Compared to What?:
ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers

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ABSTRACT
A half century ago, class actions were controversial. Aggregation was seen as permissible only under exceptional circumstances that could justify departures from the obligations of individual voice, participation, and control of the then-dominant procedural framework. The adoption in 2009 by the American Law Institute of Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation marks the normalization of group-based adjudication as well as the embrace of group-based settlements through which lawyers and judges shape binding and preclusive judgments. In its 2009 promulgation, the ALI offered two models of the “process due.” One, centered on courts, requires public explanations of decisions to authorize group-based resolutions. The other imposes some regulation on out-of-court behavior yet relaxes relational constraints on lawyers by licensing them to enter into individual contracts that sign over control about mass settlements of claims to a cohort of clients and their lawyers.

The ALI’s expansive attitudes contrast to another understanding of due process, exemplified by the 2008 Supreme Court decision of Taylor v. Sturgell. That ruling insisted that courts could not rely on the idea of “virtual” representation to use a judgment against one party to preclude another, even if the sequential plaintiffs shared the same lawyer. In this Article, I explore the his-
In 2009, the American Law Institute ("ALI") adopted new principles of the law of aggregate litigation to provide for more kinds of
aggregations, in and out of court.¹ How does this codification compare to predecessor efforts to shape large-scale litigation? What concerns animated the drafters, and what do the ALI precepts teach about aspirations for courts, lawyers, due process, and regulation? These questions are the focus of this Article, and my argument is that within the ALI’s ambitious project is evidence of the success of the past century’s impressive procedural reforms, a primer on contemporary attitudes toward adjudication and its alternatives, and serious questions about what “due process” will and should be understood to require in the coming decades.

The procedural project of the twentieth century was opening up courthouse doors, and it was the success of that work that, in 2009, produced the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. Although courts and adjudication have ancient roots, their contours changed dramatically over the last century, as an array of individuals and groups gained new entitlements enforceable through litigation. Not only did women and men of all colors come to be understood as rights-holders, but the range of rights grew to encompass interactions among households, protection of employees at workplaces, prohibitions on certain forms of discriminatory conduct, respect for environmental conditions, and obligations of due care in the manufacture and distribution of products.

Substantive transformations of rights dovetailed with procedural reforms. In the second half of the twentieth century, the constitutional term “due process of law” was reread, no longer to require only conformity with prescribed rules of procedure but as an independent metric of value: that individuals have opportunities to be heard, to present evidence to sustain factual claims, and to obtain judgments by independent decisionmakers as a predicate to preclusive and binding judgments.² This “developmental theory of due process”³ became, for some, a constitutional imperative, as seen in a recent Supreme Court ruling, Taylor v. Sturgell,⁴ decided in 2008 and detailed below.⁵

In conjunction with the broadening view of constitutional obligations, national federal rules welcomed litigants through forgiving

⁵ Id. at 891–96; see infra notes 324–59 and accompanying text.
pleading standards, capacious opportunities for discovery, and methods to group cases together through joinder, consolidation, class action, and multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) rules. Over the course of the last hundred years, normative reconstructions of equality and fairness propelled new rights and practices that drove significant structural changes. Courts came to the fore as institutions with obligations to interact with a host of individuals—the immediate participants in disputes (litigants, witnesses, counsel) and a public audience, with their own rights to be present and to speak freely about what they observed.

Given the concomitant growth of the media and the legal academy, judges became a topic of intense scrutiny, producing a vast literature (laudatory as well as critical) about the propriety and quality of their judgments. Various metrics of success can be used and debated—in terms of whether the past decades of legal interventions have produced wise and just outcomes, are efficient, and have positive or negative externalities. Whatever positions one takes, commentators agree that during the twentieth century, the demand for adjudication rose as new individuals and groups turned to courts to seek redress.

The procedural project of the twenty-first century is figuring out what to do with all the diverse rights-holders, eligible to pursue enforcement of their entitlements in courts operating under the demands of this new theory of fair process. Three kinds of access challenges have become vivid. A first is informational: do individuals or groups recognize injuries, name them as wrongs, and claim them as rights? A second is financial: resources are needed to pursue and to defend claims, and lawyers are at the center of fact and law investigation. A third is about the capacity of courts and their alternatives, which are also in need of funding, expertise, and methods to cope with large numbers of filings, some of which involve similar kinds of claims.

During the past few decades, the sense of the magnitude of the problem of access to courts intensified. One data point makes the point. As of 2009, more than 4.3 million people in civil actions in California’s courts lacked lawyers. Pressures from such challenges have produced a range of responses. One focus is the provision of lawyers

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7 See Legislative Counsel’s Digest to Assem. B. No. 590, 2009–2010 LEG. REG. SESS. § 1(b), at 2, 4 (Cal. 2009) [hereinafter Legislative Digest to Assem. B. No. 590].
to individuals—either through state subsidies (predicated on constitutional right or legislative policies),
through donations (“pro bono”), or by governments bringing claims on behalf of individuals. Skipping lawyers—by virtue of economic necessity or by choice—also lowers costs. A growing population in courts are persons who were once called “pro se” or “pro pers” and are now often described as the “self-represented.”

Simplification of rules by reformatting them to be more user-friendly and promotion of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) procedures were other initiatives, refashioning the judicial role to include negotiation and settlement. In addition to these court-centered reforms, some claimants were routed elsewhere—either to public administrative agencies or to private dispute resolution providers.

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8 The effort has been nicknamed “civil Gideon” to invoke the landmark United States Supreme Court decision interpreting the Sixth Amendment to require lawyers for indigent defendants facing felony convictions, *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). With the support of California’s Chief Justice, Ronald M. George, and its Judicial Council, the California legislature enacted laws—the “Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act”—for pilot projects based in selected courts to provide appointed counsel for “low-income parties in civil matters involving critical issues affecting basic human needs.” *Legislative Digest to Assem. B. No. 590, supra note 7, § 68651(a).* The law specifies support for “low-income persons who require legal services in civil matters involving housing-related matters, domestic violence and civil harassment restraining orders, probate conservatorships, guardianships of the person, elder abuse, or actions by a parent to obtain sole legal or physical custody of a child . . . .” See id. § 68651(b)(1). Child custody cases are among those to be given the “highest priorit[y].” Id. § 68651(b)(2).


The approach taken by the ALI in 2009 exemplifies another kind of response—that a small group of lawyers can be spread across a wider group of disputants to produce outcomes in bulk.11 Reading the 2009 precepts, one might forget the controversies—only fifty years ago—about whether class actions were permissible and whether judges ought to be actively involved in clustering cases to press for resolutions, including by settlement. While collective actions were not novelties of the twentieth century, they were in need of special justification.12 Before the 1960s, only “real” class actions had binding force that cut off subsequent litigation on the same issues; decisions in “spurious” and “hybrid” classes (classifications, based on ideas of unified or diffuse interests, that were slippery in application) did not preclude the filing of new lawsuits to pursue what today would be considered the “same” claim.13

In the 1960s, the then-new Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was understood as challenging some of the commonly held procedural presuppositions.14 The class action rule bent the emergent due process norms by weakening rights of individual autonomy and participation so as to produce binding outcomes across a wide set of individuals. But to do so, a judge had to determine, “as soon as practicable after commencement of an action,” that the proposed grouping was part of a coherently aggregated set and adequately represented.15 Moreover, through the 1970s, judicial efforts at settlement were frowned upon: while a settlement could be a “byproduct” of pretrial conferences, it was not to be the point.16 And managerial judges—overseeing both lawyers and cases—were not then widely accepted.17

16 Am. Bar Ass’n, The Improvement of the Administration of Justice 78 (5th ed. 1971).
17 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 376–77 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges]; Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming
The ALI promulgation in 2009 represents the normalization of aggregation, along with the embrace of management by judges, given a great deal of discretion.\(^\text{18}\) Under a subsection entitled “General Principles for Aggregate Proceedings,” the ALI’s compilation outlines four goals explained as furthering “the pursuit of justice under law.”\(^\text{19}\) Included are “promoting the efficient use of litigation resources,” “enforcing substantive rights and responsibilities,” “facilitating binding resolutions of civil disputes,” and “facilitating accurate and just resolutions of civil disputes by trial and settlement.”\(^\text{20}\) Understanding the costs of individual pursuit of rights, the ALI offers a range of potential methods and kinds of aggregate proceedings, both in court (through adjudication of aggregate status) and outside courts (through settlement aggregates).

In furtherance of these aims, the 2009 compilation licenses lawyers to enter into one-on-one contracts with clients, permitted to authorize those lawyers to treat them as part of an aggregate and to settle (even over their own objection) if a “substantial majority” of their cohort approved an agreement.\(^\text{21}\) Akin to the proffer of a mandatory arbitration clause in a consumer or employee contract, the ALI gives lawyers the ability, in essence, to sell both ordinary and sophisticated clients on the utility of their signing over control about the resolution of their claims to a cohort and their lawyers. The ALI does not detail methods for intragroup communications, nor require ex ante judicial oversight.\(^\text{22}\) The ALI does call for informed consent

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\(^{19}\) PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.03, at 37 (2010).

\(^{20}\) Id.

\(^{21}\) Id. § 3.17(b), at 262.

and offers some details as to its content and contours. But enforce-
ment mechanisms to police those requirements come either from ethi-
cal oversight by the profession or from an individual with the
wherewithal to find a new lawyer to bring a lawsuit, ex post, so as to
challenge a settlement as unfair as applied to that particular person.

The 2009 ALI aggregation principles thus put into place a system
of “procedure as contract” alongside a rule regime for aggregate adju-
dication predicated on a “due process procedure” model.23 The con-
tract model relies on lawyer-negotiated outcomes, both encouraged
and enforced by the state, whereas the due process model looks to
judges, authorized to determine legal liability and remedy and re-
quired to explain their judgments to the public.24 The ALI’s amalgam
demonstrates that the adjudicatory system has shifted its focus toward
settlement, seen as a mass public good, to be valorized and to some
degree regulated.25

Accountability and transparency, predicated on the free flow of
information, are not listed as components of the ALI’s “General Prin-
ciples” for “the pursuit of justice under law.”26 Yet some openness
comes by way of what the ALI terms “aggregate adjudication,” for
judges will have to rule on whether to form aggregates, to try common
issues, and to approve settlements. But the other facets of the ALI
project—intent on organizing more means of aggregate settlements,
incentivized by a broader swath for preclusion—do not entail dissemi-
nation of information beyond the group affected.

Ironically, from the vantage point of the 1960s controversies over
class actions’ incursions on participatory norms, under the precepts set
forth in 2009, class actions become the high watermark of public regu-
laratory processes. In class actions, judges enter the picture at the out-
set as collectives are being formed to police lawyers through the
certifications of classes—which are public events, as are the class trials
or (more likely) the required hearings about whether class action set-
tlements should be approved. In contrast, the ALI’s design for aggre-
gate settlement mechanisms has neither judges, nor the public, nor

23 See discussion infra Part IV. Additional discussion appears in Judith Resnik, Procedure
as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 600–09 (2004) [hereinafter Resnik, Procedure as
Contract].

24 See Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 23, at 600–09.

25 See Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORD-

26 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.03, at 37 (2010). These are in con-
trast to “The Internal Objectives of Aggregate Proceedings” that entail advancing “common
objectives,” “compensating each claimant appropriately,” and many others. Id. § 1.04, at 45.
structures by which the aggregating lawyer’s collection of clients can coordinate with each other.

Thus, the ALI has not taken its insights about the centrality of aggregation for enhancing bargaining power and applied it to the lawyer-client relationship. The 2009 principles have responded to the three resource challenges—information, funding of disputants, and support of institutional arrangements to generate binding outcomes—with limited mechanisms to force information into the public realm about the activities of the circle of lawyers, judges, and disputants given authority to create binding resolutions.

The ALI’s approach is not sui generis but is rather (like its predecessor, the 1960s class action rule revisions) part of political and legal gestalts. The ALI effort fits within a larger set of procedural reforms that similarly empower professionals and aim to dispose of claims by managerial means in court, by devolving to administrative agencies, and by outsourcing to private entities.

Like these other reforms, the ALI project gives narrow berth to one of the central normative utilities of courts: contributions to the public sphere. Instead, the ALI project builds and reflects a world of judges, lawyers, private claimants, a few objectors, appointees, and the like. But a public face for their interactions is not in focus. The 2009 ALI promulgation adverts, on occasion, to the voice of claimants and respondents, but it does not address how to nurture the public’s role as an audience that, under the model of due process procedure, has a democratic function of divesting power from both disputants and judges through observation, engagement, and critique of the legal rules governing the rights asserted. Not only are claimants left with relatively little recourse when they disagree with their representatives but, as I detail below, by reconfiguring courts as less open institutions and redefining what process law requires to be “due,” the ALI undervalues attributes of adjudication that, during the twentieth century, legitimated the expansion of courts’ authority.

27 Cf. Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1163–66 (2009) (making a parallel point when providing an overview of the debates during the 1970s that were in support and in opposition to court-based settlement efforts and underscoring the historically contingent understanding of whether settlement modalities are collective political enabling efforts or privatizing diffusing ones).
II. RECONCEIVING ADJUDICATION’S REACH AND RECONCEPTUALIZING COURTS

An overview of the ideology and practices of litigation developed during the past century is required to provide a baseline against which to consider what is (and is not) changing under the 2009 ALI’s aggregation approach. As noted at the outset, during the twentieth century, political and social movements brought about truly radical change: an array of humanity—persons who had not heretofore been understood as juridical persons—gained rights of access to courts. More than that: these movements helped to shape new kinds of claims, and the institutions to which they came—courts—changed in their wake.

A. Inventing the Traditions of Courts

I use the federal courts of the United States as my example because they provide a readily accessible and well-documented system—even as the federal courts entertain a small fraction (under three percent) of cases filed in the United States.28 In 1901, fewer than one hundred federal judges populated the lower courts; a single district judge worked in states as large as Indiana and Maryland.29 In that era, many persons (including some of us writing in this symposium) had no plausible way to go to court, and none of us had the array of rights currently recognized.

A reminder of a few landmarks of the twentieth century—of which the promulgation in the late 1930s of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is but one—is in order. A host of new rules, statutes, and practices permitted use of the federal courts (in particular) and courts (more generally) for regulatory enforcement of rights. Federal legislation not only gave us the Civil Rights Act of 1964,30 the Fair Housing Act,31 the Equal Pay Act,32 and other statutes aimed at shifting opportunity sets, but also a raft of consumer and environmental legislation

28 The expansion of adjudication over three centuries as state, federal, and transnational courts develop is mapped in Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms 134–287 (2011).


including the Truth in Lending Act, the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, Superfund cleanups, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

Substance and procedure, rights and remedies, and roles for courts were interrelated aspects of conceptual packages, both then and now. What I want to underscore is that such legislation did not only create “rights” in both the formalistic and practical senses. Rather, the changes generated a different understanding of the work of courts, the prospects for lawyers, and the obligations of judges. Discussions of the 2009 ALI’s aggregation procedures consider whether they conform to or depart from due process “traditions.” My argument is that the “traditional” or “conventional” model of adjudication is neither as deeply rooted nor as long-lived as is often assumed. Rather, this set of practices (sketched below) is what David Cannadine has described in another context as the “invention of tradition”—activities that come to be seen as inherited and that feel entrenched but are relatively newly crafted. We are the heirs to what J. Roland Pennock termed a “developmental theory of due process,” just as we are also progenitors of the next stage of that development.

1. **Independent Judges**

The idea that judges ought to be free from certain types of executive control is a modern one. Pre-Enlightenment political theory presumed that judicial officers, like other state officials, were to be

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41 Pennock, *supra* note 5, at xv, xxiv.
obedient servants and subjects of kings. What Robert Cover termed “folktales of justice” were the unusual stories of judges “speaking truth to power” and insisting on the justice of their views in contradiction to kingly edicts. During the last three centuries, however, such self-authorizing acts became part of the judicial role through political insistence on degrees of separated powers and insulated authority.

