As the 2026 Supreme Court Term begins, the Justices return to the bench to hear a range of consequential cases. This post previews the cases scheduled for argument during the October Sitting, from whether federal law precludes state tort claims against oil and gas companies to how much deference courts owe the commentary to the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Stay tuned for additional case Previews and Responses as the Term progresses.
Table of Contents
Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County
No. 25-170, Colo. (Argument Oct. 5, 2026)
Preview by Will Rupff, Member
Regulation or compensation? If the Court reaches the merits, that distinction will sit at the center of the Supreme Court’s first case argued this Term—a climate dispute that has also drawn scrutiny over potential judicial conflicts, culminating in Justice Alito’s withdrawal from the case just days before argument, following questions about his stock holdings in other oil companies. See Jordan Fischer, US Supreme Court Sets Climate Suit for First Case of Next Term, Bloomberg L. (Aug. 4, 2026); Lindsay Whitehurst, Alito Steps Aside in a Major Climate Case After Scrutiny over Oil Stock Holdings, AP (Sep. 28, 2026).
In Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, the Court may decide whether federal law precludes state tort claims arising from interstate and international greenhouse gas emissions. First, however, the Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to review the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling. See Brief for the Petitioners at i; Brief for Respondents at i.
In 2018, the City of Boulder and Boulder County, the respondents, sued Suncor Energy and Exxon Mobil, petitioners. Respondents allege that petitioners’ fossil fuel production and sales contributed to climate change and to local harms including heat, drought, wildfires, and reduced snowpack. See Brief for the Petitioners at 7–8. The Colorado respondents seek damages for nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy, but not restrictions on fossil fuel production or emissions. See Brief for Respondents at 4–5.
Jurisdiction comes first. After the trial court declined to dismiss the suit on federal preemption grounds, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the claims target allegedly deceptive marketing and “upstream production activities,” not emissions regulation. See Petitioners’ Appendix at 17a, 20a–21a. The parties dispute the Supreme Court’s ability to review this decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) and Article III. Petitioners argue that the proceeding under Colorado Appellate Rule 21, which allows the Colorado Supreme Court to review trial court rulings directly, produced a final judgment and a concrete Article III injury; respondents argue that the proceeding merely allowed litigation to continue without resolving the parties’ rights or liability. See Brief for the Petitioners at 16–21; Brief for Respondents at 6–7, 11–22. If respondents prevail on either of these grounds, the Court will not reach the merits.
If the Court does reach the merits, petitioners invoke constitutional limits on a state’s authority over interstate pollution. Petitioners argue that, because greenhouse gas emissions mix globally, Boulder’s claims would apply Colorado law to conduct and emissions outside the state. They also maintain that the Clean Air Act independently preempts respondents’ claims by assigning primary responsibility for interstate pollution to the Environmental Protection Agency and upwind states. See Brief for the Petitioners at 43–46. Separately, petitioners argue that claims based on international emissions intrude on the federal government’s exclusive foreign affairs authority. See id. at 39–43. As petitioners put it, “[o]ur Nation’s climate policy should not be left in the hands of six jurors in Boulder, Colorado.” Id. at 48.
Respondents reject that framing. They maintain that their claims seek compensation for local harms, not enforcement of emissions controls. Although the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law governing interstate pollution, respondents argue that ordinary statutory preemption principles govern and that the Act does not preempt the conduct targeted by their claims. See Brief for Respondents at 3–4, 42–51. The Colorado respondents also reject foreign affairs preemption, arguing that claims against domestic corporations for in-state injuries do not clearly conflict with express federal foreign policy. See id. at 41–42. More broadly, they contend that constitutional structure does not “disempower states from redressing [climate change’s] local harms” merely because the problem is global. Id. at 40.
The case will ultimately turn on how Boulder’s claims are understood: Are they an effort to use state tort law to regulate a global emissions problem, or a request for compensation for local injuries allegedly caused by petitioners’ conduct? The answer could shape climate litigation nationwide and clarify when the Court may review a state court ruling before the underlying litigation concludes.
Johnson v. United States Congress
No. 25-735, 11th Cir. (Argument Oct. 5, 2026)
Preview by Nicole Barth, Member
In Johnson v. United States Congress, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (“VJRA”) stripped federal district courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to laws affecting veterans’ benefits. The question turns on whether § 511(a) of the VJRA displaced Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), which held that § 511’s predecessor did not bar district courts from hearing such challenges.
