Case No. 18-935 | 6th Cir.
Preview by Michael Fischer, Online Editor
In February 1991, James McKinney and his half-brother Charles Hedlund burglarized the home of Christine Merten. Unfortunately, Merten was home during the burglary, which led McKinney and Hedlund to stab and shoot her in the course of stealing $120. The brothers next broke into the home of Jim McClain and, after stealing his money and valuables, shot McClain as he slept with a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle. Both McKinney and Hedlund were later apprehended and prosecuted. McKinney was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder while Hedlund was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder.
At McKinney’s sentencing hearing, a psychologist testified that McKinney suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of childhood abuse. Physical conflicts, the psychologist argued, could trigger childhood trauma and lead to McKinney’s diminished capacity. At the time, under Arizona law, a judge could not consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence that was unconnected with the crime. Therefore, the judge at McKinney’s sentencing was unable to consider the PTSD evidence and sentenced McKinney to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s sentence and, following a denial of McKinney’s habeas petitions in federal district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Arizona violated the Supreme Court’s holding in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). The Court in Eddings held that judges in death penalty cases may not ignore any relevant mitigating evidence. After the Ninth Circuit remanded for resentencing, McKinney argued that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The Arizona Supreme Court ruled against McKinney, holding that his case was final before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ring and subsequently affirmed his death sentence.
McKinney appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on June 10, 2019. The issues before the Court are (1) whether the Arizona Supreme Court was required to apply current law, rather than the law as it existed at the time the defendant’s conviction became final, when considering mitigating and aggravating evidence in a death sentence hearing and (2) whether the correction of error under the Eddings holding requires resentencing.
Petitioner asserts that current law applies to all cases “pending on direct review or not yet final.” Brief for Petitioner at 15, McKinney v. Arizona, No. 18-1109 (U.S. filed Aug. 21, 2019) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)). Additionally, Petitioner argues that by granting independent review of McKinney’s sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court reopened direct review, thereby rendering the sentence capable of modification and subject to current law. Id. at 15–16 (citing Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009)). With regards to Eddings, Petitioner contends that a new sentencing hearing is necessary in order to obtain testimony untainted by the Arizona Supreme Court’s reliance on a standard that predates Eddings. Id. at 18.
Respondent counters that the Arizona Supreme Court never reopened direct review since a conditional habeas order cannot, in and of itself, reopen state review. Brief for Respondent at 14, McKinney v. Arizona, No. 18-1109 (U.S. filed Oct. 25, 2019). Since the Jimenez “capable of modification” standard only applies to direct review, Respondent argues, McKinney’s sentence was final and therefore Griffith did not apply. Id. at 14–15. Furthermore, Respondent asserts that requiring trial-level resentencing for all Eddings errors would damage the interests of justice by subjecting many longstanding final convictions to resentencing irrespective of the possibility of remedying any error in judgement. Id. at 16. According to Respondent, appellate error correction in these cases is more consistent with existing precedent and practice. Id.