In the list of grievances set forth in the 1776 Declaration of Independence, the American colonists charged King George III with having “made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.” American revolutionaries had an alternative model, harkening back to the very government from which they sought to separate. Although judges in the colonies served at the pleasure of the King, by the early eighteenth century, English judges of certain ranks had obtained protections against the King. The 1701 Act of Settlement provided that English judges held office “during good behavior,” subject to discharge only upon a vote of both houses of Parliament.

That sentiment was embraced and fortified on this side of the Atlantic. The 1780 Constitution of Massachusetts insisted:

It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his life, liberty, property and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of the laws and administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit.

To implement these rights, judges were to be given tenured positions and “honorable salaries.” In addition, early constitutions afforded judges another form of protection—separation of powers, often credited to Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws, first published in

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43 The Declaration of Independence para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
44 Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.) (providing that “Judges’ Commissions be made Quam diu se bene Gesserint ["as long as he shall behave himself well"], and their Salaries ascertained and established but upon the Address of both Houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove them”).
46 Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXIX, reprinted in 1 Hough, supra note 45, at 626.
Illustrative implementation can be found in the 1776 Constitution of North Carolina, providing that the “legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other.” These precepts became a pillar of the 1789 United States Constitution, outlining the government’s three branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) and according specific protections to judges.

2. Open Proceedings

On this side of the Atlantic Ocean, the roots of a right of public access to judicial proceedings can be traced back at least to the Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey of 1676, which provided that, in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes . . . any person or persons, inhabitants of the said Province may freely come into, and attend the said courts, and hear and be present, at all or any such tryals as shall be there had or passed, that justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert manner . . . .

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47 1 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (Thomas Nugent trans., Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1748). Montesquieu warned:

Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.

Id. at 152.


49 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.

50 Charter or Fundamental Laws, of West New Jersey, Agreed Upon (1676), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj05.asp.

Of course, such customs of open processes are longstanding; Roman law had conceived of criminal proceedings as “res publicae”—public events. But the obligation to proceed before the public eye is of more recent vintage and intertwined with the republican idea that the state derived legitimacy not from divinity but from relationships with a body politic.

The quest for legitimacy through publicity, coupled with common law traditions of jury trials and rights to confront adverse witnesses, became engines of open court proceedings in America. The 1792 Delaware Constitution proclaimed that “all courts shall be open.” By the middle of the nineteenth century, many states had followed suit. As of 2008, the words “all courts shall be open” could be found in

52 Del. Const. of 1792, art. I, § 9, reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 48, at 279 (“All courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his reputation, person, movable or immovable possessions, shall have remedy by the due course of law, and justice administered according to the very right of the cause and the law of the land, without sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense . . . .”). That was Delaware’s second constitution. Accord Ky. Const. of 1792, art. XII, reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 48, at 647, 655 (“[A]ll courts shall be open.”); Vt. Const. of 1777, ch. II, § XXIII, reprinted in 6 The Federal and State Constitutions, supra note 51, at 3746 (“All courts shall be open, and justice shall be impartially administered, without corruption or unnecessary delay; all their officers shall be paid an adequate, but moderate, compensation for their services; and if any officer shall take greater or other fees than the laws allow him, either directly or indirectly, it shall ever after disqualify him from holding any office in this State.”).

53 The phrase “all courts shall be open” appears verbatim in each of these state constitutions. See, e.g., Ala. Const. of 1819, art. I, § 14, reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 48, at 32, 33; Conn. Const. of 1818, art. I, § 12, reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 48, at 258, 259; Fla. Const. of 1838, art. I, § 9, reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 48, at 317, 317; Ind. Const. of 1816, art. I, § 11, reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 48, at 499, 500; Kan. Const. of 1855, art. I, § 16, reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 48, at 580, 582; La. Const. of 1861, art. 110, reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 48, at 739, 750; Miss. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 28, reprinted in 2 Hough, supra note 45, at 745, 749; Neb. Const. of 1867, art. I, § 9, reprinted in 1 Hough, supra note 45, at 824, 827; N.C. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 35, reprinted in 2 Hough, supra note 45, at 110, 115; Ohio Const. of 1850–1851, art. I, § 16, reprinted in 2 Hough, supra note 45, at 152, 157; Pa. Const. of 1838, art. IX, para. 11, reprinted in 2 Hough, supra note 45, at 222, 237; Tenn. Const. of 1870, art. I, § 17, reprinted in 2 Hough, supra note 45, at 321, 326; Tex. Const. of 1869, art. I, § 11, reprinted in 2 Hough, supra note 45, at 356, 360. See generally 2 Hough, supra note 45, at 580–81 (frequently using the phrase “all courts shall be open” when discussing the right to justice in American constitutions). Other nineteenth-century state constitutions provided for public access with somewhat different wording. See, e.g., Mo. Const. of 1865, art. I, para. 15, reprinted in 1 Hough, supra note 45, at 779, 783 (“That courts of justice ought to be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property, or character . . . .”); Oh. Const. of 1857, art. I, § 10, reprinted in 2 Hough, supra note 45, at 186, 189 (“No court shall be secret; but justice shall be administered openly and without purchase, completely and without delay . . . .”); S.C. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 15, reprinted in 2 Hough, supra note 45, at 276, 281 (“All courts shall be public, and every person, for any injury that he may receive in his lands, goods, persons or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law and justice administered without unnecessary delay.”).
nineteen state constitutions. See Ala. Const. art. I, § 13 (“That all courts shall be open; and that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.”); Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 2 (“The court shall be open at all times, except on nonjudicial days, for the transaction of business.”); Conn. Const. art. I, § 10 (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”); Del. Const. art. I, § 9 (“All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him or her in his or her reputation, person, movable or immovable possessions, shall have remedy by the due course of law, and justice administered according to the very right of the cause and the law of the land, without sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense.”); Fla. Const. art. I, § 21 (“The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”); Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12 (“All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.”); Ky. Const. § 14 (“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”); La. Const. art. I, § 22 (“All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.”); Miss. Const. art. 3, § 24 (“All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.”); Neb. Const. art. I, § 13 (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him or her in his or her lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law and justice administered without denial or delay, except that the Legislature may provide for the enforcement of mediation, binding arbitration agreements, and other forms of dispute resolution which are entered into voluntarily and which are not revocable other than upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”); N.C. Const. art. I, § 18 (“All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay.”); N.D. Const. art. I, § 9 (“All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”); Ohio Const. art. I, § 16 (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.”); Pa. Const. art. I, § 11 (“All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”); S.D. Const. art. VI, § 20 (“All courts shall be open, and every man for an injury done him in his property, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice, administered without denial or delay.”); Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17 (“That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay.”); Tex. Const. art. I, § 13 (“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
original states’ constitutions, worked in concert to open courts to the public.

The United States Constitution of 1789 included no such generic right to “open courts.” That phrase is found only in an infrequently read section on treason: “No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.” Regular criminal defendants were protected in the original Constitution by the right to a jury trial; the Sixth Amendment, added in 1791, gave additional entitlements to a “speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” The Seventh Amendment, likewise part of the Bill of Rights, continued English party.”); WYOM. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (“All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct.”).

55 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (“The constitutions adopted by the original States guaranteed jury trial. Also, the constitution of every State entering the Union thereafter in one form or another protected the right to jury trial in criminal cases.”); see, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 1, § 9, available at http://www.sots.ct.gov/sots/cwp/view.asp?a=3188&q=392280 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favour; and in all prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”); GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXI, reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 48, at 377, 383 (“Freedom of the press and trial by jury to remain inviolate forever.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XII (“And the Legislature shall not make any law that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment, excepting for the government of the army and navy, without trial by jury.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, art. IX, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 48, at 1409, 1409 (“That no freeman shall be convicted of any crime, but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men, in open court, as heretofore used.”).

56 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.

57 “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . . .” Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.

58 Id. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Id. See SUSAN N. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2006). The phrase “speedy public trial, by an impartial jury” can also be found in the PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX.

Criticism of the theoretical framing of the public trial as a “right” and arguments that it both imposes burdens and has no necessary effect on fairness can be found in Joseph Jaconelli, Rights Theories and Public Trial, 14 J. APPLIED PHIL. 169 (1997). Celebration of the “publicness” of law and its proceedings comes from Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law,
common law traditions through its preservation of rights to juries in civil cases “where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.”

These guarantees, coupled with First Amendment and Due Process Clause rights, have since been interpreted to ensure public rights of audience for both civil and criminal trials, as well as access to evidentiary pretrial hearings and to court records. Further, the idea of open procedures for government was not limited to courts. Sections of the United States Constitution, for example, also imposed public disclosure obligations on Congress, requiring it to “keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy.” Several early state constitutions also proclaimed that legislatures should be “open.”

The practices of openness were somewhat more limited in equity. Common law procedures, predicated on jury trial rights, entailed public processes. In contrast, in Europe, on the equity side of the docket, in which English and Continental procedures both drew on “Roman-canon tradition,” masters or judges could take testimony outside the
hearing of the parties and then were authorized to keep it “secret until all the witnesses had been examined.” Some of those practices could be found on this side of the Atlantic. Yet the new Americans were distrustful of royal judges and more generally embraced the common law tradition—albeit with some resurgence of “out-of-court, ex parte examination” for some decades during the nineteenth century.

3. Procedure as Fairness

From a twenty-first-century perspective, the attributes of independent judges and open courts that I have outlined could well be termed “traditional” for the United States. But two other facets of what might be assumed as also within the “tradition”—that due process is an independent metric assessing the quality of the “fairness” of procedures and that each person is a full juridical human—are artifacts of the twentieth century. Of course, due process has a long history. Charles Miller traced its genealogy from phrases like “law of the land” and “process de ley” in English and French law of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to the term “due process of law” that became ensconced both in the Fifth Amendment of the eighteenth-century Bill of Rights and in the nineteenth-century Fourteenth Amendment.

The word “fairness”—that today may seem to be hard-wired to constitutional interpretation of due process—does not appear in the constitutional text and was not a topic of sustained discussion by the United States Supreme Court either before the Civil War or for many decades thereafter. When discussions did begin about “fair” proce-

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64 Id. at 1201.
65 Id. at 1204–06. Sometimes “masters” took evidence. Id. at 1208–10, 1218–29. By 1842, the Federal Equity Rules codified the authority to take oral evidence before the parties. Id. at 1229. By 1893, the courts, sitting in equity, were authorized to take evidence “in open court.” Id. at 1232 (citing FED. R. E Q. 67 (1893) (as amended by the Supreme Court in 149 U.S. 972, 972 (1892)); see also FED. R. E Q. 46 (1912); Kessler, supra note 63, at 1243.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment also includes rights against government in the form of indictments by grand juries (rather than a prosecutor alone) for alleged felonies, plus prohibitions on being placed “twice . . . in jeopardy.” Id. In addition, under the Fifth Amendment, no person’s “private property” can “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Id.
68 Id. amend. XIV, § 2. (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
69 One imperfect metric is the number of times the Supreme Court has used words and phrases over time. (Given that caseloads and decisions rendered vary a great deal, a reference
dures, what was generally meant by “fair” was that the procedures provided comported with those prescribed, an approach akin to that taken in England. For example, in an 1878 decision about the legality of a state tax assessment, the Supreme Court concluded that a claimed deprivation of property could be lawful if a person had been provided with “a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a case.” Following regular procedures, required by law, was what due process then entailed.

During the twentieth century, however, a new term of art—the “opportunity to be heard”—gained prominence as members of the United States Supreme Court debated what kinds of government decisions required “due process” and what quantum of process was “due.”

count is only suggestive of the role that terms play in legal discourse.) A data search of all United States Supreme Court cases between 1789 and 2008 found the word “fair” or “fairness” relatively infrequently in Supreme Court opinions until the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, after which usage expanded. Some 428 opinions used “fair” or “fairness” during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century; more than double that number invoked those words during the last third of the century. Thereafter, usage generally increased steadily each decade before taking a large jump in the 1970s. Between 1981 and 1990, the Supreme Court used those words in 930 cases, followed by a decline to 521 cases between 1991 and 2000.

See, e.g., Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. 191, 198 (1815) (declining to reexamine the “justice or fairness of the rules established in the British Courts,” given that they were “decided on ancient principles” and were not “very unreasonable” or “founded on a construction rejected by other nations”); Davy’s Ex’rs v. Faw, 11 U.S. 171, 174 (1812) (“That judges . . . ought to be fair, and their proceedings regular, so as to give the parties an opportunity to be heard . . . are propositions not to be controverted.”).

See generally Ian Langford, Fair Trial: The History of an Idea, 8 J. HUM. RTS. 37 (2009). Through searching a range of sources, Langford concluded that the word “fair” moved from a reference to how one looked (fair as in “beautiful”) to, in the context of law, regularized, as in “free from blemish.” Id. at 38, 40, 42. The term “fair trial” was not common until the nineteenth century. Id. at 44.

Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1878). As the complainant had had a “full and fair hearing,” no violation of due process existed. Id. at 105–06. The term “fair trial” or “fair” referring to a proceeding can be found in a few other cases of that era. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 378 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (finding that for proceedings involving eminent domain, what is “required is that the proceeding shall be conducted in some fair and just mode, . . . opportunity being afforded to parties interested to present evidence as to the value of the property, and to be heard thereon”). Similarly, a well-known nineteenth-century case defined due process as “the application of the law as it exists in the fair and regular course of administrative procedure.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 127 (1873) (Swayne, J., dissenting). This decision is viewed as a turning point in limiting the ability to dismantle segregation through enforcement of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1259 (1992); Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Rehabilitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 73 (1989); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 342 (1949); cf. Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 686–87 (2000).
The question was no longer only whether a government entity had conformed to a set of extant procedures. Rather, the doctrine shifted to encompass a role for the court to assess the quality and kind of procedural opportunities prescribed.\(^{73}\) By the 1970s, the Supreme Court developed both its understanding that various forms of statutory “entitlements,” such as government benefits, tenured jobs, and licenses, were kinds of property and, therefore, that process was due as a predicate to their deprivation.\(^{74}\) Moreover, while ceding a good deal of the definition of entitlements to positive law, the Court took it upon itself to define what such “fair” hearings entailed.

Phrases such as “an opportunity to be heard” and “fundamental fairness,” as well as the term “fairness,” became fixtures of the jurisprudence, appearing in hundreds of decisions rendered after the 1960s.\(^{75}\) Occasionally invoking the ancient Latin maxim *audi alterem*...
partem ("hear the other side"), the Court imposed rules of conduct on judges, prohibited from "ex parte" (or one-sided) contacts with disputants.\(^ {76}\) Statutes and ethical rules disqualified judges who gained information outside the "hearing" (via papers or orally) of an opponent. In short, in the United States (as well as abroad\(^ {77}\)), social movements and legal ideologies imbued "fairness" with a meaning that entailed assessing whether the state had properly discharged its obligations to accord disputants equal and dignified treatment.

4. Equality in Courts

Due process theory is interlaced with developments in equality theory. The precept that all persons are endowed with dignity and equally entitled to access to the various roles in courts—lawyers, judges, jurors, litigants, witnesses—is barely sixty years old. Recall that, in the nineteenth century, a Canadian provision permitted only "qualified persons" to practice law and to be members of the Senate.\(^ {78}\) In 1905, Mabel Penery French said she was so qualified, but a Canadian court ruled otherwise, that the term "persons" did not include women.\(^ {79}\) Legislation and eventually the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reversed such judgments, and women started to trickle into the bar.\(^ {80}\) That today the Canadian Supreme Court’s Chief Justice is a woman (joined by other women Justices on that bench) and that the United States Supreme Court includes women and men also diverse on other demographics is not happenstance but purposeful, the result of political and legal battles over the meaning of equality, the right to work in all professions, and the function of courts.

In 1934, Florence Allen was the first woman to serve as a federal judge in the United States; in 1937, William Hastie was the first Afri-

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\(^ {76}\) Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 558 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The majority opinion was per curiam; the dissent was joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan; Justice Harlan filed a separate concurrence, id. at 550–52 (Harlan, J., concurring).

\(^ {77}\) See Geoffrey Marshall, *Due Process in England*, in *NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS*, supra note 3, at 69, 70; see also Langford, *supra* note 71, at 44–48. Langford used the development of theories of fairness as an example of a human rights norm, and then argued that one ought not conceive of such norms as universal or atemporal but as culturally embedded. *Id.* at 38.


