Case No. 17-778 | 6th Cir.
Preview by Boseul (Jenny) Jeong, Online Editor
When the district court was sentencing Petitioner, it found that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion was the “functional equivalent of generic burglary” which qualifies as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836, 837–38 (6th Cir. 2017). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Michigan’s third-degree home invasion was “categorically equivalent to generic burglary.” Id. at 837.
In Taylor v. United States, the Court laid out three elements of burglary: “[1] an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, [2] a building or other structure, [3] with intent to commit a crime.” 495 U.S. 575, 598–99 (1990). Quarles came down to the question of when an intent to commit a crime should be present under the definition of generic burglary presented in Taylor. Petitioner argues that the intent to commit a crime must be present at the time of the first unlawful entry, and Respondent argues that the intent only need to be formed at some point during unlawful presence.
Both parties argue that the plain meaning of the word is in their favor. Petitioner emphasizes the parallel between the word “entry” and “remaining,” and argues that reading “remaining” to signify a continuous condition will make the “entry” part superfluous. On the other hand, Respondent emphasizes that the dictionary definitions and common usage of the word “remain” refer to a continuous activity.
The parties’ interpretations differ regarding Congress’s purpose in ACCA. Petitioner argues Congress intended to reserve stringent penalties for “a small number” of dangerous career criminals. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Quarles v. United States, No. 17-778 (U.S. filed Feb. 20, 2019) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 583). Meanwhile, Respondent points out that ACCA acknowledged “an invasive crime that presents a substantial risk of a violent encounter in an enclosed private space.” Brief for Respondent at 9, Quarles, No. 17-778 (U.S. filed Mar. 22, 2019) (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581, 588).
On the other hand, Respondent argues Congress aimed to capture the meaning used in most states’ criminal codes. Respondent went further by saying no states have definitely adopted Petitioner’s interpretation at the time of ACCA’s enactment and more states thus far have explicitly adopted the interpretation that intent may form at any point. Petitioner responds that there is no proof that “most States” abandoned this interpretation.
Lastly, Petitioner argues for the application of the rule of lenity and brings up due process concerns. Respondent once again emphasizes that Congress intended a “generic meaning” of the term burglary and disregards Petitioner’s approach as muddling the meaning with an “arcane and counterintuitive distinction.” Brief for Respondent at 10, Quarles, No. 17-778 (U.S. filed Mar. 22, 2019).
Circuits are split on this issue. Two circuits held that the intent is required at the first unlawful act and four circuits held that the formation of intent during the unlawful remaining is sufficient.