The International Trade Commission and the Nonpracticing Entity: Reviving the Injury Requirement for Domestic Industries Based on Licensing

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Abstract

The International Trade Commission ("ITC") has recently become a popular venue for nonpracticing entities to enforce their patent rights. Traditionally, section 337 of the Tariff Act required ITC complainants to be engaged in domestic manufacturing and demonstrate injuries to their manufacturing activities. Today, both requirements have been eliminated, dramatically increasing the presence of nonpracticing entities at the ITC. This Essay challenges the ITC's role in enforcing the patent rights of such entities. The Essay proceeds as follows: After an introduction to the ITC, Part I discusses the ITC's recent rise in popularity and provides a history of section 337. Part II describes the domestic industry requirement and how it has evolved through statutory changes and ITC decisions, explaining in particular the 1988 Amendments that both allowed licensing to constitute a protectable domestic industry and eliminated the injury requirement for all complainants. Part III outlines the ITC's standards in determining whether a complainant's licensing activities are sufficient to meet the domestic industry requirement. Finally, Part IV argues that section 337 should be amended to require licensing complainants to demonstrate an injury to their domestic industry before obtaining

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an exclusion order. Part IV also provides the rationales behind the proposed amendment, as well as the benefits that would result.

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Introduction

The International Trade Commission ("ITC" or "Commission") has become a popular forum for nonpracticing entities\(^1\) to enforce

\(^1\) This Essay uses the term "nonpracticing entity" to refer to parties that license intellectual property rights to patents without themselves manufacturing a product covered by the licensed patent.
their patent rights, and for good reason. Commission investigations proceed rapidly with the possibility of a sweeping exclusion order barring importation of all infringing articles into the United States. This Essay challenges the ITC’s role in enforcing the patent rights of such entities.

The ITC’s patent enforcement authority stems from section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Under section 337, the Commission is charged with investigating unfair imports, such as imports that infringe U.S. patents. Unlike the patent laws, section 337 was not enacted to protect the rights of private parties, but to protect U.S. industries from unfair foreign competition. To ensure that Commission investigations remain focused on this goal, section 337 requires complainants to establish that a statutory domestic industry exists before the Commission may issue a remedy.

Historically, section 337 required both (1) a protectable domestic industry and (2) proof of substantial injury to that industry. Later, the injury requirement was eliminated because Congress concluded that an injury could be presumed when imports infringed the complainant’s patent rights. This made sense when complainants were engaged in production activities because the infringing imports directly competed with the domestic products and thus injured the domestic industry.

Although eliminating the injury requirement makes sense with respect to domestic manufacturers, Congress has also allowed complainants to establish a domestic industry through nonmanufacturing activities such as licensing. Moreover, the Commission has gradually relaxed the domestic industry standard for a licensing-based domestic industry to the point that no domestically manufactured article is required. Although infringing imports almost always injure a manufacturing-based domestic industry engaged in producing the patented

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3 Id.
4 See Eric L. Lane, Keeping the LEDs On and the Electric Motors Running: Clean Tech in Court After eBay, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 013, ¶ 49 n.120.
10 See infra Part III.A.
product, the same cannot be said for a licensing-based domestic industry. For licensors, infringing imports often injure only their private patent rights and inflict no harm to any domestic industry. Patentees already have a forum to address injury to private rights: the federal district courts.

This Essay proposes that Congress amend section 337 to require nonpracticing entities to demonstrate a substantial injury to their licensing industry before the ITC can grant a remedy. The Essay proceeds as follows: After an introduction to the ITC, Part I discusses the ITC's recent rise in popularity and then provides a history of section 337. Part II describes the domestic industry requirement and how it has evolved through statutory changes and Commission decisions, explaining in particular the 1988 Amendments that both allowed licensing to constitute a protectable domestic industry and eliminated the injury requirement for all complainants. Part III outlines the Commission's standards in determining whether a complainant's licensing activities are sufficient to meet the domestic industry requirement. Finally, Part IV argues that section 337 should be amended to require licensing complainants to demonstrate an injury to their domestic industry before obtaining an exclusion order. Part IV also provides the rationales behind the proposed amendment, as well as the benefits that would result from its enactment.

I. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

The ITC is an independent, quasi-judicial federal administrative agency with investigative powers over trade matters. Specifically, the Commission is charged with promoting the competitiveness of the United States in the global economy. The Commission describes its mission as to (1) administer U.S. trade remedy laws; (2) provide the President, U.S. Trade Representative, and Congress with information and analysis on matters relating to international trade; and (3) maintain the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

In creating the Commission, Congress sought "to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor against

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11 See infra Part IV.A.
12 See infra Part IV.A.
unfair or injurious import competition." One of the Commission's responsibilities is to adjudicate cases involving imports that allegedly infringe U.S. intellectual property rights. Such cases are handled by the Office of Administrative Law Judges and governed by the provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1337, commonly known as "section 337."

A. The Increasing Popularity of the International Trade Commission

Recently, the number of section 337 investigations has increased dramatically. In the 1990s, the average number of section 337 actions was ten per year. Between 2000 and 2007, the average number of investigations grew to twenty-three per year. This dramatic rise has continued. The following graph depicts the number of investigations each year since 1974.

