have noted how the gender patterns in legislatures for women of color are quite distinct. Only two women of color have been among the already small club of female contenders for a major party's nomination for president. Traditional political discourse tends to define public policy issues in discrete terms of race or gender, excluding those issues that can affect women of color in a targeted way. As Crenshaw and others have explained, women of color may have a particular experience due to the interaction of these identities in ways that defy such discrete categorizations. Indeed, some of the scholarship on gender and politics highlights these differential effects as well.

One of the clearest illustrations from presidential politics of intersectionality's importance is the widespread focus on Jesse Jackson as the first black "contender" for President despite the fact that the first black candidate was Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm from New York in 1972, and Carol Moseley Braun of Illinois, who was a contender for the nomination in 2003. See Lisa Woznica, Chisholm, Shirley, in Black Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia 236, 236, 237 (Darlene Clark Hine ed., 1993); Dan Mihalopolous, Moseley Braun Seeks Democratic Nomination, Baltimore Sun (Sept. 23, 2003), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003-09-23/news/0309230144_1_braun-columbia-south-carolina.


See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 239, at 139–140; see also Gay & Tate, supra note 243, at 170.

See Palmer, supra note 243, at 154.
Chisholm’s insurgent campaign for the 1972 nomination faltered partly due to intersectionality issues. Amid a crowded Democratic field of white male (and more conservative) candidates, Chisholm directly challenged the Nixon administration’s policies on Vietnam, poverty, and education. Her basic strategy was to capitalize on the liberal voters who had supported Robert Kennedy four years earlier but had no preferred candidate in the campaign. Even though her platform similarly directed its appeal toward both feminist and black constituencies, the leaders within each of these communities were divided about supporting her.

Chisholm’s campaign won a significant number of delegates in larger states due to alliances within the male-dominated Congressional Black Caucus and the largely white National Organization for Women; neither group, however, formally endorsed her due to their reservations about supporting a black woman. Chisholm later noted her disappointment with questions from both communities regarding her viability in the general election and her abilities as an effective spokesperson for the liberal agenda. Shirley Chisholm’s failed nomination bid suggests that even though they belong to two historically marginalized groups, women of color have complex and distinct political identities and experiences that can pose challenges to their credibility within each group.

246 See Woznica, supra note 242, at 237 (noting that Chisholm was the first black candidate); R.W. Apple, Jr., *Jackson Is Seen as Winning a Solid Place in History*, *N.Y. Times*, Apr. 29, 1988, at A16; see also Tera W. Hunter, *The Forgotten Legacy of Shirley Chisholm: Race Versus Gender in the 2008 Democratic Primaries*, in *Obama, Clinton, Palin: Making History in Election* 2008, at 66, 67 (Liette Gidlow ed., 2011) (explaining that Chisholm’s 1972 campaign effort represented less about her status as the first black presidential candidate and more about her role as a woman competing against both white and black sentiments snubbing her legitimacy); John Nichols, *Hillary Clinton Versus Shirley Chisholm*, *Nation* (June 5, 2008, 12:20 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/hillary-clinton-versus-shirley-chisholm# (focusing on Chisholm’s role as a female candidate rather than as a Black candidate).


248 *Id.* at 165–99 (providing Chisholm’s various position papers and transcripts of her campaign speeches).


252 See Chisholm, supra note 247, at 37–38.

253 See Gay & Tate, supra note 243, at 172.
Intersectionality was as influential in the 2008 primaries as it was in the Shirley Chisholm campaign. In the 2008 primaries, African American women in particular recognized that race proved to be at least as powerful a factor as gender was in the campaign. The primary competition pitted two candidates from the Democratic Party's most significant and loyal constituencies, which threatened to divide the core of the party's electoral coalition.\textsuperscript{254} One of the most heated debates on the campaign trail was whether race or gender bias posed a greater barrier in politics.\textsuperscript{255} Former Democratic vice-presidential nominee Geraldine Ferraro (a Clinton supporter) provocatively suggested in an interview that Obama would never have been a serious contender for the nomination had he been either a woman or white.\textsuperscript{256} She later resigned her position in the Clinton campaign to quell the negative public reaction.\textsuperscript{257} Although her detractors characterized this point as racially insensitive, Ferraro maintained that her comments described how gender bias clouded a fair comparison of the experience that each candidate brought to the table.\textsuperscript{258}

Likewise, media mogul Oprah Winfrey (an early backer of Obama) felt compelled to justify her publicized endorsement in the face of criticism from her white female viewers that she had betrayed the cause of women by supporting Obama.\textsuperscript{259} Gender identity was a significant feature in the subjects and themes in her syndicated television show, and the threatened boycott by a large share of her television audience might have caused financial loss as well as severe damage to her public image.\textsuperscript{260} Winfrey rightly understood the risk of not responding to this allegation, and she rapidly issued a press state-

