Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued two landmark decisions about the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. District of Columbia v. Heller rejected the notion that the Second Amendment protects only organized militia activities, and McDonald v. City of Chicago found that the right to keep and bear arms applies to state and local governments via incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. Those decisions left important questions unanswered. In particular, the Supreme Court declined to specify what level of scrutiny or test should be used to assess the validity of gun laws. Lower courts are now wrestling with that crucial issue. Examining the decisions made so far, this Article argues that the third phase of the fight over the right to keep and bear arms is moving toward an unusual result. The lower court decisions reflect the pragmatic sentiments of Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinions in Heller and McDonald. Frustrated by the predominantly historical approach and the puzzling categorizations suggested by Justice Scalia and the other members of the Heller and McDonald majorities, the lower courts have focused on contemporary public policy interests and applied a form of intermediate scrutiny that is highly deferential to legislative determinations and leads to all but the most drastic restrictions on guns being upheld. Justice Breyer thus stands poised to achieve an unexpected triumph despite having come out on the losing side of both of the Supreme Court’s recent clashes over the right to keep and bear arms.

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INTRODUCTION

History shows that one can lose significant battles but still win the war. The ancient Greeks suffered devastating losses at Thermopylae and Artemisium, but one year later they drove out the invading Persian forces.1 The Romans endured fifteen years of defeats after Hannibal lumbered across the Alps into Italy, yet they ultimately managed to force him to retreat.2 George Washington lost most of the major battles as commander of the Continental Army, but the Americans’ revolutionary efforts nevertheless succeeded in the end.3 World War II began badly for the British and French at Dunkirk and for the United States at Pearl Harbor and Kasserine Pass, but the Allies eventually prevailed.4 Defeats sometimes lay the groundwork for improbable future success.

In the realm of constitutional law, this phenomenon is now occurring in the context of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.5 That right has been the subject of intense legal conflict in recent years. After more than two centuries without ever striking down any law as violating the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court re-

3 RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 457 (2010).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
recently made two decisions hailed as landmark victories for gun rights.\(^6\) In *District of Columbia v. Heller*,\(^7\) the Court struck down several laws that severely restricted ownership and use of guns in the Nation’s capital, including a provision that essentially banned possession of handguns.\(^8\) Rejecting the notion that the Second Amendment applies only to activities of organized state militias, the Court concluded that the Amendment instead extends more broadly to the use of guns for other purposes, such as defending one’s “hearth and home” from criminals.\(^9\) Two years later, in *McDonald v. City of Chicago*,\(^10\) the Court found that Chicago’s handgun ban was also unconstitutional because the right to keep and bear arms applies to state and local laws through the Fourteenth Amendment.\(^11\)

The *Heller* and *McDonald* decisions resolved important questions about the right to keep and bear arms, and at first blush they appeared to swing momentum decisively toward gun rights and away from gun control efforts. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s decisions left vital questions unanswered. In particular, the Court declined to specify exactly what test or type of analysis should be used to assess the constitutionality of the wide variety of legal restrictions imposed on guns.\(^12\) Rather than spelling out what level of constitutional scrutiny or other standard should be used, the Court left lower courts to grapple with this difficult but enormously important issue.

Lower court judges across the country have now had several years to begin the task of assembling the “plumbing” of the right to keep and bear arms,\(^13\) deciding what sort of analysis should be used and applying that analysis to determine which laws can withstand con-


\(^8\) Id. at 574–75, 635.

\(^9\) Id. at 635.

\(^10\) McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).

\(^11\) Id. at 3050.

\(^12\) *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (acknowledging that the Court did not specify a level of scrutiny for Second Amendment claims and left many issues unresolved regarding the application of the right).

stitutional attack. The work has not been quick or easy. Without clear or complete guidance from the Supreme Court, lower court judges have proposed an array of different approaches and formulations, producing a “morass of conflicting lower court opinions” regarding the proper analysis to apply.

Although the Supreme Court’s rulings in *Heller* and *McDonald* naturally garnered enormous attention, this third battle, playing out in the lower courts, ultimately is of even greater importance. It is in the application of these rulings that “the Second Amendment rubber meets the road” and the actual impact of these constitutional issues on Americans’ lives will be determined.

Examining the stream of decisions made thus far by the lower courts, this Article describes the problems that courts have encountered, the varying approaches that courts have taken, and the direction in which the judicial consensus seems to be heading. The courts generally have been very cautious and practical in handling the important issues facing them. While trying to follow the Supreme Court’s lead, they have not mimicked its approach. Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in *Heller* heavily emphasized historical investigation of the original meaning and traditional understandings of the right to keep and bear arms. Justice Scalia also viewed the right in categorical terms, suggesting that courts should try to clearly demarcate the types of guns, people, and activities protected rather than letting analysis degenerate into a more subjective and volatile “interest-balancing inquiry” that would empower judges to let their personal predilections dictate decisions. The lower courts, frustrated by the indeterminacy of historical inquiry and puzzled by the categorizations suggested by Justice Scalia, have steered in other directions. They have effectively

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14 Id. (“What exactly will the doctrine look like? What kinds of regulations will be unconstitutional? Which guns? Which people? Which situations?”).


16 United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring); see also Adam Winkler, *Heller’s Catch-22*, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1560 (2009).

17 See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 576–619; see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. *Heller and Originalism*, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 923, 924 (2009) (“[T]he opinions in *Heller* represent the most important and extensive debate on the role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation among the members of the contemporary Supreme Court.”).

embraced the sort of interest-balancing approach that Justice Scalia condemned, adopting an intermediate scrutiny test and applying it in a way that is highly deferential to legislative determinations and that leads to all but the most drastic restrictions on guns being upheld.

Indeed, this Article contends that the Supreme Court’s revival of interest in the right to keep and bear arms may ultimately have a surprising outcome. The lower courts’ duty, of course, is to implement the rulings made by the majority of the Supreme Court. But in this instance, the lower courts’ decisions strongly reflect the pragmatic spirit of the dissenting opinions that Justice Stephen Breyer wrote in *Heller* and *McDonald*. Justice Breyer warned that the search for historical, logical, and conceptual answers to difficult Second Amendment questions would prove to be futile, and he urged courts to read and apply the Constitution in ways that respect legislative judgments rather than obstructing the search for practical solutions to difficult problems. Thus far, Justice Breyer’s approach appears headed for an unexpected triumph in the third battle over the Second Amendment now being waged in the courts.

Part I of this Article reviews the first major fight over the right to keep and bear arms, which the Supreme Court resolved in *Heller* by deciding that the Second Amendment’s protection extends beyond militia activities. In particular, this part of the Article looks carefully at the aspects of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in *Heller* that were oddly enigmatic but would become highly important for lower courts trying to implement the Court’s decision. This part of the Article also explains the alternative approach to gun rights put forward by Justice Breyer in his *Heller* dissent. Part II looks at the second skirmish in this constitutional conflict, describing the Supreme Court’s resolution of the incorporation issue in *McDonald* and the aspects of that decision that supply additional clues to the lower courts. Part III turns to the lower court decisions. Reviewing each of the key issues with which the courts have been struggling, the Article argues that a consensus has begun to emerge among lower court judges about how to handle government actions allegedly infringing on the right to keep

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and bear arms. The courts have generally encountered difficulties with the more historically oriented and rigidly categorical modes of decisionmaking exemplified by Justice Scalia’s opinion in *Heller*. They have steered away from those approaches and toward a more pragmatic consideration of contemporary public policy considerations, with a strong dose of deference to legislative determinations about complex empirical issues. That approach is much like the analysis that Justice Breyer encouraged in his *Heller* and *McDonald* dissents.

Part IV argues that the lower courts’ handling of these matters has significant virtues no matter what one thinks about the ideal extent of regulation of firearms. The lower courts have essentially made judicial restraint their guiding principle. That is a prudent course of action under the circumstances, particularly given the lack of clear instructions from the Supreme Court, the dramatic variation in the roles that guns play in urban and rural environments, the tremendous political power that gun owners possess, and the perils of having judges step well beyond their expertise to undertake a dramatic revamping of the complex array of laws affecting firearms throughout the Nation.

I. THE FIRST BATTLE: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

For most of the twentieth century, the meaning of the Second Amendment seemed well settled. Courts consistently read it as guaranteeing a right to have and use guns only for purposes of organized state militia activity. A trickle of law review articles began to question that view, suggesting that the right instead should apply more broadly to other uses of guns, such as self-defense and hunting. The trickle turned into a large outpouring of scholarly literature on both sides of the question. Courts eventually began to take notice, and a circuit split soon emerged on the issue.

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22 See Banner, supra note 13, at 898–99 (describing how the Second Amendment became the focus of substantial academic attention).

23 See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Second Amendment guarantees the people’s collective right to maintain effective state militias but not an individual right to own or possess guns), abrogated by United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 294 (2010); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260
In 2008, the Supreme Court’s decision in *Heller* resolved this basic question about the Second Amendment’s scope. The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, concluded that the Amendment’s text plainly guaranteed a right to individuals and not just to state militias.24 Indeed, Justice Scalia determined that individuals’ lawful use of guns for self-defense was the “central component”25 or “core” purpose of the right.26 The Amendment’s prefatory clause about a “well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,”27 did not narrow the scope of the right; instead, it merely explained a key reason for the right’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights.28 Justice Scalia bolstered his interpretation with historical evidence from before and after the Second Amendment’s ratification supporting his broad reading of the provision’s scope.29 He made clear from the outset that he perceived his mission to be determining what the Second Amendment meant to ordinary Americans at the time of its adoption.30 The opinion, with its intensely historical perspective, has been hailed by some as a “triumph for originalism.”31

A voluminous amount of commentary has already been written about whether Justice Scalia correctly interpreted the Second Amendment as reaching broadly beyond organized militia activities.32 Although the purpose of this Article is not to revisit that debate,33

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25 *Id.* at 599.
26 *Id.* at 630; see also *id.* at 635 (concluding that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
29 See, e.g., *id.* at 592–95, 605–19.
30 See *id.* at 576–77.
33 For my assessment of Justice Scalia’s opinion, see Allen Rostron, *Protecting Gun Rights*
careful examination of Justice Scalia’s opinion is nevertheless impor-
tant because of the light it sheds on the questions that courts are still
struggling to answer, including what level of scrutiny to apply to Sec-
ond Amendment claims. In this respect, several features of Justice
Scalia’s opinion stand out.

A. Law-Abiding, Responsible Citizens

While construing the Second Amendment broadly in some ways,
Justice Scalia’s opinion in *Heller* repeatedly emphasized the existence
of important limits on the right. “Of course the right was not unlim-
ited,” Justice Scalia explained, “just as the First Amendment’s right of
free speech was not.”34 Scalia went on to recognize specifically that
the Second Amendment should protect a right to use guns only for
lawful purposes. He explained that “we do not read the Second
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort
of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to pro-
tect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”35 Scalia instead
suggested that the right to keep and bear arms protects only the inter-
ests of “law-abiding, responsible citizens” who use guns to protect
their homes and families or for other lawful, socially beneficial pur-
poses.36 In short, the Second Amendment was not meant to assist
those who would use guns to commit crimes such as murders, assaults,
or robberies.

B. Arms in Common Use at the Time

Justice Scalia also indicated that the Second Amendment’s pro-
tection does not extend to all types of guns. Instead, the Amendment
merely guarantees a right to have the types of weapons commonly
used by Americans for lawful, nonmilitary purposes such as self-de-
defense.37 Scalia derived this limitation on the Second Amendment’s
reach from the Supreme Court’s cryptic 1939 decision in *United States
v. Miller*,38 where the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to an

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34 *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 595.
35 *Id.*; see also id. at 626 (noting that commentators and courts before the twentieth cen-
tury “routinely explained” that the right to keep and bear arms “was not a right to keep and
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose”).
36 *Id.* at 635; see also id. at 625 (concluding that the Second Amendment protects only
those guns commonly used “by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”).
37 *Id.* at 624–25, 627.
indictment charging two men with violating the federal restrictions on
possession of sawed-off or other short-barreled shotguns. 39 Although
Justice Scalia otherwise found Miller to be a “virtually unreasoned
case,” 40 he emphasized Miller’s observation that militia participants
ordinarily “were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by them-
selves and of the kind in common use at the time.” 41 Scalia thus af-
fermed Miller’s conclusion that “the Second Amendment does not
protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes.” 42 Citing Blackstone and a smattering of nine-
teenth-century treatises, cases, and other sources, Scalia concluded
that limiting the Second Amendment’s reach in this way was “fairly
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of
‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’ ” 43

Applying the “common use” requirement, Justice Scalia unequiv-
ocally found that handguns qualify for protection because they “are
the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the
home.” 44 On the other hand, Scalia hinted that short-barreled shot-
guns are not in common use today, just as they were not in common
use at the time of the Miller decision in 1939. 45 Moreover, Scalia sug-
gested that machine guns 46 are also outside the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protection because they are not in common use among
American civilians. 47 At the oral argument in the Heller case, Justice
Scalia stated even more clearly that he thinks machine guns are too
unusual to qualify for Second Amendment protection. 48 Even if more
than one hundred thousand Americans legally own machine guns,
they still represent only a small fraction of the Nation’s population,
and therefore Scalia believes those weapons are “quite unusual” and
too uncommon to receive the Second Amendment’s protection. 49

39 Id. at 183.
40 Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 n.24.
41 Id. at 624 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
42 Id. at 625.
43 Id. at 627.
44 Id. at 629.
45 Id. at 625.
46 A machine gun is any firearm capable of firing more than one shot with a single pull of
47 Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 (stating that it would be “startling” to interpret the Second
Amendment in a way that would render unconstitutional the federal statutory restrictions on
machine guns).
49 Id.
Many logical objections to Justice Scalia’s common use approach spring readily to mind. Although it makes good sense not to recognize a right to possess extraordinarily dangerous weapons, it is more difficult to see why a gun should fall outside the scope of the right to keep and bear arms merely because it is uncommon. If a weapon was widely used and originally understood to be within the scope of the right to keep and bear arms, why should it lose its constitutional protection merely because the number of its users dwindles over the years? In addition, Scalia’s approach gives governments an incentive to ban new types of weapons as soon as they appear, so that they never become common enough to receive constitutional protection. The common use requirement also means that the Second Amendment does not cover the potent and sophisticated military weaponry that would be necessary today to counter the greatest threats to the security of a free state. Justice Scalia recognized these objections in *Heller*, but shrugged them off, saying that the Court’s job is merely to read the Constitution and to apply the rights contained within it, not to rewrite the law to achieve more sensible results or to accommodate modern developments.50

C. The List of Presumptively Lawful Regulatory Measures

The Supreme Court’s decision in *Heller* thus imposed several important and relatively clear limitations on the Second Amendment’s scope, specifying that it would protect only law-abiding citizens’ rights to own and use common types of guns for lawful purposes. After that, Justice Scalia’s opinion took a somewhat mysterious turn. Reiterating that Blackstone and other early commentators saw the right to keep and bear arms as having some limits, just like other constitutional rights, Scalia noted that courts in the nineteenth century generally upheld laws banning the carrying of concealed guns in public places.51 Scalia followed that observation with a sentence that has received more attention than any other part of the *Heller* opinion:

Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government

51 *Id.* at 627.
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.52

The Court hastened to note that it provided this list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” merely to offer some examples, and that the list “does not purport to be exhaustive.”53 Indeed, later in the opinion, the Court specifically mentioned another example, saying that its analysis should not be read to “suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”54

Scalia’s decision to provide a list of presumptively lawful measures is perplexing for several reasons. The list is obviously dictum because none of the types of laws on the list was at issue in the *Heller* case, and therefore the Court’s statements about them were not necessary elements for analyzing the issues before the Court.55 Moreover, it seems quite odd that Scalia would want to offer even a tentative view about the validity of any types of laws without undertaking a historical analysis of them, given that the *Heller* opinion otherwise emphasizes so strongly the need for constitutional decisionmaking to be supported by detailed historical analysis of original understandings and traditional interpretations.