\(^ {79}\) See *id.* at 78–79.

Thurgood Marshall joined the Supreme Court in 1967, and Sandra Day O’Connor was the Court’s first female Justice, in 1981. Courts themselves gained awareness of their own potential for bias through commissioning of task forces on gender, race, ethnicity, and religion that reported on the experiences of litigants, lawyers, and judges. As a result, canons of ethics and doctrine changed, shaping rules mandating equal treatment of participants—be they litigants, witnesses, lawyers, judges, or staff. Even some judgments changed, upon demonstrable “bias” by jurists in their behavior towards litigants or their lawyers.

The result of the twentieth-century efforts can be found in twenty-first-century efforts to cope with the numbers of persons asserting rights and unable to afford to do so. In 2010, California enacted a pilot effort on the right to counsel in civil cases. The imperative to do so came from the state’s commitment to “equal justice under the law” that was predicated on two principles—that “substantive protections and obligations of the law shall be applied equally to everyone, no matter how high or low their station in life,” and that such “true equality before the law will be thwarted if people cannot invoke the laws for their protection.” All branches of the (often contentious) California government came together, as they agreed that access to justice was required.

This rapid overview aims to make plain that, while familiar, these four facets of courts—independent judges, public rights of observation, fair hearings entailing limits on what judges could know and how they could learn it, and the equality of all persons to participate in all roles of courts—are not ancient nor heretofore assumed to be intrinsic to courts. The term “reflexivity” from social theorist Pierre Bourdieu is apt here to capture that the practices have come to de-
fine an institution as a court. Moreover, that understanding has moved beyond the arena occupied by lawyers and judges and has come to be shared by nonprofessionals as well. Coupled with Lon Fuller’s injunction for rationality and reasoning, adjudication has taken on its distinctive character as a discrete activity and a specific kind of “social ordering.” Courts have come to be seen not only as instruments of social order and economic stability, but also as fundamentally embodying practices respectful of all persons’ dignity and materializing forms of public discourse essential to deliberative democracies.

B. Aggregation’s Predicates: Access and Equipage

Both the need for and the perceived desirability of aggregation is embedded in these efforts that reconfigured courts. The core ideas of the 1966 version of Rule 23 are access and equality. The dryness of the text may make this reading less than vivid. Yet the memoranda and debate that produced the 1966 revisions, as well as explanations thereafter, make plain that the Rulemakers believed they needed to provide access to court for those lacking either the knowledge of rights or the resources to pursue them. As Benjamin Kaplan, the Harvard Law School professor who served as Reporter for the 1960s Rule revisions, later explained, the class action rule “was not neutral: it did not escape attention at the time that it would open the way to the assertion of many, many claims that otherwise would not be pressed; so the rule would stick in the throats of establishment defendants.”

In terms of those claims “that otherwise would not be pressed,” the explanatory Notes written by the drafters, as well as some of their published commentary and archival exchanges, focused on two sets of claimants. Plaintiffs in school desegregation cases were one concern;
after children graduated, no plaintiff remained to pursue enforce-
ment.\footnote{See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (explaining that civil rights actions are “[i]llustrative” of the purpose of Rule 23(b)(2) and listing several school desegregation cases as examples). The archival materials make plain Charles Alan Wright’s efforts to help craft this Rule. Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan 5–7 (Feb. 6, 1963), microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference: Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935–1996. A thoughtful examination of the history and concerns that prompted interest in using class actions to implement school desegregation comes from David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 Fla. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011).} By creating one kind of class action for plaintiffs in need of declaratory or injunctive relief (what today we call “23(b)(2) classes”) and another for plaintiffs identified as subjected to common treatment by a defendant (known as “23(b)(1) classes”), the Rule drafters ena-
abled courts to oversee implementation of injunctions during the de-
cades required to bring about change. The 1966 reforms that empow-
ered federal judges to deal with school desegregation through class action lawsuits paved the way for parallel structural remedies for violations of rights in jails, prisons, and mental hospitals, and by social welfare agencies.

A second group of claimants whom the drafters sought to help was consumers with low-value claims. As a pioneering article by Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield explained, “[m]odern society seems increasingly to expose men to . . . group injuries for which indi-
vidually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either be-
cause they do not know enough or because such redress is dispro-
portionately expensive.”\footnote{Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 686 (1941). Examples included that the “‘single and isolated security holder [was] usually . . . helpless in protecting his own interests or pleading his own cause.’” Id. at 684 (quoting U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, pt. II, at 1 (1937)).} The view was that, were lawyers able to bundle relatively low-value claims, they would have monetary in-
centives to bring cases to enforce federal statutory rights in areas such as securities and antitrust law. The utility of class actions in this re-
gard relied on the equitable theory of awarding attorney’s fees be-
cause a client’s lawyer had, through pursuing an individual claim, con-
ferred a “common benefit” on a group.\footnote{For details, see Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 296, 304, 337–38 (1996).} Cases involving small claims but large enough classes would be sufficiently lucrative for law-
yers to take the risk of filing, serving as “champions of semi-public rights,” and thereby augmenting administrative regulatory oversight. 95

Many of the proposed beneficiaries of aggregate reforms in the 1960s were then new to the federal courts. As Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell have detailed, school children, prisoners, and social welfare recipients had not received protections under federal law, nor did they have lawyers or other resources to pursue their claims. 96 Some of these innovations enabled private enforcement of federal rights, often against state and local defendants, subjected not only to court but to public scrutiny. Other aspects of the class action rule focused on consumer, securities, and antitrust cases that put federal judges to the task of enforcing regulations aimed at limiting corporate misbehavior.

That access was a central goal of the Rulemakers can also be gleaned from considering potential claimants the drafters did not seek to include under their 1966 Rule 23 umbrella. As is familiar (even if now quaint), the 1960s Rules Advisory Committee members thought that their new class action rule did not and should not cover torts. 97 In a once-famous comment to 23(b)(3), the drafters advised against tort class actions, effectively “ruling” them out for about two decades:

A “mass accident” resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried. 98

As this text suggests, the 1960s drafters had three reasons why class actions did not fit tort cases. First, the drafters thought that tort plaintiffs had little need for the equipage provided by their new procedures. 99 Unlike many consumers whose small-damage claims were not attractive to lawyers, the system of contingent fees enabled tort plaintiffs to obtain legal assistance. 100 In contrast, when individuals were

95 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 93, at 717.
97 I detailed the interaction and development of this approach and its reflection in the minutes and letters of the Advisory Committee in Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 91, at 6–15.
99 Id.
100 Benjamin Kaplan stated that “where the stake of each member bulks large and his will
“without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all,” class actions were needed to vindicate rights.101 Second, the drafters thought that the distinctions among tort victims (even if involved in the same incident)—as to fact and to law—made aggregation inappropriate or very difficult. In Kaplan’s words, “individual questions of liability and defense will overwhelm the common questions.”102 This discussion was framed by a presumption of resolution by law, rather than negotiated settlement.103

Third, drafters of the 1960s class action rule thought that class treatment of tort cases was problematic given their views on federalism, respecting jurisdictional boundaries. Recall that *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*104 was in its heyday in the 1960s,105 as *Hanna v. Plumer*106 was decided before the 1966 Rule was finalized.

The 1960s rulemaking project was integrative, in that the drafters addressed multiparty rules as a related packet—involving intervention and the joinder of parties and claims as well as a new class action rule. Coupled with opportunities for discovery and other statutory innovations, the leaders of the bench and bar who wrote those Rules saw the social utility of bringing lawsuits to regulate behavior. Equipage to equalize access to justice was decidedly their object. Discovery rules were, to borrow my colleague Owen Fiss’s term, the poor person’s “FBI,”107 and class actions permitted private lawyers to function akin to attorneys general, pursuing regulatory rights enforcement through courts.

and ability to take care of himself are strong,” class treatment was not necessary. Kaplan, *supra* note 91, at 391.

102 Kaplan, *supra* note 91, at 393.
103 The paradigm tort cases were personal injuries from a car accident or medical malpractice, and hence the sense of individualization was strong. At the time, large cases (then called “mass accidents”) were exemplified by a train wreck or a plane crash or a fire at a circus or in a hotel. Not in sight were what has come to be: mass consumer tort cases involving harms from asbestos, smoking, pharmaceuticals, and environmental hazards.
105 Linda Silberman, *The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions*, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2015 (2008) ("[T]he federal courts in these class action choice of law cases felt bound under *Erie* . . . to adopt the choice of law approach of the respective states in which they sat, and thus were limited as to how they might expressly shape choice of law to accommodate aggregate litigation.").
106 *Hanna v. Plumer*, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). That decision, which concluded that the state method of service need not be used, underscored the authority of federal procedural rules to govern diversity cases. *Id.* at 473–74.
Several Supreme Court decisions joined the effort to widen court access. The decision of *United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs* affirmed federal constitutional power over pendent state claims and thereby outlined the contours of a doctrine—now called supplemental jurisdiction—that welcomed plaintiffs to court. Reform of administrative agencies to improve their adjudicatory decisionmaking came through the 1970 *Goldberg v. Kelly* decision, requiring hearing officers to provide “rudimentary due process” with procedures modeled after what courts did.

Further, the Supreme Court recognized new rights to counsel in criminal cases, and in civil litigation, the Court relied on the interaction of the evolving ideas of fairness and equality to recognize Gladys Boddie as a rights-holder, for whom Connecticut was obliged to waive its filing fee so that she could get a divorce. In her wake, the Supreme Court also decided that disputants at risk of losing the status of being a parent could, upon an exacting showing of the utility of a lawyer’s appointment, be entitled to a state-funded lawyer and, if such persons could not afford it, to court-paid transcripts for appeal.

Moving from federal constitutional rights to statutory provisions, Congress created the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in 1974, and authorized fee shifting so that successful lawyers could recoup expenses and be paid under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976. Indeed, when the Supreme Court cut back on the class action rule in *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin* by requiring that plaintiffs identify, send to, and pay for notice to all members of (b)(3) class actions, a great deal of criticism followed about how that undercut the rule’s function as access-enabling. Further, at the urging of Chief

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108 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727–29 (1966). The Court explained that, if “a plaintiff’s claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.” *Id.* at 725. In the era of *Gibbs*, the terminology used was “pendent” and “ancillary” claims and parties, and legislative provisions addressing these ideas speak of “supplemental jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).


116 *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1973); see, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, *Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?*, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 98. As this Article was on its way to press,
Justice Earl Warren, the ALI completed an overview of federal and state court jurisdiction in 1969.\(^{117}\) The report proposed making access to federal courts for federal claims easier by eliminating the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331\(^{118}\)—a statutory change put into place by 1980.\(^{119}\) A successor ALI effort, the 2004 *Federal Judicial Code Revision*,\(^ {120}\) also sought to simplify boundaries and access provisions.

Thus, Congress, the courts, and the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shared a vision for the federal courts as public sites instrumentally engaged in forwarding national regulatory policies. From the 1960s through the early 1980s, those policies embodied substantive commitments to increasing the rights of racial minorities, to responding to some of the inequalities predicated on gender, and to equipping consumers with mechanisms to enforce fair practices in commerce. Aggregation—with the class action as the iconic embodiment—is central to that vision.

Caseload pressures also justified the expansion of the federal judiciary. In 1901, fewer than 120 authorized life-tenured district judgeships were provided by Congress.\(^ {121}\) By 2001, Congress had licensed more than 650, supported by a like number of statutory judges when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in *Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, a Title VII case in which a large class was certified under Rule 23(b)(2). See *Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.) (en banc), *cert. granted*, 79 U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277). In addition to the first question presented by the petition (“Whether claims for monetary relief can be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)—which by its terms is limited to injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief—and, if so, under what circumstances.”), the Court directed the parties to brief the following question: “Whether the class certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a).” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, No. 10-277, 2010 WL 3358931, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010); *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,* No. 10-277, 2010 WL 3358931, at *1. The *Dukes* case offers another opportunity for the Court to consider the function of aggregation.


\(^{118}\) *Id.* The ALI study explained that the “stated requirement of an amount in controversy in fact has relatively little impact on the volume of federal question litigation. The few cases there are, however, that must satisfy the § 1331 requirement are likely to involve matters particularly deserving of a federal forum.” *Id.* at 172.


\(^{120}\) *Am. Law Inst., Federal Judicial Code Revision Project* (2004). That focus was on supplemental jurisdiction, removal, and venue. Background on this project is provided by its Reporter, John B. Oakley, in Kroger Redux, 51 DUKL J. 663 (2001).

\(^{121}\) In 1901, appellate and trial judges nationally numbered 116; 70 served on the district courts. See *Table of Authorized Judgeships, supra* note 29. The table also listed one Article I judgeship as of that date. *Id.*
both full-time magistrate and bankruptcy judges are counted.\textsuperscript{122} By
then, these judges worked in more than 550 federal courthouse facili-
ties. Further, under the brilliant leadership of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, the federal government invested some eight to ten billion
dollars, the largest federal building program since the New Deal, in
courthouses—producing designer structures aiming to turn those
courts into emblems of the national government.\textsuperscript{123} The federal judici-
ary tripled the amount of space it occupied,\textsuperscript{124} with construction
projects sited around the United States.\textsuperscript{125} In the decade between
1996 and 2006, the judiciary gained “46 new courthouses or annexes
(17 million square feet) at a cost of $3.4 billion,” with more
underway.\textsuperscript{126}

C. Enabling, Managing, and Regrouping

1. Aggregate Forms

Federal courthouse construction and the ALI’s decision to orga-
imize principles of aggregation are but two of many measures of the sup-
port that was shared across branches of government and segments of
the private sector for the due process model. Between the 1960s and
the 1990s, Congress enacted legislation creating more than 400 new

\textsuperscript{122} Id.

\textsuperscript{123} Status of Courthouse Construction, Review of New Construction Request for the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations, and Comments on H.R. 2751, to Amend the Public Buildings Act
of 1959 to Improve the Management and Operations of the U.S. General Services Administration:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Bldgs. & Econ. Dev. of the H. Comm. on Transp. &

\textsuperscript{124} The Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program: Results of a Government
Accountability Office Study on the Judiciary’s Rental Obligations: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs. & Emergency Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure,
Admin.) [hereinafter 2006 Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program Hearings]; see
1998 Status of Courthouse Construction Hearings, supra note 123, at 22.


\textsuperscript{126} 2006 Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program Hearings, supra note 124,
tween 1985 and 2000, fifty-two court projects “totaling $3.5 billion” had been completed—pro-
ducing a courthouse-building program that was the “largest in U.S. history” and was listed
among the “major accomplishments” of the Administrative Office. A HISTORY OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: SIXTY YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 113 (Cathy A. McCarthy & Tara Treacy eds., 2000). As of 2005, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the actual outlays between 1993 and 2005 had been
$4.5 billion for seventy-eight courthouse projects. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-673, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: INFORMATION ON PROJECT COST AND SIZE
CHANGES WOULD HELP TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT 1 (2005).
federal causes of action, and during those decades, the federal court caseload tripled. Through new procedures, mechanisms, and doctrines, the possible meanings of the word “case” changed—such that tens of thousands of people came to be understood as somehow together (individually aggregated or, as David Shapiro instructs, as an “entity”) in something called a “litigation” that can result, on occasion, in institutional reform or in millions of dollars distributed to thousands of individuals as compensation for injuries.

Contributing to this shifting presumption towards aggregation was another mechanism for case collection—multidistrict litigation. During the 1960s, the Judicial Conference of the United States (the policymaking body of the federal judiciary) became concerned about redundant procedural work; several parallel antitrust cases, pending in different districts, spawned parallel discovery. The Conference proposed a managerial response, a statute that created multidistrict litigation, authorizing interdistrict transfers so as to bring all the cases together for pretrial processing to gain economies of scale.

