Case No. 17-1091 | Ind.
Preview by Ian K. Bryant-Smith
This case seeks to determine whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nearly every provision of the Bill of Rights has been incorporated at this point. If the Excessive Fines Clause were to be incorporated, only “the Third Amendment’s protection against quartering of soldiers[,] . . . the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury indictment requirement, [the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict, and] the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases” would remain exclusively applicable to the federal government. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010).
The parties fundamentally disagree on the scope of the question presented. Timbs seeks a broad ruling holding that the Clause as a whole applies to the states, while Indiana seeks a narrower holding that the Clause does not apply to the states in the context of in rem seizures of property. The case will settle this dispute in part by clarifying the scope of the Court’s decision in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), which applied the Clause to two specific provisions of federal law involving in rem seizures relating to drug offenses.
Tyson Timbs became addicted to hydrocodone after being prescribed the drug to treat his persistent foot pain. When his prescription ran out, he began buying pills from drug dealers. Eventually, he transitioned to heroin. Looking for ways to fund his heroin purchases, he became involved in drug dealing and ultimately made two sales to undercover police officers: two grams of heroin each time for a total of $385. While driving to make a third sale, Timbs was pulled over. He was arrested, and his $42,000 Land Rover was seized. He pleaded guilty to one count each of dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft. The jury sentenced him to a year of house arrest, five years of probation, a drug treatment program, and assorted fees totaling $1,203.
In separate proceedings, Indiana initiated a civil claim for the forfeiture of Timbs’s Land Rover. The trial and appellate courts found that the Land Rover had been used to illegally transport heroin but that its seizure would be grossly out of proportion to the offense in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause. This was in part because the maximum fine for Timbs’s offenses would have been just $10,000 (although Indiana notes that this is in fact the maximum fine for all felonies, including murder). The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Excessive Fines Clause had not been incorporated against the states and so Indiana was free to seize the Land Rover.
Timbs’s primary argument rests on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated because the rights it guarantees are “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and are “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). He traces the Clause’s guarantees through the Anglo-American legal history to even before the Magna Carta and argues that this continuous presence in our tradition indicates that they are fundamental to the American legal system at both the state and federal levels. The portions of the Eighth Amendment relating to cruel and unusual punishments and excessive bail have already been incorporated, he claims, and there is no meaningful reason to distinguish the Excessive Fines Clause. Alternatively, Timbs claims that the right to be free from excessive fines is one of the privileges and immunities covered by the Fourteenth Amendment that no state may abridge.
Indiana seeks to narrow the question presented, focusing specifically on whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to in rem civil asset forfeiture. They make the historical argument that civil asset forfeiture proceedings have been brought against property used in breaking the law since before the revolution, and that throughout its history civil asset forfeiture has frequently been used in draconian and disproportionate—but still perfectly legal—ways. No court until the late 20th century had ever held the Excessive Fines Clause could possibly apply to a civil forfeiture. In 1992, the Second Circuit held that the Excessive Fines Clause could be applied to such a forfeiture but went on to decline to do so because the forfeiture was not sufficiently disproportionate. See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992). Indiana also leans heavily on the distinction between civil asset forfeiture and punishments, asserting that the Eighth Amendment regulates only punishments, and that civil forfeiture is not considered one. Alternatively, Indiana argues that even if the Clause does apply to in rem seizures on the federal level, there is not enough historical evidence to apply it to the states.
The overwhelming amount of outside pressure in this case is on behalf of Timbs. He is being supported by amici ranging from the ACLU to the Chamber of Commerce. Of the 20 amicus briefs submitted, just one, written by the National Association of Counties, supports Indiana.