GRAPH. NUMBER OF SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS BY YEAR

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18 Id. § 1337.
21 Id.
The ITC’s role in enforcing U.S. patent laws is unique, and this has contributed to the recent growth in its popularity. Significantly, the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in *eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.* limited the ability of district courts to grant injunctions. *eBay* held that courts must use the traditional four-factor test for equitable relief when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief.

Subsequently, in *Spansion, Inc. v. ITC*, the Federal Circuit unequivocally held that “*eBay* does not apply to Commission remedy determinations under Section 337.” Thus, the Commission continues to issue exclusion orders upon finding a violation of section 337, regardless of whether the four-part equitable test for injunctions required in district courts is satisfied.

Together, the *eBay* and *Spansion* decisions greatly increased the ITC’s attractiveness to nonpracticing entities. In district court litigation, nonpracticing entities find it difficult to satisfy the equitable test required for injunctive relief. Thus, the ITC is often the only forum available for nonpracticing entities to obtain an injunction. This makes the ITC attractive to nonpracticing entities because injunctions are often necessary as leverage to extract royalties from practicing entities.

The ITC also has several other advantages over district court litigation. It provides broad injunctive relief in the form of exclusion orders. Upon finding that an imported article infringes U.S. intellectual property rights, the Commission directs U.S. Customs to bar all such imports from entering the United States. This remedy is auto-

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24 See id. at 391-92.
25 Id. Under the *eBay* test, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that (1) it suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. Id.
26 *Spansion, Inc. v. ITC*, 629 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
27 Id. at 1359.
28 See e.g., *z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that patentee was not entitled to injunctive relief despite finding infringement).
matic. If appropriate, the Commission may issue a general exclusion order excluding all articles containing the infringing article, regardless of whether the manufacturer of the final product was a party to the investigation.

The power to issue such sweeping remedies lies in the Commission’s broad jurisdictional reach. Importation is a privilege granted by Congress, and exclusion orders “operate[] against goods, not parties.” Thus, the Commission does not need in personam jurisdiction to issue exclusion orders because its section 337 jurisdiction is tied to the imported articles. Therefore, even if an alleged infringer does not have sufficient contacts with the United States for personal jurisdiction, the products they import are still subject to the ITC’s jurisdiction and can be excluded.

Finally, Commission investigations move much more quickly than district court litigation. Patent litigation in district courts typically takes around thirty-one months to complete. By contrast, ITC actions are mandated by statute to be concluded “at the earliest practicable time” after the investigation is initiated. Within forty-five days after institution of an investigation, the administrative law judge must set a target date for completion. If the target date is more than sixteen months after the institution of the investigation, the Commissioners must approve the target date.

Because of its rising popularity, the ITC has become an increasingly important forum for patent holders. The following Section provides a history of the ITC’s enforcement of section 337 and the statute’s unique domestic industry requirement.

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32 Id.
33 A general exclusion order is warranted if (1) it is necessary to prevent circumvention of a limited exclusion order, or (2) there is a pattern of violation and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products. Id. § 1337(d)(2).
34 See id.
36 Sealed Air Corp., 645 F.2d at 985–86.
37 See id.
40 The Commission Rules define “institution” as the date when notice of an investigation is published in the Federal Register. 19 C.F.R. § 210.10(b) (2011).
41 Id. § 210.51(a).
42 Id.
B. The History of Section 337

The origins of section 337 date back to 1922, when a protectionist-minded Congress passed the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act. Concerned with the lower production costs of foreign manufacturers, the Act sought to encourage budding industries in the United States by regulating foreign imports. Section 316 of the Act, the predecessor to section 337, granted the President power to penalize imports that “destroyed, injured, or impaired the development of industry” within the United States. The aim was to protect U.S. production investments and jobs, i.e., domestic industries.

Prior to 1922, patent owners had little recourse against infringing foreign imports. Their only response against importers of the infringing articles was to bring multiple, duplicative suits against each individual retailer. Section 316 remedied this ineffectiveness by giving patent holders a single forum to obtain remedies against all infringing imports in a single proceeding.

Congress revisited the Tariff Act in 1930, immediately prior to the beginning of the Great Depression. Section 316 was largely unchanged, but became known as section 337 in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Since its enactment, section 337 has been significantly amended three times. The Trade Act of 1974 granted the ITC authority to issue exclusion orders and cease-and-desist orders, and made all legal and equitable defenses available in Commission investigations. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 eliminated the injury requirement when intellectual property infringement was alleged and explicitly recognized licensing as a protectable domestic industry. Finally, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of

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43 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (repealed 1930); see also Lasher, supra note 8, at 158.
44 Lasher, supra note 8, at 158.
45 Id. at 159; see also § 316, 42 Stat. at 943-44.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 Id.
52 See Lasher, supra note 8, at 163.
54 See Ting-Ting Kao, Section 337’s General Exclusion Order—Alive in Theory but Dead in
1994 allowed respondents to assert counterclaims and required district courts to stay parallel proceedings upon the respondents' request.

Today, section 337 enables the Commission to instigate an administrative proceeding to investigate improper importation of goods into the United States. "Improper importation" includes the importation of goods that violate U.S. intellectual property laws. After finding that an import infringes a valid U.S. patent, the Commission directs Customs to exclude infringing articles from entering the United States. Exclusion orders may exclude only the article in question, or they may exclude all products containing the infringing article, regardless of whether the manufacturer of the final product was a party to the investigation.