Some have speculated that the list of presumptively lawful regulations was not Justice Scalia’s idea, and that he included it in the opinion only because one of the other Justices on the majority side of the case, such as Justice Anthony Kennedy, demanded it.56 In other words, including the list of presumptively lawful measures may have been a price that Justice Scalia had to pay in order to have his opinion speak for a united majority of five Justices rather than a mere plurality of four. Whether or not that sort of speculation is accurate, the fact remains that the list is in the opinion, and so it is something with which the lower courts must grapple as they try to decide how to implement the constitutional right addressed in *Heller*.57

52 *Id.* at 626–27.
53 *Id.* at 627 n.26.
54 *Id.* at 632.
56 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 419, 420 (2009) (claiming that these parts of the *Heller* opinion are “transparent add-ons” that “were clearly tacked on to the opinion to secure a fifth vote (presumably Justice Anthony Kennedy’s”).
57 Cf. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1343, 1345 (2009) (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is presented as a reasoned interpretation of the law by a court, not as a political compromise, and I will leave others to speculate about logrolling and secret deals.”).
The problem, however, is that Scalia’s opinion does not give lower courts any clear guidance about what to do with the list of presumptively lawful measures. The opinion does not spell out exactly why certain types of laws, and not others, make the list. As a result, “[e]xactly why these regulations are ‘presumptively lawful’ is obscure, as is what might be sufficient to overcome the presumption.”

The passage containing the list could be read as intended to have no effect on future adjudication of Second Amendment claims. For example, the list might be seen as nothing more than a reminder that the Court was not deciding anything, one way or the other, about the validity of the listed measures. But if that is all the Court meant to say, it did a very poor job of making the point. The Court could have simply inserted a footnote saying something along the lines of “we of course do not decide today any issues not presented in the case before us.”

At the other extreme, the Court’s opinion could be read as definitively establishing the constitutionality of the listed measures. In other words, the Court refers to the list as containing “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” but some presumptions are conclusive or irrebuttable. That reading of the passage draws support from the Court’s statement that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt” on any of the listed measures. After all, a Second Amendment claim would be in deep trouble if there truly was nothing to support it in the most important Second Amendment ruling ever made by the Supreme Court.

Of course, one could also read the Heller list of presumptively lawful regulations in a variety of ways that fall somewhere in between the weakest and strongest meanings that could be assigned to it. Perhaps the list essentially serves as a vague but helpful hint to lower courts about what to do and as a form of foreshadowing to the public about what to expect. Lower courts will need to assess the constitutionality of measures that fall within the list’s parameters rather than simply taking for granted that the listed types of laws are valid. But in embarking on that task, the lower courts should bear in mind that the

58 Tushnet, supra note 56, at 420 (footnote omitted).
60 See James J. Duane, The Constitutionality of Irrebuttable Presumptions, 19 Regent U. L. Rev. 149, 157 (2006) (“There is nothing unconstitutional, illegal, or even un-American about irrebuttable presumptions. They have always abounded in our law.”).
61 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see, e.g., People v. Delacy, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 223–24 (Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that Heller’s language unambiguously requires courts to uphold all types of laws on the list of presumptively valid regulations), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1092 (2012).
types of laws on the list are the sorts of measures likely to pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court thus might have simply felt it was wise to give the lower courts a nudge in the right direction, lest any judges get the wrong idea and rush off too rashly to invalidate a broad swath of gun laws.

If the presumption of validity is not conclusive, that leads to significant questions about what exactly the lower courts should be looking for in analyzing the constitutionality of laws that fall within the presumptively lawful categories. *Heller* does not clearly say, but it strongly hints that the analysis should be deeply historical in nature. Again, the list of presumptively lawful measures comes at the end of a paragraph describing what Blackstone and other early commentators had to say about limits on the right to keep and bear arms, as well as noting how nineteenth-century courts upheld laws banning the carrying of concealed weapons.62 Continuing to emphasize history, the Court uses the word “longstanding” to describe the types of laws on the list of presumptively lawful regulations.63 Scalia did not specify what it takes for a law to qualify as longstanding.64 But despite such ambiguities, the inclusion of the word “longstanding” in that passage seems deliberate and important given the opinion’s persistent focus on historical sources and traditions as primary elements of constitutional interpretation.

Perhaps the most illuminating clue that Scalia offers about all of this comes later in the opinion, when he responds to the dissenting Justices’ criticism of the puzzling nature of the list of presumptively lawful regulatory measures. Scalia promises that “there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.”65 Scalia thus seems to indicate that the types of laws on the list are not entirely immune from constitutional attack. Instead, he anticipates that there might well be plausible challenges made to them, some of which may ultimately reach the Supreme Court. And according to

62 *See supra* note 51 and accompanying text.

63 *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626.

64 *Id.* The wording of Justice Scalia’s opinion in *Heller* was a little ambiguous as to whether “longstanding” described only the laws concerning felons and the mentally ill, or whether that word also applied to laws forbidding guns in sensitive places and laws regulating commercial sale of arms. But Justice Alito’s opinion in *McDonald* seems to assume that “longstanding” describes every category of laws on the list, not just prohibitions on guns for felons and the mentally ill. *See McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (plurality opinion).

65 *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635.
Scalia, the Supreme Court will apply a historical analysis to determine the validity of the challenged laws in those cases.66

D. Declining to Specify the Level of Scrutiny or Other Test Applicable to Second Amendment Claims

As for gun laws falling outside the list of presumptively lawful regulations, the *Heller* opinion was equally enigmatic on the basic question of how courts should decide what restrictions on guns violate the right to keep and bear arms. The Court did make one thing clear: Second Amendment claims cannot be subject to mere rational basis scrutiny.67 Other constitutional principles, such as equal protection and due process, already require that all government actions must have a rational basis.68 If the Second Amendment merely required that gun laws pass the same rational basis hurdle, it would be a redundant and pointless provision.69

The Court thus signaled that something more demanding than rational basis scrutiny should apply, but declined to specify exactly whether strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or some other standard should be used. An explanation for the Court’s failure to identify a particular test for Second Amendment claims may be found in comments made by Chief Justice John Roberts during oral argument in *Heller*. When the U.S. Solicitor General suggested that the Court should apply intermediate scrutiny rather than a strict scrutiny test so as not to jeopardize too many important gun laws, Roberts questioned the need to assign the Second Amendment to any of the tiers of the conventional framework for constitutional analysis:

Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are proposed, “compelling interest,” “significant interest,” “narrowly tailored,” none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder why in this case we have to articulate an all-encompassing standard. Isn’t it enough to determine the scope of the existing right that the amendment refers to, look at the various regulations that were available at the time, including you can’t take the gun to the marketplace and all that, and determine how these—how this restriction and the scope of this right looks in relation to those?

I’m not sure why we have to articulate some very intricate standard. I mean, these standards that apply in the First

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66 See generally id.
67 Id. at 628 n.27.
68 Id.
69 Id.
Amendment just kind of developed over the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked up. But I don’t know why when we are starting afresh, we would try to articulate a whole standard that would apply in every case?[^70]

Consistent with Chief Justice Roberts’s skepticism about applying a traditional standard of review, the Supreme Court in *Heller* opted to refrain from establishing a formulaic test for Second Amendment claims. The Court first addressed the scope of the right, concluding that it extended beyond the activities of organized state militias and finding that defense of the home against criminal attackers is at the core of the right.[^71] The Court looked at various regulations of guns that existed at the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption, such as a law that prohibited having loaded firearms within buildings in Boston and laws in other cities that restricted the storage of gunpowder in homes or prohibited the firing of guns within city limits.[^72] And in the decisive part of the analysis, the Court compared the District of Columbia’s restrictions on guns to the historical evidence about the original scope of the right to keep and bear arms and traditional understandings of that right and its limitations.[^73]

Finding that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban,” the Court concluded that prohibiting the “quintessential self-defense weapon” impermissibly infringed on the ability of citizens to defend themselves in their homes.[^74] Likewise, the District’s requirement that firearms in the home be kept unloaded and disassembled or locked would make it “impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.”[^75] Regardless of any purposes or benefits that these laws might have, they failed “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional


[^71] See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 628 (concluding that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right”); *id.* at 630 (describing self-defense as the right’s “core lawful purpose”); *id.* at 635 (finding that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”).

[^72] *Id.* at 631–34. Not strictly limiting itself to evidence predating the Second Amendment’s adoption in 1791, the Court bolstered its assessment of the traditional meaning of the right to keep and bear arms with citations to nineteenth-century state court decisions striking down laws that prohibited open (i.e., nonconcealed) carrying of pistols. *Id.* at 629 (citing Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 187 (1871)).


[^74] *Id.* at 629.

[^75] *Id.* at 630.
rights.”

The Court thus had no need to wade into fine distinctions among various forms of intermediate or strict scrutiny, let alone get bogged down in complex debates about the effects of and interests served by the District’s guns laws, because the provisions at issue simply infringed far too much on the basic concept of self-defense that the Court found enshrined within the Second Amendment.

E. Justice Breyer’s Dissent

The four Justices unconvinced by Scalia’s reasoning generated a pair of dissenting opinions. Squarely disagreeing with the entire premise of the majority’s position, Justice John Paul Stevens disputed the conclusion that the Second Amendment protects anything other than organized militia activities. Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent, on the other hand, focused on the application of the right to keep and bear arms rather than its scope. In other words, assuming for the sake of argument that the Second Amendment does protect a right to use guns for personal self-defense, Justice Breyer argued that the District of Columbia’s laws nevertheless should be upheld as reasonable and appropriate regulations of that right.

In contrast to the more historical and theoretical bent of Scalia’s analysis, Breyer’s dissent took a pragmatic approach. Although Breyer talked about historical evidence, particularly gun laws that existed in Boston and other major American cities during the Founding era, he emphasized that historical evidence about the scope of the right to keep and bear arms merely provided “the beginning, rather than the end, of any constitutional inquiry.” To decide whether a particular restriction on use of guns should be upheld “requires us to focus on practicalities, the statute’s rationale, the problems that called it into being, its relation to those objectives—in a word, the details.”

In Breyer’s view, there can be “no purely logical or conceptual answers to such questions.” Instead, the analysis inevitably must boil down to an “interest-balancing inquiry,” weighing the risks and bene-

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76 Id. at 628.
77 See id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated militia” and does not limit legislative authority to regulate private uses of firearms such as for hunting or personal self-defense).
78 Id. at 681–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 681.
80 Id. at 683–86.
81 Id. at 687.
82 Id.
83 Id.
fits at stake on each side of the controversy. A legal restriction may reduce criminal or accidental misuse of guns, but it also may interfere with beneficial use of guns for self-defense or other legitimate purposes. Do the potential benefits of a challenged regulation outweigh the potential costs?

Breyer argued that because “any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry,” the Court should simply go ahead and explicitly establish an interest-balancing test for Second Amendment claims. Breyer recognized that such a test would naturally take into account the degree of the burden that a challenged law imposed on those wanting guns for lawful reasons, as well as the availability of alternative ways that the government might pursue its safety interests while interfering less with legitimate uses of guns. The ultimate question would be whether a law “imposes burdens that, when viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate objectives, are disproportionate.”

Breyer added one crucial caveat to his proposed approach. “In applying this kind of standard,” Breyer observed, “the Court normally defers to a legislature’s empirical judgment in matters where a legislature is likely to have greater expertise and greater institutional factfinding capacity.” In other words, Breyer would not require governments to present detailed, absolute proof that a challenged law’s benefits outweigh its detrimental effects. Instead, Breyer would have judges merely inquire as to whether the legislature’s judgments were reasonably based on substantial evidence. Where different conclusions could be drawn from the statistical data and other information available, and experts disagree about the likely net effect of a gun regulation, courts should respect legislators’ “primary responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact.”