\textsuperscript{254} Id.
\textsuperscript{256} Katharine Q. Seelye & Julie Bosman, Ferraro’s Obama Remarks Become Talk of Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12 2008, at A23 (noting later comments that “[i]t’s O.K. in this country to be sexist . . . . It’s certainly not O.K. to be racist. I think if Barack Obama had been attacked for two hours—well, I don’t think Barack Obama would have been attacked for two hours”).
\textsuperscript{257} See Joyce Purnick, Ferraro Is Unapologetic for Remarks and Ends Her Role in Clinton Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at A16.
\textsuperscript{258} Id.
\textsuperscript{259} See Jeff Zeleny, Oprah Endorses Obama, N.Y. TIMES THE CAUCUS (May 3, 2007, 3:25 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/oprah-endorses-obama-2/ (quoting Oprah Winfrey’s explanation of her endorsement from CNN’s Larry King Live: “Because I am for Barack does not mean I am against Hillary or anybody else.”).
\textsuperscript{260} See Emily Friedman, Women Angry over Oprah-Obama Campaign, ABC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=4167650&page=1&page=1 (describing messages that were posted on Oprah.com by disappointed women).
ment noting that her support for Obama was not a denunciation of Clinton or of her contributions as a public figure.\textsuperscript{261} Throughout the primary, Winfrey emphasized favorable comments about Clinton in justifying the reasons for her choice of a candidate.\textsuperscript{262}

Oprah Winfrey was not alone in grappling with this dilemma. Women of color, especially African American women, were at the fulcrum of this identity tug-of-war. Facing conflicting pressures from both campaigns,\textsuperscript{263} these voters weighed whether making history for women or for blacks deserved greater priority. Ultimately, more black women in the Democratic primaries moved en masse toward Obama.\textsuperscript{264} Even compared with black men, exit polling reveals that black women were among the most ardent supporters of the Obama campaign in states that gave the candidate his decisive edge in February (incidentally Black History Month).\textsuperscript{265} Despite emphasizing several endorsements from prominent black women (including Maya Angelou and Congresswomen Shelia Jackson Lee, Stephanie Tubbs Jones, and Maxine Waters),\textsuperscript{266} Clinton simply could not overcome the momentum that this trend posed.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The laudable contribution of Parks and Roberson’s articles “Eighteen Million Cracks” and Michelle Obama: A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination Through the Lens of Title VII is their argument in favor of incorporating implicit bias as a more central element in the analysis of discrimination cases. They persuasively lay out the problems with the legal doctrine’s view of intent, which ignores the real ways that stereotypes can influence otherwise neutral decisionmaking. As the authors show, emergent psychology research provides some promising ideas for constructing models that can show credible and sustainable connections between types of group bias and formal decisionmaking. By outlining a more complex understanding of discrimination that includes the more latent structural dimensions of bias and stereotype, Parks and Roberson suggest that

\textsuperscript{261} See Zeleny, supra note 259.

\textsuperscript{262} See, e.g., id. (describing a few of Winfrey’s positive comments regarding Clinton).

\textsuperscript{263} See, e.g., Thomas F. Schaller, Editorial, Black Women Face Dilemma in Democratic Primary, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 7, 2007, at A17.

\textsuperscript{264} See Exit Polls, supra note 211; Key Indicators, supra note 211; Saad, supra note 211.

\textsuperscript{265} See Exit Polls, supra note 211; Key Indicators, supra note 211; Saad, supra note 211.

courts ought to show as much concern about the general biases that pervade the workplace as the more specific expressions of animus and disaffect that the traditional legal doctrine rightly tries to deter.

What an argument grounded in employment law can tell us about politics, though, is not entirely clear. Parks and Roberson very persuasively identify the crucial moments in the 2008 primary campaign, showing the influence of gender bias both in its conscious and unconscious forms. Unfair treatment, however, is not a new phenomenon in political debate—as one well-regarded observer described politics: "[It] ain't bean bag[s]." The quest for political power is a fundamentally different kind of enterprise from the typical employment-hiring context. Campaigns and elections are intensely competitive, subjective, and personal. They involve multiple decisionmakers whose deliberation and neutrality cannot be assumed. Just as elections are a chance for the public to express its hopes, they also are a platform for conveying the electorate’s fears about the candidates and issues. For all of these reasons, politics cannot easily embrace the kind of analysis that the authors would like to apply.

Other more traditional issues that affected the Democratic primary tend to overshadow the influence of implicit bias. The influences of money, class, and intersectionality obscure any gender-based analysis. Given this complicated mix of factors, drawing any hard conclusions about the influence of gender discrimination (either implicit or explicit) is a strained exercise.

Parks and Roberson’s attempt to distill gender bias issues in employment law is largely successful. The evidence showing the effects on the Democratic primary of more typical influences, however, reveals why the gender bias link in politics is so difficult to substantiate. If Hillary Clinton were to sue the American public for its employment decision, not only would implicit bias be difficult to prove, the issue of causation would be impossibly elusive. As the candidate herself eloquently told supporters in her concession speech, imagining

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267 See Parks & Roberson, Eighteen Million Cracks, supra note 4, at 336–38 (providing specific examples of implicit bias from the Clinton campaign); Parks & Roberson, Through the Lens of Title VII, supra note 4, at 31–34 (discussing instances of implicit bias relating to Michelle Obama).

268 See Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley in Peace and War xiii (Boston, Small, Maynard & Co. 1898).
“if only” or “what if” in politics is not an inquiry that yields any satisfactory answers.269 “Every moment wasted looking back keeps us from moving forward.”270

269 Hillary Clinton Endorses Barack Obama, supra note 2.
270 Id.