While the Commission has the power to issue far-reaching remedies, complainants must prove that a domestic industry exists with respect to articles protected by the asserted patent. This requirement stems from section 337's role as a trade remedy designed to protect U.S. industries. The domestic industry requirement, discussed below, ensures that the Commission is protecting industries rather than private patent rights.

II. THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY REQUIREMENT

The domestic industry requirement was part of the original section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, and was later incorporated into section 337. The ITC's interpretation regarding what constitutes a protectable domestic industry has evolved tremendously over the years. The following Sections discuss the requirement as it has been applied by the Commission.


59 See id. § 1337(d).
60 See id. § 1337(d)(2).
61 Id. § 1337(a)(3).
62 See Lane, supra note 4, ¶ 49 n.120.
63 See id.
A. Early Interpretations of the Domestic Industry Requirement

Section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, the predecessor to section 337, was designed to protect U.S. manufacturers from the "post–World War I revitalization of European industry." The statutory text of section 316 required complainants to demonstrate that they are part of an "industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States," but provided no guidance with regard to what constituted a protectable U.S. industry.

In the early years of section 316, "industry" was thought to be synonymous with domestic manufacturing. Under section 316, the domestic industry requirement was not a heavily disputed issue. For example, in Ex parte Bakelite Corp., a rare case arising under section 316 that was appealed to the courts, it was undisputed that the complainant had a protectable domestic industry. There, the complainant clearly alleged that infringing imports injured "its domestic business of manufacturing" similar articles.

After section 337 was enacted in 1930, Congress still declined to define "industry" expressly. Even so, for the first fifty years of section 337, it was more or less undisputed that "domestic industry" referred to manufacturing activities, i.e., the utilization of domestic labor, capital, and infrastructures to produce some tangible product. The Commission confirmed this view in 1965 when it terminated the investigation in Walkie-Talkie Units because the complainant obtained the patented articles from foreign manufacturers rather than producing them in the United States. Walkie-Talkie Units strongly suggested that the Commission viewed section 337 as a production-oriented statute.

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67 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
68 See id. at 446–48.
69 Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
71 See Schwimmer, supra note 66, at 171.
73 Id.
74 See Schwimmer, supra note 66, at 171 n.44.
B. The Domestic Industry Requirement After the 1974 Amendments to Section 337

Congress finally provided some guidance about what constituted a protectable domestic industry when it passed the 1974 Amendments to section 337.75 Although "industry" was still undefined in the statutory text, the legislative history of the Amendments seemed to confirm that industry was synonymous with production or manufacturing.76 In discussing the Amendments, the House Committee on Ways and Means stated that "the patent must be exploited by production in the United States."77

Shortly after the 1974 Amendments, companies tested the limits of what constituted a protectable industry.78 In Certain Cast-Iron Stoves,79 a foreign manufacturer sought to establish a domestic industry through various nonmanufacturing domestic activities performed in the United States.80 There, the Commission found that evidence of domestic "repair, testing, installation, and distribution services" relating to the foreign-manufactured products was sufficient to establish a domestic industry.81 Cast-Iron Stoves significantly expanded section 337's reach to include foreign manufacturers engaged in nonmanufacturing activities in the United States.82 This reflected the Commission's recognition that America was transitioning from a manufacturing-driven to a service-driven economy.83

Two years later, however, the Commission limited the applicability of Cast-Iron Stoves and reined in its definition of domestic industry. In Miniature, Battery-Operated, All Terrain, Wheeled Vehicles ("Toy Cars"),84 the Commission found no domestic industry when the complainant manufactured the patented products abroad but advertised, licensed, and sold the articles in the United States.85 The Commission found that, because the complainant's manufacturing activity did not primarily relate to production, no protectable domestic indus-

75 Lasher, supra note 8, at 164.
76 Id.
77 H.R. REP. No. 93-571, at 78 (1973) (emphasis added).
78 See Lasher, supra note 8, at 164.
80 Id. at 10–11.
81 Lasher, supra note 8, at 164.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 165.
85 Id. at 10–11.
try existed. It distinguished Cast-Iron Stoves by noting that the domestic activities in Cast-Iron Stoves were "integrally related" to the patented article while the activities in Toy Cars were "more akin to an 'assist' which are often provided by a buyer of imported merchandise." In his Additional Views, Commissioner Haggart opined that "[t]his Commission, from the very beginning of its administration of section 337, has defined industry by referring to production, particularly in cases involving patents."

Other decisions in the mid-1980s also suggested that, despite Cast-Iron Stoves, domestic production and manufacturing activities were still the cornerstones of a protectable domestic industry. In Certain Products with Gremlins Character Depictions, Warner Brothers alleged that the respondents imported products that depicted copyrighted characters from the movie Gremlins. To support the existence of a domestic industry, Warner Brothers pointed to the various licensing activities related to the Gremlins copyrights. Although the Commission ultimately found that the complainant had a protectable domestic industry, it focused on the complainant's production rather than licensing activities. In particular, the Commission credited the production of books, nightshirts, and toys bearing the copyrighted images by the complainant's licensees for the existence of a domestic industry. The Commission again noted that domestic industry has consistently been defined by "the domestic production of products covered by the intellectual property rights in question."