Turning to the specific laws at issue in the *Heller* case, Breyer emphasized that the District of Columbia is an urban territory with high crime rates and a particularly acute problem with handgun violence. Although reasonable minds could certainly disagree about whether the District’s tight gun control laws alleviated or exacerbated

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84 *Id.* at 689.
85 *Id.*
86 *Id.* at 689–90, 693.
87 *Id.* at 693.
88 *Id.* at 690.
89 *Id.* at 702, 704.
90 *Id.* at 704.
91 *Id.* at 681–82, 714.
that problem, Breyer would defer to elected officials’ choices about what to do.\textsuperscript{92}

Justice Scalia unequivocally denounced Breyer’s interest-balancing approach as a “judge-empowering” maneuver that could rob the Second Amendment of any real meaning or effect.\textsuperscript{93} In Scalia’s view, laws infringing the core right established by the Second Amendment cannot be tolerated even if every legislator and judge in the country wholeheartedly agrees that such laws would have significant positive social effects.\textsuperscript{94} The constitutional protection of a right to keep and bear arms “takes certain policy choices off the table,” regardless of what virtues those policy choices might be expected to have.\textsuperscript{95}

Scalia and Breyer thus offered two fundamentally different, competing visions of how courts should look at Second Amendment claims. Breyer endorsed a highly pragmatic approach focused on assessing gun control laws from a contemporary public policy perspective, but with a potent dose of judicial restraint and a correspondingly strong tilt toward upholding legislative determinations supported by any reasonable amount of information and plausible reasoning. At one point, Breyer argued that “practical wisdom” supported his position,\textsuperscript{96} and that phrase is a tidy encapsulation of the overall tenor of his opinion. He essentially trusts that legislators will try to make sensible policy decisions about guns, and he advises judges to be cautious, pragmatic, and open-minded about respecting those legislative decisions. By contrast, Scalia does not think that judges or politicians have any business deciding what is wise with respect to matters already resolved by the Constitution. Although Scalia’s opinion in \textit{Heller} never precisely articulates the framework for analysis that lower courts should use in future cases, Scalia makes clear that the analysis should be primarily historical in nature. For Scalia, the original meaning of the right and the traditional understandings that surrounded it in early U.S. history cannot be trumped by the whims of contemporary cost-benefit policy analysis.

As Justice William Brennan reportedly quipped, “[T]he first rule of the Supreme Court is that you have to be able to count to five.”\textsuperscript{97} Scalia, not Breyer, was able to garner five votes in \textit{Heller}, and thus a

\textsuperscript{92} See id. at 719.
\textsuperscript{93} Id. at 634–35 (majority opinion).
\textsuperscript{94} Id.
\textsuperscript{95} Id. at 636.
\textsuperscript{96} Id. at 691 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{97} Abner Mikva, \textit{The Scope of Equal Protection}, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 8.
significant initial dispute about the Second Amendment was resolved. For the first time, Supreme Court precedent clearly established that Americans have a constitutional right to own and use guns that extends broadly beyond militia activities. Not surprisingly, the Court’s decision drew a mixture of responses. As one newspaper aptly summarized, “The reaction broke less along party lines than along the divide between cities wracked with gun violence and rural areas where gun ownership is embedded in daily life.”

Gun rights advocates naturally lavished praise upon Scalia’s decision. For example, Professor Randy Barnett described Scalia’s opinion as “historic in its implications and exemplary in its reasoning,” calling it “the clearest, most careful interpretation of the meaning of the Constitution ever to be adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court” and predicting that it would be “studied by law professors and students for years to come.”

Texas lawyer David Schenck, who filed an amicus brief in the *Heller* case, had a similarly spirited but pithier response: “‘Hallelujah. Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition.’”

II. THE SECOND BATTLE: *MCDOUGALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO*

While putting to rest some questions about the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court’s decision in *Heller* left other important issues unresolved. One of the most significant was whether state and local government actions could violate the right to keep and bear arms. The Second Amendment, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, applies only to the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, applies to state and local governments and prohibits them from depriving people of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In a series of decisions starting in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court decided that most rights secured against federal infringement by the Bill of Rights are so fundamentally important that they are part of what it means to receive due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The result is that

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98 Chad Livengood, *Court Affirms Gun Rights*, *Springfield News-Leader* (Mo.), June 27, 2008, at 1A.


100 Todd J. Gillman, *Rejection of Ban Triggers New Debate*, *Dallas Morning News*, June 27, 2008, at 1A (quoting David Schenck, who filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Texas State Rifle Association and sister groups in forty-two other states).


102 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
important provisions of the Bill of Rights wind up being “incorporated” through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and thereby restrain the actions of state and local governments as well as the federal government.\(^{103}\)

_Heller_ involved laws of the District of Columbia, which is a special federal territory and not a state, so the Court did not need to make a decision about incorporation in that case.\(^{104}\) But lower courts would immediately face the incorporation question, as litigants around the country began to challenge state and local gun restrictions. Indeed, within fifteen minutes of the Supreme Court’s announcement of the _Heller_ ruling, the Illinois Rifle Association had filed a lawsuit challenging the City of Chicago’s handgun ban,\(^{105}\) and the National Rifle Association followed up with a similar suit of its own the next day.\(^{106}\)

The incorporation issue took a few years to wind its way through the lower courts, but it eventually reached the Supreme Court in 2010 in _McDonald v. City of Chicago_. The Court split 5–4, just as in _Heller_,\(^{107}\) and once again the majority expanded gun rights.\(^{108}\) The five Justices on the prevailing side could not completely agree on the rationale for their result. Never afraid to question seemingly well-settled constitutional doctrine,\(^{109}\) Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Court should rethink its incorporation jurisprudence, recognize that it had been using the wrong part of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate rights, and hold that the right to keep and bear arms enjoys

\(^{103}\) See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.2 (6th ed. 2000) (explaining the controversies surrounding incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment).

\(^{104}\) District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620 n.23 (2008) (noting that incorporation of the right to keep and bear arms was “a question not presented by th[e] case”).

\(^{105}\) CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast June 26, 2008).


\(^{107}\) One change in the Supreme Court’s lineup had taken place between the _Heller_ and _McDonald_ decisions, with Sonia Sotomayor replacing David Souter, but that switch did not affect the results because both voted with the liberal or gun control side of these issues. See _Heller_, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also _McDonald v. City of Chicago_, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the story of how the incorporation issue affected Sotomayor’s journey to the Supreme Court, see Allen Rostron, _The Past and Future Role of the Second Amendment and Gun Control in Fights over Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees_, 3 NE. U. L.J. 123, 148–63 (2011).

\(^{108}\) _McDonald_, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (Alito, J., opinion of the Court).

\(^{109}\) See KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS 281–82 (2004) (quoting Antonin Scalia as saying that Clarence Thomas “does not believe in stare decisis, period. If a constitutional line of authority is wrong, he would say let’s get it right” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
protection through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause. The other four Justices on the majority side, led by Justice Samuel Alito, preferred to stick with the conventional route of incorporating through the Due Process Clause. Again undertaking an in-depth exploration of American history, this time focusing on the post–Civil War era, Alito’s opinion concluded that those who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment considered the right to keep and bear arms to be fundamentally important to American liberty. Despite their differing views about the proper mechanism of incorporation, the bottom line was that once again a slim majority of the Supreme Court had resolved a major question about the right to keep and bear arms, concluding that the right applied fully to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment just as it binds the federal government through the Second Amendment.

Indeed, the *McDonald* decision made it very clear that the right would be exactly the same whether applied directly under the Second Amendment or via incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. For many years, one of the controversies surrounding incorporation was whether an incorporated right must be treated exactly the same—in other words, given the same scope, the same strength, the same rules and requirements, the same exceptions, and so on—when it applies to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment rather than to the federal government through the Bill of Rights. Some Justices argued that rights can be tailored in various ways and need not be applied in identical form to different levels of government, while others insisted that a right must mean the same thing in every instance regardless of whether it applies through incorporation. The Supreme Court eventually drifted toward the latter view, sometimes described as the “jot-for-jot” or “one-size-fits-all” approach, declaring that it would be “incongruous to have dif-

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100 *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3058–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
101 *Id.* at 3030–31 (plurality opinion).
102 *Id.* at 3036–42 (Alito, J., opinion of the Court).
103 *Id.* at 3026.
105 See *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 (citing examples).
107 Rosen, supra note 114, at 1516.
ferent standards” apply depending on which level of government infringed a right.\footnote{Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).} Debate about the matter nonetheless persisted.\footnote{See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52–53 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 181 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Rosen, supra note 114, at 1562–80 (discussing contemporary constitutional cases, including some majority opinions, reflecting a willingness to tailor constitutional rights for application to different levels of government).}

In McDonald, Alito took the opportunity to emphatically slam the door on any notion that analysis of the right to keep and bear arms might differ depending on whether a case involved a federal, state, or local government action. Alito read the Supreme Court’s past decisions as “decisively”\footnote{McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035.} creating a “well-established rule that incorporated Bill of Rights protections apply identically to the States and the Federal Government”\footnote{Id. at 3035 n.14.} and rejecting “the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”\footnote{Id. at 3047 (plurality opinion) (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10–11) (internal quotation marks omitted).}

The Supreme Court in McDonald thus made clear that a single, uniform method of analysis will apply to gun laws at the federal, state, and local levels. But once again, the Court failed to explain clearly what that method of analysis should entail. Alito’s analysis of the incorporation question was primarily historical in nature,\footnote{See supra note 112 and accompanying text.} just like most of Scalia’s analysis in Heller had been. Alito also pointed back to Heller’s intriguing passage about specified types of longstanding regulatory measures being presumptively constitutional, saying “[w]e repeat those assurances here.”\footnote{McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008)); see supra Part I.C.} Chicago’s “doomsday proclama-
tions” were misguided, Alito promised, because “incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”\footnote{McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.} But the Court shed no new light on exactly how judges should go about sorting valid gun laws from invalid ones. The Court, for example, did not talk about levels of scrutiny or other forms of assessment that might be used to apply the newly invigorated right to keep and bear arms.

Justice Breyer’s dissent in McDonald echoed themes from his Heller dissent. History alone, he argued, is not a sound basis for con-
stitutional decisionmaking.126 Judges instead must “consider the basic values that underlie a constitutional provision and their contemporary significance” as well as “the relevant consequences and practical justifications that might” warrant striking down or upholding a gun law.127 In other words, judges inevitably must approach gun rights claims as matters of contemporary public policy, not just history, and weigh the interests in personal safety and public safety at stake on each side. Breyer suggested again that in balancing these interests, courts generally should defer greatly to legislative determinations about the risks and benefits of various approaches to regulating guns.128 Determining the effect of any particular gun law presents complex empirical questions that legislatures are better equipped than courts to handle.129 Again, Breyer essentially counsels pragmatism in McDonald, urging that judges be attentive to the real consequences of different policy choices about guns but deferential to reasonable legislative assessments.130 And just as in Heller, the Justices on the prevailing side of the case flatly denied that Breyer’s brand of interest balancing should have any role in adjudication of gun rights issues.131

III. THE THIRD BATTLE: APPLYING THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IN THE LOWER COURTS

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald opened the way to a steady stream of litigation in lower courts about the right to keep and bear arms. The development and refinement of this area of law is of course likely to continue for many years, but an ample body of decisions already exists. In some areas, the lower courts have achieved strong consensus. In others, uncertainty still reigns, but strong indications have nonetheless emerged about the directions in which the courts seem likely to proceed.

A. Law-Abiding, Responsible Citizens

Even within a complex and evolving field like constitutional law, some questions are easy to answer. Lower courts have faced little difficulty in applying the Supreme Court’s instruction that the right to keep and bear arms should protect only those seeking to use guns for

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126 See id. at 3122 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127 Id.
128 See id. at 3135–36 (explaining how most state courts have long taken a “highly deferential attitude towards legislative determinations” about guns).
129 Id. at 3126–28.
130 See id. at 3126–27.
131 Id. at 3047, 3050 (plurality opinion).
legitimate, lawful purposes, not those who would arm themselves to commit dangerous crimes. For example, courts have flatly rejected challenges to convictions under laws prohibiting the use of firearms in furtherance of violent crimes or drug trafficking offenses. Rejecting the argument of a defendant who claimed a right to protect himself while distributing cocaine and other illegal drugs out of his home, one opinion observed that “[t]he Constitution does not give anyone the right to be armed while committing a felony, or even to have guns in the next room for emergency use should suppliers, customers, or the police threaten a dealer’s stash.” Courts have likewise consistently rejected challenges to statutes providing stiffer punishment for crimes committed with firearms. These sentencing enhancement provisions do not in any way infringe on the rights of law-abiding citizens, and drawing this sort of categorical line to limit the scope of the Second Amendment makes good sense and has not sparked significant controversy.

B. Arms in Common Use at the Time

So far, lower courts also have had a fairly easy time implementing the Supreme Court’s determination that only guns currently in common use fall within the scope of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. Following Justice Scalia’s lead, courts have briskly re-


133 United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Rush, 635 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (rejecting the idea that the Second Amendment “allows a person to insert himself intentionally into dangerous and illegal activity” and then have his possession of a gun in conjunction with that activity treated with “kid gloves”).

134 United States v. Jacobson, 406 F. App’x 91, 93 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Goodlow, 389 F. App’x 961, 969 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. King, 333 F. App’x 92, 95–96 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Rhodes, 322 F. App’x 336, 343 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009).

135 Courts have also begun to wrestle with other potential limits on the scope of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. For example, several courts have concluded that although the Second Amendment protects those who seek to own and use guns, it does not apply to those who wish to sell guns. See United States v. Chafin, 423 F. App’x 342, 344 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding no authority “that remotely suggests that, at the time of its ratification, the Second Amendment was understood to protect an individual’s right to sell a firearm”); Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 3926029, at *21–22 (D. Mont. Aug. 31) (findings and recommendation of Magistrate Judge) (finding that the Second Amendment does not protect gun manufacturers or dealers), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 09-147-M-DMW-JCL, 2010 WL 3909431 (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 2010). Others have ruled that the right to keep and bear arms protects only U.S. citizens. See, e.g., United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010).