In later decades, provisions of the multidistrict litigation statute provide an umbrella for various kinds of cases, including mass torts. Coupled with the bankruptcies in the 1980s of Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins, the grouping of cases via the MDL process helped to make plausible the bundling of mass torts. Over time, the Rule 23 drafters’ warning against using the 1966 class rule for such disputes was superseded by practice. By the 1980s, the diversity of aggregates had grown through a range of methods. As I outlined in an article called “From ‘Cases’ to ‘Litigation,’” and as Howard Erichson examined in more recent work, both formal and informal methods of aggregation became commonplace. Authority came from Rule 23, rule-based joinder and consolidation, and diverse statutory provisions for group processes, such as the pioneering Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as via the MDL statute, bankruptcy, and the more re-

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130 See Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 91, at 28–35 & n.103.
131 Id.
cent Class Action Fairness Act. Informal methods relied on judicial aggregation by means of “related” case procedures, designated dockets, or the appointment of special masters, as well as on lawyer aggregation, some but not all of which is visible to courts, the public, or clients. Indeed, the ALI’s judgments in 2009 are predicated on the view that informal modes of aggregation are both commonplace and in need of regulation.

The development of various modes of aggregation also reframed the judicial role. In the 1960s, federal judges created new and, initially, special procedures for what were then termed “protracted cases”—with the initial prototype being the MDL antitrust actions and then the class actions spawned by Rule 23. In the 1970s, the rise of “public interest litigation” put judges at the center (as Abram Chayes pointed out), for the adjudication of liability was not the end of a case, but a phase in an ongoing process in which a judge entered into long-term relationships with disputants, who returned to court to seek enforcement of future-looking reform decrees.

All decisions to aggregate are value laden, but aggregation can be enlisted in pursuit of different goals. The 1966 Rule 23 was frankly “enabling”—a self-consciously ideological view of the moral propriety of using law to recognize the dignity and rights of groups, and a political view that law should be used to bring new claimants, otherwise unable to make their way, into court. The 1968 MDL statute was emphatically managerial, focused on “economy” and aiming to rationallyize cases that were already in the system. Yet economies of scale are not achieved only by focusing on pending cases but also require looking forward—to cases that could be filed.

Note that when the paradigm of the class action was a lawsuit about schools or prisons, the question of “futures” was dealt with by defining a class in the present tense that resulted in a current and always replenishing class—all students at The George Washington University Law School or prisoners at the Federal Correctional Facility at Alderson, West Virginia. Those lawsuits focused on defendants’ subsequent treatment of class members and entailed no need to bring in all future claimants; indeed the point was to keep the courthouse door open through having continuously available class members to enforce injunctions. But once tort and consumer plaintiffs came into view, the

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group mechanism became preoccupied with bringing plaintiffs in to move toward global resolution (typically by settlement) so as to permit corporate defendants to structure future business arrangements secure in the knowledge of what liabilities have resulted from prior action. And of course, class actions seeking monetary relief produced a dramatic change in the market for lawyers, whose compensation grew with the size of a class. The agendas of enabling and economizing thus came to be intermingled, and, during the 1990s, efforts to bind future tort victims prompted the Supreme Court to record concerns—in the language of due process.  

Over time, interest in forcing individuals into aggregation has grown. Exemplary is the prior effort of the ALI to generate a regime for aggregation. In the 1980s, the ALI commissioned Professor Arthur Miller (who had also served as a Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules) to undertake a “Preliminary Study” of how the ALI might usefully be involved in what it described as “the complex litigation problem.” The paradigm of the referenced “problem” had become mass tort litigation, exemplified by Agent Orange and asbestos cases, and seen (in the words of one commentator) as “debilitating” for the inefficient imposition of redundancies that overtaxed the resources of courts and litigants alike.

By then, judges and lawyers had begun to work around the Rule 23 Advisory Committee Notes admonishing against the use of class actions for mass accidents. In the Agent Orange litigation, Judge Jack Weinstein had certified a class of individuals exposed to those chemicals. Some of the asbestos manufacturers had gone into bankruptcy, and their tort claimants trailed along, forcing group-based handling of mass torts. Commentators pointed to the impositions

137 See id. at 626–27. The other major Supreme Court discussion of mass tort class actions, again in the context of asbestos and again concerned about procedural fairness, is Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 818–19 (1999).


140 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729–31 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145, 163–67 (2d Cir. 1987). The litigation has been chronicled by Peter H. Schuck in his 1986 book Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts. More recent decisions, addressing whether the resolution was preclusive, include Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded in part, aff’d in part by an equally divided Court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).

that asbestos litigation placed on state and federal courts, even as some judges were hesitant to take a group of manufacturers and plaintiffs with various and overlapping sets of illnesses and treat them in the aggregate.142

The ALI’s undertaking became its “Complex Litigation Project,” resulting in 1993 in “statutory recommendations and analysis” approved by the ALI.143 Unlike the 2009 aggregation approach that shaped novel rules for aggregate settlements as well as for in-court aggregations, the 1993 Complex Litigation Project termed itself “limited in scope to judicial dispute resolution and matters of procedure,” and explained that it deliberately eschewed “reshaping existing legal theories or forms of relief.”144 The focus was on finding new ways to transfer and to consolidate cases within the federal system, across state courts, and between state and federal systems.

Yet, despite the disclaimer of not breaking new ground, the 1993 Complex Litigation Project did propose national choice of law standards145 stemming in part from the proposals for consolidation.146 Moreover, while initially focused on mass torts, the final version did not specifically limit its proposals to that template. The Complex Litigation Project did, however, stay true to its commitment to courts, as it sought to offer structures for what judges, operating under formal legal provisions, could be authorized to do.

The 1993 project (narrow or not) was met with a good deal of controversy.147 Praised by one commentator as the “most innovative,

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143 Am. Law Inst., supra note 138, at 1. Professors Miller and Mary Kay Kane served as Reporters. Id.

144 Id. at 3.

145 Id. at 305–09.


147 An earlier, related effort, the 1991 ALI’s Reporters’ Study on Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury, was part of the backdrop. That project addressed liability rules for various enterprises, as well as the procedural mechanisms (from workers compensation boards to courts, insurance, and regulation) to respond. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to 1 Am. Law Inst., Reporters’ Study on Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury, at xi (1991). Thereafter, the ALI concluded a Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998) that also was surrounded by debate about whether it was evenhanded or particular of
resourceful, and ambitious work ever undertaken in the United States on the subject of multistate complex litigation," others objected to its emphasis on consolidation (in part through “coercive” intervention encouraged by claim preclusion) and the proposal to federalize choice of law rules. Others faulted the 1993 project for failing to address federal jurisdictional authority, the changes underway in bankruptcy and through then-innovative claims processing facilities, and a host of informal aggregation packages. One critic termed the effort an “assault on state sovereignty,” and another objected that “the 700 pages of this Project” resulted in only an enhancement of MDL and an elaboration of choice of law rules.

The conflict about the project resulted in the ALI declining to take a formal vote on the Reporters’ proposed model statute for a uniform transfer system. Seen, however, from the vantage point of the ambitions of the ALI’s decisions in 2009, the 1993 Complex Litigation Project appears modest. It honed to the model of the decades that preceded it, as it looked to judges, to formal rules, and to public procedures of adjudication to legitimate decisions and then applied these precepts in a quest for more conglomerates of cases.

2. Commitments to Contract

The judge-centric model of adjudication, authorizing judges to control the shape and pace of litigation and elaborated initially as special process for unusual cases (such as antitrust, public law litigation,

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149 AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT § 5.05 & cmt. a (1993). That Comment notes that the “scheme is . . . designed to be coercive, not compulsory; the individual retains the option to join the suit or not, but is confronted with a risk of being bound to an adverse judgment should he decide to stay away.” Id.


153 Mullenix, supra note 151, at 999.

154 See Hazard, supra note 147, at xvii.
and then mass torts), migrated to become the expected procedures in ordinary cases—resulting in the managerial judge.\textsuperscript{155} Rule revisions in the 1980s and 1990s gave trial judges more discretionary control over pretrial procedures and licensed them to focus on settlement.\textsuperscript{156} Through the enactment in 1990 of the Civil Justice Reform Act,\textsuperscript{157} Congress encouraged the shift toward judicial control.\textsuperscript{158} Further, Congress and the courts embraced alternative dispute resolution, encouraging party-negotiated settlements, mediation, and private arbitration.\textsuperscript{159}

Moreover, the Supreme Court insisted that contracts agreed upon before disputes arose and that mandated use of private dispute resolution systems were enforceable, as long as the alternative system adequately vindicated statutory rights.\textsuperscript{160} Over complaints from consumers and employees, the Court applied that rule to contracts proffered by manufacturers or employers.\textsuperscript{161} The public, “day in court” model that had come to be equated with “due process of law” gained a competitor—“procedure as contract”—in which judges encouraged litigants in private to contract with each other either to anticipate or to conclude their disputes.\textsuperscript{162}

Like the due process model, the contractual approach also has constitutive elements. Its political underpinnings are that individuals, entities, and groups know their own preferences and capacities and are better able to structure agreements that meet those needs than can third parties. Given various transaction costs, bargained-for agreements to resolve disputes are likely to be better—in the sense of more


\textsuperscript{162} Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 23.
accurate, less expensive, and hence more efficient—than external mandates. In the context of filed or potential lawsuits, legal rights create bargaining power; the assumption is that negotiated conclusions will reflect the relative strength of such entitlements, given the uncertainty of establishing both liability and damages. Courts, judges, and lawyers are thus admonished to pursue settlements that will minimize the costs of disputing while maximizing the utility of the resolutions.

The enthusiasm for settlement has prompted the Supreme Court to permit an expanded understanding of courts’ powers, reaching at times beyond (or trumping) their formal jurisdiction. Through the alchemy of settlement, for example, state courts settling securities cases are able to include cases they could not try, because the claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.163 Similarly, federal district courts may be able to superintend final resolutions by settlements in multidistrict cases when those judges do not have the authority to preside at trials of the MDL aggregate.164 Further, in the few cases entailing structural remedies against states, federal courts are able to impose obligations on state officials by way of settlement that they could not order by decree.165

Given the skepticism about the utility of third-party intervention in bilateral negotiations, the contractual model places no special value on public oversight or involvement. Indeed, contractual models are praised for providing a confidentiality otherwise unavailable. Courts have enforced clauses in settlements precluding third-party access on the rationale that “honoring the parties’ express wish for confidentiality may facilitate settlement.”166

Yet the due process model has still served to impose some constraints upon lawyers and judges. In monetary class actions, absent plaintiffs must be given notice of the pendency of an action before a court can exercise jurisdiction.167 Neither the desire to settle nor the fact of being part of a potential settlement is sufficient to create “common” law or fact under Rule 23, and future plaintiffs cannot necessa-

166 See Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004).
rily be represented by current litigants.\textsuperscript{168} Objectors, if appearing even if not intervening, are to be accorded opportunities to bring appeals of settlements.\textsuperscript{169} Moreover, capped settlements are not to be approved based only on parties’ agreements that funds are limited.\textsuperscript{170}

The rise of rules and doctrine endorsing court-based contracts reflected social and political movements focused on deregulation and in retreat from the government initiatives of the 1960s. These critics argued that prior efforts redefining procedural opportunities had opened the door too wide, resulting in too many filings and too capacious a process. Interest in exclusion and preclusion of certain kinds of federal filings gained impetus over the course of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{171} In the 1920s, concerns had been expressed that Prohibition had brought the “wrong” kinds of claims to federal courts.\textsuperscript{172} In the 1940s and 1950s, the Judicial Conference of the United States recorded distress about too many prisoner filings, and it proposed limitations.\textsuperscript{173} Given the 1938 decision in \textit{Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins}, which took federal judges out of the lawmaking business for diversity cases, attention turned to walling off some of those cases.\textsuperscript{174} By 1977, under Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Judicial Conference an-


\textsuperscript{169} Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). That case held that a member of a certified class who was not the named representative and who had objected to the fairness of a settlement could appeal the district court’s approval of the settlement without first intervening. \textit{Id.} at 4, 14. Some lower courts have construed \textit{Devlin} narrowly. \textit{See}, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 475 F.3d 845, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an organization that was not a class member and that represented a group of class members and nonclass members could not appeal the district court’s approval of a settlement because the organization was not “bound” by the final judgment); \textit{In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practice Litig.}, 302 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 2002) (questioning whether \textit{Devlin} applies where objectors had opt-out rights, such as in 23(b)(3) class actions). \textit{But see} Nat’l Ass’n of Chain Drug Stores v. New Eng. Carpenters Health Benefits Fund, 582 F.3d 30, 39–40 & n.8 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that \textit{Devlin} applies to all class actions, not only class actions with no opt-out rights, and citing Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit cases reaching the same conclusion).

\textsuperscript{170} Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821.

\textsuperscript{171} Burbank, \textit{supra} note 2, at 751–52.

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{See}, e.g., Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, \textit{Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guarantee of Trial by Jury}, 39 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 917, 920, 976–77 (1926).

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{See} \textit{Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 5649: A Bill to Amend Section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code in Reference to Applications for \textit{Writs of Habeas Corpus} by Persons in Custody Pursuant to the Judgment of a State Court}, 84th Cong. 3 (1955) (statement of the Hon. John Parker, C.J., United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit). Chief Judge Parker discussed the federal judiciary’s “collaboration with the representatives of the State chief justices and the State attorneys general” to prepare a proposed statute to limit prisoners’ habeas corpus filings. \textit{Id.} at 7.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins}, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938).
nounced its support for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction, as the Conference began to shape arguments that Congress had turned too much and too often to the federal courts.\textsuperscript{175} By the end of the twentieth century, the Judicial Conference had issued its first ever \textit{Long Range Plan}, campaigning against congressional expansion of its authority as it objected to what it perceived to be undue “federalization” of civil claims and of crimes.\textsuperscript{176}

Rulemaking, statutes, and doctrine complemented the view of a broader role for contract and a narrower role for federal jurisdiction. In the 1990s, Congress changed underlying rights and remedies through major legislation that limited liability rules for securities transactions,\textsuperscript{177} reduced access for prisoners filing cases challenging their convictions\textsuperscript{178} and their conditions of confinement,\textsuperscript{179} and for migrants.\textsuperscript{180} In 2005 and 2006, Congress sought to limit access for individuals detained in the wake of 9/11.\textsuperscript{181} And, through interpretations of pleading rules (in \textit{Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly}\textsuperscript{182} and in \textit{Ashcroft v. Iqbal}\textsuperscript{183}), the Court gave a good deal of discretion to district judges to assess the “plausibility” of plaintiffs’ complaints and if not plausible, to grant motions to dismiss. In addition, the Court narrowed the remedial powers of judges through interpreting their equitable authority as dependent on affirmative congressional grants.\textsuperscript{184}

Yet even within this confining approach, commitments to aggregation are robust. The ALI’s 2009 proposals are one example, making plain that aggregation, once thought to be the exception delineated

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{182} Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
\item \textsuperscript{183} Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 1952 (2009).
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for specific kinds of remedies, has gained acceptance as an ordinary form of procedure. Administrative regimes—from sentencing guidelines to Social Security determinations—are a related part of the aggregation landscape. Thus, like the procedural modeling of the twentieth century, views of desirable framings are shared across institutional actors. Codification of aggregation can thus also be found in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, comprehending group litigation—when appropriately authorized—as a desirable means of resolution. The Supreme Court’s decision in 2010 in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. likewise marks a reading of Rule 23 that assumes the normalcy of group-based actions. The plurality, joined by Justice Stevens, divested states from interposing an individualized procedural approach for particular claims if litigated in federal court.

III. The Process Due in Twenty-First Century Procedural Forms

A. Provisioning and Precluding: The 2009 ALI Aggregation Principles

The sketch of the currents of twentieth-century procedure—with its expansionist, judge-centered and then its more recent constraining modes iterated through two procedural models—provides a baseline from which to consider the 2009 ALI approach toward adjudication’s work. Who are the claimants to which these precepts attend? What attitudes can be found about enabling or limiting adjudication? Where are the independent judges, fair hearings, public access, and equal treatment of all persons of the due process model? What provisions are made for bargaining and settlement, the key elements of the procedure-as-contract model?

185 An empirical overview of a decade of class actions and of multidistrict litigation is provided by Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010). The shift there documented to “nonclass settlements” is part of the landscape the ALI sought to address and, as noted, to regulate as well as to license. Id. at 806.