Floyd D. Johnson is an Army veteran who received an eighty percent disability rating for service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder. Brief for Petitioner at 9. After Johnson was convicted of several felonies and sentenced to forty years in prison, the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) reduced his rating to ten percent under 38 U.S.C. § 5313, which limits compensation paid to veterans incarcerated for felony convictions. Johnson v. U.S. Cong., 151 F.4th 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2025). Johnson filed suit, alleging that § 5313 violated the Bill of Attainder Clause and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id.
Johnson originally sued the United States Congress, and the district court dismissed his complaint as frivolous on the merits. Id. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that sovereign immunity barred Johnson’s suit against Congress and that amending the complaint to change defendants would be futile because the VJRA strips district courts of jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to veterans’ benefits legislation. Id. at 1296.
Johnson argues that § 511(a)’s text does not eliminate district court jurisdiction over constitutional challenges, but instead only bars review of specific VA determinations. Brief for Petitioner at 12–14. Section 511(a) requires the VA Secretary to decide questions of law and fact “necessary to a decision” concerning veterans’ benefits and makes that decision unreviewable in district court. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). Johnson argues that a constitutional challenge is not a question the Secretary is authorized to decide and therefore it cannot be “necessary to a decision by the Secretary,” meaning § 511(a) cannot preclude district courts from hearing such challenges. See id.; Brief for Petitioner at 17–21.
The government argues that the VJRA created a comprehensive and exclusive system for review of veterans’ benefits decisions. Brief for the Respondent at 17–20. Under that system, challenges are deliberately channeled through the VA to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and then to the Federal Circuit, which has “exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation” brought under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). See id. at 22–24.
The dispute largely centers on the authority of Robison. In that case, the Court held that § 511’s predecessor did not preclude district court review of constitutional challenges to veterans’ benefits legislation. Robison, 415 U.S. at 367–74. Johnson argues that Congress preserved the relevant language when it enacted the VJRA and that Robison remains valid. However, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the VJRA’s comprehensive review scheme channels constitutional challenges to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, making Robison inapplicable. Johnson, 151 F.4th at 1296. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision deepened a circuit split over whether the VJRA permits district court review of facial constitutional challenges to veterans’ benefits legislation. Brief for Petitioner at 24–30. The Court can either reaffirm its longstanding precedent or hold that Congress has displaced Robison.
The Court’s decision will determine in which court veterans may bring constitutional challenges and to what extent Congress can channel review of veterans’ benefits disputes into specialized administrative procedures.
Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee
No. 25-498, 9th Cir. (Argument Oct. 6, 2026)
Preview by Jules Saks, Member
In Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, the Supreme Court will decide the pleading standard for claims that an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) fiduciary breached ERISA’s duty of prudence. Specifically, the Court must consider whether, when the claim is predicated on an investment’s underperformance, the complaint must allege a “meaningful benchmark”––a similar fund against which the challenged fund can be compared. See Brief for Petitioners at i. The petitioners, Winston R. Anderson, et al., argue that ordinary pleading rules do not require a meaningful benchmark. Id. at 27–29. The respondents, Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al., argue that underperformance allegations may only support a “plausible inference of imprudence” if a meaningfully similar comparator is pleaded. Brief for Respondents at 11, 14.
The case arose when two Intel employees sued under ERISA, alleging that Intel’s fiduciaries violated their duty of prudence when investing for Intel’s two main retirement plans. Intel’s fiduciaries created bespoke funds that invested roughly one-third of each plan into nontraditional assets and used these funds as default investments. Notably, it is alleged that no other major provider offered conventional funds with similarly high allocations to nontraditional assets. Brief for Petitioners at 1–3.
The employees’ complaint alleged that the fiduciaries’ investments in nontraditional assets underperformed their investments in traditional assets. It also alleged that the default funds underperformed compared with funds allocating less to nontraditional assets that Intel’s fiduciaries identified as relevant comparators. Id. at 2. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under a pleading rule requiring imprudence complaints to allege a comparatively better-performing fund with similar risks, objectives, and potential rewards. The court found that in the absence of this “meaningful benchmark,” the performance allegations must be disregarded. Id. at 2–3.