136 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008); see also supra Part I.B.
jected challenges to the laws that impose special restrictions on machine guns\footnote{See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.} and short-barreled shotguns.\footnote{See, e.g., Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2426 (2010); United States v. McCartney, 357 F. App’x 73, 76 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ross, 323 F. App’x 117, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008).} The opinions generally contain no real analysis or discussion of this point, and instead they simply assert that such weapons clearly are not in common use, as though this is a self-evident fact.\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, 376 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Artez, 290 F. App’x 203, 208 (10th Cir. 2008); Gilbert, 286 F. App’x at 386; see also United States v. Majid, No. 4:10cr303, 2010 WL 5129297, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 2010) (finding that short-barreled AR-15 rifles are not commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes).} Even if they are reaching the right conclusions, the courts’ failure to offer at least a bit more explanation for these conclusions is puzzling. Federal data suggest, for example, that there are about 400,000 legal machine guns in the hands of American civilians today,\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008).} and many people undoubtedly enjoy using them for recreational purposes.\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008).} Again, Justice Scalia suggested during the \textit{Heller} oral argument that “common use” means a much larger number, given the fact that America’s population exceeds 300 million people,\footnote{See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.} but a remark by one Justice during oral argument is obviously not a particularly solid basis for resolving a legal issue. Lower court judges may eventually provide a more thorough explanation for the conclusion that machine guns fall outside the Second Amendment’s scope, perhaps

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\footnote{See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.} \footnote{See, e.g., Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2426 (2010); United States v. McCartney, 357 F. App’x 73, 76 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ross, 323 F. App’x 117, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008).} \footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, 376 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Artez, 290 F. App’x 203, 208 (10th Cir. 2008); Gilbert, 286 F. App’x at 386; see also United States v. Majid, No. 4:10cr303, 2010 WL 5129297, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 2010) (finding that short-barreled AR-15 rifles are not commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes).} \footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008).} \footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008).} \footnote{See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.}

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\footnote{See, e.g., Ashley Lutz, \textit{Machine Gun Fun? Shoot Is ‘Stress Relief’ for Some, Anxiety Source for Others}, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), June 28, 2009, at B1.}
focusing on the fact that machine guns are not only unusual in a numerical sense but also unusually dangerous compared to other firearms.\textsuperscript{144} Assuming that 400,000 is insufficient, the question becomes how many guns of a certain type must be owned in order to establish common use. That should be an interesting and difficult issue for courts to answer at some point in the future, but so far they have not even scratched the surface of that question.\textsuperscript{145}

Courts also have shown little interest in examining the potential logical flaws in the common use requirement. For example, a plaintiff seeking to enjoin enforcement of the federal ban on armor-piercing ammunition insisted that rather than asking whether that type of ammunition is currently in common use for self-defense purposes, the court instead should consider whether it would be commonly used in the absence of the federal ban.\textsuperscript{146} This plaintiff had a reasonable point, for it is oddly circular reasoning to say that a law banning an item can justify itself because it prevents the item from being commonly used. The Fourth Circuit panel in that case nevertheless upheld the ban, presuming that the use of armor-piercing ammunition would not be common even without the ban “considering the great risk such ammunition poses to law enforcement officers.”\textsuperscript{147}

Other courts similarly have had little to say about the logic of the common use requirement because in the end, that requirement produces appealing results.\textsuperscript{148} Judges know that public safety would be unduly endangered if the Constitution guaranteed easy access to machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, armor-piercing ammunition, and the like. Following Justice Scalia’s lead, they invoke the common use requirement and make what is ultimately a contemporary public policy

\textsuperscript{144} Scalia referred to the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).

\textsuperscript{145} The D.C. Circuit has pointed out that courts need appropriate evidence to make decisions about what weapons are in common use. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), No. 10-7036, 2011 WL 4551558, at *13 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 2011) (finding that data in the record were sufficient to establish that semiautomatic rifles and large-capacity ammunition magazines are in common use in the United States today, but not to establish whether they are commonly used for self-defense or hunting).

\textsuperscript{146} See Kodak v. Holder, 342 F. App’x 907, 908–09 (4th Cir. 2009).

\textsuperscript{147} Id. at 909.

\textsuperscript{148} For example, the defendant in United States v. Hatfield, 376 F. App’x 706 (9th Cir. 2010), argued that he had a right to keep and bear a sawed-off shotgun because it “resembles a blunderbuss, a short-barreled, muzzle-loading firearm used around the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification.” Id. at 707. The court summarily rejected that argument because sawed-off shotguns are not typically possessed for lawful purposes today, regardless of how similar they may be to weapons popular two centuries ago. Id.
determination look as though it emerges from a historical limitation of the right’s scope.\textsuperscript{149}

\section*{C. \textit{The List of Presumptively Lawful Regulatory Measures}}

More difficult issues have arisen over what to do about challenges to the types of gun regulations characterized as “longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” by Justice Scalia’s opinion in \textit{Heller}.\textsuperscript{150} Although it has only been a few years since the \textit{Heller} decision, the lower courts’ attitudes toward such claims have already undergone substantial evolution. Much of the judicial discussion has concerned the federal statute that prohibits possession of guns by convicted felons.\textsuperscript{151} Although it still seems very likely that this law will escape constitutional attack unscathed, the issue has revealed that the lower courts simply do not really know what \textit{Heller} instructed them to do.

As soon as the \textit{Heller} decision was announced, the lower courts faced an onslaught of challenges to the felon-in-possession statute. Over and over, courts quickly brushed aside these claims by simply citing the passage from \textit{Heller} listing the presumptively lawful regulations.\textsuperscript{152} The question seemed that it might never receive greater attention until a Tenth Circuit judge, Timothy Tymkovich, objected to it being so cavalierly dismissed.\textsuperscript{153} Judge Tymkovich pointed out that it was not at all clear that banning felons from having guns was really a “longstanding” practice after all.\textsuperscript{154} New scholarly research published after the \textit{Heller} decision suggested that laws banning felons from hav-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} See Rostron, \textit{supra} note 33, at 390–91 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s creation of the common use requirement “sacrifice[d] logical consistency and faithful reading of precedent in order to construct an interpretation of the Second Amendment more in harmony with contemporary public opinion”).
\item \textsuperscript{150} See \textit{supra} Part I.C.
\item \textsuperscript{151} 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{152} See, e.g., United States v. Brye, 318 F. App’x 878, 880 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Frazier, 314 F. App’x 801, 807 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Irish, 285 F. App’x 326, 327 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts have reached the same conclusion about state laws prohibiting possession of guns by convicted felons. See, e.g., People v. Valdovinos, No. F054871, 2009 WL 446122, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2009); State v. Gatson, No. 284654, 2009 WL 2767199, at *5 n.4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2009). Courts have also rejected challenges to the federal law prohibiting possession of a gun by a person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); see, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 681 F. Supp. 2d 95, 103 (D. Me. 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{153} United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
\item \textsuperscript{154} \textit{Id.} at 1048.
\end{itemize}
ing guns were not enacted until the twentieth century, and therefore no such laws existed in America at the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption. Tymkovich rightly noted that upholding felon-in-possession convictions based on an erroneous historical understanding would be highly troubling given the overriding emphasis that Justice Scalia placed on historical analysis in *Heller*. If history is what truly matters most in constitutional interpretation, one’s historical analysis surely needs to be accurate. Despite his misgivings, Judge Tymkovich concluded that there was nothing he could do. In his view, the *Heller* list of presumptively lawful regulations was dictum, and perhaps misguided dictum, but it nevertheless bound lower courts. The Supreme Court had said that nothing in *Heller* cast doubt on the validity of laws disarming felons, and Tymkovich felt that he had to accept that and move on.

After Judge Tymkovich expressed his misgivings about relying on the *Heller* list of presumptively lawful regulations, other judges began to give the matter much more attention. Rather than simply assuming that the *Heller* list conclusively established the validity of laws banning felons from having guns, some courts looked more carefully at the extent of their obligation to follow dicta in Supreme Court opinions. Rather than broadly upholding felon-in-possession laws across the board, some courts began to emphasize more heavily the factual details of the cases before them, such as the nature of the felony convictions at issue, suggesting that distinctions might be drawn among various categories of felons. As a Seventh Circuit decision ex-

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156 *McCane*, 573 F.3d at 1048.

157 *Id.* at 1050.

158 *Id.* at 1047, 1050.

159 *Id.*


161 See, e.g., *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 172–73 (finding that *Heller* requires courts to “presume” that a felon gun dispossession law is valid, but implies that the presumption is rebuttable, and therefore facial challenges to the law must be rejected but as-applied challenges may proceed);
plained, Justice Scalia’s opinion in *Heller* “referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘presumptively lawful,’ which, by implication, means that there must exist the possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.”162 The Third Circuit hinted that perhaps a successful challenge could be brought by a felon “convicted of a minor, non-violent crime” or “whose crime of conviction is decades-old.”163

Some courts also began to explore further the historical justifications for excluding convicted felons from the Second Amendment’s protection.164 As soon as judges embarked on this quest to dig more deeply into history, they collided with the reality that history will not provide clear answers to these sorts of questions.165 Although Justice Scalia’s opinion in *Heller* characterized disarming felons as a long-standing tradition,166 federal law did not disqualify any felons from possessing firearms until 1938 and did not disqualify nonviolent felons until 1961.167 Of course, the power to disarm felons may have been available all along, even if Congress did not exercise it until the twentieth century. Looking back to earlier days, some researchers find that the original understanding of the Second Amendment was that only “virtuous” citizens would have the right to keep and bear arms, and felons did not qualify.168 Other studies find scant support for that

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162 *Williams*, 616 F.3d at 692 (quoting District of Columbia v. *Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008)).
163 *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 174.
164 *Id.* at 173–74; *Vongxay*, 594 F.3d at 1117–18.
165 *Vongxay*, 594 F.3d at 1118 (recognizing that “the historical question has not been definitively resolved”).
166 *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626.
167 *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 173.
conclusion. The scholarly research on the subject is therefore “inconclusive at best.”

The historical evidence simply is too easy to spin in either direction. Some judges have been impressed, for example, by the fact that Anti-Federalists at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in December 1787 proposed a constitutional amendment that would have created a right to keep and bear arms, expressly providing that “no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.” This purportedly confirms that the Founding generation did not view the common law right to keep and bear arms as protecting those likely to commit crimes. But of course, one can just as easily wonder why James Madison chose not to use the Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists’ language in the Second Amendment and speculate that if those who wrote and approved the Second Amendment meant to exclude criminals from the right to keep and bear arms, they would have said so.

With history providing no clear answers, courts ultimately decide what to do about these issues based on assessments about sound public policy for modern-day America. Federal law seeks “to keep firearms out of the hands of violent felons, who the government believes are often those most likely to misuse firearms,” and that is an unquestionably important goal. Statistics clearly show that convicted felons are more likely than the average person to commit violent crimes. Moreover, felony convictions often limit a person’s rights in other respects, such as voting, so the idea that felons might be unable to have guns does not seem odd or shocking.

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169 See supra note 155 (citing other sources on both sides of this debate).

170 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011); accord United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681–82 (4th Cir. 2010).


172 Barton, 633 F.3d at 173.


174 United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 805 (2010).

175 Barton, 633 F.3d at 175.

176 Id.
The U.S. government thus remains undefeated, so far, in overcoming Second Amendment challenges to the federal ban on gun possession by felons. Nevertheless, courts will continue to face the issue, and it is certainly conceivable that a narrow attack based on sympathetic facts could succeed, such as a claim asserted by a person who was convicted long ago for a nonviolent felony, who has become a model citizen, and who has a particularly pressing need to arm himself for self-defense.

Such an argument has already found success at the state constitutional level, albeit in a very limited way. In its 2009 decision in Britt v. State, the Supreme Court of North Carolina carved out a small exception to the state law banning felons from having guns. The court relied strictly on the North Carolina Constitution rather than invoking federal constitutional rights. The case involved Barney Britt, who pled guilty in 1979 to possessing drugs with the intent to sell. Several years after Britt completed his time in prison and probation, state laws restored his right to have firearms, enabling him to lawfully own guns from 1987 to 2004. Britt used his guns for hunting, on his own land, and he never caused trouble of any sort. In 2004, however, North Carolina’s legislature cracked down, enacting a new blanket prohibition of firearms possession by felons. After dutifully surrendering his guns to the local sheriff, Britt filed a lawsuit challenging the amended state law that retroactively disqualified him from continuing to own and use firearms for hunting. The Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that the state’s new law was unreasonable as applied to Britt, a person who had a single conviction for a nonviolent felony thirty years ago and who had subsequently demonstrated his responsible and law-abiding character by safely and lawfully possess-

177 See, e.g., United States v. Pruess, 416 F. App’x 274, 275 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (remanding for the district court to analyze the constitutionality of a federal felon gun ban as applied to a nonviolent felon).
179 Id. at 322. The North Carolina Constitution has a provision containing language identical to that of the U.S. Constitution’s Second Amendment. Compare N.C. Const. art. I, § 30, with U.S. Const. amend. II.
180 Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 321.
181 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006) (providing that federal law will not bar a convicted felon from possessing guns if the felon’s civil rights have been restored).
182 Id. at 322.
183 Id. at 321.
184 Id. at 322.
ing guns for seventeen years and then voluntarily turning them in to
the sheriff as soon as the law changed.\footnote{Id. at 322, 323.}

The Britt decision is the exception that proves the rule. Far from
broadly opening the door to constitutional challenges to gun regula-
tions, the North Carolina court created a narrow crevice just big
enough for an exceptionally sympathetic plaintiff to slip through.\footnote{Recognizing the narrowness of the court's holding, the North Carolina legislature re-
sponded to Britt by revising its laws to provide a means by which a person convicted of a single
nonviolent felony can petition a court to have gun rights restored after a twenty-year period of
Subsequent court decisions in North Carolina similarly confirm Britt's very limited impact. See
State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 404-05 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting constitutional claim
where convicted felon could not establish all of the factors that supported the ruling in Britt),
aff'd, 700 S.E.2d 215, 219 (N.C.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3428 (2010).}

Very few litigants challenging gun laws will ever be able to show that
they are similarly situated to Barney Britt.\footnote{For example, federal law has barred possession of guns by felons—even those convicted of a single nonviolent crime—since 1961. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. That was fifty years ago, making it unlikely that there will be many challengers to the federal law's dis-
qualification of nonviolent felons who can say that they lawfully and peaceably enjoyed the use
of guns for a substantial period of time before the 1961 enactment.}

Far less attention has been devoted so far in the lower courts to
the other items on Heller's list of presumptively lawful regulations, but
they too may eventually pose similarly tricky questions. For example,
Heller referred to “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensi-
tive places, such as schools and government buildings.”\footnote{District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).}

Does “schools” mean just school buildings or does it also include school
ing state law prohibiting firearms in school zones).}

Does it include public college and university campuses?\footnote{See Digiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 370 (Va. 2011) (upholding regulation prohibiting possession of guns in university facilities and at campus events).} Are all
government buildings “sensitive” or only some?\footnote{See Aderinto v. Sessions, No. 3:08-2530-JFA-PJG, 2009 WL 2762514, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2009) (suggesting that a public library is a “sensitive place”).}

Should the parking lot of a government building be treated the same as the building it-
self?\footnote{See United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 875–76 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction
for possession of a handgun in parking lot of a U.S. Postal Service facility).} Aside from schools and government buildings, what other
places are “sensitive” enough to justify prohibitions of firearms?\footnote{See United States v. Davis, 304 F. App’x 473, 474 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming conviction

For example, trying to decide whether churches are sensitive places, a federal court in Georgia admitted that it was simply impossible to know the answers to these types of questions because the Supreme Court did not explain what it meant by using the phrase “sensitive places.”