189 Id. at 1437–39, 1442.

As I noted at the outset, the ALI frames its project with “general principles” to promote the “[p]ursuit of justice under law.”191 The means are through the enforcement of rights, with efficient uses of “litigation resources” by judges, lawyers, and litigants so as to facilitate “binding resolutions” and “accurate and just resolution of civil disputes by trial and settlement.”192 This opening statement embraces both the due process model (enforcement of rights through opportunities for a public trial) and the contractual model (welcoming settlement mechanisms, as efficient for and intrinsic to courts).

In furtherance of both modalities, the 2009 ALI’s efforts chart new methods of enabling litigation by endorsing a wider array of aggregates and new methods of settling in the aggregate, with attention paid to regulating both forms. What is less engaged by the 2009 aggregation principles is the function of public adjudication in contributing to norm development and in policing judges and lawyers. The project puts professionals at the helm, protects little space for outsiders to participate, and gives no mechanisms by which ordinary disputants can counterbalance the power of their lawyers.

B. What Claimants? What Remedies?

What problems did the ALI set out to solve? The ALI drafters were, like their 1960s and 1990s counterparts, responding to real-world practices and problems. As addressed by others in this symposium, aggregation had become the lynchpin to certain kinds of claims, rendered economically viable by pooled resources.193 Yet critics worried that some judges were too ready to certify groups and thereby to give undue leverage to plaintiffs, able to extract settlements when they would not have been able to establish liability.194 Reforms of Rule 23 in 2003 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 mix endorsement of that modality with efforts to impose constraints. As to informal mechanisms, lawyers were packaging deals for groups of clients, sometimes outside the parameters of what ethical rules provided.195 Moreover, as

192 Id.
194 See Brickman, supra note 193, at 704.
195 See id. at 703–08.
the ALI commentary noted, some defendants insisted on group agreements in search for “complete peace,” and some claimants held out, trying to extract “premiums” for agreeing to join a group.196 What the ALI offers in response is regularization and some forms of regulation of both adjudicated and contractual aggregations.

1. Maximizing Value and Distributing Relief

Economic remedies are at the center of the ALI aggregation principles, which makes that point when moving from the general goals to what are called “Internal Objectives.”197 The first listed objective is “maximizing the net value of the group of claims”198—“unless otherwise agreed by the claimants.”199 Thereafter detailed (in order) are the objectives of “compensating each claimant appropriately,” “obtaining a judicial resolution of the legality of challenged conduct and stopping unlawful conduct from continuing,” “obtaining the broadest possible nondivisible remedies for past misconduct,” and, as a last-mentioned point, “enabling claimants to voice their concerns” as well as “facilitating the rendition of further relief that protects the rights of affected persons as defined by substantive law.”200

The Comments also note that “claimants may rank compensation ahead of voice and legal vindication or behind them.”201 The objectives presumed for an aggregation of respondents are parallel to those of claimants. Respondent aggregates are seen as seeking to minimize “the total loss attributable to litigation of the claims the group faces,” to “allocat[e] financial responsibility appropriately,” to obtain a “judicial resolution of the legality of challenged conduct,” to “enable[ ] lawful conduct to continue,” and to restrict “nondivisible remedies for prior wrongful acts as narrowly as possible.”202 And, like the objectives for claimants, respondent aggregate proceedings enable participants to “voice their concerns” as they “enjoy the benefits of their substantive legal rights.”203

Who are the claimants and the respondents on behalf of whom these objectives are stated? One finds few of the highly visible plaintiffs who animated the work of Ben Kaplan and others drafting Rule

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196 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17 cmt. b, at 265 (2010).
197 Id. § 1.04, at 45.
198 Id. § 1.04(b)(1), at 45.
199 Id. § 1.04(b), at 45. The list describes itself as not limiting other objectives. Id.
200 Id. § 1.04(b)(2)–(5), at 45.
201 Id. § 1.04 cmt. c, at 46.
202 Id. § 1.04(c)(1)–(4), at 45–46.
203 Id. § 1.04(c)(5), at 45–46.
23 in the 1960s, and who once embodied the phrase “class action.” Amidst dozens of examples (termed “illustrations”) and explanatory comments that follow the various segments of the 282-page printed volume, a handful relate to civil rights. Women and men of all colors are not much present; prisoners, school children, and structural reform are not in sight; and relatively few illustrative cases involve injunctive relief.

Indeed, the category “injunction” is subsumed under a discussion of “indivisible remedies.” A good deal of that segment focuses on the “limited fund” with examples such as retirement fund beneficiaries, persons at risk of future diseases and in need of medical monitoring, and employees seeking both hiring remedies and damages for discrimination. The people whose problems concern the ALI drafters are, by and large, tort claimants, some consumers, and victims of asbestos, other toxic substances, environmental pollutants, or of corporate misbehavior, some of whom are in search of remedies for employment discrimination. As for respondents, the institutions

204 Id. § 1.02 illus. 5, at 12–13 (discussing a housing discrimination case, where the remedy included $100 million in housing benefits); see also id. § 2.07 cmt. f, at 153 (discussing employment discrimination or other civil rights claimants who may, if provided notice, have “important information and . . . considerable stakes in the outcome”).

205 See, e.g., id. § 2.02 illus. 1, at 91 (using a pattern-and-practice, sex-discrimination, disparate-treatment case to explain whether a court should authorize aggregate treatment or whether a defendant needed to be able to rebut that inference in individual cases). Pregnant women are also represented in an illustration involving tort claims against a pharmaceutical company. See id. § 3.13 illus. 4, at 252 (discussing the potential need to adjust attorney’s fees upward because of information withheld about risks of a drug to pregnant victims who suffered injuries from an arthritis medication). One general note is in order: in the analysis, I refer to illustrations provided in the ALI text and not to the citations to various cases and law review articles in the Reporters’ Notes that accompany the text.

206 See, e.g., id. § 1.01 illus. 6, at 5–6 (considering the question whether injunctive relief precluded other employees from seeking to enjoin wrongful deductions from wages); id. § 1.02 illus. 2, at 12 (discussing citizens seeking to enjoin the building of a cellular tower); id. § 2.03 illus. 10, at 111 (focusing on aggregation for damages in an antitrust case for which injunctive relief might also be proper).

207 Id. § 2.04 cmts. a & b, at 117–19.

208 Id. § 2.04 cmt. a, at 118.

209 Id. § 2.04 illus. 1, at 120.

210 Id. § 2.04 illus. 2, at 120.

211 Id. § 2.04 illus. 5, at 122–23.

212 See, e.g., id. § 1.02 illus. 1, at 11 (addressing kinds of aggregations and preclusion, and using as an example that “ten employees sued their common employer claiming a discriminatory denial of promotions); id. § 1.01 illus. 8, at 6 (involving whether individual suits are precluded by a government agency’s pursuit of discrimination claims); id. § 2.04 illus. 5, at 122–23 (employees alleging race discrimination in employment and seeking hiring and backpay); id. § 3.07 illus. 2, at 220 (discussing a proposed settlement of an employment discrimination suit,
in focus are largely private sector businesses rather than government entities.

Further, while the “internal objectives” include either “stopping unlawful conduct” or “enabling lawful conduct to continue,” the bulk of the ALI 2009 precepts are organized around how to allocate money. As noted, injunctions are mentioned under a discussion of “indivisible remedies,” defined to be “the distribution of relief to any claimant [that] as a practical matter determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other claimants.” Distribution is not the word that comes readily to mind for mandates directing equal treatment, school desegregation, or reduction of environmental hazards.

Rather, distribution fits what a significant portion of what the commentary addresses—“a limited fund.” Continuing the concerns about monetary damages, the volume’s index offers categories such as “damage averaging,” “fluid recovery,” and “future claims,” but not “injunctive relief,” “civil rights,” or “institutional reform.” Thus, the ALI teaches that twenty-first-century aggregation is aimed at the resolution of economic claims and that what is to be indivisible is likely the limits on a proposed recovery fund, capped perhaps along the kind of parameters that the Supreme Court (rightly or wrongly) rejected in *Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.*

The ALI is not, of course, inventing this shift in focus toward economic recovery through aggregation, although the proposition that victims seek money as their primary goal is contested. Decades of

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213 *Id.* § 1.04(b)(3), (c)(2), at 45.
214 *Id.* § 2.04, at 116–29. The initial Comment discusses, for example, “a prohibitory injunction or a declaratory judgment with respect to a generally applicable policy or practice maintained by a defendant.” *Id.* § 2.04 cmt. a, at 117.
215 *Id.* § 2.04(b), at 116.
216 *Id.* § 2.04 cmt. a, at 118.
217 *Id.* at 293–305.
218 *Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.*, 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). The discussion of limited funds in the 2009 ALI principles describes its provisions as “[i]n keeping with existing law,” in that the “limited nature of the fund must preexist aggregate treatment itself. It must not be the creation or consequence of the decision to aggregate.” *Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig.*, § 2.07 cmt. i, at 157 (2010). The Reporters’ Notes to that section reference *Ortiz.* *Id.* § 2.07 reporters’ notes cmt. i, at 165–66. As noted in the discussion of settlement remedies, limited funds are a means for aggregation. *See infra* Part III.B.3.
219 *See* Gillian K. Hadfield, *Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund*, 42 *Law & Soc’y Rev.* 645, 647–48 (2008). The certiorari grant in the *Dukes v. Wal-Mart* litigation also raises questions about how to concep-
Supreme Court doctrine coupled with legislation have made the obtaining of injunctive relief more difficult for plaintiffs of various kinds. Moreover, Congress has precluded the Legal Services Corporation from bringing class actions. During those same decades, courts developed the common benefit doctrine, authorizing fees to lawyers conferring remedies on groups of plaintiffs, and class actions came to be used in various kinds of cases seeking dollars.

The 2009 ALI aggregation principles are also not the first rulemaking provisions to reflect the receding import of civil rights and structural-reform class actions. The 1993 Complex Litigation Project was focused on mass torts. Similarly, the 2003 revisions of Rule 23 assumed money to be at aggregation’s core when they set up a structure in which judges choose among lawyers competing to be named lead counsel in class actions. The intense market for representation—in need of judicial oversight—stems from the potential for profit in cases seeking damages. In contrast, in injunctive class actions, lucrative fee recoveries are increasingly rare. Fees come, if at all, from statutes such as the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, which (as noted earlier) authorizes successful plaintiffs to recoup fees. But over the years, the Supreme Court has limited the amount of recovery by imposing exacting measures of what constitutes the gravamen of a claim seeking redress for employment discrimination, in that the questions to be addressed by the parties include whether monetary damages are “incidental” to the declaratory and injunctive relief, and therefore whether 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate. See supra note 116.


221 See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–53 (“None of the funds appropriated in this Act to the Legal Services Corporation may be used to provide financial assistance to any person or entity . . . that initiates or participates in a class action suit.”); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1617 (2009). Other aspects of the restrictions were held unconstitutional in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).


223 See supra text accompanying notes 143–46.

224 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), (h).

225 See Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 11, at 2155–63.


227 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
stitutes “success,” by requiring calculations through a “lodestar method” (hours worked times a reasonable billing rate), and virtually precluding “multipliers” either for risk or unusual challenges.228

2. Opportunities for Voice

Another of the ALI “internal objectives” is enabling claimants and respondents “to voice their concerns.”229 The Comments explain that point briefly—that “[p]articipants . . . often value the opportunity to express themselves and to participate in the legal process of vindication.”230 Expressive values are given no further elaboration but caveats come immediately thereafter. The commentary continues: “However, the cost and value of expression may vary from one proceeding to another. When regulating opportunities for expression, it is appropriate to take account of both their costs and their benefits.”231 Unexplained is what regulation of expressive opportunities the drafters had in mind. As discussed below, the ALI proposes to limit collateral attacks on adjudicated aggregation outcomes made after settlements and to authorize nonadjudicated aggregate settlements, both of which have the effect of limiting expressive opportunities.

Other voices—of judges, class members, objectors, public officials, and ad hoc court appointees—come into play in subsequent principles. In Chapter II, “Aggregate Adjudication,” judges are called to account for their decisions to form aggregations for dispositions of common issues of fact or law.232 Judges are to explain why “aggregation will resolve fairly and efficiently the common issues identified and materially advance the resolution of any remaining issues or claims.”233 Judges must also explain choices of law.234 Moreover, the

228 Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 565–66 (1992) (holding that multipliers for risk were not generally appropriate); see Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1669 (2010) (holding that federal fee-shifting statutes create a strong presumption that attorney’s fees were to be based only on lodestar calculations and that additional multipliers should be applied only in “extraordinary circumstances”); see also Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2524 (2010) (holding that under the Equal Access to Justice Act, fees go to the litigant as the “prevailing party” and therefore the government could seek funds from that award for unrelated debt, precluding recovery of the money by the lawyer who provided representation).
229 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.04(b)(5), (c)(5), at 45–46 (2010).
230 Id. § 1.04 cmt. g, at 48.
231 Id.
232 Id. § 2.02 cmt. a, at 91–92 (discussing appellate review); id. § 2.02 cmt. c, at 90 (discussing common issues and preclusion). See generally Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 39 (discussing the development of judicial gatekeeping in class actions).
233 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.02(c)(2), at 83 (2010).
234 Id. § 2.05, at 129.
2009 ALI project calls for interlocutory appeals to be available (sometimes on a discretionary basis) on issues of class certification and on merits decisions on other common issues. One could also interpret exit rights as a form of voice, as members of aggregates are empowered to opt out (including a second opportunity in certain settlements) and on occasion, perhaps to opt in as part of a process of notice. Further, the commentary supporting widespread notice explains that mandatory aggregation proceedings can create “a forum in which all interested persons may voice their views concerning the practice or policy.”

The ALI puts another voice on the stage: that of potential objectors. When requiring hearings on settlements, the ALI permits attorney fee shifting, for or against objectors, that gives incentives for raising concerns even as it also prices outsider entry. As the commentary explains, the purpose is both to “fill a serious gap” in current law that does not compensate objectors and to ensure that “side deals” (in essence buying off objectors) be disclosed to courts.

The ALI also invites in others, including state officials and court appointees. One provision authorizes judges (at their discretion) to solicit the views of state or federal officials and then structure opportunities for parties to respond. In addition, the ALI details how

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235 Id. § 2.09, at 168.
236 Id. § 3.11, at 242 (“In any class action in which the terms of a settlement are not revealed” during an initial opt-out period, “class members should ordinarily have the right to opt out after the dissemination of notice of the proposed settlement.”). The Comment explains that the purpose is to encourage such a practice, but, as noted in the 2003 revisions to Rule 23, the rule has not had a “substantial impact.” Id. § 3.11 cmt. a, at 242.
237 Id. § 2.10 & cmt. a, at 176–77.
238 The ALI’s 2009 precepts elaborate a typology of the interaction among “exit,” “voice,” and representatives’ “loyalty,” in relationship to opportunities to be heard. See, e.g., id. § 2.07 cmt. f, at 154 (“As with the right of exit, [§ 2.07](a)(3) casts the right of voice in general terms, leaving subconstitutional questions about the precise operation of that right for judicial treatment on pragmatic terms.”); see also id. § 2.07 reporters’ notes cmt. e, at 162.
239 Id. § 2.07 cmt. h, at 156.
240 Id. § 3.08, at 223–26. Objectors who “demonstrate that a settlement should be rejected in its entirety,” or who reconfigure a classwide judgment, are entitled “to recover reasonable fees” upon a showing that their work was “instrumental in laying a basis for the ensuing benefit enjoyed by the class.” Id. § 3.08(a), at 223. If a court decides that objections were “insubstantial,” and “not reasonably advanced,” objectors can be sanctioned. Id. § 3.08(d), at 224. Sanctions can also be imposed on proponents of settlements who “misrepresent the benefits.” Id. § 3.08(c), at 224.
241 Id. § 3.08 cmt. a, at 224–25. Alan Morrison has described these provisions (and others) within the project as improvements over the prior practice. See Alan B. Morrison, Improving the Class Action Settlement Process: Little Things Mean a Lot, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 428, 442–43 & n.36 (2011).
242 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.09(c), at 228 (2010). Further, as
courts can appoint an “adjunct court officer” such as a special master or expert, to enlarge the circle of discussants. Further, the ALI recognizes the external benefits of settlements, as it authorizes the potential to use funds in a settlement for others through a cy pres remedy, which could be conceived to give third-party beneficiaries a form of voice.