Here, the employee-petitioners argue that the Court should reject the meaningful benchmark rule and vacate the judgment below. First, they argue that ERISA’s text does not contain the requirement. Brief for Petitioners at 27. Second, they argue that the rule exceeds the ordinary pleading standards established in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). These standards require judges to disregard legally conclusory allegations, while taking factual allegations as true to determine the claim’s plausibility. Id. at 33. Finally, the employees argue the rule is “unworkable,” because it ignores benchmarks identified by fiduciaries and asks judges to assess the similarity of funds independently. Brief for Petitioners at 45–50.
Intel, as the respondent, argues that the judgment should be affirmed on the following grounds. First, ERISA’s text does not require funds to maximize performance, and the employees’ complaint targets performance rather than imprudent process. Second, imprudence cannot be inferred from comparisons to dissimilar funds. Third, the rule comports with ERISA’s goal of risk mitigation. Finally, Intel argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly found that the employees’ pleading did not contain a meaningful benchmark, as the compared funds had different aims and risks. Brief for Respondents at 14–15.
Although this case may appear unassuming, employer-sponsored retirement plans are used by over 100 million Americans. As a result, the Court’s decision will have widespread consequences that will impact ERISA litigation, how fiduciaries invest in funds, and employees’ access to court.
Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guåhan
No. 25-579, 9th Cir. (Argument Oct. 7, 2026)
Preview by Sonia Stadler, Managing Editor
In Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guåhan, the Court will decide (1) whether the federal government’s application to renew a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) permit is a “final agency action” and can be reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and (2) whether, before submitting a RCRA permit-renewal application, the federal government must comply with the environmental-review procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”). Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i.
Prutehi Guåhan is a Guam-based activist organization. Brief for Respondent at 11–12. The organization brought this case to challenge the Air Force’s practice of disposing of expired munitions by open detonation. See id. at 1–3. The detonation zones are located on or near Guamanian ancestral land, fishing locations, and water sources. Id. at 3–6. The decision at issue in this case is the Air Force’s 2021 application to renew its RCRA permit, which is required to dispose of hazardous waste. Id. at 10.
The Court will decide whether the application is reviewable under the APA, which permits a court to review a “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. To decide whether the action was final, the Court will look at (1) whether the decision marked the end of the agency’s decision-making process, and (2) whether legal consequences resulted from it. Brief for the Petitioners at 21.
The Court will also decide whether the Air Force was required to conduct an environmental review under NEPA before applying for the permit. NEPA requires all federal agencies to include an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) in their proposals for major actions that significantly affect the environment. Id. at 7. An agency action can be exempt from NEPA’s requirements by law or when NEPA conflicts with another law. Id. at 8–9.
The Air Force petitions the Court to reverse the judgment below for three reasons. First, a RCRA permit renewal application is not a final agency action. Id. at 21–27. Internal agency decisions cannot be final unless tied to a specific agency action, and the legal consequences only happen when the RCRA permit is approved. Id. Second, RCRA’s specific environmental-review provisions displace NEPA’s more general review requirements. Id. at 19–21. Third, legislative history and practice show that NEPA does not apply. Id. at 43–47.
Prutehi Guåhan asks the Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision. First, the application was a final agency action because it consummated the Air Force’s internal decision-making and gave it a legal right to continue the detonations. Brief for Respondent at 39–51. Second, RCRA does not displace NEPA’s EIS requirements because Congress has not excluded RCRA permits from NEPA, and the statutes do not conflict. Id. at 18–22. Third, the Air Force’s claim that NEPA gives way when another statute is its “functional equivalent” is invalid and would not apply anyway. Id. at 22–38.
The case is scheduled for argument on October 7, 2026. Its outcome could have a significant impact on hazardous waste management and environmental law.
Beaird v. United States
No. 25-5343, 5th Cir. (Argument Oct. 13, 2026)
Preview by Gwendlyne Guido, Member
In Beaird v. United States, the Supreme Court will consider whether Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), still governs the deference courts must give the commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in interpreting and applying the Guidelines.
In 2022, police found petitioner Kendrick Jarrell Beaird with a Glock 17 firearm on his person. The firearm was unloaded but equipped with a standard-issue magazine capable of holding seventeen rounds of ammunition. See Brief for Petitioner at 8. Beaird subsequently pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Id. at 9.
At sentencing, the district court adopted an enhanced base offense level pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(3) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. This enhanced base offense level applies to offenses involving a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). The Guidelines text does not define a “large capacity magazine”; rather, the commentary to § 2K2.1(a)(3) defines it as one “that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.2. The district court, in reliance on Stinson and Fifth Circuit precedent, deferred to the commentary and applied the enhanced base offense level without independent interpretation of the phrase. Joint Appendix at 18.
