David Seidman
95 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo 30
Congress’s authority over the District of Columbia is often described as plenary, but it is not unlimited. This Essay argues that the prevailing District Clause doctrine impermissibly collapses two distinct constitutional functions: protecting the federal seat of government and governing a permanent civilian population. The resulting jurisprudence permits Congress to regulate the District of Columbia’s local affairs with minimal scrutiny, despite the absence of electoral safeguards that ordinarily justify deference.
This Essay advances a textual and structural rereading of the Constitution’s District Clause. The Clause grants Congress authority over “the Seat of the Government,” not “the city,” reflecting a design in which power follows function—not geography. The Constitution’s parallel Enclave Clause confers “like Authority” over federal enclaves, yet courts have recognized that power as functionally limited, not geographically unbounded. Additionally, recent dissents in Veneno v. United States and United States v. Vaello Madero suggest the Supreme Court is increasingly skeptical of plenary power over tribes and territories resting on geography alone. The same critique applies to the District.
To resolve this tension, this Essay proposes a Bifurcation Test. When Congress regulates seat of government functions, such as securing federal property or ensuring the independent operation of the national government, courts should apply traditional Palmore deference. But when Congress regulates purely municipal affairs, it must identify a substantial federal interest tied to seat-of-government functions, and the regulation must bear a meaningful relationship to that interest. This approach does not create a new tier of scrutiny; it withdraws deference when political safeguards are absent and ensures that congressional authority does not become self-validating.