3. Precluding by Contract and Law

If one series of provisions locates the ALI project within a due process model, with participatory values and public action entailed, another sequence marks the embrace of contract, of judicial discretion, and of the privatization of decisionmaking. Focused on efficiency, the ALI offers to expand the preclusive reach of judgments as well as of mass settlements, whose parameters may not become public. The underlying assumption is that claimants will be more likely to obtain remedies if respondents can be assured some measure of protection (“global peace”) through cutting off future access to court on related issues and by permitting the packaging of group deals. To get to such preclusive agreements requires power—given by the 2009 ALI precepts to lawyers and to judges.

In the provisions directed at aggregate adjudication, the discussion of “Ensuring Adequate Representation” authorizes judges to “limit” party “control” and to “enforce parties’ agreements.” Judges may therefore empower “certain parties or attorneys to control litigation,” and judges can reward such lawyers and litigants for doing so. Judges can also create partial class actions by having authority to deal with “common issues” in the aggregate as well as by authorizing “aggregation by consent.” Further, as noted, judges can permit aggregation based on the view that indivisible remedies—limited funds—require mandatory participation.

explained in Comment c, the section echoes the Class Action Fairness Act’s welcoming of state officials, but does not rely solely on volunteers. Id. § 3.09 cmt. c, at 228. The court may in appropriate cases solicit such involvement. Id.

243 Id. § 3.09(d), at 228.
244 Id. § 3.07, at 217–20.
245 Id. § 1.05, at 55.
246 Id. § 1.05 cmt. b, at 56. Judges have some oversight role, with a series of recommendations for its exercise, such as encouraging lawyers to use electronic communications with large numbers of clients. Id. § 1.05 cmt. i, at 63.
247 Id. § 2.02, at 82–83; Id. § 2.03, at 104–05.
248 Id. § 2.10 & cmt. a, at 176–77. Each “affected claimant” must provide “affirmative consent” for aggregate treatment of related claims or a common issue. Id. § 2.10, at 176.
249 See infra notes 253–54 and accompanying text.
What animates the decision to give judges such supervisory authority? Two concerns are at the core. First, the ALI explains that certain forms of conflicts of interest are intrinsic to aggregation; the issues are what forms of conflicts are tolerable and which impermissible. Second, the point of aggregation is to obtain binding judgments. Because claimants are rights-holders, entitled as a matter of due process to some participation by means of representatives who are loyal and by means of the ability to exercise their own voices through information or by exit, the “[s]trictures of constitutional due process comprise the most significant constraints on the preclusive effect of the aggregate proceeding.”

Judges solve those concerns by their oversight, and thus the phrase “the court shall” forms the predicate to “aggregate treatment of related claims.” Such “judicial scrutiny” of representatives’ “loyalty” can suffice to support differential terms within a settlement. Also noted are mitigating strategies, such as the availability of exit rights, except when a “mandatory aggregation” is based on indivisible remedies. In addition, the ALI provides for wider notice than under Rule 23, and hence more opportunities to communicate, if not to participate in other fashions.

Class settlements are a subject of their own, and some of what the ALI codifies is familiar given Rule 23. But freed from the constraints of rule promulgation through the Supreme Court, the ALI offers several additions. Plainly welcomed by the ALI are settlements that “include remedies not available in contested lawsuits,” as long as a settlement is “fair, reasonable and adequate.” Further, under court supervision, “future claims” can also be settled. Plainly disfavored are postsettlement challenges, to be “limited” as long as procedures exist for “contemporaneous challenge.” Rather, given the “[n]eed for finality,” “collateral challenges” are restricted—leaving claimants who believe that they were not adequately represented to remedi¬es of malpractice against their lawyers. This provision takes up a much debated issue in both caselaw and commentary about the requi-

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251 Id. § 2.07(a), at 147.
252 Id. § 2.07 cmt. d, at 149.
253 Id. § 2.07 cmt. e, at 151.
254 Id. § 2.07 cmt. f, at 152–54.
255 Id. § 3.01(b), at 187–88.
256 Id. § 3.10, at 231.
257 Id. § 3.01(c), at 188.
258 Id. § 3.14 cmt. a, at 254.
259 Id. § 3.14(b), at 254. Also called for is a presumption of preclusion for decisions on whether or not to accord class treatment to aggregates. Id. § 2.11 cmt. b, at 179.
site “process due,” but the commentary explaining its parameters is sparse, with little elaboration of whose “need for finality” trumps the participatory values otherwise in play.\footnote{Id. § 3.14, at 254–56. For criticism, see generally Patrick Woolley, The Jurisdictional Nature of Adequate Representation in Class Litigation, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 410, 411–15 (2011).}

A yet more ambitious aspect of expansionist aggregation is the decision to create “non-class aggregate settlements.”\footnote{Id. §§ 3.15–.18, at 257–62 (2010).} As the ALI project discusses, that reference is intended to embrace a diverse set of aggregations created through formal mechanisms such as MDL and joinder or through informal processes.\footnote{Id. § 3.15 cmt. a, at 257.} Recognizing that lawyers are already functioning outside the purview of judges on behalf of aggregates, the 2009 ALI precepts seek to impose a layer of regulation, while also legitimating the practice and hence making it more plausible.\footnote{Id. § 3.15 cmt. a, at 257–58.} (Indeed, as Richard Marcus notes, the nonclass aggregations may have sufficient appeal as to become more common than court-based aggregations.\footnote{Id.} Under the ALI’s approach, lawyers for both potential plaintiffs and defendants are authorized to bargain for a group delineated by settlements that are “interdependent.”\footnote{Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 39, at 108.} Interdependency flows because claimants’ cases are not valued “based solely on individual case-by-case facts and negotiations” but rather as part of a set.\footnote{See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.16(c), at 258 (2010) (“In determining whether claims are interdependent, it is irrelevant whether the settlement proposal was originally made by plaintiffs or defendants.”).}

One way to understand these provisions is by reference to the two Supreme Court cases that, in different ways, forbade those forms for court-based class actions. In \textit{Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor}, the Supreme Court held that the fact that a group was joined together by a “common interest” in a settlement could not serve as a basis for finding commonality and certifying a class.\footnote{Id. § 3.16(b)(1), at 258.} Further, in \textit{Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.}, the Court prohibited party agreements from stipulating the boundaries of, and thereby creating a limited fund to pro-
duce a mandatory class action, which is a point (as noted earlier) that the ALI invokes when discussing court-certified classes.\textsuperscript{269} In contrast, for out-of-court, law-legitimated aggregation, the ALI’s 2009 principles permit the use of a shared settlement opportunity to justify aggregate treatment that could entail a capped fund.\textsuperscript{270} Moreover, as detailed below, courts may implicitly affirm such predicates to settlement by rejecting challenges to them.

Unlike court-based classes, in which judges are to ride herd, non-court-based aggregations are creatures of contracts. To impose some constraints on the power accorded, the ALI obliges lawyers either to inform clients in writing of the agreements and the “total financial interest of claimants’ counsel,” or to get ex ante agreements before settlement offers are made that “each participating claimant” will be “bound by a substantial-majority vote of all claimants” on a settlement proposal.\textsuperscript{271} In other words, the current obligation of lawyers to be loyal to their individual clients can be superseded through a contract in which a client transfers loyalty rights to a group. That form of agreement likely would take place when a lawyer is first retained, and hence, entered into individually. And, while “informed consent” is required, lawyers may also decline to represent individuals with whom they do not have a preexisting relationship, if those potential clients do not agree to be part of future collective bargaining.\textsuperscript{272}

The discussion also recognizes the possibility that sophisticated claimants might find means to engage in collective action vis-à-vis their own counsel—for example by appointing “certain members to act on behalf of the group by receiving communications and overseeing the day-to-day conduct of the lawsuit.”\textsuperscript{273} Moreover, Elizabeth Burch has argued that “obligations of solidarity or loyalty” ought to flow to those giving consent to formulate methods of exchange to de-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{269} Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821, 857 (1999); see Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 2.07 cmt. i, at 165 (2010); supra note 218 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{270} Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.17, at 262 (2010).
  \item \textsuperscript{271} Id. § 3.17(a)–(b), at 262. Details in the Comments offer content to what constitutes informed consent. Id. § 3.17 cmt. b., at 265–67. For example, claimants could be informed of a method of distribution, but need not be. Id. The Comments note that what constitutes a “substantial majority” is a question for “legislative drafting,” with models offered such as the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement of seventy-five percent of certain classes of creditors’ approval. Id. § 3.17 cmt. c(2), at 269. The ALI provision does not preclude the all-or-nothing settlements that have drawn criticism, but does offer the alternative to the “substantial majority” model. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 979, 1019–20 (2010) [hereinafter Erichson, All-or-Nothing Settlements].
  \item \textsuperscript{272} Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 3.17 cmt. b, at 267–68 (2010).
  \item \textsuperscript{273} Id. § 3.17 cmt. c(2), at 268–69.
\end{itemize}
velop group consensus.274 While the ALI commentary recognizes the desirability of delaying the request for client consent until after group settlements are known or members may have opportunities to know each other,275 the 2009 precepts do not require lawyers to help their coclients communicate with each other nor insist that the group sprout its own methods for doing so. One outsider is proffered as a potential participant; either clients or the lawyers representing groups could engage a “neutral” who, if validating the agreements reached, would serve as a means of defending against any later challenges that might emerge.276

The formal outside protection created is a provision for “limited judicial review” of such settlements if, within a prescribed period of time, a claimant brings a challenge that the settlement was not negotiated under the procedural framework the ALI envisions for such collective settlement bargaining.277 Further, if successful, a challenger can obtain fees from a wayward representative if a court finds that a settlement was procedurally or substantively unfair.278

The criteria for a court to use in assessing a challenge to a nonclass settlement are in some respects familiar, given the factors relied upon when court approval is sought in in-court class action settlements. Under the new ALI procedures, judges would ask in a challenged, nonclass settlement whether, given the facts and circumstances, the “costs, risks, probability of success, and delays in achieving a verdict” rendered a settlement sufficient.279 The added questions for a challenge after a nonclass aggregate is settled are whether the treatment among claimants was equitable and whether a particular claimant was “disadvantaged” when the settlement is “considered as a whole.”280 The “safety valve” (a nonwaivable protection281) of being able to bring a postsettlement challenge could be understood, in the language of class actions, as a judicially authorized “second opt-out.”282 The result of not opting out through mounting such a challenge is that one is bound.

274 Burch, supra note 22, at 520. She thus argues that the ALI provisions could generate a “claimant-based governance” model. Id. at 531.
276 Id. § 3.17 cmt. d(4), at 270.
277 Id. § 3.18(a), at 276.
278 Id. § 3.18(d), at 277.
279 Id. § 3.17(c), at 264.
280 Id.
281 Id. § 3.18 cmts. a & b, at 277.
282 See id. § 3.11, at 242.
Given that the ALI built in structural controls in the person of the judge for court-based aggregates, the non-court-based collectives look sparsely protected. As noted, the ALI mentioned that sophisticated clients might attempt monitoring of their lawyers, but no mechanisms to ensure equity among those subject to the package settlement are detailed. But the 2009 aggregation principles do not provide ways for ordinary claimants to coordinate so as to cabin their attorney’s powers ex ante, nor has the ALI offered a means (absent a claimant’s ex post challenge) for the public to learn about either the processes or outcomes. Confidentiality agreements are common features of many settlements, yet the possibility of respondents conditioning settlement on confidentiality is not squarely addressed. Were a good many challenges filed and adjudicated, one might find development of the meaning of equitable treatment across a group of noncertified class claimants and of how the concept of loyalty to a group, as contrasted to an individual client, is tested.


Five analogues help to illuminate facets of the proposed new mode of aggregate nonclass settlements. The first is that settlements entailing what the ALI calls “collective conditionality” exist, on a smaller scale, on the criminal side of the federal court docket. These “package pleas” contain various contingent offers by prosecutors. Some are what on the civil side are called “all-or-nothing settlements,” requiring that all codefendants must accept the proffered bargain, while others can entail leniency for some family members in exchange for others pleading guilty.

The rationales resemble those for aggregate civil settlements—the conservation of resources to obtain finality and the desirability of

283 See supra notes 245–54 and accompanying text.
284 See supra note 273 and accompanying text. In contrast, certification of a class and approval of its $21 million settlement in a mandatory limited-fund class action was recently reversed, in part because the agreement had failed to clarify how it would achieve intraclass equity and had, instead, left the compensation question for a wide array of injuries to a special master. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., Nos. 09-31156, 09-31188, 2010 WL 5128640 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2010).
285 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.16 cmt. b, at 259 (2010).
encouraging cooperation.\textsuperscript{288} Even if several defendants enter a guilty plea, they do not save the state all the costs of trial if one holdout insists on undergoing the full process. Yet, the prosecutorial power is seen by some as so coercive as to be banned.\textsuperscript{289} Indeed, in 1975, the ALI warned about such offers inducing inaccurate pleas.\textsuperscript{290} But support for the practice comes from most jurisdictions that have addressed it and concluded that such agreements are not “invalid per se.”\textsuperscript{291}

The ALI project is in some sense aiming to respond to the power imbalance represented by the prosecutor offering plea bargains. By enabling either judges or lawyers to collect clients, the resources of the claimant class may grow—if their representative is loyal, energetic, and able. But despite the literature replete with concerns about self-interested lawyers and collusion,\textsuperscript{292} the 2009 ALI aggregation principles rely on a good deal of self-policing by the participants and do not build in public dissemination or judicial review, absent the happenstance of an unhappy claimant raising a challenge after a settlement.\textsuperscript{293} In contrast, package pleas are (like other plea bargains) subjected ex ante to a modicum of judicial oversight. Courts have required disclosures of the terms of package pleas and have called for heightened scrutiny of such agreements.\textsuperscript{294} Some jurisdictions go fur-

\textsuperscript{288} See Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through Osmosis—Reminders to Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 67, 100 & n.162 (2008).

\textsuperscript{289} State v. Solano, 724 F.2d 17, 22 (Ariz. 1986) (Gordon, J., dissenting) (arguing that package plea deals should be disallowed in all cases).


\textsuperscript{291} See Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 334 (Tenn. 2006); see also Green, supra note 287, at 512–14.


ther, holding that a plea is not likely to meet the constitutional standard of voluntariness “if the court finds that a promise of leniency to a third party was a significant consideration in the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.”295

The lessons from the criminal side serve as a reminder of the limits of what judges can do. In practice, oversight has proved relatively thin. Courts have declined to overturn convictions on the grounds of insufficient disclosure of packages.296 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently refused to find “plain error” when a prosecutor conceded failed to adhere to a plea agreement in which the government agreed to request a reduction in a guideline sentence.297 But the public process of plea bargaining does enable knowledge of the frequency of its use and the terms (including package pleas) that are proffered and tolerated—sparking a normative debate about what law should require when an individual or a group agrees to plead guilty. Thus, although “judging consent” is a task that puts the judge in a particularly party-dependent mode,298 likely to defer to the proponents of agreements, the public gains insight into the practices of lawyers, litigants, and the courts.