In Stinson, the Court ruled that commentary in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual is authoritative when interpreting or explaining the Guidelines, unless it violates other federal law or is plainly erroneous. 508 U.S. at 38. On appeal, Beaird argued that Kisor v. Wilkie,588 U.S. 558 (2019), which held that deference to agency interpretation was only appropriate in the face of genuine ambiguity, had displaced Stinson. See Brief for Petitioner at 10. This argument, however, was foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent. Id.
Beaird argues that any deference to the commentary conflicts with the Sentencing Reform Act’s text and structure and threatens the separation of powers. Id. at 11. In the alternative, Beaird argues that, in light of Kisor, courts cannot instinctively defer to the commentary. Id. at 12. Instead, courts must independently interpret the Guidelines before considering whether deference to reasonable commentary interpretation is appropriate, an outcome Beaird argues would be “rarely” permitted. Id.
The United States, as respondent, supports vacatur of the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remand for the lower court to consider in the first instance the effect of Kisor on Beaird’s case. See Brief for the United States Supporting Vacatur at 15. Unlike Beaird, the government argues that courts will often still defer to commentary after applying Kisor and that Kisor does not displace Stinson. Id. The government argues that the commentary represents the views of an expert agency that, under Kisor, is entitled to “controlling weight” when reasonably addressing a repetitive guidelines interpretation issue. Id. (quoting Kisor, 588 U.S. at 576).
The Court’s decision in Beaird v. United States could reshape federal criminal sentencing by introducing more judicial discretion and interpretation at sentencing and, subsequently, by reducing consistency in guidelines application.
Salazar v. Paramount Global
No. 25-459, 6th Cir. (Argument Oct. 14, 2026)
Preview by Claudia Rodriguez, Member
In Salazar v. Paramount Global, the Court will decide whether a “consumer,” as used in the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”), refers to a consumer of any of a videotape service provider’s goods or services or only to a consumer of its audiovisual goods or services. See Brief of Petitioner at i.
The facts that give rise to this case are straightforward. Respondent Paramount Global (“Paramount”) owns a subsidiary website called 247Sports.com. Id. at 1. Petitioner Michael Salazar subscribed to that website’s online newsletter. Id. at 7. While logged into his Facebook account, he watched videos directly on the website, and Paramount, using a tracking software, disclosed Salazar’s Facebook ID and video-watching history to Facebook. Id. Salazar filed suit, alleging that Paramount violated the VPPA. Id.
The VPPA creates liability for “video tape service provider[s]” that knowingly disclose “personally identifiable information concerning any consumer” without consent. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). Under the statute, a “consumer” is “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” 18 U.S.C.§ 2710(a)(1).
On appeal, it is undisputed that Paramount is a “video tape service provider” and that the disclosed information—Salazar’s Facebook ID and watch history—is “personally identifiable information.” See Brief for Petitioner at i. However, Paramount argues that VPPA liability is not triggered because Salazar does not qualify as a “consumer.” Brief in Opposition at 18. Both lower courts agreed with Paramount. See id. at 12.
Specifically, Paramount contends that although Salazar was a newsletter subscriber, he is not a “consumer” because he did not subscribe to audiovisual materials. See id. at 18. To support this narrow interpretation, Paramount points to the VPPA’s history and purpose, emphasizing that Congress enacted the statute to address privacy concerns surrounding audiovisual transactions, not unrelated, non-video items like newsletters. See id. at 30–31. Therefore, Paramount argues, the definition of “consumer,” though broad, cannot be read in isolation. It must be understood in the context of the statute’s purpose and surrounding definitions, which place a clear audiovisual limitation on the term. See id. at 24–31.
Salazar, on the other hand, argues that the VPPA covers consumers of all of a videotape service provider’s goods and services. Brief of Petitioner at 1. His argument is anchored in the statute’s plain language. As his brief puts it, “[t]he language Congress writes into a statute is the law. Language it does not include is not the law.” Id. Congress defined a “consumer” as a “renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services,” without limiting those goods or services to audiovisual materials. Id. Because Congress imposed express audiovisual limitations elsewhere in the statute, Salazar argues that this breadth should be read as intentional. Id. Such a reading would trigger liability under the VPPA.
The outcome of this case will ultimately determine the scope of VPPA liability in a modern digital space where “video tape service providers” take forms not anticipated when Congress passed the statute in 1988.
