Case No. 17-8995, 6th Cir.
Preview by Ian K. Bryant-Smith
This case seeks to clarify the interaction between two federal sentencing statutes. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (2012), federal courts are authorized to retroactively revoke supervised release after the period of supervised release has expired “for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of [a violation of the supervised release agreement].” But under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), a period of supervised release “does not run” while a prisoner “is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime.” In Mont, the Supreme Court will rule on whether a period of incarceration between arrest and sentencing for a state crime, which was then credited toward the sentence, qualifies as being imprisoned under § 3624(e).
On March 6, 2012, Jason Mont was released from federal prison after serving seven years on drug and gun charges. Immediately upon release he began a five-year term of supervised release. In May 2015, he was arrested on state marijuana charges and released on bond pending trial. On June 1, 2016, he was arrested again on state charges and incarcerated in the Mahong County Jail pending trial. On October 16, 2016, he plea-bargained for a six-year prison sentence that included time served. In November, the federal court scheduled a hearing to adjudicate the government’s claim that Mont had violated the terms of his supervised release, but ultimately delayed those proceedings until after Mont’s state sentence had been finalized. The district court found that a summons had been issued on November 1, but this later turned out not to have been the case. The five-year period after Mont’s release expired on March 6, 2017. The final sentencing order was published on March 21. On March 30, the federal district court held that Mont’s state convictions had violated the terms of his supervised release and issued a warrant for his arrest. At a hearing on the violations, the federal court sentenced Mont to an additional 42 months, to run consecutively to the state sentences.
Mont argued that the district court lacked authority to re-arrest him on March 30 because the five-year supervised release period had expired on March 6, and that the court’s lack of authority was especially problematic considering that the November 1 summons had never actually been issued. But the United States argued that § 3583(i) gave the court continued jurisdiction because the period since the expiration of the supervised release period was a reasonable delay, and the district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
On appeal, Mont maintains that the district court had no jurisdiction for two reasons. First, he argues that § 3624(e) does not pause the clock on a supervised release period when a prisoner is being held in presentencing detention for separate state charges. Because pretrial detention is not punishment for the commission of a crime, he maintains that that time does not qualify. Second, he argues that § 3583(i) requires an assertion of jurisdiction prior to the expiration of the supervised release term, and that because the summons was not actually issued this assertion never took place. The language of the statute suggests that it was intended to be jurisdictional, he claims, and once the time of its jurisdiction has expired there is no way for the court to reclaim that jurisdiction.
The United States counters on two grounds. First, it argues that § 3624(e) is broadly worded and that the “in connection with” language clearly applies to pretrial detention. It looks to the purpose of supervised release programs; they are intended to assist former inmates with their transition back into society, and time spent in jail (regardless of whether that is pretrial or postconviction) is not time that helps with that transition. According to the United States, if a prisoner were able to double-count time in jail as time towards supervised release, he or she could conceivably complete a supervised release program and be set free into the world without actually spending any time outside of a jail or prison. Second, the United States argues that, at minimum, the supervised release period stopped running on October 16, 2016, when Mont pled guilty to the state crimes. And if that were the case, the United States contends, the five-year period would not yet have expired when the federal district court issued its warrant.