Case No. 19-968 | 11th Cir.
January 12, 2021
Preview by Emma Liggett, Online Editor
In 2016, Georgia Gwinnett College, a public institution, enforced a Speech Zone Policy that only allowed speech in two designated “free speech expression areas.” Brief for Respondents at 3, Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, No. 19-968 (U.S. filed Nov. 19, 2020). Speech in other campus areas required authorization from school officials. Chike Uzuegbunam, a student at the time, was distributing religious literature in a plaza when campus police stopped him because the plaza was not a designated free speech expression area. Uzuegbunam later reserved a designated speech area and spoke for approximately twenty minutes before campus police stopped him again, this time due to complaints and concerns that he was carrying out “disorderly conduct” in violation of the Student Code of Conduct. Id. at 4. Uzuegbunam ceased his expression and left the area without further attempts. After learning about the school’s enforcement of the policies against his fellow student, petitioner Joseph Bradford refrained from publicly speaking and distributing religious literature on campus. Uzuegbunam and Bradford, who have both since graduated, filed complaints alleging that the Speech Zone and Student Conduct policies violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, both facially and as applied. Georgia Gwinnett officials involved in enforcement of the policies (“Gwinnett officials”), filed a motion to dismiss and revised the Speech Zone Policy, allowing students to speak anywhere on campus without prior approval (unless involving a group of thirty or more). See id. at 5. Gwinnett officials also removed the “disorderly conduct” provision from the Code of Conduct.
Article III grants federal courts the power to adjudicate cases and controversies that have real stakes for the parties. If an injury cannot be redressed by a favorable court outcome, then the court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. Due to the policy revisions, Uzuegbunam and Bradford’s graduation from Georgia Gwinnett, and their request for nominal damages but not compensatory damages, the district court dismissed the case as moot. See id. at 5–6. In affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Flanigan’s Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga., in which it held that the repeal of an unenforced ordinance moots plaintiffs’ claims for nominal damages because the award “would serve no purpose other than to affix a judicial seal of approval to an outcome that has already been realized.” 868 F.3d 1248, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). The court of appeals explained that Uzuegbunam and Bradford only have abstract injuries, not actual ones, and thus there is no Article III jurisdiction to hear the case. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a post-filing change of policy moots nominal damages claims regarding past violations of constitutional rights.
Gwinnett officials argue that claims for nominal damages become moot when interfering events end future threat of injury. See Brief for Respondents at 8. Nominal damages—usually around $1—represent a “legal symbol” that the plaintiff is in the right and seeks to preclude ongoing or threatened injuries, but they do not actually redress any injury or make a plaintiff whole like compensatory damages. Id. at 7–8. Because Gwinnett officials permanently revised the policies, there is no longer any future threat of injury that nominal damages can vindicate, the claims are mooted, and federal courts lack Article III jurisdiction to hear this case.
Uzuegbunam and Bradford argue that a case is moot only when there is no relief available at all. See Brief for Petitioners at 14, Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, No. 19-968 (U.S. filed Sept. 22, 2020). Nominal damages do provide relief because they remedy past harms that are not quantifiable but are still just as important, and permanently modify the relationship between the parties. The officials’ subsequent revision of the policies did not change the fact that Uzuegbunam and Bradford suffered injuries that need redress. Furthermore, they argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding creates an Article III exception carving out nominal-damages awards from proper jurisdiction. Id. at 15. This contrasts with the majority of federal circuits and interferes with years of precedent. Id. Uzuegbunam and Bradford also stress that Gwinnett officials are confusing “redressability with quantifiability.” Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, No. 19-968 (U.S. filed Dec. 21, 2020). If Uzuegbunam and Bradford had suffered even one cent of compensatory harm, for example from the use of chalk to express their religious views that was then washed away, their claims would be justiciable. Id. at 3. Just because their harms are not quantifiable does not mean they are not redressable.
Americans place immeasurable value on constitutional rights, particularly freedom of speech. The immeasurable quality of harms to these rights should not render them meaningless. Furthermore, college campuses are integral educational environments where individuals should feel free to have open discussion about thought-provoking topics. One can imagine policies like these being used to stamp out unpopular views. The Court’s decision will affect the ability of individuals to gain symbolic wins for incalculable violations of fundamental rights.