Home > Vol. 78 > Issue 78:6 > Incentives and the Supreme Court

Incentives and the Supreme Court

Mark Tushnet · September 2010
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1300 (2010)

Good-government reform proposals like those offered by Professors Craig Lerner and Nelson Lund generally confront several difficulties. Details matter, but most reform proposals are understandably sketchy. The details ordinarily would be fleshed out as the proposal works its way through the process of enactment, but this process is difficult to navigate. The politics of good-government reforms are messy because they are bound up with ordinary partisan politics, and they are obscure because it is hard to understand why politicians might be interested in (merely) good-government reforms. This brief Essay explores these difficulties as they arise in connection with some of the proposals put forth in the article by Professors Lerner and Lund.

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