Even once courts get past those line-drawing issues, they face the same fundamental mystery that pervades the decisions about felon-in-possession laws. What was the Supreme Court trying to say with its list of longstanding, presumptively lawful types of gun regulations? In other words, what are courts supposed to do when someone challenges the constitutionality of a law on the list? The Fourth Circuit confronted this puzzling question in *United States v. Masciandaro*, where the defendant was convicted for having a loaded pistol while sleeping in his car in a parking lot on national park property. In response to Masciandaro’s assertion that he was exercising his right to keep and bear arms, the government argued that a parking lot on national park property fits within *Heller*’s reference to “sensitive places.” The Fourth Circuit panel in the case recognized that even if it agreed that the parking lot in question was a sensitive place within *Heller*’s meaning, that would simply “raise the question whether the ‘sensitive places’ doctrine limits the scope of the Second Amendment or, instead, alters the analysis for its application to such places.” *Heller* thus could be read to mean that the Second Amendment does not even apply to sensitive places, so any regulation of guns in those places should be upheld automatically. But of course that would be just one of many possible ways of reading the Supreme Court’s enigmatic listing of the presumptively lawful regulatory measures. After describing this quandary in which *Heller* had put the lower courts, the Fourth Circuit panel essentially ducked the question by concluding that it was unnecessary to figure out what to make of *Heller*’s reference to “sensitive places” because Masciandaro’s conviction should be upheld regardless of whether he possessed a gun in a sensitive place.

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197 Id. at 460.
198 Id. at 471.
199 Id. at 472.
200 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
201 Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473.
The bottom line, according to the court, was that the government had sound reasons for regulating guns in “a national park area where large numbers of people, including children, congregate for recreation.” Although lawyers and judges could carry on an endless and abstract game of dissecting and speculating about the meaning of Justice Scalia’s opinion in *Heller*, the concrete conclusion at the end of it all must be that courts should uphold “reasonable measures to secure public safety.”

That attitude runs throughout the decisions that lower courts have been making since *Heller*. As a theoretical matter, judges remain baffled by the Supreme Court’s inscrutable declaration that some longstanding types of gun laws are presumptively constitutional. But when it comes to actually resolving cases, judges consistently have been making sensible choices based on practical considerations.

**D. Beyond the List of Presumptively Lawful Regulatory Measures**

While struggling to figure out what to make of the Supreme Court’s list of presumptively valid regulatory measures, lower courts have also faced a flood of constitutional challenges to gun laws not included on that list. *Heller* mentioned longstanding prohibitions of gun possession for felons and the mentally ill, but federal laws impose a variety of other restrictions. Illegal aliens are not allowed to possess guns. The same goes for people who unlawfully use or are addicted to drugs. Federal laws also prohibit possession of a gun by a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence or who is the subject of a domestic violence restraining order. Although federal law sets no minimum age for possession of rifles and shotguns, it generally prohibits handgun possession until the

202 *Id.*

203 *Id.*


205 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2006). With some exceptions, federal law also prohibits possession of guns by legal aliens with nonimmigrant visas, such as tourists, students, and temporary workers. *Id.* § 922(g)(5)(B). Some states have historically imposed special restrictions that apply even to legal aliens who are permanent U.S. residents. See, e.g., Washington v. Ibrahim, No. 28756-4-III, 2011 WL 5084790, at *4–5 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2011) (concluding that a Washington statute, which was repealed several months after the defendant’s arrest, violated equal protection rights by requiring lawful permanent resident aliens to register all firearms).


207 *Id.* § 922(g)(9).

208 *Id.* § 922(g)(8).
age of eighteen.209  Many other restrictions on guns can be found in various federal, state, and local laws.210

The Supreme Court’s decisions in *Heller* and *McDonald* invited constitutional challenges to these laws but did not provide a clear framework for lower courts to use in evaluating those challenges. Again, Justice Scalia’s opinion in *Heller* emphasized the importance of historical analysis but did not explain in greater detail how lower courts should proceed.211 In particular, *Heller* did not identify a particular level of scrutiny or standard that should be used, other than to rule out rational basis scrutiny and Justice Breyer’s proposed interest-balancing approach.212 Chief Justice Roberts’s comments during oral argument suggested that he thought that the conventional formulas for applying constitutional rights, like intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny, would be unnecessary in the Second Amendment setting because a more historically oriented approach would be used.213 The *Heller* opinion seemed to reflect Roberts’s suggestion,214 but it also briefly mentioned that the District of Columbia’s gun laws could not withstand any form of intermediate or strict scrutiny.215 The Court thus avoided making any commitments about use of the familiar formulas of heightened scrutiny but also did not entirely disavow them. In short, the Supreme Court provided an intriguing stew of different signals, rather than a single clear recipe, for lower courts taking on the work of implementing the right to keep and bear arms. Not surprisingly, lower courts have found this task to be quite a challenge, and they have taken a number of different approaches to handling it.

Many state courts have simplified matters by essentially declaring that they will not strike down any law that is not clearly rendered invalid by *Heller* and *McDonald*. In other words, these courts strictly construe the Supreme Court’s decisions as having established only that the right to keep and bear arms can be violated by severe restric-

209 Id. § 922(x)(2). Selling a handgun to a person under the age of eighteen is also a federal crime. Id. § 922(x)(1). Sellers who are federally licensed gun dealers are subject to additional restrictions: they cannot sell rifles and shotguns to customers under the age of eighteen and they cannot sell handguns to those under the age of twenty-one. Id. § 922(b)(1).


211 See supra notes 65, 71–73 and accompanying text.

212 See supra notes 67–69, 93–95 and accompanying text.

213 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

214 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.

215 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
tions on law-abiding citizens’ use of guns for self-defense in the home.  

If the Supreme Court wants to go beyond that, the state courts insist, “it will need to say so more plainly.” The states where courts have adopted this approach include California, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and

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216 See infra notes 218–25 (citing cases).

217 Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md.), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011); see also Crespo v. Crespo, 972 A.2d 1169, 1179 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (concluding that a state law prohibiting possession of a gun by a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order would be upheld as a “valid, appropriate and sensible” limitation on gun rights “absent a clear and binding announcement from the Supreme Court of the United States to the contrary”), aff’d, 989 A.2d 827 (N.J. 2010).

218 In addition to the state court decisions, District of Columbia courts have adopted this narrow interpretation of the principle established by Heller. See, e.g., Wooden v. United States, 6 A.3d 833, 840 (D.C. 2010) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge where use of a weapon was “not at all the home-defense scenario contemplated in Heller”); Daniels v. United States, 2 A.3d 250, 253 n.2 (D.C.) (“It is not obvious that Heller’s reach extends beyond cases of handgun possession in the home.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 806 (2010).

219 See, e.g., People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 808 (Ct. App. 2008) (upholding state ban on carrying a loaded firearm in public because the statute contains exceptions for self-defense, and therefore “there can be no claim that [the statute] in any way precludes the use ‘of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home’” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008))); People v. Yarbrough, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, 682 (Ct. App. 2008) (upholding state ban on carrying a concealed firearm without a permit because this law “does not broadly prohibit or even regulate the possession of a gun in the home for lawful purposes of confrontation or self-defense, as did the law declared constitutionally infirmed in Heller”).

220 See, e.g., People v. Williams, No. 1-09-1667, 2011 WL 6351861, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 15, 2011) (upholding state ban on carrying a loaded gun outside one’s residence or business because “both Heller and McDonald made clear that the only type of firearms possession they were declaring to be protected under the second amendment was the right to possess handguns in the home for self-defense purposes”); People v. Ross, 947 N.E.2d 776, 784 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 949 N.E.2d 1102 (Ill. 2011).

221 See State v. Knight, 241 P.3d 120, 133 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (upholding a state law forbidding unlicensed possession of a concealed firearm because the Supreme Court in Heller clearly “was drawing a narrow line regarding the violations related solely to use of a handgun in the home for self-defense purposes”).

222 See Williams, 10 A.3d at 1177 (upholding state law requiring a permit to carry a handgun in public because the gravamen of Heller and McDonald was possession of firearms in the home).

223 See Commonwealth v. McCollum, 945 N.E.2d 937, 954 (Mass. App. Ct.) (upholding state law banning possession of ammunition without a license because defendant had the ammunition in a place other than his home), review denied, 953 N.E.2d 720 (Mass. 2011).

New York. It is surely no coincidence that, with the exception of Kansas, these are deeply “blue” (i.e., liberal) states that rank in the top ten on lists of states with the strictest gun laws and the lowest rates of firearm ownership.

Federal courts generally have not assumed that *Heller* and *McDonald* may be read so narrowly, and therefore they have been forced to struggle with the difficult question of how to apply the right to keep and bear arms to the many types of gun laws not mentioned in the Supreme Court’s decisions. One of the first strategies that emerged was to analyze challenged gun laws by way of comparison or analogy to the *Heller* list of presumptively valid regulatory measures. For example, the federal district court in Maine pioneered this approach in *United States v. Booker*, where the defendant challenged a federal statute banning a person with a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction from possessing a gun. Rather than tackling the broader “complex and unanswered question” of whether strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny should apply, the court decided that a more “useful approach” would be to look at how the law in question stacks up against *Heller’s* list of presumptively valid measures. In other words, is a law that prohibits people who have committed misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing guns sufficiently similar to a law that prohibits convicted felons from possessing guns, such that the former deserves the same presumption of validity given to the latter in *Heller*? The judge in *Booker* found that the ban for domestic violence misdemeanants is, if anything, even more precisely tailored to reducing risks of gun violence than the felon disqualification provision. Although some felonies are nonviolent, every crime of domestic violence involves the use, attempted use, or threatened firearms within the home such as those statutes deemed unconstitutional” in *Heller* and *McDonald*).

225 See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 2009) (upholding state ban on possession of a handgun without a license because the defendant was not in his home at the time of the crime and this law “does not effect a complete ban on handguns”).


229 *Booker*, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 163.

230 Id. at 164.
If the Second Amendment will tolerate a gun ban for felons, the *Booker* court reasoned, then surely the same conclusion must apply to the ban for domestic violence misdemeanants because that category of offenders squarely implicates the government’s goal of reducing risks of firearm misuse.\(^{232}\) That reasoning makes perfect sense if one assumes that the *Heller* list of presumptively valid laws is essentially based on judgments about what would be good public policy. In other words, if the underlying logic of the list is that certain types of gun laws are constitutional because they promote public safety, then banning guns for domestic violence misdemeanants seems just as prudent as prohibiting guns for all felons. Indeed, Congress enacted the prohibition on gun possession for domestic violence misdemeanants to close a loophole in and better achieve the policy goals of the felon dispossession law. Congress observed that, in some instances, the difficulties of prosecuting domestic violence cases led to serious abusers being convicted of only misdemeanor assault charges rather than felonies, and Congress wanted the prohibition of firearms to extend to such cases.\(^{233}\) Seen in that light, the federal ban on guns for domestic violence misdemeanants is really a closely connected component of the felon gun ban, like a patch stitched in to close a hole in fabric.

That is not, of course, the only plausible way to view the *Heller* list of presumptively valid types of laws. If qualifying for that list has more to do with a law’s historical pedigree than its public policy implications, the basis for analogizing domestic violence misdemeanants to felons might be much weaker. The statutory provision disqualifying people with domestic violence misdemeanors from having guns is a relatively new development, having been enacted by Congress in 1996.\(^{234}\) The federal gun ban for felons is substantially older,\(^{235}\) and

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\(^{231}\) See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A)(ii) (defining “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”)).

\(^{232}\) *Id.* For examples of other cases using a similar approach of drawing analogies or comparisons to the *Heller* list of presumptively lawful regulations, see United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862–63 (S.D. W. Va. 2010); People v. Villa, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 463, 467–68 (Ct. App. 2009); and People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 807 (Ct. App. 2008). For a particularly far-reaching example of this approach, see People v. Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301–02 (App. Div. 2011) (upholding state law banning gun possession by person with any misdemeanor conviction).


the notion of excluding felons from the right to keep and bear arms at least arguably might date back centuries to before the Constitution came into existence.236 If longstanding tradition is the key common characteristic of the items on the *Heller* list, modern legal innovations like the ban on guns for domestic violence misdemeanants, however much they may reduce risks and benefit society, do not qualify.

The lower courts have thus faced fundamental questions about whether analysis of Second Amendment claims should be driven more by historical inquiries or contemporary public policy considerations. Some judges opted to head down the historical path. A quintessential example was the First Circuit’s decision in *United States v. Rene E.*,237 which upheld the constitutionality of the federal ban on juvenile possession of handguns.238 Rather than trying to evaluate the importance of the government’s reasons for restricting juvenile access to handguns, the court undertook a strictly historical analysis and found a longstanding tradition supporting the challenged enactment.239 While noting that federal law did not impose any age restrictions on access to firearms until 1968 and did not prohibit juvenile possession of handguns until 1994,240 the court found evidence of a longer tradition, stretching back to the latter half of the nineteenth century, of state laws restricting minors’ possession of guns and other weapons such as knives.241

As for the era in which the Constitution was written and adopted, the available evidence was far less specific or enlightening. The court in *Rene E.* cited no primary sources from the eighteenth century or even the first half of the nineteenth century, such as laws, judicial decisions, treatises, or other writings, addressing the issue of juvenile access to guns. The closest that the court came to offering evidence about the Founders’ attitudes was to quote a modern law review article suggesting that the Founding generation saw the right to keep and bear arms as extending only to “virtuous” citizens and regarded children as being “incapable of virtue.”242

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235 *See supra* note 167 and accompanying text.
236 *See supra* notes 155, 168 and accompanying text.
237 *United States v. Rene E.*, 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009).
238 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (2006); *see supra* note 209 and accompanying text. The court in *Rene E.* emphasized that the federal statutes contain several exceptions allowing juvenile use of handguns, for example, for self-defense in the home or for hunting or target practice with a parent’s consent. *Rene E.*, 583 F.3d at 12, 13–14 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(3)(D)).
239 *Rene E.*, 583 F.3d at 13–16.
240 *Id.* at 13.
241 *Id.* at 14–15.
242 *Id.* at 15 (citing Glenn Harlan Reynolds, *A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment*, 62
When one digs underneath that article to examine its sources, the historical evidence is limited but interesting and ambiguous. Juveniles had no right to have guns in the Founding era, the historical argument goes, until they were eligible for militia service. But the obligation to serve in a militia, including the duty to possess arms, began at the age of fifteen, sixteen, or eighteen, depending on the colony. Indeed, half a million soldiers in the Civil War were sixteen or younger, and even today seventeen-year-olds can join the military with their parents’ permission.

