Case No. 19-5807 | 5th Cir.
December 2, 2020
Preview by Nick Contarino, Online Editor
In 2006, Edwards was arrested and charged with five counts of armed robbery, one count of aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2–3, Edwards v. Vannoy, No. 19-5807 (U.S. filed Oct. 5, 2020). At the time of his trial, Louisiana law “permitted conviction based on a guilty verdict returned by at least 10 of 12 jurors.” Id. at 3. Ten jurors found him guilty on the armed robbery counts and eleven found him guilty on the other charges. Id. at 3. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for each of the kidnapping and rape counts and consecutive sentences of 30 years imprisonment for each of the armed robbery counts. Id.
In 2019 Edwards filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, stating that the legality of nonunanimous criminal juries, upheld in Adopdaca v. Oregon, had been called into question by recent legal developments and urged the court to reverse Adopdaca. 406 U.S. 404 (1972); id. at 3–4. As his petition was pending, the Court ruled six to three in Ramos v. Louisiana, that “the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious crime and that the unanimity requirement applies to the States.” 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020); Id. at 4 (citing Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397). The question in Edwards v. Vannoy is whether Ramos applies retroactively to cases on federal collateral review, or whether the Apodaca rule allowing nonunanimous juries still applies.
This question is especially difficult because it is unclear whether Ramos actually overruled Apodaca. Three of the Justices stated that Adopaca should be overruled or distinguished. See id. (citing Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1409 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 1410, 1417 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); id. at 1424–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). Three Justices submitted that Adopaca should not be considered “‘a controlling precedent’ on the Sixth Amendment question.” Id. (quoting Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1404 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.)). The three dissenting Justices stated that they would “not overrule Adopdaca.” Id. at 5 (quoting Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting)).
Darrel Vannoy, warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, notes that “‘new rules’ of criminal procedure do not apply to cases on collateral review unless they constitute ‘watershed’ rules.” Brief of Respondent at 9, Edwards v. Vannoy, No. 19-5807 (U.S. filed Sept. 28, 2020) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)). Rather than primarily argue that Ramos announced a new rule, Edwards argues that Ramos “reaffirmed an ‘old rule’ that was logically ‘dictated by precedent [when the] defendant’s conviction became final.” Brief for Petitioner at 12, Edwards v. Vannoy, No. 19-5807 (U.S. filed Jul. 15, 2020) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301). And because an old rule applies on both direct and collateral review, Ramos consequently applies retroactively to cases on federal collateral review. Id. (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007)). If the Court finds that Ramos does announce a new rule, however, Edwards asserts it is a “watershed” rule. See id. at 22.
Vannoy disagrees that Ramos is a “watershed rule,” arguing that the Ramos court, in discarding the nearly 50-year old precedent in Adopdaca, laid down a decision that is “the very definition of a new rule.” Brief for Respondent at 9. According to Vannoy, the Ramos decision is a new rule because it “impose[d] a new obligation on the government.” Id. (quoting Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347 (2013)). To demonstrate that the Ramos decision was not a new rule, Edwards would need to show that it would “have been ‘apparent to all reasonable jurists’ that the later-announced rule was dictated by then-existing precedent,” and Vannoy argues that Edwards cannot establish this. Id. at 10 (Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527–528 (1997)). However, while Ramos is a new rule, according to Vannoy, he argues that Edwards fails to show that Ramos created a “watershed” rule. Vannoy notes that the only procedural right that was ever found to apply retroactively was the right to counsel. Id. at 10–11 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). Vannoy further asserts that the Ramos rule has no compelling reason to be applied retroactively. Id. at 11–13. Finally, Vannoy states that the relitigation bar in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) forecloses the application of Ramos to this case. Id. at 13.
Edwards argues that the Ramos decision is a new rule only if “(1) Apodaca was controlling precedent that Ramos expressly overruled; (2) Apodaca is the only decision relevant to the Teague analysis; and (3) Apodaca’s binding effect on lower courts means that the rule in Ramos was neither ‘dictated by precedent’ nor apparent to ‘all reasonable jurists’ for Teague’s purposes.” Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Edwards v. Vannoy, No. 19-5807 (U.S. filed Oct. 28, 2020). Edwards contends that all three propositions are incorrect, and hence Ramos did not announce a new rule. Id. Even if it did, Edwards argues that Ramos qualifies as a “watershed” rule because Ramos “altered our understanding of the unanimous-jury guarantee in the same way” that Gideon v. Wainwright altered our understanding of the right to counsel. Id. at 8–9. Edwards further states that the pressing need for Jury unanimity to prevent “impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions” outweighs Louisiana’s minimal finality interests, suggesting that Ramos must be a watershed rule. Id. at 10–15. Finally, Edwards states that, at this stage, the Court need not address the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) precludes applying Ramos retroactively to cases on federal collateral review, and insists that “[i]f the Court is inclined to reach [the § 2254(d)(1) issue], it should permit supplemental briefing.” Id. at 20.