A second analogy to the aggregate settlement procedures fashioned by the ALI comes from contract clauses that oblige mandatory arbitration. Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court reread federal statutes to permit, rather than to prohibit, enforcement of arbitration contracts that, in advance of a dispute, waive rights of access to court, even when federal or state statutory rights were at stake.299 A first wave of cases dealt with consumer contracts, but in 2001, the Court applied an expansive approach to endorse mandatory arbitration despite an employee’s claim of violations of the right to be free from

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295 See People v. Sandoval, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 911, 921 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing earlier California law).
296 See, e.g., Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 340 (Minn. 2003), superseded by statute on other grounds, 2005 Minn. Laws 197–98.
297 See Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009). The Court held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)’s plain error review applied and affirmed the conviction and sentence.
discrimination based on sexual orientation under state law.\textsuperscript{300} The constraint imposed under the doctrine is that, so long as the alternative provides an adequate opportunity to vindicate statutory rights, such contracts are enforceable.\textsuperscript{301} Objections go, by and large, to the arbitrator. This proposition was reiterated emphatically at the end of the 2010 Term in \textit{Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson}, when the Supreme Court held that a challenge to the enforceability of the entire agreement (which the Ninth Circuit had held unconscionable because of the lack of meaningful consent) is a judgment to be made, initially at least, by an arbitrator.\textsuperscript{302}

Unlike the ALI 2009 precepts that impose detailed requirements on how lawyers are to obtain “informed consent,”\textsuperscript{303} the waivers of court access in employment and consumer contracts often come in the small print.\textsuperscript{304} Indeed, in some instances, prospective employees are required to sign waivers before becoming eligible for a job interview.\textsuperscript{305} Further, under the 2009 decision of \textit{14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett},\textsuperscript{306} these provisions can be part of contracts entered into by unions rather than by employees personally; a union’s agreement to arbitrate claims bound individual employees.\textsuperscript{307}

But like mandatory arbitration contracts, a more powerful party (in this instance, a lawyer) proffers a form and can refuse to provide services if the client does not waive rights of the duty of individual loyalty and acquiesce to this form of alternative dispute resolution. While the ALI provisions insist that the clients remain in control of final settlement decisions,\textsuperscript{308} the ALI has not specified means for clients (unless sophisticated ex ante negotiators with lawyers) who have transferred loyalty to the group to exercise effectively that control. Both mandatory arbitration contacts and the ALI aggregation agree-

\textsuperscript{300} See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001), remanded to 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002). On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, under California law, the contract was not enforceable because it was a contract of adhesion. \textit{Circuit City Stores, Inc.}, 279 F.3d at 893.


\textsuperscript{302} Id. at 2778–79.

\textsuperscript{303} \textit{PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG.} § 3.17(a), at 262 (2010).


\textsuperscript{305} See, e.g., id.; cf. Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006).


\textsuperscript{307} Id. at 1466.

\textsuperscript{308} \textit{PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG.} § 3.17, at 262 (2010).
ments forego judicial process and authorize private actors to make judgments that—absent litigants with the ability to mount court-based challenges to such contracts—will render binding conclusions on what are otherwise legally enforceable claims.

An ongoing challenge to mandatory arbitration clauses illuminates the potential problems in the ALI model. Many of the current form contracts for mandatory arbitration include clauses prohibiting “class arbitrations.” But just as the ALI has underscored the importance of aggregate processing to enhance the pursuit of justice through enforcing rights, so too have advocates for consumers and employees argued that clauses banning class arbitrations are fundamentally unfair. The Second Circuit concluded in a case involving shipping companies that, when a contract was silent on the issue, arbitrators had the power to infer the ability to proceed as a class. But in the spring of 2010, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that silence could not be read by a panel of arbitrators to permit them to hear a class arbitration. As for express bans, some courts have found that preclusion of class arbitration renders a contract unconscionable. That issue is before the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law finding unconscionable a contract that prohibits class arbitrations.

Although the 2009 ALI precepts insist that “under no circumstances” may a client assign a claim, a third analogue to the ALI aggregate settlement provisions is the assignment of claims. While not a formal assignment (because of the stated retention of control and voting rights), the ALI aggregation principles offer lawyers means to obtain clients individually yet to negotiate for them as a group, and

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310 E.g., id. (noting a recent decision of the Washington Supreme Court which struck down an agreement prohibiting class actions and concluded that such a requirement prevented consumers from vindicating their rights).
313 Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010). Judge Bea, writing for the Ninth Circuit, held that California law made the contract unenforceable and that the Federal Arbitration Act neither expressly nor implicitly preempted California unconscionability law. The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in July 2010, holding that the arbitration clause of a student loan consolidation contract was unconscionable under California law, and that the Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt California contract law. See Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2010).
This new mode of lawyer services is responsive to the shift in the market of injuries. A custom-tailored (or as an English commentator put it, “bespoke”) system of lawyer-client relations may be a form of craft that, as in other industries, is fast becoming obsolete or only available to clients with substantial resources. As Howard Erichson and Benjamin Zipursky observe, the ALI offer to clients of the option to shop for lawyers who do not proffer contracts committing clients to aggregate settlement possibilities may be illusory, in that clients will want to have lawyers who represent others similarly situated, and hence have or gain knowledge and bargaining clout. Thus, Erichson and Zipursky see the ALI provisions as unduly lawyer-empowering.

Fourth, mention needs to be made of the concerns attendant to “vanishing trials,” the term Marc Galanter helped to imbue with meaning as he headed a research project, sponsored by the Section on Litigation of the American Bar Association, to map the declining number of trials. In the federal courts, of one hundred cases filed, fewer than two start trials. The ALI has created new methods to obtain the benefits of law—sanctioned aggregate settlements without the necessity of filing a lawsuit and seeking class certification. As the ALI explains: “Aggregate proceedings may resolve claims that have not ripened into lawsuits and that are held by persons who are not represented persons. For example, a settlement proposal extended to persons with unfiled claims may accomplish this result,” namely through the development of the ideas of “nonparty claimants” and of

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315 The ability of “repeat players”—of whom lawyers are an example par excellence—to shape rules to their benefit is explored in a classic essay by Marc Galanter, *Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change*, 9 Law and Soc’y Rev. 95, 97 (1974). Some 150 years earlier, Jeremy Bentham made a similar point, complaining that “Judge & Co.” (judges and lawyers) had created a system that suited their interests but not the populace. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, *An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence*, in 6 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 1, 351 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter Bentham, Rationale].


318 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 193, at 301–03. They also argue that the consent under such conditions would be “inauthentic” and that lawyers would functionally end up “adjudicating clients’ claims vis-à-vis each other.” Id. at 300; see also Nancy J. Moore, *The American Law Institute’s Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?*, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 395, 419–20 (2008).


“nonparty respondents.” The ALI project thus raises the potential for “vanishing settlements,” in that the less regulated, less visible, private out-of-court regime could have more appeal than the requirements of justification and public disclosures of in-court aggregate settlements.

Finally, the ALI’s shaping of non-court-based settlements frees negotiators from dealing with the jurisdictional boundaries that are currently at the core of the current federal system. In this respect, the ALI project is in sync with the Supreme Court’s embrace of court-based settlements that do not rely on delineations between state and federal authority. The ALI provisions share the enthusiasm that prompted the Supreme Court’s expansive understanding of courts’ powers that, as noted, mean that state courts can settle securities cases they have no authority to try. The ALI can also find support in aspects of the congressional enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act, bringing cases arising solely under state law, if aggregated, into federal courts.

D. An Alternative: Shared Lawyers and Redundant Procedures

In contrast to the ALI’s focus on preclusion and finality, the 2008 decision of Taylor v. Sturgell affirms the potential that certain kinds of claims could be brought repeatedly, even if against the same defendant and even if a second litigant has the same lawyer as did a first, unsuccessful claimant. For a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg insisted that Brent Taylor could have his “day in court” to pursue a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request. The opinion has been criticized by commentators enthusiastic about the ALI model, as they argue that the FOIA action fits neatly within concepts such as a mandatory class action or other forms of aggregation. Yet, one can draw a different conclusion: that the Taylor case represents the value of redundancy because, had a first judgment been preclusive, impor-

321 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 1.01, cmt. d, at 6 (2010) (developing the ideas of “nonparty claimants” and of “nonparty respondents”).
tant legal questions about access to information would have remained unaddressed.

The facts are necessary for analysis of the ruling’s implications. Taylor, a mechanic and the president of the Antique Airplane Association, sought technical documents about how to make an F-45, “a vintage model” airplane that was manufactured in the 1930s by the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation. Taylor’s lawsuit was not the first attempt to get that information. According to the record, Greg Herrick (whom Taylor knew) had made such a request, pursued thereafter through litigation in the District Court of Wyoming. In doing so, he had relied on 1955 materials from the manufacturer, which had authorized public disclosure of documents it had submitted to the government when initially obtaining manufacture and sale permission from the Civil Aeronautics Authority, the predecessor to the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”).

Herrick lost in the administrative proceedings and then at the district court on the grounds that trade secret status has been restored to the 1930s plans following the company’s objections to the disclosure by the FAA. The Tenth Circuit affirmed that ruling, as it also explained that because Herrick had not challenged the trial court ruling on the issues, the court had not reached the legal questions of whether trade secret status could attach after a FOIA request was made or whether it could be “restored,” and if so, how or when.

Represented by the same lawyer who had brought Herrick’s unsuccessful claim, Taylor filed in the District of Columbia, where he advanced arguments about why the 1930s plans were no longer trade-secret protected. Taylor lost at the district and circuit levels on the grounds that Herrick had been his “virtual” representative, sharing

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327 Taylor v. Blakey, No. 03-0173, 2005 WL 6003553, at *1 (D.D.C. May 12, 2005). The attorney listed as counsel of record, Michael John Pangia, had represented Herrick as well.
329 Id. at 885.
330 Id. at 886.
331 Id. at 886–87.
332 Herrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328–29 (D. Wyo. 2000). The court commented that “only sixteen” of the F-45 planes were ever built. Id. at 1323. That court noted that the documents had not in fact been released and, further, that reasserting the private right reversed its waiver. Id. at 1329.
333 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 887; see Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1194 n.10 (10th Cir. 2002).
“the same incentive” to obtain disclosure. As the appellate decision explained, permitting the lawsuit to continue would enhance the potential for “tactical” manipulation by a second litigant able to get “multiple bites at the litigatory apple.” Such a lawsuit could only occur if a “later plaintiff” who had connections to a prior litigant and lawyer could establish that the second plaintiff had no interest in the earlier litigation.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit in a decision outlining the parameters of federal common law while also engaging the constitutional import of due process. The Supreme Court concluded that friendship, shared lawyers, shared membership in the Antique Aircraft Association, the sharing of documents, and the shared goal of getting disclosure of design details of a vintage airplane from the FAA were not proper bases on which to preclude Taylor from going forward. In its discussion, the Court provided an overview of when preclusion of individuals not formally parties to lawsuits could occur. The methods recognized as permissible are several, including contracts (such as the ALI proposes) that authorized representation; law that recognized relationships such as assignee and assignor, proxy relationships, or those in privity; law that structured relationships through mechanisms like class actions or trusteeship, or by means of special statutory schemes, such as bankruptcy; and factual control over a lawsuit that resulted in practical participation.

But the Court refused a federal common law rule that would have added new grounds for preclusion. Instead, it reiterated its adherence to the “fundamental nature of the general rule that a litigant is not bound by a judgment to which she was not a party.” The Court imposed parameters on the permissible forms of preclusion: preclusion can only occur if “at a minimum . . . the interests of the nonparty and her representative are aligned” and “either the party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care to protect the interests of the nonparty.”

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336 Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d at 975 (internal quotation marks omitted).
337 Id. at 976–77.
339 Id. at 892–96.
340 Id.
341 Id. at 898.
342 Id. at 900.
The Court specifically rejected the idea of a “common-law” class action, in part on grounds of practicality and burden and in part because of vagueness; “no clear test” enabled assessment of when “virtual” representation existed or sufficed.

Taylor embodies not only concerns about day-in-court rights but also the particular nature and importance of the underlying claim—the statutory right of free information. FOIA harkens back to the constitutional commands (discussed at the outset) that courts be open and that legislatures make regular accountings. As the Tenth Circuit explained in the first case, Herrick v. Garvey, “FOIA’s purpose is ‘to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.’” Congress updated and translated those norms through a statute according “any person” the power to request records from federal agencies and obligating those agencies either to provide the information or explain why it is withheld. Further, Congress put courts inside the process by charging them with policing refusals either by the government alone or (as illustrated in Taylor itself) resulting from a joint effort by government agencies and industry, seeking to keep information from the public realm.

Taylor also offers an example of the role played by lawyers, who can miss as well as identify claims, whose sophistication can grow over time through repeated involvement with issues during a series of cases (what Francis McGovern called “mature” in the context of mass torts), and whose resources can be augmented because, as the profile of the case grows, other lawyers become involved. Initially, Brent Taylor was represented by a lawyer who had expertise in aviation law

343 Id.
344 Id. at 901 (citing Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 972–73 (7th Cir. 1998)).
345 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 455 (8th Cir. 1996)).
347 Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2002).
348 Id. at 1189 (quoting Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1990)).
350 See id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
and had worked for the FAA. On appeal in the D.C. Circuit and then before the Supreme Court, additional assistance came from Public Citizen, expert in class actions, procedure, and appellate practice.

Some commentators (including Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Nagareda, who also served as Reporters for the ALI aggregation project) have questioned the Supreme Court’s Taylor decision for failing to appreciate the degree to which the FOIA claim was a public, rather than a personal, right. While not endorsing the unspecified contours of the D.C. Circuit’s virtual representation theory, Issacharoff and Nagareda saw the commonality across claimants such that, for example, a mandatory class action could be the response. Others, such as Professor Martin Redish and William Katt, have praised the Taylor ruling as demonstrating the “foundational American political commitment to democracy” that recognizes individual autonomy and participatory rights.

For me, Taylor not only represents the confluence of statutory information-forcing rights and courts’ capacity to engender participatory parity, but also the utility of redundancy and judicial articulation of legal precepts. Do trade secrets lapse? How might they be resuscitated? Who wants to protect the plans of a 1930s vintage plane and why? Given that Congress has specifically crafted a statute giving “any person” rights to pursue these questions, courts should be hesitant to assume that collective processing that would result in broad preclusive effects is a preferred method of implementing this congressional directive. Imagine that an initial lawsuit had been cert-

352 See Trial Lawyers: Michael J. Pangia, Anderson Pangia & Assocs., PLLC, http://www.andersonpangia.net/mjpangia.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) (“Michael Pangia leads the firm’s aviation practice . . . . Mr. Pangia is a licensed commercial pilot, has a long experience with air crash disasters. As the former chief trial lawyer for the Federal Aviation Administration . . . Mr. Pangia is a nationally recognized expert in aviation law . . . .”).

353 As its own description explains:
Public Citizen Litigation Group is the arm of the organization that functions as a public interest law firm. Our attorneys litigate cases at all levels of the federal and state court systems. We specialize in health and safety regulation, access to courts, consumer rights, open government, and the First Amendment, including Internet free speech . . . .


354 See Issacharoff, supra note 326, at 17; Nagareda, supra note 326, at 19–20.

355 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 326, at 21–23.


fied as a mandatory class, lawyers had not pursued arguments of lapsed trade secrets, and the courts had held the issue waived. Taylor offers the law and fact pattern counseling against too-ready certifications, given statutory opportunities for repeated exploration of the public and private rights entailed in delineating the secret from that which can be revealed in documents filed with the government or produced by the government.

IV. THE PRESSURES TO AGGREGATE, THE PLASTICITY OF NORMS, AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PROCESSES

This skim of decades of procedural changes permits one to see how procedural frameworks are both deeply embedded in political visions and historically contingent. Currently in the United States (and elsewhere), two models—due process procedure and procedure as contract—intersect. Both can be explained in terms of enabling rights enforcement. One relies to a significant degree on public exchanges, while the other embraces more private routes.

What are the arguments for the public facets of the due process model? Answers come in part by way of Jeremy Bentham, who was a remarkable procedural reformer and whose commitment to “publicity” still echoes in contemporary opinions explaining why open courts are required. Bentham wanted to constrain a wide range of actors, including “Judge & Co.”—common law judges and English lawyers whose self-interest resulted, he believed, in a cumbersome procedural system that worked to their, but not to the populace’s, benefit.

Publicity was a primary means, operating to enhance accuracy, a view one can also find espoused in contemporary analyses of the impact of public trials. Bentham also believed that public courts

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358 As for published decisions in the case, on remand, the district court denied discovery on the maintenance of the record prior to the request as a trade secret and whether the Fairchild Corporation was the true owner of record. The decision on discovery left open the possibility of returning to the issue. Taylor v. Babbitt, 673 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009). As of this writing, the parties had briefed cross motions for summary judgment, pending before the court.


360 See Bentham, Rationale, supra note 315, at 359.

361 See generally id.

362 Id. at 355. As Twining quoted Bentham, “Falsehood—corrupt and wilful falsehood—mendacity, in a word—the common instrument of all wrong,” was the “irreconcilable enemy of justice.” William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore 90 (1985).