A few years later, in Certain Soft Sculpture Dolls Popularly Known as "Cabbage Patch Kids," Related Literature and Packaging Therefor, the Commission specifically rejected the use of licensing

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86 Id. at 11.
87 Id. at 6 n.9.
88 Id. at 41 (Additional Views of Commissioner Haggart) (emphasis added).
90 Id. at 1.
91 Id. at 4. These included "marketing, financial, and legal activities related to the lease and legal protection of the [copyrights]." Id.
92 See id. at 3–4 (finding that "licensing activities . . . do not constitute a domestic industry under section 337 [and] that there is a domestic industry in the United States that includes the domestic production-related activities of Warner's licensees involving the Gremlins copyrights").
93 Id. at 12.
94 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
activities to establish a domestic industry. Similar to the *Gremlins* investigation, however, the Commission ultimately found that a domestic industry existed because of the complainant’s domestic *manufacturing-related* activities, such as assembly, cleaning, and packaging the patented articles. Thus, the Commission reaffirmed the position that whether a protectable domestic industry exists turned on production, rather than licensing activities.

Although the Commission struggled to define a coherent standard for domestic industry in the 1980s, the pre-1988 investigations seem to suggest that a protectable domestic industry required *some* quantum of domestic production or manufacturing activity. This all began to change in 1988 when the domestic industry requirement was finally codified. The following Section discusses the 1988 Amendments to section 337 and their effect on the domestic industry requirement.

C. *The 1988 Amendments to Section 337*

The 1988 Amendments were motivated in part by Congress’s recognition that the United States’ economic strength was transitioning from manufacturing to technology and innovation—something that the Commission alluded to in the *Cast-Iron Stoves* decision. Because of this shift, the Amendments altered the domestic industry requirement in two ways. First, they expressly expanded the definition of domestic industry to cover licensing activities. Second, they eliminated the requirement that complainants must demonstrate a substantial injury to the domestic industry. These two changes are discussed below.

1. *Licensing and the Domestic Industry*

The 1988 Amendments redefined “industry” under section 337 to include research and licensing activities. The text of the Amendments defined “domestic industry” in part as follows:

> with respect to the articles protected by the patent, copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned—

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96 *Id.* at 15 (emphasis added).
97 *See id.* at 16.
98 *See Lasher, supra* note 8, at 166–67.
101 *See Clark, supra* note 7, at 1160.
(A) significant investment in plant and equipment;
(B) significant employment of labor or capital; or
(C) substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and development, or licensing.\textsuperscript{103}

The amended definition of "domestic industry" expanded section 337 protection to activities such as licensing.\textsuperscript{104} However, it did not necessarily follow that licensing without any corresponding production was sufficient to demonstrate a protectable domestic industry. In fact, early investigations after the 1988 Amendments suggested that a licensing domestic industry required either the complainant or its licensees to be producing articles covered by the asserted patent domestically.\textsuperscript{105}

The Amendments were intended to protect entities who were engaged in innovation-driven activities.\textsuperscript{106} As Representative Robert Kastenmeier explained: "[S]uch a change will enable universities and small businesses who do not have the capital to actually make the goods in the United States to still have access to the ITC forum for the protection of their rights."\textsuperscript{107}

Although the Amendments opened the doors of the ITC to innovation-driven and inventive entities, eventually it also laid the groundwork for opening the doors of the ITC to revenue-driven nonpracticing entities. The 1988 Amendments began the shift that ultimately resulted in the current state of section 337. Today, patent holding companies that derive revenue solely from licensing their intellectual property to companies already engaged in existing production may establish a protectable domestic industry.\textsuperscript{108} Such a business model is vastly different from the model that Congress originally intended the Amendments to reach—a model based on developing technology and licensing the resulting intellectual property to manufacturers who have the capabilities to bring the technology to market.\textsuperscript{109} In addition to redefining the domestic industry requirement,
the 1988 Amendments also eliminated the injury requirement for patent-based investigations.110

2. Injury to the Domestic Industry

Prior to the 1988 Amendments, section 337 required complainants to demonstrate that their domestic industry was substantially injured by the infringing imports.111 The rationale behind this requirement was that section 337's primary focus was to protect domestic industries from unfair imports.112 Vindication of individual complainants' patent rights was done through the patent laws, not section 337.113 Thus, Congress required that complainants separately demonstrate injury to a U.S. industry before the ITC could provide a remedy.114

Congress eliminated the independent injury requirement based on the premise that any patent infringement necessarily injures the patent holder's domestic industry.115 Accordingly, complainants alleging patent infringement as the basis for a section 337 investigation after the 1988 Amendments are not required to prove any specific injury to their domestic industry; injury is assumed from the infringement.116

D. The Domestic Industry Requirement in Practice

Today, there is a two-pronged test for analyzing the domestic industry requirement for patent-based investigations.117 Complainants must demonstrate both an "economic prong"118 and a "technical prong"119 to establish that a protectable domestic industry exists.120

110 See Clark, supra note 7, at 1160.
111 See id. at 1162. Complainants demonstrated injury by various facts including the following: (1) lost sales; (2) increased importation and sale of infringing products; (3) declining production by domestic competitors due to lost sales; (4) declining profits of domestic competitors; (5) lower-price infringing imports; (6) infringing imports forcing complainant's prices lower; (7) decline in employment as a result of the importation of infringing products; (8) loss of potential sales resulting from the importation of infringing products; (9) loss of royalties from licensees or potential licensees as a result of existence of potentially infringing products; (10) capacity of foreign competitors to produce a significant amount of infringing products; (11) significant penetration of domestic market by infringing imports; and (12) competition between complainant's product and infringer's product in the particular domestic industry. Id. at 1160–61.
112 See id. at 1162.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 1163–67.
116 See id.
117 See Lasher, supra note 8, at 169.
119 See id. § 1337(a)(2).
Section 337 provides three ways to satisfy the economic prong. Complainants may demonstrate either "significant investment in plant and equipment" or "significant employment of labor or capital" with respect to articles protected by the asserted patents. Complainants may also demonstrate "substantial investment" in the exploitation of the patented articles through "engineering, research and development, or licensing."

