Case No. 18-725 | 11th Cir.
Preview by Nicholas Drews
Andre Barton, a citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States in May 1989 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1992. Barton was arrested in January 1996 and convicted of aggravated assault, criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After Barton was convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act in 2007 and 2008, the Department of Homeland Security served him with a notice to appear before an immigration judge for removal proceedings.
Barton filed an application for cancelation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the Attorney General to cancel removal of a lawful permanent resident that, among other requirements, has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. This provision is subject to a “stop-time rule” under § 1229b(d)(1), which terminates the period of continuous residence when an alien commits a qualifying crime that renders them “inadmissible”.
In a motion to pretermit Barton’s application, the government argued that he did not qualify for cancelation of removal because his 1996 offenses rendered him “inadmissible” and terminated his continuous residence, under the “stop-time rule,” a few months short of the 7-year requirement. Barton v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2018). Barton argued that, as a lawful permanent resident not seeking admission, he could not be rendered “inadmissible” and, as a result, his 1996 offenses did not terminate his period of continuous residence. Id. at 1297. The immigration judge found in the government’s favor and ruled that Barton was ineligible for cancelation of removal. This order was affirmed by a single-member decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether a lawful permanent resident not seeking admission to the United States can be rendered “inadmissible” for the purposes of the “stop-time rule” under § 1229b(d)(1).
In his brief, Barton argues that an offense only renders an alien “inadmissible” if it “actually triggers an adjudication of inadmissibility during the alien’s removal proceeding.” Brief of Petitioner at 12, Barton v. Barr, No. 18-725 (U.S. filed June 26, 2019). Barton relies on several factors, including the plain text of § 1229b(d)(1), to argue that a finding that an offense could “hypothetically” trigger inadmissibility is insufficient for the purposes of the “stop-time rule.” Id. Alternatively, Barton argues that even if the Court were to find that inadmissibility is an “abstract ‘status,’” he could not legally be charged with inadmissibility as a lawful permanent resident. Id. at 14–15. Several groups, including a coalition of former United States immigration judges and various immigrants’ rights organizations, have filed amicus briefs in support of Barton.
The government also relies on the plain text of the statute in arguing that an alien does not need to be actively seeking admission to be rendered “inadmissible” for the purposes of § 1229b(d)(1). Brief for the Respondent at 13, Barton v. Barr, No. 18-725 (U.S. filed Aug. 15, 2019). The government argues that the text of the statute treats “inadmissibility” as a status that can be rendered regardless of whether an alien is seeking admission, id. at 15–16, and that Barton’s 1996 offenses rendered him “inadmissible,” which triggered the “stop-time rule.” Id. at 23. As a result, the government argues that Barton does not qualify for cancelation of removal, id. at 11, and that the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. Id. at 41.