Case No. 19-549 | 6th Cir.
November 9, 2020
Preview by Austin Martin, Senior Online Editor
In this case, the Court must decide whether the “judgment bar” provision under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) prevents a plaintiff from filing a Bivens claim where the plaintiff’s FTCA claim against the government, which involves the same defendants and arises out of the same transaction of events, failed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (2018); see § 2676. The case presents difficult issues of statutory interpretation and civil procedure, all stemming from a police misidentification with serious consequences.
In 2014, two plainclothes officers—Detective Todd Allen and FBI Special Agent Douglas Brownback—stopped and arrested James King, a 21-year-old college student, because they identified King as a wanted criminal suspect. The parties dispute whether the officers could be identified as police officers, but King began resisting arrest under the belief that he was being mugged. After a violent fight, the officers subdued King and took him to the hospital. Although it was clear King had been misidentified, he was then taken to jail and charged with various felonies for resisting arrest. After being acquitted of all charges at trial, King filed suit under the FTCA to hold the U.S. government vicariously liable for torts committed against him by the officers. Additionally, King alleged that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights and asserts claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
The district court concluded that King failed to satisfy one of the Act’s six jurisdictional elements necessary to state a FTCA claim, leading the court to dismiss the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The district court also rejected King’s Bivens claims and held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Brief for the Respondent at 1, Brownback v. King, No. 19-546 (U.S. filed Aug. 24, 2020). King pursued only the constitutional claims on appeal, but the government, representing the officers, asserted that those claims were precluded by the FTCA’s “judgment bar” provision, which bars a claimant receiving a judgment on a FTCA claim from “any action” related to the “same subject matter” against the same government employee. § 2676.
The Sixth Circuit agreed that King failed to state a FTCA claim, but disagreed that the dismissal precluded King’s constitutional claims. Instead, the court held that dismissal did not constitute a decision on the merits that would trigger the FTCA’s judgment bar. After further holding that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from King’s constitutional claims, the court remanded for further proceedings on those constitutional issues. The government filed a petition for certiorari.
In the government’s view, the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was a final judgment on King’s FTCA claims that “resolved the substantive liability of the United States.” Brief for the Petitioners at 14, Brownback v. King, No. 19-546 (U.S. filed June 19, 2020). Because King’s Bivens claims involve the same officers and the same facts, the government argues they are precluded by the FTCA’s judgment bar. The government urges the Court to consider Congress’s purpose for the judgment bar, which is to “prevent unnecessarily duplicative litigation” that would threaten and distract federal employees by ensuring that FTCA claims are resolved through a single, determinative judgment. Id. at 5, 14 (quoting Simmons v. Himmelreich, 136 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2016)).
King argues that the judgment bar “only applies to: (1) a separate lawsuit; after (2) a court with FTCA jurisdiction under Section 1346(b) enters a final judgment; that is (3) on the merits.” Brief for Respondent at 10. King brought his claims in a single lawsuit where the court dismissed his FTCA claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than on the merits. For both of these reasons, he argues, the judgment bar does not apply to his Bivens claims. The government responds that the courts of appeals have overwhelmingly rejected the argument that simultaneous FTCA and Bivens claims negate applying the judgment bar. Brief for Petitioners at 19. Furthermore, the government argues that the district court entered a “judgment” on the merits when it dismissed his FTCA claims because it was an appealable, final decision of the kind that Congress intended to resolve the merits of the present FTCA claims and preclude those in the future. Id. at 22–23 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (2009)).
This complex case has drawn the interest of a number of amici, including civil rights organizations and members of Congress. Interestingly, no amici have submitted briefs in the government’s favor. The outcome will have significant implications for plaintiffs bringing FTCA and Bivens claims together, as is often the case. If the government prevails, it seems that future plaintiffs bringing Bivens claims alongside FTCA actions could risk losing their entire case if they cannot satisfy the jurisdictional elements of FTCA claim alone. Such great consequences warrant careful attention in this case.