The Dutra Group v. Batterton

Case No. 18-266 | 9th Cir.

Preview by Boseul (Jenny) Jeong, Online Editor

Before this case reached the Supreme Court, the sole question before the Ninth Circuit was, “whether punitive damages are an available remedy for unseaworthiness claims.” Batterton v. Dutra Group, 880 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2018). The appellee was a seaman who was working on a vessel owned and operated by the appellant. The appellee got injured because of the appellant’s unseaworthy vessel, and brought a lawsuit seeking damages, including punitive damages. The appellant filed a motion to strike the prayer seeking punitive damages, the United States District Court for Central District of California denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The question came down to whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), which held “wrongful death damages are limited to ‘pecuniary loss’ and because ‘[t]he Jones Act/[Federal Employers’ Liability Act] survival provision limits recovery to losses suffered during the decedent’s lifetime,’” Id. at 1091 (citations omitted), implicitly overruled the Ninth Circuit decision in Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987) where the court held “[p]unitive damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness, and for failure to pay maintenance and cure.” Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit held that Evich remained good law under the Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003), and Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), which is about maintenance and cure actions, provides alternative grounds to affirm.

Petitioner’s emphasis is on the uniformity of maritime law, arguing that the same principle that prohibits punitive damages in the Jones Act applies to general maritime law as well. It also distinguishes the maintenance and cure claim in Townsend from the unseaworthiness claim in this case based on that the former is a separate and ancient doctrine, and the latter is a judicially created alternative to the Jones Act. Furthermore, the petitioner proposed an extension of the logic applied to the wrongful death claim in Miles to this case, asserting there is no sound basis for limiting the application.

In response, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s points—including the overlap between an unseaworthiness claim and how the maintenance and cure standard evolved—are immaterial in determining the applicability of Townsend. He also asserts that the petitioner did not use proper reasoning to distinguish Townsend and apply Miles in this case, and further emphasized the policy reasons for awarding punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims.

Since there were splits not only within the circuit but also among the circuits, and because this is quite an important issue in maritime law, the case will draw a lot of attention.