Case No. 18-1323 | 5th Cir.
Preview by Michael Fischer, Online Editor
In early 2014, the Louisiana legislature passed Act 620, a law requiring that all physicians who perform or induce abortions have admitting privileges at a hospital located within thirty miles from the location where the abortion is performed or induced. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.10 (2016). In August of that same year, a group of Louisiana abortion clinics and doctors brought suit alleging that Act 620 imposed an undue burden on their patients’ substantive due process right to have an abortion. The district court subsequently entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the state from enforcing any penalties under Act 620. In June 2015, the district court held a six–day hearing to consider the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion, which was granted in early 2016. During the pendency of this case, the Supreme Court struck down a nearly identical Texas law in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, finding that it imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). In light of this ruling, the district court held that Act 620 was unconstitutional and granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court overlooked significant differences between the facts of the instant case and those in Hellerstedt. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 4, 2019 to decide whether the Fifth Circuit’s decision to uphold Louisiana’s law requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital conflicts with the binding precedent in Hellerstedt.
Petitioner contends that the precedent established in Hellerstedt controls and, as such, materially indistinguishable laws are likewise invalid. Brief for Petitioners at 21–25, June Medical Services LLC v. Russo, No. 18-1323 (U.S. filed Nov. 25, 2019). In light of the detailed fact finding by the district court, which evinced no meaningful distinction between Act 620 and those in Hellerstedt, Petitioner argues that the Fifth Circuit’s decision to set those findings aside was baseless and erroneous. Id. at 26–45. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that since Act 620 provides no offsetting benefit given the burden it imposes on abortion rights, it is still unconstitutional even if the burdens were less than in Hellerstedt. Id. at 45.
Respondent counters that Petitioner has not met their burden under the ordinary rules of third party standing since they have failed to offer adequate proof of a close relationship with their patients and because their patients are not hindered in pursuing their own rights. Brief for the Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 39–41, June Medical Services LLC v. Russo, No. 18-1323 (U.S. filed Dec. 26, 2019). With regard to the merits of the underlying case, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s interpretation of Hellerstedt would threaten generally applicable health standards by requiring a “fact-intensive analysis” and absolute medical necessity before rendering any abortion regulation valid. Id. at 53–60. Furthermore, Respondent argues that Hellerstedt should be overruled to the extent that is inconsistent with “bedrock principles” including rational basis review for abortion procedures that do not impose a substantial obstacle. Id. at 67–69. Finally, Respondent contends that the Fifth Circuit did not err in finding the district court erred when evaluating the burdens of Act 620, since Louisiana abortion providers can obtain admitting privileges under the Act and because at least three failed to seek such privileges in good faith. Id. at 73–78. Likewise, Respondent argues that the Fifth Circuit did not err when reviewing the district court’s assessment of the benefits under Act 620 since the Act improves credentialing and patient safety. Id. at 80–87.