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A Dangerous Custom: Reining in the Use of Signature Strikes Outside Recognized Conflicts

Amy Byrne
86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 620

It is well known that the U.S. Government has actively used drone strikes to target enemies abroad for years. The struggle between the powers of the President to provide security to our nation and the external restrictions imposed on those powers, however, is lesser known. For example, the Constitution grants Congress alone the power to declare war, yet numerous drone strikes have been conducted without congressional authorization. And although “personality strikes” are based on intelligence regarding specific targeted individuals, “signature strikes” are based on a combination of circumstances
and observed target behavior, and are therefore more prone to error. 

Based on a pattern of conduct initiated by George W. Bush and extended by Barack Obama, the President may unilaterally sign off on drone strikes outside recognized conflicts in which the United States is engaged (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq). This pattern establishes customary authority for the President to continue these operations without congressional approval. Congress has known of such strikes for years, but has failed to take action over the course of four presidential terms. Now, President Donald Trump and future presidents may claim the power to conduct drone strikes outside of recognized conflicts absent congressional authorization. 

This Note proposes legislation to effectively curb this customary authority in the context in which it is most likely to be abused—conducting signature strikes in areas outside of recognized conflicts. The proposed act delineates the circumstances under which signature strikes could be lawfully conducted. It limits the unilateral war powers of the President and curtails the adverse
ramifications of continued U.S. drone campaigns in multiple countries.

Read the Full Note Here.