363 See Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Chilling, Settlement, and the Accuracy of
would generate a desirable form of communication between citizen and the state.\textsuperscript{364} While not legally obliged to deliver opinions, Bentham thought judges would want their audience to understand their actions.\textsuperscript{365} Thus, it would be “natural” for judges to gain “the habit of giving reasons from the bench.”\textsuperscript{366} Providing a stage for such dialogic exchanges, courts were “schools” as well as “theatres of justice.”\textsuperscript{367}

Another function of publicity is disciplinary; “the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave.”\textsuperscript{368} Recall that Bentham was a fierce critic of judges and their common law. “Publicity is the very soul of justice . . . . It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.”\textsuperscript{369} Bentham proposed that ordinary spectators (whom he termed “auditors”\textsuperscript{370}) be permitted to make notes that could be distributed widely. These “minutes” could serve as insurance for the good judge and as a corrective against “misrepresentations” made by

\textit{the Legal Process}, 26 J.L. Econ. & Org. 144, 152 (2010). They offered a model to demonstrate that pressures toward settlements, in lieu of public trials, reduce accuracy because, under certain circumstances, “allowing settlement either increases chilling of legitimate activity or reduces deterrence of harmful activity.”

364 See Bentham, Rationale, supra note 315, at 355–56.
365 Id. at 356–57.
366 Id. at 357.
367 Id. at 354. This imagery has currency in both France and the United States. See Nancy Fraser, \textit{Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy}, in \textit{Habermas and the Public Sphere} 110–11 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992). Fraser described Habermas’s public sphere as a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, and hence an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction. This arena is conceptually distinct from the state; it is a site for the production and circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the state.


368 Bentham Project, UCL Faculty of Laws, \textit{The More Strictly We Are Watched, the Better We Behave} 1 (2007), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-Project/who/panopticon_leaflet. The quote comes from 1 \textit{Writings on the Poor Laws} 277 (Michael Quinn ed., 2001). The website and the project’s pamphlet also provide a copy of Bentham’s emblem, which included an “all seeing eye, framed by the words Mercy, Justice, Vigilance.” Bentham Project, UCL Faculty of Laws, supra, at 2.


370 Bentham, Rationale, supra note 315, at 356.
“an unrighteous judge.” 371 More generally, “notification” of decisions enabled the public to exercise its authority to “enforce the will of the people by means of the moral sanction.” 373 Bentham’s enthusiasm for openness did not render him insensitive to the burdens of public processes and the need for privacy. Bentham’s list of circumstances for closure, like his arguments for openness, parallel those made in contemporary courts. 374

Bentham’s views on the importance of publicity were not limited to courtrooms, for he believed publicity’s benefits—truth, education, interaction, and superintendence—to be useful in diverse settings across a vast swath of social ordering. The “doors of all public establishments ought to be, thrown wide open to the body of the curious at large—the great open committee of the tribunal of the world.” 375 Bentham’s invocation of door opening was more than a metaphor; he described in detail how to design structures to ensure that a host of activities, including legislative and executive functions, took place before the public. 376 These many and varied plans used architecture as

371 Id.; see also Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code, in 9 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, supra note 315, at 158 (writing of “Public Opinion”: “To the pernicious exercise of the power of government, it is the only check; to the beneficial, an indispensable supplement. Able rulers lead it; prudent rulers lead or follow it; foolish rulers disregard it.”). Here, Bentham also linked publicity with his utilitarian philosophy, continuing that,

   Even at the present stage in the career of civilisation, [publicity’s] dictates coincide, on most points, with those of the greatest happiness principle; on some, however, it still deviates from them: but, as its deviations have all along been less and less numerous, and less wide, sooner or later they will cease to be discernible; aberration will vanish, coincidence will be complete.

Id.


373 Id. at 263.

374 For example, the European Convention on Human Rights provides:

   Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.


376 One was direct observation: he called for a debating chamber that was “‘nearly circular’ with ‘seats rising amphitheatrically above each other.’” SCHOFIELD, supra note 372, at 258 (quoting POLITICAL TACTICS 45 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999)).
“a means of securing publicity, while publicity was a means of securing responsibility.”377 Because he did not want government officials to be the sole sources of such accounts, Bentham devised various information-forcing methods. For example, he wanted to build designated spaces for newspaper reporters “to produce unofficial records of the proceedings, and thereby ‘prevent negligence and dishonesty on the part of the official reporters.’”378

Moving beyond Bentham to contemporary critical theorists concerned about democratic discourse and the public sphere brings other justifications for open adjudicatory processes to the fore.379 Adjudication can itself be a democratic practice—an odd moment in which individuals can oblige others to treat them as equals, as they argue in public about their disagreements, misbehavior, wrongdoing, and obligations. Litigation forces dialogue upon the unwilling (including the government, as Taylor v. Sturgell illustrates380) and, momentarily, alters configurations of authority. Social practices, etiquette, and a myriad of legal rules shape what those who enter courts are empowered to do.381

Courts can be a great leveler, in that participatory parity382 is an express goal, and one that the ALI embraced in 2009 when it aimed to use aggregates to alter power disparities. Moreover, when government officials are parties to litigation, they are forced, either as plaintiffs or defendants, to comply with court rules, divulging information and responding to questions posed by opponents or judges. Depending on rule regimes such as discovery, disclosure, and statutes like FOIA, government litigants can be obliged to produce documents, files, e-mails, and other records.

377 Id. at 259. Bentham is (in)famous for promoting the “panopticon,” a prison that was designed to subject incarcerated inmates to continual observation. Bentham, Panopticon, supra note 375, at 46; see also Schofield, supra note 372, at 255–56.

378 Schofield, supra note 372, at 258 (quoting Political Tactics, supra note 376, at 40).

379 See generally Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., The MIT Press 1991) (1962) (describing the “public sphere” as a place where citizens can interact and discuss common affairs); Fraser, supra note 367, at 112–37 (arguing against “the bourgeois conception of the public sphere”).

380 See supra notes 346–50 and accompanying text.

381 This understanding of law as a social practice can be seen in the work of Robert M. Cover. See generally Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983); Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 Yale J.L. & Human. 17 (2005).

382 Fraser argued that such parity was requisite to the proper functioning of Habermasian public spheres. Fraser, supra note 367, at 118.
Open courts and published opinions permit individuals who are neither employees of the courts nor disputants to learn, firsthand, about processes and outcomes. Indeed, courts—and the discussions that their processes produce—are one avenue through which private persons come together to form a public, assuming an identity as participants acting within a political and social order. Courts make a contribution by being what could be called nondenominational or nonpartisan, in that they are one of relatively few communal spaces not organized by political, religious, or social affiliations. Open court proceedings enable people to watch, debate, develop, contest, and materialize the exercise of both public and private power.

Thus, while Bentham stressed the protective side of adjudication (policing judges as well as witnesses), I want to emphasize its democratic capacities. The developmental theory of due process has generated public facets of adjudication that engender participatory obligations and enact democratic precepts of equality. Courts provide opportunities to make meaningful the democratic aspirations to locate sovereignty in the people, to constrain government actors, and to insist on the equality of treatment under law. As a consequence, the vanishing trials and vanishing court-based settlements can entail lost democratic opportunities for public debate and input about law’s entailments. Courts serve not only as a segment of the regulatory apparatus but as contributors to democracy by enacting its precepts.

Of course, courts can also be a place for the manipulation of popular opinion and for a few atypical events to become unduly salient. Moreover, one should not romanticize spectatorship. A 2010 decision by the United States Supreme Court about what it determined to be the unconstitutional exclusion of the public arose from a trial judge asking the “lone courtroom observer” to leave the room. Locating judgment in courthouses with windows to the streets and open doors makes publicity possible, but a question remains about how to secure an audience whose members understand themselves as participatory

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383 See generally Craig Calhoun, Introduction to Habermas and the Public Sphere, supra note 367.

384 Those problems are discussed at length in Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 4 Law & Ethics Hum. Rts. (forthcoming 2011). Further, as David Luban has noted, publicity itself can be used to undercut the legitimacy of the very institution making the knowledge public. All “actions relating to the right of other human beings are wrong if publicizing their maxim would lead to self-frustration by undercutting the legitimacy of the public institutions authorizing those actions.” David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in The Theory of Institutional Design 154, 192 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996).

observers, functioning politically as responsible “auditors” rather than indifferent viewers or as partisans. Watching state-authorized processes could prompt celebration, action, or dialectic exchanges that develop new norms of diverse kinds, but boredom can also result.

Bentham saw this problem of obtaining “an audience for the ‘judicial theatre,’” and offered both moral and economic incentives. He considered whether to have public authorities require attendance as a matter of duty, provide compensation for attendance, or devise some other “factitious means” to bring people into the audience. Another method was the printed word; Bentham advocated that permission be liberally granted for the publication of information obtained, and for its republication as well.

In short, a host of problems haunt the project of publicity. Viewers may be episodic or distracted and neither interested in nor able to see full proceedings, nor to understand and accurately put their knowledge into the public stream of information. Further, while one set of problems stems from getting an audience and sustaining its attention, others relate to getting attention of the wrong kind. Yet, through litigation (as well as other modalities), authority is relocated. Whether the results are distributionally, morally, and politically desirable depends on views about the underlying social norms interacting with the conflicts put before the public through court processes.

Whatever the outcomes, the public and the immediate participants can see that law varies by contexts, decisionmakers, litigants, and facts, and they gain a chance to argue that the governing rules or their applications are wrong. Through democratic iterations—the backs-and-forths of courts, legislatures, media, public and private actors, and their audiences—norms can be reconfigured. But to insist on courts as vital facets of democratic functioning is also to acknowledge that, like the democratic output of the legislative and executive branches, adjudication does not always yield wise or just results. What it offers are opportunities for democratic norms to be implemented through the millions of exchanges in courts among judges, audiences, and litigants. Courts are an important component of functioning democracies seeking to demonstrate legitimacy through per-

386 See Bentham, Rationale, supra note 315, at 356.
387 Schofield, supra note 372, at 310.
388 See Bentham, Rationale, supra note 315, at 354.
389 Id. at 356.
mitted disciplined exchanges among disputants, and thereby displaying the quality of governance.\textsuperscript{390}

Others, including the ALI drafters, have argued at length the utilities of the contract model, which prizes outcomes negotiated through private ordering as it assumes that efficiencies will result. Yet the ALI’s approach to aggregation embodies some market skepticism, stemming from an appreciation of imbalances in access and authority and intervening by generating power through group formation. A puzzle is thus presented by the ALI proposals, which are committed to aggregation and insistent on the need for judicial regulation of in-court aggregations. The ALI has generated an individualized system for clients to waive obligations of loyalty to become a group for settlement purposes. Further, the ALI provides no method for clients to obtain the benefits of aggregation in that very negotiation with their lawyers and no oversight by a judicial officer before agreements close.\textsuperscript{391} Moreover, despite the ALI’s understanding that aggregation is central to enabling access to courts, the postsettlement objector finding his or her way to court is not offered a means by which to aggregate such complaints nor able to use that challenge to permit (or require) reopening the agreement structured for the group of which the objector is a part.

The reason I began this Article by rehearsing a history of the development of the due process and contract models of procedure is to underscore that what courts do, who enters them, what due process entails, and what constitutes “fairness” are defined by social practices as well as by abstract political legal theory. The changing content of these norms makes their shape dependent on social and political expectations of governments’ relationship to the public and of interactions among members of polities. Conflicts over the process due to those detained in the wake of 9/11 or those put on “no fly” lists are


\textsuperscript{391} Burch, supportive of the ALI proposal, sees the structure as permitting claimants to “exchange settlement autonomy for collective representation” that begets “increased bargaining power.” Burch, supra note 22, at 539. But no such exchange is provided for clients to have such bargaining power against the lawyers proffering the arrangement.
but two of many examples in which the words “due process” are being defined and redefined. Fairness could entail entitlements to a measure of individuality, could entail ideas of hearings, could constrain judges not to deal with disputants ex parte, and could put them before the public—or not.

The questions on the table are whether the efforts of California and New York to shape a “civil Gideon,” insistent on equipping individuals to come to court, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Sturgell—with its fight about whether 1930s airplane specifications are to be kept secret—are themselves “vintage,” embodying the waning moments of due process obligations to scrutinize relationships among disputants and their lawyers as well as to insist on court access. Alternatively, the provisioning efforts of states and the regulatory impulse presented in Taylor may come to be seen as part of a resurgence of an interest in adjudication and in state-articulated rule of law requirements. (This is, after all, a moment in which governments are faulted for undersupervising large institutions, now spilling assets and oil.)

One other aspect of the interaction between the due process and contract models bears examining. To paint a picture that only puts settlement in tension with adjudication is not only to miss the interaction between the two but also to miss that claims for settlement made in the name of the public values of rights enforcement and distributive equity. It is not settlement that is problematic but the conditions under which it is reached and how it can be used after agreements are had. What the ALI has not fashioned in its proposed aggregate nonclass settlement rules are opportunities to bridge divides by creating procedures to accomplish what one of the nation’s most prominent practitioners of settlement, Ken Feinberg, has called the center of his work: “transparency, outreach, notice, and opportunity to be heard.” The nonclass aggregate settlements do not rely on

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these four facets Feinberg described as central to gaining legitimacy for the agreements he helps to shape.  

What will, fifty years hence, seem to be settled facets of what due process of law requires and what will be controversial and in need of special justifications? I have argued that we should be leery of assuming that what we think of as fixtures are deeply embedded and hence invulnerable. In 1850, fewer than forty federal judges worked at the trial level in the United States, and no building owned by the federal government had the sign “U.S. Courthouse” on its front door. By 2000, more than 1700 trial-level judges worked in more than 550 federal courthouse facilities.

That trend line seems to predict unending expansion. Indeed, in 1995, leaders of the federal judiciary undertook to make a Long Range Plan to deal with what they assumed was an unendingly mounting pile of federal cases. In that year, they predicted that more than 600,000 cases would, as of 2010, be pending. But the number of filings—both civil and criminal—over the last decade has been relatively flat. Aside from bankruptcy filings, the numbers have gone up and down a bit, but average around 325,000 filings—about which they did a decade ago. (Criminal cases run around 62,000 to 68,000, and in 2009, the number of cases rose somewhat.) The transformation in the role of the courts came during the same era in which the national postal system and the press were also expanding. More dramatic than

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395 See Table of Authorized Judgship, supra note 29.

396 Id.


the flattening numbers of filings in federal courts are the falling fortunes of post offices and newspapers.\textsuperscript{400}

Procedures, laws, and norms have great plasticity. Practices that seemed unimaginable only decades ago (from the mundane examples of the new reliance on court-based settlement programs to the stunning assertions by the U.S. government of the legitimacy of according little or no procedural rights to individuals at Guantánamo Bay) are now parts of the collective landscape. In the 1970s, consumers of goods and services and employees were not required to sign form contracts that imposed bars to bringing claims to court. In that era, those who did file federal lawsuits were not greeted by judges instructed in rules to implore litigants to explore alternatives to adjudication.\textsuperscript{401}

As currently formatted, the ALI’s aggregation procedures for non-court-based aggregate settlements do not insist on communicative obligations outside the circle of lawyers for claimants, respondents, and the clients on both sides. Such procedures undermine the discipline to be imposed on decisionmakers, be they lawyers or judges. But just as the reconfiguration of processes in courts to produce private settlements makes plain that court-based procedures are not necessarily public ones, one ought not assume that secrecy is an essential characteristic of various methods of resolution, now denominated ADR. Law can build in a place for the public (“sunshine,” to borrow the term that legislators have used\textsuperscript{402}) or wall off proceedings from the public.

Whatever the places constituted as authoritative, opportunities exist to engender or to preclude communal exchanges. Or, as Bentham put it:

Considered in itself, a room allotted to the reception of the evidence in question . . . is an instrument rather of privacy than of publicity; since, if performed in the open air . . . the number of persons capable of taking cognizance of it would bear no fixed limits.\textsuperscript{403}

The ALI has thus served us well in making plain that choices of the construction of adjudication and its alternatives are upon us.

\textsuperscript{400} These issues are explored in Resnik & Curtis, supra note 28.
\textsuperscript{401} See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, The Improvement of the Administration of Justice 78 (5th ed. 1991).
\textsuperscript{403} See Bentham, Rationale, supra note 315, at 354.