The technical prong is satisfied by demonstrating "that the complainant practices the IP right domestically." This requires the complainant to show that he engages in activities covered by the asserted patent. Inexplicably, the technical prong requirement is now relaxed, or arguably even eliminated, when the complainant's asserted domestic industry is based on licensing activity. To establish a licensing domestic industry, the complainant need only demonstrate a nexus between the licensing activity and the asserted detail. The following Part further discusses the analysis involved in establishing a domestic industry through licensing activities.

III. LICENSING AS A DOMESTIC INDUSTRY

As discussed above, after the 1988 Amendments, complainants could demonstrate a protectable domestic industry through their licensing activities. The standard for establishing a licensing domestic industry, however, is different from establishing a manufacturing domestic industry and has changed substantially since the enactment of the 1988 Amendments. The following Section discusses the evolution of the Commission's technical prong requirement for licensing domestic industries. Then, the next Section discusses the economic prong for establishing a licensing domestic industry.

120 See Lasher, supra note 8, at 171.
122 Id. § 1337(a)(3)(A).
123 Id. § 1337(a)(3)(B).
124 Id. § 1337(a)(3)(C).
125 Thomas A. Broughan, III, Modernizing § 337's Domestic Industry Requirement for the Global Economy, 19 Fed. Cir. B.J. 41, 49 (2009) ("The technical prong is also satisfied if the complainant is actively engaged in the process of establishing a domestic industry.").
126 See id.
128 See id. at 5, 8.
A. The Technical Prong for Licensing Domestic Industries

In early investigations where complainants sought to establish a licensing domestic industry, the Commission continued to require the technical prong.\textsuperscript{129} In other words, the Commission required either the complainant or its licensees to practice the patent domestically.\textsuperscript{130} This was hardly surprising. Complainants seeking to establish a manufacturing domestic industry, for example, have always been required to demonstrate that expenditures on equipment and personnel culminated with a domestically produced article covered by the asserted patent.\textsuperscript{131} It logically follows that complainants seeking to establish a licensing domestic industry should also be required to demonstrate that expenditures on licensing activities (e.g., licensing professionals, office space, etc.) result in a domestically produced article covered by the asserted patent.

There is no reason that investigations based on a licensing domestic industry should be treated any differently from investigations based on a manufacturing domestic industry. In fact, in 1993, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") summarily rejected a complainant's argument that the existence of a licensing domestic industry did not require the complainant or his licensees to practice the asserted patents.\textsuperscript{132} The ALJ noted that the complainant's argument was made without citation and that it was contrary to the Commission's "longstanding practice" of requiring exploitation of the asserted patent to find a domestic industry.\textsuperscript{133}

For undisclosed reasons, however, the Commission began retreating from its long-held practice of requiring the domestic production of a patented product.\textsuperscript{134} As early as 1997, ALJs found, with little elaboration, that neither the complainant nor its licensees needed to manufacture a product covered by the asserted patent to establish a licensing domestic industry.\textsuperscript{135} This is a significant departure from the

\textsuperscript{129} See Certain Doxorubicin and Preparations Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-300, at 137 (Feb. 7, 1991) (Initial Determination) (finding that a domestic industry existed "[a]ssuming complainant's [product] . . . [was] made" under the asserted patent).

\textsuperscript{130} Id.

\textsuperscript{131} See Lasher, supra note 8, at 164.


\textsuperscript{133} Id. at 99 n.87.

\textsuperscript{134} See Lasher, supra note 8, at 174–75.

Commission's historical requirement that the domestic industry be both linked to an actual product covered by the asserted patent's claims and manufactured in the United States.

In a string of decisions issued in the early and mid-2000s, the Commission confirmed that complainants with a licensing domestic industry need not satisfy the traditional technical prong of the domestic industry analysis. In Certain Short-Wavelength Light Emitting Diodes, Laser Diodes and Products Containing Same, the Commission stated that "[t]he domestic industry analysis under subsection (c), 'subsumes within it the technical prong aspect' and thus, only the economic prong needs to be proven." In another case, the Commission found that a complainant may establish a licensing domestic industry without showing that any articles that practice a claim of the asserted patents are manufactured in the United States.

Today, a complainant attempting to establish a licensing domestic industry only needs to demonstrate that "there is a sufficient nexus between the patent at issue and the alleged domestic licensing industry." No domestically manufactured product is needed. This has made it easier for nonpracticing entities to satisfy the domestic industry requirement than entities that actually manufacture a domestic product because the latter is still required to show that they domestically manufacture an article covered by the patent.