One could therefore argue that the historical evidence actually cuts sharply against the First Circuit’s conclusion in Rene E. that the Founding generation would have approved a law preventing people from possessing handguns until the age of twenty-one. As often happens, the answers that one derives from this sort of historical inquiry depends greatly on the level of generality of the questions asked. If history proves that the Founding Fathers accepted the general idea of age restrictions on access to guns, perhaps that is all that should really matter, and the Founders’ more specific beliefs about an appropriate age limit should be ignored because times have changed since the eighteenth century. Although the Founders may have drawn a line at fifteen or sixteen in contrast to the line that exists today at eighteen or twenty-one, the crucial point is simply that the Founders approved of drawing lines based on age. On the other hand, once judges have a license to overlook aspects of original or longstanding traditional understandings that do not square well with modern realities and needs, the historical approach to defining constitutional rights starts to look suspiciously inconsistent and susceptible to manipulation. Although the First Circuit’s opinion in Rene E. thus purports to employ the his-
torical methodology endorsed by the Supreme Court in *Heller* and *McDonald*, it ultimately winds up illustrating how historical evidence is often indeterminate. It can be readily spun in various directions, depending on what conclusion a court ultimately wants to reach.\(^{247}\)

Courts attempting to imitate the Supreme Court’s historical approach have encountered problems even on basic points like what time period is most relevant for determining the original meaning of the right to keep and bear arms when it applies to state and local laws through the Fourteenth Amendment. At least one court opinion, issued by a Seventh Circuit panel in *Ezell v. City of Chicago*,\(^{248}\) has proposed that the relevant time frame depends on the level of government involved. To determine the scope of the right to keep and bear arms for challenges to federal government action, judges should look to the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification (i.e., around 1789 to 1791).\(^{249}\) But for challenges to state or local laws, “the focus of the original-meaning inquiry is carried forward” to the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption (i.e., circa 1866 to 1868).\(^{250}\) That seems logical if one believes that the goal of constitutional interpretation is to determine what the relevant constitutional provision meant at the time of its adoption, but it flies directly in the face of the Supreme Court’s very clear rejection of such a “two-track approach” to rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.\(^{251}\) The Supreme Court strongly emphasized in *McDonald* that the right to keep and bear arms must be enforced against state and local governments according to exactly the same standards that protect the right against federal infringement.\(^{252}\) And yet, the scope and strength of the right cannot be exactly the same for all levels of government, as *McDonald* demands, if courts assess federal actions based on the right’s meaning in the late eighteenth century when the Second Amendment was born, but evaluate state and local actions based on

\(^{247}\) Litigation concerning New York City’s ban on possessing air pistols provides another example. A judge in *People v. Nivar*, 915 N.Y.S.2d 801, 809–11 (Sup. Ct. 2011), concluded that air-powered guns are not arms within the Second Amendment’s meaning, even though the defendant presented historical evidence that Meriwether Lewis, during his famed expedition westward with William Clark, used an air rifle “for hunting and to astonish native Americans.” *Id.* at 811 (internal quotation marks omitted). The judge deemed that evidence insufficient because it did not mention the use of air guns for self-defense. *Id.*

\(^{248}\) *Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).

\(^{249}\) *Id.* at 701–02.

\(^{250}\) *Id.* at 702.

\(^{251}\) *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048 (2010) (plurality opinion).

\(^{252}\) *Id.* at 3035 (Alito, J., opinion of the Court); see also *id.* at 3048 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 114–22 and accompanying text.
what the right meant several generations later when the Fourteenth Amendment arrived on the scene.

Rather than deal with these sorts of problems and stick with an exclusively or even predominantly historical approach, most courts have gravitated in a direction that brings them onto very familiar terrain. Courts have essentially returned to the three tiers of scrutiny used to analyze laws allegedly infringing equal protection and some other constitutional rights. Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion for the en banc Seventh Circuit in United States v. Skoien has quickly emerged as one of the most influential explications and applications of this approach.

Like many of the other Second Amendment cases decided in recent years, Skoien involved a conviction under the federal law prohibiting people convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms. Chief Judge Easterbrook’s opinion began by deftly cutting through much of the tangle of confusion generated in the lower courts by Heller’s more ambiguous pronouncements, particularly its listing of longstanding and presumptively valid regulations. “We do not think it profitable,” Chief Judge Easterbrook observed, “to parse these passages of Heller as if they contained an answer” to questions like the validity of the ban on domestic violence misdemeanants having firearms. The lower courts, in Easterbrook’s view, had been trying to read too much into the Supreme Court’s “cautionary language” intended merely to warn readers not to treat Heller as deciding more than it really did.

Chief Judge Easterbrook’s opinion likewise swiftly shot down the idea that Second Amendment cases should turn on crude historical assessments of what legal restrictions on guns are sufficiently “longstanding” or traditional. As an example, Easterbrook noted that federal law did not disqualify violent felons from having guns until 1938 and did not expand that prohibition to nonviolent felons until

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254 See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010).
257 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 640–61.
Is a law enacted in 1938 longstanding? Easterbrook said it depends on how one looks at it: “A 1938 law may be ‘longstanding’ from the perspective of 2008, when *Heller* was decided, but 1938 is 147 years after the states ratified the Second Amendment.” More important, a law’s constitutionality should not depend on whether it is longstanding. It would be “weird,” Chief Judge Easterbrook bluntly noted, to suggest that the federal law disarming domestic violence misdemeanants is unconstitutional now, but will become constitutional when it has been around long enough to qualify as longstanding.

Chief Judge Easterbrook argued that *Heller’s* list of presumptively valid measures teaches an important lesson, but the lesson is not that gun laws must be old to be constitutional. The *Heller* list instead simply demonstrates that legislatures can impose categorical limitations on gun possession without violating any constitutional rights. Specified categories of individuals can be prohibited from having guns without the government being required to present evidence on a case-by-case basis proving that each member of the affected class really deserves to be disarmed. Moreover, the categories of individuals prohibited from having guns today “need not mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.” Rather than locking in whatever specific beliefs about sound gun policy were prevalent in 1791, the Second Amendment wisely “leav[es] to the people’s elected representatives the filling in of details.”

After explaining how not to decide Second Amendment cases, Chief Judge Easterbrook concluded that courts simply should require some form of “strong showing” that a law is substantially related to an important governmental objective. This is, Easterbrook noted, what many opinions call “intermediate scrutiny,” although Easterbrook expressed reluctance to unnecessarily wade “more deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.” Applying this standard, Easterbrook concluded that the federal ban on guns for domestic violence

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260 *Id.* at 640; *see supra* note 167 and accompanying text.
261 *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 640.
262 *Id.* at 641.
263 *Id.* at 640–41.
264 *Id.*
265 *Id.* at 641.
266 *Id.*
267 *Id.* at 640.
268 *Id.* at 641.
269 *Id.* at 641–42.
misdemeanants easily passes constitutional muster because of the simple fact that people who have been violent in the past are more likely to be violent again in the future.\textsuperscript{270} Easterbrook cited a variety of social science sources to support his conclusions, including data showing that a domestic assault is more likely to be lethal if the attacker uses a firearm\textsuperscript{271} and that domestic abusers have high rates of recidivism.\textsuperscript{272} In short, someone convicted for a domestic violence crime—regardless of whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor—is apt to act violently again, and that violence is more likely to be deadly if the attacker wields a gun.

Chief Judge Easterbrook’s version of intermediate scrutiny is not a particularly demanding one. Although courts sometimes refer to intermediate scrutiny as though it is a single or unitary standard,\textsuperscript{273} a judge purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny actually has a variety of options for how to proceed.\textsuperscript{274} Professor Eugene Volokh noted this in his influential article on implementing the right to keep and bear arms, explaining how the consequences of courts applying heightened scrutiny to gun laws will depend greatly on how judges evaluate empirical claims about the likely effects those laws have on public safety.\textsuperscript{275} The most demanding judge might require “substantial scientific proof that a law will indeed substantially reduce crime and injury.”\textsuperscript{276} A less exacting approach would be “to simply require a logically plausible theory of danger reduction.”\textsuperscript{277} In Volokh’s view, the former approach would lead courts to strike down virtually every gun law, because scientific studies have never absolutely proven (or

\textsuperscript{270} Id. at 642–44.
\textsuperscript{271} Id. at 643–44.
\textsuperscript{272} Id. at 644.
\textsuperscript{273} Cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, \emph{The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence}, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 802 (describing how courts tend to synthesize various distinct doctrines into a “single, overarching standard” of intermediate scrutiny for First Amendment purposes).
\textsuperscript{274} See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97–98 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting various articulations of the intermediate scrutiny standard in freedom of speech cases), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011); Kimberly J. Jenkins, \emph{Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of Public Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary Schools}, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1953, 1997 (2006) (observing that, in equal protection cases, “intermediate scrutiny currently is sufficiently indeterminate that the only thing consistent about it is that it is inconsistently interpreted and applied”); David A. Herman, Comment, \emph{Juvenile Curfews and the Breakdown of the Tiered Approach to Equal Protection}, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1857, 1883 (2007) (“There is a lot of space between strict and rational review, and ‘intermediate scrutiny’ does not mean the same thing in all contexts.”).
\textsuperscript{276} Id. at 1467.
\textsuperscript{277} Id. at 1468.
disproven) the effectiveness of these laws, while the latter attitude would lead to everything being upheld because there is a plausible argument to be made on behalf of virtually any gun control measure.278

Chief Judge Easterbrook’s approach in Skoien falls somewhere between the possibilities that Volokh described, but closer to the less demanding end of the spectrum. Chief Judge Easterbrook certainly cites social science studies and data, and those sources provide strong reasons to think that the ban on gun possession for domestic violence misdemeanants may be a very valuable law.279 But do they conclusively prove that America is a safer place because of this law? The research that exists simply is not capable of proving that one way or the other.280 The missing key piece of information is the extent to which the gun ban actually has its intended effect of reducing the odds that a domestic abuser will have and use a gun. Chief Judge Easterbrook logically assumes that the ban reduces, at least to some significant extent, the number of guns that are used in domestic assaults.281 And under Chief Judge Easterbrook’s version of intermediate scrutiny, that logically plausible theory about how the law will work is enough to sustain the law.282

One member of the Seventh Circuit, Judge Diane Sykes, dissented from Easterbrook’s opinion, and her views offer a glimpse of what a somewhat more demanding form of judicial scrutiny of gun laws might entail.283 Judge Sykes complained that most of the empirical data mentioned in Chief Judge Easterbrook’s opinion came from

278 Id. at 1468, 1470.

279 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011). Chief Judge Easterbrook’s approach is thus consistent with that of courts emphasizing that a challenged law must be supported by “sufficient evidence” that the law has a substantial relationship to an important government objective, not just “plausible reasons” why the law may have beneficial effects. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010).

280 Professor Mark Tushnet has extensively discussed the difficulty of proving the effectiveness of gun control laws through social science evidence. See Mark V. Tushnet, Out of Range: Why the Constitution Can’t End the Battle over Guns 85–102 (2007).

281 See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 643.

282 For a later example of the Seventh Circuit’s approach, see United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683, 686 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the federal ban on gun possession by habitual drug users and citing evidence that showed a general link between drug use and violent crime but did not conclusively establish the challenged law’s effectiveness).

283 See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 645 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Judge Sykes wrote the initial appellate decision in Skoien for a unanimous three judge panel. That opinion was vacated when the Seventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc. See United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted and vacated, No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 1267262 (7th Cir. Feb. 22), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011).
the court’s own research, rather than from the government. Judge Sykes jabbed, “to put the government to its burden of justifying a law that prohibits the exercise of a constitutional right,” and it “deprives Skoien of the opportunity to review the outcome-determinative evidence, let alone subject it to normal adversarial testing.” Worried that the court’s understanding of the social science research might be mistaken, Judge Sykes argued that the court should have remanded the case to the district court and put the onus on the government to “shoulder its burden” of proving how the challenged law actually advances important interests.

Other courts have begun to adopt approaches quite similar to that of Chief Judge Easterbrook’s en banc opinion for the Seventh Circuit, albeit with some refinements and variations. These courts apply intermediate scrutiny, requiring that the challenged law have some substantial relation to an important government interest. They emphasize that this test merely requires the fit between the government’s objective and the challenged law to be “reasonable, not perfect,” so that the government can “paint with a broader brush.” The government need not utilize the best or least restrictive means of achieving its goal.

The principal gloss that other courts have added to the Seventh Circuit’s approach is that the degree of scrutiny applied should vary depending on the magnitude of the burden that the challenged law imposes on individuals’ legitimate interests in use of firearms. In

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284 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 646–47, 651–52 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
285 Id. at 647.
286 Id. at 652.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 653. Judge Sykes again expressed her preference for more vigorous protection of the right to keep and bear arms in Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 694–711 (7th Cir. 2011); see infra notes 324–33 and accompanying text.
290 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98.
292 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98.
293 See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 682; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96–97; see also Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (determining that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Skoien permits this sliding scale
other words, a court would require stronger justifications for a law that severely limits the use of firearms for the core purpose of defending one’s home and family, like the District of Columbia laws struck down in *Heller*, but require a weaker showing where the impact on gun owners’ legitimate interests is modest. Most cases do not involve restrictions as severe as those in *Heller*, of course, and so making the intensity of judicial scrutiny vary according to the degree of burden imposed is likely to help the government’s side in most instances. In other words, factoring the degree of burden on gun rights into the intermediate scrutiny calculus is likely to be a useful mechanism for judges “rightly worried about gun crime and gun injury” who “want to leave legislatures with some latitude in trying to fight crime in ways that interfere little with lawful self-defense.”

The Ninth Circuit’s panel decision in *Nordyke v. King* provides a useful example. The case involved an ordinance in Alameda County, California, which prohibited possession of firearms on county property and thus had the effect of preventing gun shows from being held at the county fairgrounds. Emphasizing the severity of the legal restrictions on guns struck down in *Heller*, the Ninth Circuit concluded that only laws which “substantially burden” the right to keep and bear arms should receive heightened scrutiny. The court gave the plaintiffs a chance to amend their complaint to allege facts showing a substantial burden on their rights, but the decision strongly hinted that this would be a futile endeavor. In the court’s view, the ultimate question would be whether the county’s action left reasonable alternative ways for law-abiding citizens to obtain firearms with which to defend themselves. And in the end, there are places in Alameda County, other than gun shows at the county fairgrounds, where guns can be purchased.

