Case No. 16-460 | D.C. Decision
A good candidate for future Legislation and Statutory Interpretation law school textbooks, Artis v. D.C. will force the Court to define the meaning of “tolled.” When Stephanie Artis filed her federal and state law claims in federal court, she hardly could have predicted this result. Ms. Artis filed various claims related to her termination as a Department of Health code inspector, including one federal discrimination claim under Title VII and numerous state law claims under the D.C. Whistleblower Act, D.C. False Claims Act, and for wrongful termination against public policy. Two and a half years after filing, the federal district court dismissed the Title VII claim and, as such, no longer had jurisdiction to decide the state law claims. By this time, the three-year statute of limitations on her state law claims had passed. Following the dismissal, Ms. Artis waited fifty-nine days to refile her state law claims in state court. Based on one reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), Ms. Artis was time-barred from refiling.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) provides that a “period of limitations for a supplemental jurisdiction claim shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” The question at issue is what “tolled” means under this statute. Two theories have emerged from the lower courts. First, the “suspension theory”—Ms. Artis’s theory—states that the state statute of limitations freezes on the day the federal suit is filed and unfreezes thirty days after the federal lawsuit is dismissed. Under this theory, Ms. Artis would have about two years to refile her lawsuit in state court, meaning she filed her suit well in time at fifty-nine days. Alternatively, the “grace-period theory” is much less forgiving, despite its name suggesting otherwise. Proponents of this theory read the statute as follows: if the state statute of limitations would have expired while the federal case was pending, a litigant has thirty days from the federal court’s dismissal to refile in state court. Under this theory, because Ms. Artis waited fifty-nine days to refile, it was too late.
The D.C. Court of Appeals embraced the grace-period theory in ruling that Ms. Artis’s state law claims were time-barred. Their opinion suggests that the court considered more than just the text, noting the policy argument that the grace-period theory is better for state and local governments. While the suspension theory can significantly extend the statute of limitations for state law claims, the grace-period theory would ensure that state and local governments would not have to spend crucial resources defending old claims. In arguing this theory, D.C. also notes that the definitions of “tolled” at the time Congress enacted the statute were “to bar, defeat, or annul.” Ms. Artis contests this definition, claiming the plain text is very clear, and that “toll” means “suspended,” meaning the statute of limitations would be suspended until the claim is dismissed. In Court, it might very well be the battle of the tolls.