B. The Economic Prong for Licensing Domestic Industries

The standard for a licensing domestic industry's economic prong has also been significantly lowered since the 1988 Amendments. The Commission and the Federal Circuit recently made clear that all types of licensing activities may satisfy the economic prong under section 337(a)(3)(C). The Commission noted with respect to the protectable licensing activities:

137 Id. at 18 n.3 (June 18, 2008) (quoting Certain Light Emitting Diodes and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-512, at 134 (May 10, 2005) (Initial Determination)).
138 See Certain Semiconductor Chips with Minimized Chip Package Size and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-432, at 12 (Jan. 24, 2001) (Initial Determination) ("[A]ctual production of the article in the United States is not required if a complainant has made a substantial investment in licensing the patent (or patents) at issue in an investigation.").
141 See John Mezzalingua Assocs. v. ITC, 660 F.3d 1322, 1327-31 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Certain
The examples mentioned in the legislative history... share a common thread; namely, the intellectual property right holder is taking steps to foster propagation or use of the underlying intellectual property. These examples include instances in which licensing activities encourage practical applications of the invention or bring the patented technology to the market.

Despite recognizing a distinction between production-driven licensing and revenue-driving licensing, the Commission concluded that the plain language of the statute “does not limit the types of licensing activities that the Commission can consider.” The Commission ultimately found, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that revenue-driven licensing is a protectable domestic industry under section 337.

The Federal Circuit went one step further in the appeal of Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors & Components Thereof & Products Containing Same, styled John Mezzalingua Associates v. ITC. There, the Court suggested that when litigation-related expenses are sufficiently tied to licensing the asserted patent, such expenses may be used to satisfy the domestic industry requirement. This further lowered the standards for establishing a licensing domestic industry because it implied that even patent litigation—with no corresponding manufacturing activity—may be evidence of a protectable domestic industry.

Today, nonpracticing complainants engaged in licensing arguably face lower hurdles to obtaining a remedy under section 337 than complainants who actually engage in domestic manufacturing. This result is contrary to the original aims of section 337, a trade remedy designed to protect U.S. industry. Furthermore, this result leads to undesirable outcomes. For example, a domestic manufacturer who

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143 Id.
144 See generally John Mezzalingua Assocs., 660 F.3d 1322.
145 Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-650, at 50.
147 John Mezzalingua Assocs. v. ITC, 660 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
148 Id. at 1328.
149 See Chien, supra note 140, at 176.
150 See Lasher, supra note 8, at 158–59.
holds a patent covering a product that it does not produce cannot satisfy the domestic industry requirement under section 337(a)(3)(A) or (B). However, if that same manufacturer sues or threatens to sue other domestic manufacturers who are still practicing the patent, they may be able to satisfy the domestic industry requirement by establishing a licensing industry under section 337(a)(3)(C). Encouraging lawsuits that impede, rather than promote, technological development hardly seems consistent with the Commission's goals of protecting domestic industry. The proposed amendment, discussed below, seeks to address the current problems with the Commission's lax domestic industry requirement for nonmanufacturing complainants.

IV. The Proposed Amendment

Congress should amend section 337 to require complainants who seek to establish a domestic industry through licensing to demonstrate that the effect or tendency of the importation and sale of the infringing articles is to destroy or substantially injure the domestic licensing industry. The amended statute should mirror the pre-1988 injury requirement.\(^{151}\) Specifically, subsection 337 (a)(3)(C) should be amended to provide that an "industry" exists, "with respect to the articles protected by the patent . . . concerned," where there is substantial investment in its exploitation through licensing, and the effect or tendency of the importation of articles into the United States by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of one of these parties is to destroy or substantially injure the licensing industry in the United States.\(^{152}\)

In assessing the injury to a licensing domestic industry, the Commission should specifically look at evidence demonstrating loss of royalties from licensees or potential licensees as a result of the infringing imports. For example, a complainant seeking to establish a licensing industry may be a university or small business without manufacturing capabilities, as envisioned by Congress.\(^{153}\) Under the amended statute, the complainant could establish an injury by demonstrating that importation of the infringing articles affects or has affected licensing negotiations and driven down the negotiated royalty rates. A complainant with licensees who manufacture products covered by the patent could also demonstrate injury by showing that the infringing imports reduced sales of the complainant's licensees' products and,

\(^{152}\) The language in italics represents the amendment.
thus, reduced the royalties paid to the complainant. In either case, if
the demonstrated losses were "substantial," the complainant would
demonstrate a sufficient injury to the complainant's domestic licensing
industry.

The following Sections discuss the rationales behind and benefits
of the proposed amendment. The first Section argues that, although
such an injury from patent infringement may be presumed when the
domestic injury involves manufacturing activity, it cannot be pre-
sumed for licensing industries. The second Section discusses how the
amendment would ensure that nonpracticing entities do not face
lower hurdles in satisfying the domestic industry requirement. Finally,
the third Section discusses the potential benefits of the amendment,
such as providing greater clarity to section 337.

A. Injury Cannot Be Presumed for Licensing Industries

As previously explained, the 1988 Amendments eliminated the
injury requirement for investigations where the unfair act alleged is
intellectual property infringement. The rationale behind eliminat-
ing the requirement was that any infringement of a valid patent neces-
sarily injured the patent holder. This rationale, however, is only
reasonable when the patentee is actually engaged in manufacturing a
product domestically.