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294 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97.

295 Volokh, *supra* note 275, at 1461.

296 *Nordyke v. King*, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir.), *reh’g en banc granted*, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011).

297 *Id.* at 780.

298 *Id.* at 782–86. The court did not decide what type of heightened scrutiny, such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, would apply to laws that do substantially burden the right to keep and bear arms. *See id.* at 786 n.9.

299 *Id.* at 789.

300 *Id.* at 787.

301 The *Nordyke* plaintiffs pointed out that there are only three licensed gun dealers in Alameda County, and so the ban on gun shows at the county fairgrounds “ma[de] it more diffi-
By requiring a threshold showing of a significant burden on the exercise of the right to keep and bear arms, courts reduce the number of constitutional claims that even reach the intermediate scrutiny stage where some showing of the challenged law’s probable effects is required. The sorting achieved by the substantial burden framework thus sensibly pushes more of the job of evaluating gun control laws away from judges and back to legislators.

Reflecting the same pragmatic and cautious attitudes, courts’ decisions consistently downplay the usefulness of historical inquiries, recognizing the difficulty of making comparisons across centuries during which so many vast technological, legal, social, and other changes have occurred. Even where courts insist initially on undertaking a historical inquiry to determine whether an issue falls within the scope of the right to keep and bear arms as that right was originally understood, the results are generally inconclusive, and the courts wind up applying intermediate scrutiny. For example, the Founding Fathers’ firearms did not have serial numbers; the practice of putting such numbers on guns did not begin until many decades after the Second Amendment was adopted. Does this imply that the original understanding of the right to keep and bear arms clearly protects unnumbered guns? And if so, should courts strike down the federal law that today prohibits possession of firearms with removed or altered serial numbers? Courts have recognized that this sort of argument overstates the extent to which historical analysis can provide answers to the specific issues that arise in contemporary constitutional adjudication. Concluding that the Founding generation wanted to protect a right to possess firearms without serial numbers “would make little sense” given that people in that era “had no concept of that characteristic or how it fit within the right to bear arms.”

The lively debate over original understandings about felonies, misdemeanors, and guns has an equally anachronistic flair. As noted...
earlier, scholars do not agree on whether eighteenth century minds considered felons outside the scope of the right to keep and bear arms.\textsuperscript{308} Historical research often fails to generate clear answers but the problem is compounded here because basic matters regarding criminal offense categories like felonies and misdemeanors have changed so much over time. In the Founding era, felonies “were typically punishable by death and imprisonment for such offenses was rare,” and “many serious crimes, such as kidnapping and assault with intent to murder or rape, were classified as misdemeanors.”\textsuperscript{309} In a time when a felony conviction was essentially a death sentence, the issue of whether a felon should have the right to keep and bear arms was nonsensical. The Founding Fathers surely did not devote time to pondering whether prisoners awaiting execution, let alone those already put to death, should have access to firearms. On top of this, even if historical research could conclusively establish that felons were never disarmed in colonial America, that would still prove little, because firearm possession by felons may have been left unregulated “as a matter of public policy, not right.”\textsuperscript{310} For example, early American legislators may have simply thought that disarming convicted criminals would be “highly impractical in a frontier society, in which isolated communities struggled to survive in rugged conditions.”\textsuperscript{311} Given these difficulties in comparing the eighteenth-century world to our times, the effort to decide Second Amendment cases through historical analysis becomes a “virtually meaningless” exercise.\textsuperscript{312}

In cases involving the federal law that prohibits individuals with domestic violence misdemeanor convictions from possessing guns, the historical picture becomes even murkier. For example, a defendant in federal court in Wisconsin tried to use the historical route to challenge that law by arguing “that there is a modern stigma attached to crimes of domestic violence which was not extant in the 18th century” and that “the Founding Fathers would not have viewed domestic violence as seriously as we do today.”\textsuperscript{313} Exploring how American society viewed domestic violence in the Founding era might be a fascinating topic for a doctoral dissertation, but it would undoubtedly be a challenging undertaking for judges, and ultimately a pointless one because

\textsuperscript{308} See supra notes 164–70 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{311} Id.
\textsuperscript{312} Walker, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
the historical record on an issue of such complexity undoubtedly con-tains much to support many different views. \(^{314}\) Judges simply will be disappointed if they hope to find specific and clear historical evidence about the Founding generation’s attitude toward the rights of domestic abusers. \(^{315}\) And even if such evidence could be found, “mapping colonial analogues onto the Constitution as it exists today would produce incongruous results—while men who beat their wives would re-main free to own guns, Catholics and African Americans, among others, would have no Second Amendment rights.” \(^{316}\)

A consensus among the lower courts on how to handle Second Amendment claims thus seems to be emerging from the confusion and uncertainty that followed in \(\text{Heller}\)’s wake. An intermediate scrutiny analysis, applied in a way that is very deferential to legislative determinations and requires merely some logical and plausible showing of the basis for the law’s reasonably expected benefits, is the heart of the emerging standard approach. Historical analysis has taken a backseat. And over and over, courts have concluded that the gun laws being challenged should be upheld as constitutional. \(^{317}\)

\(^{314}\) See generally \(\text{OVER THE THRESHOLD: INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN EARLY AMERICA}\) (Christine Daniels & Michael V. Kennedy eds., 1999).

\(^{315}\) For example, the court in \(\text{United States v. Tooley}\), 717 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D. W. Va. 2010), aff’d, No. 10-4936, 2012 WL 698885 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2012), acknowledged that “[h]owever regrettable it may seem today, domestic violence was not a separate criminal offense and was probably not even viewed as especially problematic in most circles during the Founding Era.” \(\text{Id.}\) at 588. The court nevertheless undertook an extensive historical analysis and found that that the Founders generally would have been comfortable with substantial restrictions on guns in the interests of public safety, including bans on possession for types of people considered dangerous. \(\text{Id.}\) at 588–92. Another judge looking at the same sort of historical evidence found it thoroughly unhelpful. See \(\text{United States v. Elkins}\), 780 F. Supp. 2d 473, 478 (W.D. Va. 2011) (“No facts have been produced to show that the drafters of the Second Amendment contemplated that domestic violence restraining orders would exist, let alone cause an individual to lose his rights.”).

\(^{316}\) \(\text{Brown}\), 715 F. Supp. 2d at 698.

\(^{317}\) See Anna Stolley Persky, \(\text{An Unsteady Finger on Gun Control Laws: Despite 2nd Amendment Cases, Firearms Codes Are Moving Targets}\), A.B.A. J., Dec. 2010, at 14 (observing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in \(\text{Heller}\) and \(\text{McDonald}\) have not had a significant practical impact on gun policy throughout the country because so few challenges to federal, state, or local laws have been successful). In addition to the many examples discussed already in this Article, a wide variety of other gun laws and regulations have been sustained by the courts. See, e.g., \(\text{Justice v. Town of Cicero}\), 577 F.3d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding municipal ordinance requiring registration of all firearms), \text{cert. denied}, 130 S. Ct. 3410 (2010); \(\text{Peterson v. LaCabe}\), 783 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1176–78 (D. Colo. 2011) (upholding a law preventing nonresidents of state from obtaining permits to carry concealed handguns); \(\text{United States v. Hart}\), 726 F. Supp. 2d 56, 60 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding that the Second Amendment does not provide a right to carry a concealed weapon); \(\text{Dorr v. Weber}\), 741 F. Supp. 2d 903, 1004–05 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (same); \(\text{Commonwealth v. Runyan}\), 922 N.E.2d 794, 799–800 (Mass. 2010) (upholding a state law requir-
Although most courts have gravitated in the same general direction, some decisions have suggested other paths. The courts nevertheless have been remarkably unanimous in rejecting the strict scrutiny standard of review.318 But one ruling by the federal district court in Utah in *United States v. Engstrum*319 seemed for a time to be the first spark in what could grow to be a line of decisions employing a strict scrutiny standard. Considering a challenge to the federal ban on guns for domestic violence misdemeanants, *Engstrum* concluded that strict scrutiny should apply based on the simple syllogism that all fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny and that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right.320 The court held that the defendant essentially could use the Second Amendment as an affirmative defense at trial, with the jury being instructed that they should acquit if they found that the defendant posed no risk of prospective or future violence despite his past domestic violence misdemeanor conviction.321 The case thus seemed to be a significant departure from the general trend in the lower courts, not only because it applied strict scrutiny, but also because it found that a federal gun law was unconstitutional at least as applied to some individuals.322 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, quickly stepped in and issued a writ of mandamus rejecting the district court’s reading of *Heller* and directing the district court not to instruct the jury about a Second Amendment defense.323 As a result, the cupboard remains bare for those hoping courts might apply strict scrutiny and be more aggressive about finding constitutional defects in gun laws beyond the type struck down in *Heller*.

318 The courts’ rejection of strict scrutiny is particularly striking given that before *Heller*, it was widely assumed that strict scrutiny would apply if the Supreme Court ever interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to have guns for nonmilitia purposes. See,* e.g.*, Erwin Chemerinsky, *Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective*, 73 *Fordham L. Rev.* 477, 484 (2004) (challenging the assumption that strict scrutiny would apply). Much of the credit for dissuading courts from applying strict scrutiny under the Second Amendment surely goes to Professor Adam Winkler, whose work undercut the premise that fundamental constitutional rights always or even usually receive strict scrutiny. See Adam Winkler, *Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights*, 23 *Const. Comment.* 227, 227 (2006) (finding that “only a small subset of fundamental rights triggers strict scrutiny”).


320 *Id.* at 1231–32.

321 *Id.* at 1235.

322 *Id.*

323 In re United States, 578 F.3d at 1199–200.
Of course, proponents of a more robust version of the right to keep and bear arms may yet have a breakthrough in the lower courts. For example, they saw reason for hope in *Ezell v. City of Chicago*, a decision concerning new ordinances enacted by Chicago to replace those invalidated by the *McDonald* decision. Chicago’s new laws require all gun owners to have firearm permits, and one of the requirements for such a permit is completing at least one hour of training at a shooting range. At the same time, Chicago did not permit the operation of any shooting ranges within city limits. Although the district court had found that this placed no significant burden on anyone’s rights because there are plenty of firing ranges open to the public within just a few miles of the city, Judge Rovner of the Seventh Circuit admonished Chicago for being “too clever by half” and essentially “thumbing [its] nose at the Supreme Court.” The court remanded the case to give the city a chance to present evidence justifying its ban on firing ranges, but hinted that it seemed “quite unlikely” that the city could succeed in doing so. The opinion suggested that the Seventh Circuit, despite taking a very deferential attitude toward the type and amount of evidence needed to justify a gun regulation in Chief Judge Easterbrook’s en banc opinion in *Skoien*, might take a much more aggressive attitude, one that almost rises to the level of strict scrutiny, in situations involving severe burdens on the core right of armed self-defense. Gun rights advocates

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324 *Ezell* v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
325 CHI. MUN. CODE § 8-20-10 to -300 (2011).
326 *Id.* § 8-20-120(a)(7).
327 *See Ezell*, 651 F.3d at 695 (noting that CHI. MUN. CODE § 8-20-10, subsequently repealed, prohibited shooting ranges within city limits).
328 *Id.* at 693.
329 *Id.* at 711–12 (Rovner, J., concurring in the judgment).
330 *Id.* at 710 (majority opinion). While awaiting the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, city attorneys predicted that the case might produce a decision that would be unfavorable to the city and imperil other local gun restrictions, and so Chicago officials tried to render the case moot by quickly doing away with the ban on firing ranges. John Byrne & Hal Dardick, *City Council OKs Gun Ranges as Federal Court Reverses Ban*, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 2011, at C11. The Seventh Circuit, however, beat Chicago to the punch. Just an hour before the city council’s vote to repeal the challenged ban, the Seventh Circuit released its decision, issuing it in typescript form, “a practice ordinarily reserved for emergency action.” *Ezell* v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 5135, 2011 WL 4501546, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2011). Despite the ban’s repeal, the litigation continues because the defendant contends that the new ordinance imposes an unduly burdensome “thicket of regulations” on firing ranges. *Id.* at *2.
331 United States v. *Skoien*, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011); *see supra* notes 253–82 and accompanying text.
332 *Ezell*, 651 F.3d at 708.
hailed the ruling as a “major win,” and the opinion certainly leans in the direction of giving the right to keep and bear arms somewhat stronger protection than most judges have thus far been willing to offer. Nevertheless, it is remarkable to think that this decision, a ruling that enables Chicagoans to travel a slightly shorter distance to firing ranges, is the most dramatic advance for gun rights made by the lower courts in the years since *Heller*.

Perhaps the most revealing discussion of the controversy surrounding the interpretation of the Second Amendment appears in opinions issued by members of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the ongoing litigation concerning the District of Columbia’s gun laws. After the Supreme Court invalidated portions of those laws in *Heller* in 2008, the District revised the laws in an attempt to comply with the Supreme Court’s demands while maintaining unusually tight restrictions on access to firearms. Several residents of the District quickly filed suit, claiming that many provisions of the revised statutes violated the Second Amendment. By a 2–1 vote, the D.C. Circuit upheld some of the challenged measures and remanded the case for development of a more complete evidentiary record concerning other provisions under attack. Judge Douglas Ginsburg’s majority opinion and Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s dissent laid out starkly different ways of reading the Supreme Court’s rulings in *Heller* and *McDonald*. Judge Ginsburg explained that, although gun regulations with longstanding roots may enjoy a special presumption of validity, history and tradition should not constitute the only elements of Second Amendment analysis. Rather, courts should apply intermediate scrutiny, look at the public policy objectives that the challenged regulation purportedly serves in modern society, and defer to legislative judgments supported by some “meaningful evidence.”