Prior to the 1988 Amendments, complainants were nearly always
engaged in production and manufacturing, because the domestic in-
dustry requirement referred only to manufacturing activities. When
assessing whether there was an injury, the Commission considered
factors that were mostly directed toward the effect the imports had on
articles that the complainant manufactured. These included the
complainant's evidence of lost profits, loss of market share, and re-
duced domestic production. Because the infringing articles necessa-
arily competed with the products produced by the domestic
complainant, the Commission could logically presume that the infringing
imports would result in lost profits, increased competition, and re-
duced production to the domestic manufacturer.

154 See supra Part II.A.
155 See Lasher, supra note 8, at 167 ("Congress believed that the injury requirement made
no sense in the intellectual property arena inasmuch as the mere importation of infringing goods
into the United States harmed the public interest.").
156 Id. at 164.
(May 1986) (Initial Determination).
158 Id.
At the same time that Congress eliminated the injury requirement, however, Congress also broadened the scope of domestic industry to include licensing. Initially, the Commission continued to require complainants seeking to establish a licensing domestic industry to demonstrate the domestic production of an article covered by the asserted patent by the complainant or its licensees. In such cases, the elimination of the injury requirement made sense, as the infringing imports competed with the domestically produced article.

By the mid-1990s, however, the Commission no longer required any domestic manufacturing to establish a licensing domestic industry. Today, a licensing domestic industry can exist even where no domestic labor, capital, or equipment has ever been used to produce an article covered by the asserted patent. Because complainants establishing a licensing domestic industry no longer need to show that an article covered by the asserted patent is or was produced in the United States, Congress’s rationale in eliminating the injury requirement is hardly convincing. While infringing importers directly compete with domestic manufacturers producing the patented article, there is no analogous competition between the infringing importers and nonmanufacturing licensors.

When neither the complainant nor its licensees actually produce any article covered by the asserted patent in the United States, importation of the allegedly infringing article may not have any detrimental effect on the industry producing the patented article. There is no industry—i.e., jobs, investments, manufacturing facilities—to protect. In such cases, the only injury would be a violation of the patent holder’s intellectual property rights. Such injuries are not redressable under section 337, as the patentee already has a means to rectify such injuries—litigation in the district courts under the patent laws.

The absence of an injury requirement coupled with the relaxed standards for establishing a licensing domestic industry creates a significant problem: complainants are able to seek redress from the ITC despite the fact that there is no domestic injury caused by the infringing imports. The proposed amendment would rectify this problem by requiring nonmanufacturing complainants to demonstrate an injury to their domestic industry of the type that Congress originally enacted.

159 See Lasher, supra note 8, at 167-68.
160 See supra Part III.A.
161 See supra Part III.A.
162 See supra Part III.A.
section 337 to prevent. This will ensure that section 337 stays true to its purpose of protecting domestic industries, not private patent rights.

B. Nonpracticing Entities Should Face a Higher Standard to Satisfy the Domestic Industry Requirement

Congress should hold complainants who establish a domestic industry through licensing activities to a higher standard than complainants who have a manufacturing- and production-based domestic industry. However, the opposite is currently true. Complainants seeking to establish a licensing domestic industry arguably face fewer hurdles than those establishing a domestic industry through traditional manufacturing and production activities. The proposed amendment would therefore heighten the standard for complainants seeking to establish a licensing domestic industry.

Today, complainants seeking to establish a manufacturing domestic industry under section 337(a)(3)(A) and (B) must satisfy the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement and prove that a domestically manufactured article exists. This ensures that the complainant's alleged domestic industry is tied to the asserted patent and would be harmed by imports that infringe the patent.

Complainants seeking to establish a licensing domestic industry under section 337(a)(3)(C), however, have no such requirement. Instead, they only need to establish a nexus between the asserted patent and licensing activities. Under existing law, no domestically produced article covered by the asserted patent is necessary to establish a licensing domestic industry. Moreover, the economic prong for licensing domestic industries has been defined so broadly that the revenue-driven licensing models that nonpracticing entities follow now constitute a protectable domestic industry.

Nonpracticing entities were not the types of entities that the drafters of the 1988 Amendments intended to protect by allowing licensing to establish a domestic industry. Section 337 was historically intended to protect domestic industries, not to protect

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163 See Chien, supra note 140, at 176.
164 See id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
168 See Chien, supra note 140, at 176.
169 See supra Part III.B.
unnecessary hold-up litigation and licensing activities that neither produce nor promote the development of technology within the United States.\footnote{Brief of Amici Curiae Verizon Communications Inc. & Google Inc. in Support of Neither Party & Supporting Affirmance at 2, John Mezzalingua Associates, Inc. v. ITC, 660 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).} Thus, it is inexplicable that nonpracticing entities face lower standards to access the Commission than entities engaged in utilizing domestic labor, capital, and equipment to produce products.

Requiring proof of injury compensates for eliminating a link between the asserted patent and a domestically manufactured product by requiring a link between the asserted patent and an injury to the domestic industry. The proposed amendment would ensure that complainants seeking to establish a licensing injury face a higher, rather than lower, standard for establishing a protectable domestic industry.

C. An Injury Requirement Will Further Benefit Section 337 Investigations

The proposed amendment would provide other benefits to section 337 investigations.\footnote{These benefits are similar to the benefits proposed by Professor Chien. \textit{Id.} at 184–85. Professor Chien’s article suggests that the Commission consistently apply the technical prong requirement to both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing complainants. \textit{Id.} at 184. Although this is a possible solution to the problem of nonpracticing entities seeking relief from the ITC, this Essay does not address the merits of that approach.} For example, the amendment would increase clarity with regard to when a complainant may seek a remedy before the ITC when the asserted patent is one of many in a portfolio.\footnote{See Chien, supra note 140, at 184–85.} The amendment would also reduce the risk that an exclusion order will cause domestic consumers to lose access to certain technologies that are only available via the imported products.\footnote{See \textit{id.} at 185.}

To establish a licensing domestic industry, a licensee must demonstrate a nexus between the asserted patent and the complainant’s licensing activities.\footnote{See supra Part III.A.} This is complicated when the asserted patent is part of a patent portfolio. If the complainant’s domestic activities are minimally related to licensing the asserted patent, the Commission will analyze the strength of the nexus between the complainant’s activities and licensing the asserted patent.\footnote{Multimedia Display and Navigation Devices and Sys., Components Thereof, and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-694, USITC Pub. 4292, at 8–13 (2011) (Commission Opinion).} The strength of the nexus is dependent on various factors, including “(1) the number of patents...
in the portfolio, (2) the relative value contributed by the asserted patent to the portfolio, [and] (3) the prominence of the asserted patent in licensing discussions."\textsuperscript{177} There is, however, no statutory standard to determine and assess a nexus's strength.\textsuperscript{178}

The proposed amendment would decrease the ambiguity associated with portfolio licensing. The rationale of requiring a nexus is to ensure that the asserted patent is actually associated with the complainant's domestic industry when there are multiple patents within a portfolio.\textsuperscript{179} The proposed amendment would ensure the existence of a nexus, because if the complainant can prove that the infringing imports injured his licensing industry, then the asserted patent must be substantially connected to the domestic industry.

For example, if the asserted patent were merely a minor patent in a portfolio consisting of thousands of patents, articles infringing that patent would likely not affect negotiated royalty rates or payments significantly, because negotiations will center on unasserted patents. On the other hand, if the asserted patent were the dominant patent in the portfolio, imports that infringe the patent would likely have a significant effect on the negotiations, because prospective licensees may be less inclined to pay significant royalties for critical patents that are subject to significant infringement from foreign entities. Accordingly, the infringing imports injure the complainant's licensing activities when the infringed patent is a critical patent in the licensed portfolio. Focusing on whether the complainant can demonstrate an injury provides greater clarity than attempting to assess the "strength" of a nexus.

The injury requirement would also ensure that U.S. consumers do not lose access to important technologies.\textsuperscript{180} Currently, complainants who engage in licensing may obtain an exclusion order against an infringing article, even if articles covered by the asserted patent are not manufactured in the United States.\textsuperscript{181} In such circumstances, an exclusion order would cut off all sources of the technology to domestic consumers, because the technology is only available from foreign manufacturers.

\textsuperscript{177} Id. at 10.
\textsuperscript{178} See Chien, supra note 140, at 184–85.
\textsuperscript{179} See id. at 183.
\textsuperscript{180} See id. at 185 (noting that the current application of the domestic industry standard carries a "risk that the US will lose access to technology through exclusion orders").
\textsuperscript{181} See id. at 185–86.
The Commission has recognized that disruptions to the domestic market may preclude an exclusion order. In the only three cases where the Commission declined to issue an exclusion order on public interest grounds, the Commission was concerned that domestic supply would be unable to meet consumer demand. Reintroducing the injury requirement would prevent exclusion orders from disrupting the domestic markets.

For example, the nonpracticing entity complainant would have to demonstrate a substantial injury to his licensing activities by showing that the infringing articles negatively affect royalty rates and payments. It follows that such rates and payments would only be affected if the complainant’s licensing activities result in domestically manufactured products that compete with the infringing articles. In such cases, the Commission’s award of an exclusion order would not prevent consumers from obtaining the technology, because there would be a domestically manufactured alternative to the infringing articles.

On the other hand, if a complainant were unable to prove that his royalty rates and payments were negatively affected by the infringing imports, the existence of a domestically manufactured alternative would be unlikely. Accordingly, the technology would only be available to consumers via the infringing imports. An exclusion order would therefore disrupt the domestic markets by denying consumers access to the technology. Thus, the proposed amendment would ensure that exclusion orders do not block access to technology for U.S. consumers.

CONCLUSION

The current state of the law enables nonpracticing entities to establish a domestic industry without even linking the asserted patent to a product produced domestically. Moreover, nonpracticing entities establishing a licensing industry face arguably lower hurdles than manufacturers seeking to establish a production-based domestic industry. Such a result is inconsistent with section 337’s basis as a trade remedy designed to protect U.S. industry. Licensees engaged only in licensing should be held to more stringent standards in establishing a protectable domestic industry.

Although Congress previously eliminated the injury requirement by reasoning that injury can be presumed for patent infringement, this

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182 See id. at 185.
183 Broughan, supra note 125, at 71.
184 See Chien, supra note 140, at 185.
rationale only applies with respect to domestic manufacturing industries. Allowing complainants to establish a domestic licensing industry without proving injury is inconsistent with section 337's aim of protecting domestic industry. For the reasons stated above, Congress should amend section 337 to require complainants seeking to establish a licensing domestic industry to demonstrate a substantial injury to their licensing industry.