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334 Judge Sykes, the author of the Ezell panel’s opinion, was the sole member of the Seventh Circuit who dissented from Chief Judge Easterbrook’s en banc opinion in Skoien. See supra notes 283–88 and accompanying text.
335 See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 699.
337 See Rostron, supra note 33, at 394–403.
338 *Heller II*, 2011 WL 4551558, at *1–2. Dick Heller, the named respondent in the case decided by the Supreme Court, is among the plaintiffs in the new litigation.
339 Id. at *1.
340 Id. at *6.
341 Id. at *8–11.
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent regards the Supreme Court’s decisions as instead requiring courts to analyze gun laws “based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.” Indeed, he pointed out that the deferential form of intermediate scrutiny applied by Judge Ginsburg and most other lower court judges resembles the flexible policy-oriented analysis proposed in Justice Breyer’s *Heller* dissent more than it resembles the rigidly categorical and deeply historical approach favored by Justice Scalia and the other four Justices who joined his majority opinion in *Heller*.

Judge Kavanaugh is correct, but he is a lone voice in a sea of lower court judges preferring to give public policy considerations a preeminent role in Second Amendment analysis.

IV. Celebrating Justice Breyer’s Triumph

A great irony thus runs throughout the lower court cases. The *Heller* decision was undoubtedly a monumental step in Second Amendment jurisprudence, a crowning achievement for Justice Scalia, and a masterful showcase for the originalist methodology of constitutional interpretation. The *McDonald* decision followed through on the crucial step of extending the right to keep and bear arms to reach state and local government actions. And yet, the lower court decisions and the analytical approach that has begun to crystallize in them reflect Justice Breyer’s sentiments about Second Amendment claims far more than those of Justice Scalia or the other members of the Court who formed the majorities in *Heller* and *McDonald*.

This is not to say that judges have improperly set out to follow dissenting views rather than those of the Supreme Court’s majority. Instead, while conscientiously trying to implement the Supreme Court’s instructions, judges have ineluctably followed an analysis that fulfills Justice Breyer’s forecast. Trying to follow Justice Scalia’s lead by making Second Amendment analysis an intensely historical enterprise, lower court judges have run into the reality that historical inquiries are extremely difficult and do not produce determinate answers to the types of detailed questions that must be resolved concern-
ing the wide range of gun laws and regulations in effect in various places throughout the country. Puzzled by Justice Scalia’s curious list of longstanding and presumptively lawful regulatory measures and the Supreme Court’s conspicuous refusal to identify a level of scrutiny or some other specific standard to be applied, lower court judges have pulled toward an intermediate scrutiny approach that gives them the comfort of applying familiar formulas and enables them to show due respect for the right to keep and bear arms while rarely ever actually using it to strike down a law. Struggling to work within the more categorical framework of decisionmaking favored by Justice Scalia, the lower courts have essentially wound up embracing the sort of interest balancing that Justice Breyer recommended and that Scalia vociferously denounced. And like Justice Breyer, the lower courts have looked at the conflicting tangle of complex empirical and other research surrounding gun laws and essentially decided that legislatures are better suited than judges for the task of deciding what conclusions to draw from it.

Of course, the lower court decisions cannot cite Breyer’s dissents as their inspiration. But there are passages in Breyer’s *Heller* and *McDonald* dissents that capture quite well the flavor of the already enormous and quickly growing volume of precedent being generated by the lower courts, and so it is worth reviewing them. According to Breyer, Second Amendment questions that confront courts do not have “purely logical or conceptual answers.” Treacherous “reefs and shoals” also “lie in wait for those nonexpert judges who place virtually determinative weight upon historical considerations.” The judges’ task instead requires them “to focus on practicalities, the statute’s rationale, the problems that called it into being, its relation to those objectives—in a word, the details.” And in the end, judges cannot avoid essentially weighing the advantages and disadvantages of sustaining the government actions being challenged. However one describes the level of scrutiny involved or articulates the standard used, the decisionmaking “will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly

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345 Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), with *id.* at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
346 *Id.* at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
348 *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 687.
burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.”349 Justice Breyer saw “practical wisdom” in this approach,350 and the lower court decisions have admirably fulfilled that promise.

Any appraisal of the lower courts’ approach will depend greatly on one’s views about gun control and gun rights and what outcomes one ultimately prefers. But there are some reasons to appreciate what the lower courts have done regardless of which side one supports in the greater debate about guns. Most important, the courts essentially have adopted a posture of judicial restraint, upholding legislative determinations where ample room for debate exists about their constitutionality. Courts are routinely criticized for purported sins of judicial activism,351 and so they certainly deserve some understanding where they proceed cautiously. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III eloquently and candidly described how this factor influenced the Fourth Circuit’s treatment of the right to keep and bear arms:

To the degree that we push the right beyond what the Supreme Court in *Heller* declared to be its origin, we circumscribe the scope of popular governance, move the action into court, and encourage litigation in contexts we cannot foresee. This is serious business. We do not wish to be even minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment rights. . . .

If ever there was an occasion for restraint, this would seem to be it. There is much to be said for a course of simple caution.352

Treading carefully is particularly appropriate with respect to an issue for which the need for judicial intervention to protect rights is not at its zenith. Gun owners are a perennially potent political force. The most prominent organization representing their interests, the National Rifle Association, is among the Nation’s most powerful lobbying organizations.353 The political tide has been moving against gun

349 Id. at 689.
350 Id. at 691.
control in recent years, with the conventional wisdom being that gun issues hurt Democratic candidates in key elections in the past.\textsuperscript{354} Despite some gun enthusiasts’ fears that President Barack Obama’s election posed a significant threat to firearm rights, the Obama Administration has been very quiet on gun issues.\textsuperscript{355} Considering the many problems facing this country (wars, terrorism, climate change, a struggling economy, budget deficits, illegal immigration, and healthcare, just to name a few), insufficient access to firearms hardly seems to be a pressing concern. Judges’ reluctance to be more aggressive in expanding gun rights and overriding political and legislative processes seems defensible. Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in \textit{Heller} made this very point, arguing that “no one has suggested that the political process is not working exactly as it should in mediating the debate between the advocates and opponents of gun control,” and so “adherence to a policy of judicial restraint would be far wiser” than unnecessarily bold action to invalidate gun laws and regulations.\textsuperscript{356}

The courts’ cautious approach also serves the interests of federalism and respects the wide variation in the roles that guns play in different parts of the country, particularly differences between rural and urban areas. City dwellers are “less likely to own guns and more likely to support gun control initiatives.”\textsuperscript{357} Rates of gun violence obviously vary dramatically from place to place,\textsuperscript{358} as do cultural traditions concerning firearms and the extent to which state and local laws regulate them.\textsuperscript{359} Justice Breyer’s dissents in \textit{Heller} and \textit{McDonald} specifically argued for recognition of these differences, repeatedly emphasizing that the District of Columbia and Chicago are highly urban areas with crime problems unknown in rural areas.\textsuperscript{360}

\textsuperscript{354} See Dick Polman, \textit{Gun-Shy Dems Abandon Debate on Gun Control}, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 21, 2009, at A21.


\textsuperscript{359} President Barack Obama has emphasized these different experiences and perspectives on the few occasions when he has addressed the topic of gun control. See Rostron, \textit{supra} note 355, at 357–58.

After *Heller*, Professor Michael O’Shea made a scholarly plea for implementing the right to keep and bear arms in ways attuned to federalism values, arguing that a “bifurcated standard of review” should apply so that national gun laws would be subject to greater scrutiny than state and local ones.\(^{361}\) The Supreme Court, however, rejected the possibility of tailoring the right in that manner when it ruled in *McDonald* that incorporation of the right to keep and bear arms through the Fourteenth Amendment demands that exactly the same standards apply to state and local laws as to federal ones.\(^{362}\)

Justice Stevens’s dissent in *McDonald* warned that this insistence on perfect symmetry as applied to all levels of government created a “real risk” that the right would wind up being diluted.\(^{363}\) “When one legal standard must prevail across dozens of jurisdictions with disparate needs and customs,” Stevens predicted, “courts will often settle on a relaxed standard.”\(^{364}\) If a tailor decided to adopt a one-size-fits-all policy, it would have to make suits big enough to accommodate its largest customers. Stevens specifically warned gun rights proponents to temper their celebrations, for when forced by the *McDonald* decision to settle on a single standard for analyzing gun rights claims, lower courts would face tremendous pressure to adopt a very deferential standard in order to avoid trampling excessively on “the diverse interests of the States and their long history of regulating in this sensitive area.”\(^{365}\)

The lower court decisions implementing *Heller* and *McDonald* seem to bear out these prophecies. Judges know that they cannot tailor different degrees of scrutiny for local laws versus state or national ones. They cannot say that the strength of the right to keep and bear arms is different in urban and rural settings. The lower courts therefore may be understandably reluctant to find violations of this constitutional right when doing so would mean stifling the ability of various governments to try new and different ways of dealing with gun issues. As Justice Louis Brandeis noted in his much-quoted ode to the benefits of letting states serve as laboratories testing new and different policies, “To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a


\(^{362}\) See supra notes 114–22 and accompanying text.

\(^{363}\) *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3095 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also O’Shea, supra note 361, at 217–20 (warning about the risk of constitutional “dilution” if the Second Amendment right must be incorporated and applied to state and local laws in a “jot-for-jot” manner).

\(^{364}\) *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3095.

\(^{365}\) Id. at 3095 n.13.
grave responsibility.” By adopting a deferential and restrained approach to gun rights claims, the lower courts properly respect the importance of that responsibility.

The lower courts’ deferential approach to firearm legislation has the additional virtue of synchronizing constitutional law and public opinion about these matters. Most Americans believe that they should have the right to own and use guns. About two-thirds of Americans agree with the Supreme Court’s decisions striking down handgun bans. At the same time, the vast majority of Americans believe that gun control laws should either be made stricter or kept just as they are now. For example, most Americans support a nationwide ban on assault weapons and high-capacity ammunition magazines. In short, by striking down only the most severe restrictions on guns like handgun bans and upholding other regulations and restrictions, courts have been achieving the results that most Americans want.

Finally, the lower courts’ approach to the right to keep and bear arms also has the simple virtue of being candid. Justice Breyer argued that no matter what results they reach about the right to keep and bear arms, courts should be honest about the weighing of interests that inevitably underlies their decisionmaking. His approach’s

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367 See Rostron, supra note 33, at 413 & n.163 (citing poll data).
369 See, e.g., ABT SRBI, Time Magazine/ABT SRBI—June 20–21, 2011 Survey (2011), http://www.srbi.com/TimePoll5380-Final%20Report-2011-06-22.pdf (finding that fifty-one percent want gun laws to be more strict, thirty-nine percent prefer no change, and only seven percent want gun laws to be less strict); CBS News, supra note 368 (finding that forty-six percent of respondents want gun laws to be more strict, thirty-eight percent prefer no change, and only thirteen percent want gun laws to be less strict); HART/McINTURFF, Study No. 11023: NBC News/Wall Street Journal Survey 19 (2011), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/A_Politics/Politics_Today_Images/Teasers/11023%20Jan%20NBC-WSJ%20Filled%20in%20beta.pdf (finding that fifty-two percent of respondents want gun laws to be more strict, thirty-seven percent prefer no change, and only ten percent want gun laws to be less strict).
370 See, e.g., ABT SRBI, supra note 369 (finding that sixty-two percent of respondents support a ban on sale of semiautomatic assault weapons); CBS News, supra note 368 (finding that sixty-three percent of respondents support a ban on sale of assault weapons and sixty-three percent support a ban on sale of high-capacity magazines).
371 See Rostron, supra note 33, at 412–13 & nn.161–62 (discussing courts’ tendency to gravitate toward the predominant view of the American public on controversial issues like gun control, affirmative action, and abortion).
“necessary transparency lays bare the judge’s reasoning for all to see and to criticize.”373 Justice Breyer found it much more difficult to discern the reasoning behind the Supreme Court majority’s conclusions.374 The lower courts have felt the same way, repeatedly expressing frustration about the Supreme Court’s failure to explain why, for example, it emphasized the crucial role of historical inquiry and yet presented a list of presumptively lawful regulatory measures supported by no such analysis.375 Determining the proper limits on the right to keep and bear arms requires courts to make a profusion of difficult choices with significant consequences for society, and judges should strive to be as straightforward as possible with themselves and the public about the factors that drive their decisionmaking.

**Conclusion**

Two major battles over the right to keep and bear arms have already produced important victories for gun rights, but the third battle is still underway. This third battle will ultimately determine the real impact of this entire constitutional conflict. The cases decided so far by the lower courts suggest that the result will be a right that is broad but not particularly deep. In other words, although the right now extends to nonmilitia activities like defending one’s home and family against criminal attackers, the courts apply the right in ways that result in the vast majority of gun laws surviving constitutional scrutiny and the invalidation of only the most extraordinarily severe restrictions. Near the end of his dissenting opinion in *Heller*, Justice Stevens warned that the District of Columbia’s laws struck down in that case might be “just the first of an unknown number of dominoes to be knocked off the table,”376 but the lower courts’ cautious and pragmatic approach to implementation of the *Heller* and *McDonald* decisions suggests that the practical impact of the Supreme Court’s reinvigoration of the right to keep and bear arms ultimately will be quite limited.

Of course, the lower courts may change directions and steer away from the course they appear to be charting. Alternatively, the Supreme Court may decide to take another gun case and address more clearly what sort of scrutiny or other analysis should be applied to

373 *Id.*

374 *Id.*

375 *See, e.g.*, United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047–49 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (describing the tension between the Supreme Court’s dictum in *Heller* about presumptively valid regulations and the detailed textual and historical analysis that the Supreme Court otherwise employed).

376 *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
laws challenged as violations of the right to keep and bear arms. Both *Heller* and *McDonald* were 5–4 decisions and could someday be overruled if a single vote shifts. But the better strategy for Justice Breyer and his allies on the Court is not to undertake a direct assault aimed at overturning *Heller* and *McDonald*. Instead, Breyer and his allies should accept those decisions, celebrate the importance of the right to keep and bear arms, and focus on ensuring that the right is implemented so as to give legislatures wide leeway to craft laws that reasonably seek to reduce risks of the misuse of firearms. As one federal judge recently put it, “Prudent, measured arms restrictions for public safety are not inconsistent with a strong and thriving Second Amendment.” If Justice Breyer can bring together a majority of the Supreme Court under that banner, he will have won a decisive victory in the third and ultimately most important phase of the legal fight over the right to keep and bear arms.

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377 Rostron, *supra* note 107, at 159, 167 (describing how U.S. Senators expressed concerns during the hearings on the Supreme Court nominations of Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan that the margin of victory for gun rights in *Heller* and *McDonald* was a single vote).

378 Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 799 (9th Cir.) (Gould, J., concurring in part and in the judgment), *reh’g en banc granted*, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011).